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ABSTRACT
This thesis identifies a family of humanist presuppositions which, I argue,
pervade modern Western society and are partly responsible for our inability to
escape from a spiral of environmental destruction. For example, humanist
ethical theories frequently assume the existence of an objective / subjective
divide, autonomous rational individuals and a neutral rationality. I argue that
these assumptions, which are peculiar to our society, provide a wholly
inappropriate basis for the expression of many environmental concerns.
Humanism imposes particular taxonomies and interpretations on social and
environmental relations; these facilitate the treatment of nature as a resource
rather than as a part of our (ethical) community. At the theoretical level,
humanism develops explicit systems of ''formal rationaiity" which purport to be
neutral e.g. axiological systems like neoclassical economics and utilitarianism.
However, these systems reduce environmental evaluation to the bureaucratic
application of abstract methodologies and, far from being neutral, they impose a
particular humanist ideology on decision making processes which marginalises
those who speak in a different voice.
I develop an alternative perspective; a critical theory informed by the anti-
humanism of Althusser, the later Wittgenstein and Bourdieu. This post-humanist
theoretical problematic works in two ways. First, it explains how ideologies
interpellate individuals into social structures and reproduce current social
values. Second, it advocates an alternative "ecological paradigm", embedded
in anti-humanist and radical traditions which would give due regard to the
constitutive role of 'nature' in the formation of our moral values.
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A Klee painting named "Angelus Navalis" shows an angel looking
as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings
are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face
is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events,
he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage
upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would
like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been
smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught
in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close
them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which
his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows
skyward. This storm is what we call progress.
Walter Benjamin "Theses on the Philosophy of
History" 1
, Walter Benjamin I/uminations pp. 259-260.
1INTRODUCTION
It should not be necessary to begin an essay in environmental ethics with the
by now familiar litany of ecological disasters. I assume that we are all well
aware of the earth's current predicament and its human causes.' Suffice it to
say that the tempest of progress has now blown us "far from paradise".
Benjamin's dystopian imagery finds increasingly frequent echoes in the
writings of many environmentalists angered and sickened by the scale of our
destructive actlvitles.'
The current obscene scale of damage inflicted upon our natural environment
is a product of our society, of modern Western social structures and
ideologies. This thesis attempts to characterise, deconstruct and offer
alternatives to the dominant ideology which legitimises this carnage, that
which I refer to as "humanism". Following Ehrenfeld and many other
environmentalists, I hold that humanist assumptions and presuppositions
(characterised in detail in chapter one) are deeply implicated in our
destructive and shortsighted policies towards the non-human world.'
The argument of this thesis is that the survival of remaining wilderness areas,
however small, is a matter for mora/concern. Their preservation will not be
, The Worldwatch Institute provides a concise summary of our current environment in their
annual State of the World Atlas.
2 Far From Paradise is the title of John Seymour's and Herbert Girardet's chronicle of
environmental devastation. See also Kirkpatrick Sale's timely counter-blast to the celebration
of the SOOthanniversary of the 'discovery' of the Americas, The Conquest of Paradise. The
golden age is a recurrent theme amongst environmentalists which, although romantically
appealing, does have its own dangers in idealising a past of which we know so little. (See
chapter 8.)
3 David Ehrenfeld The Arrogance of Humanism.
2urged in the usual terms of human utility. For example, rainforests are often
referred to as gene banks, potential resources for sustainable development,
oxygen factories and so on. Though in some sense they may be all of these
things, to justify their preservation by reference to these roles is to accept the
language and rationale of their exploitation. These are expressions of
human-centred attitudes towards nature and concrete examples of the
imposition of managerial and financial constraints upon nature. Just as in
our present bureaucratic/consumer society all has to be managerially
approved and financially profitable, wilderness too, it is often argued, needs
to justify its continued existence on the same grounds. Though the defence
of wild places by such means may sometimes be successful as a short term
expedient, to justify their preservation only, or even primarily, in these terms
is tacitly to accept the status quo and the ultimate hegemony of human
self-i nterest.
Systems of institutionalised rights are frequently touted as alternatives to an
unrestricted instrumental rationality. They supposedly introduce ethical
constraints into political and economic structures. However they fail to
challenge humanistic presuppositions at their deepest levels. Often they
simply reiterate anthropocentric assumptions and reinforce the bureaucratic
institutions of modern society. Even where such rights are biocentrically
disposed, e.g. towards animal or environmental rights, their a-contextual
abstraction makes them ill suited to deal with the immense complexities of
human / environmental interactions. What is more, I shall argue that these
systems of explicit rules and regulations rely upon a very narrow conception
of ethical values, they (erroneously) claim to represent real values but
provide no insight into how ethical values might be produced and how such
3values actually function in societies.
Whilst this essay argues that, in our current situation, it makes sense to
speak of the ethical value of natural objects, as opposed to their instrumental
value, it does not attempt to justify a specific normative stance on the moral
value of the environment. Its refusal to produce a philosophical justification
of particular values is not motivated by a wish to remain 'objective' or by any
lack of concern over these issues. Quite the contrary. Rather, it represents
an opposition to a form of humanist philosophical practice which, I shall
argue, is too restrictive. Instead, this thesis attempts to understand how
humanity might, in different times and places, have come to hold such a
bewildering variety of values where relations with our encompassing
environment are concerned.
It would therefore be a mistake to read this essay as supporting a radical and
absolute dichotomy between two essentially different kinds of value; ethical
and instrumental. Rather, I argue that all values are products of our social
and environmental relations and that the particular historical development of
our own Western society (Gesel/schaff) has produced this humanist
dichotomy; has divorced the instrumental from the ethical, increasingly
privileging the former and fragmenting the latter. My re-privileging of the
ethical is a manoeuvre intended to show the inadequacies of
instrumentalism and the society which produced and relies so heavily upon
it. The ultimate aim of the essay is to give a theoretical account of the
production of environmental values which avoids, so far as is possible,
reliance upon those humanist dichotomies and presuppositions which are
entwined with society's headlong ecocidal dash toward oblivion. The
4hegemony of humanism makes this task extraordinarily difficult but
nonetheless necessary.
If humanism is at the heart of our environmental crisis, then this has serious
implications for those ethical theories which attempt to define solutions to this
crisis within philosophical frameworks which are themselves humanist. Thus
we need to examine the very foundations of our ethical theories. As Alasdair
Macintyre has noted;
"[t]he ability to respond adequately to this kind of cultural need
depends of course on whether those summoned posses intellectual
and moral resources that transcend the immediate crisis, which
enable them to say to the culture what culture cannot say to itself. For
if the crisis is so pervasive that it has invaded every aspect of our
intellectual and moral lives, then what we take to be resources for the
treatment of our condition may turn out themselves to be infected
. areas." 4
For example, humanism in ethical theory recognises only those
philosophical solutions which either reduce all values to the purely
subjective (e.g. emotivism) or posit the existence of timeless universal
objective values in nature (including human nature). That is, values are
either matters of personal choice or alternatively concrete laws of nature to
be unearthed by philosophy and expressed in rational arguments. Both of
these conceptions blindly accept reason as a neutral tool, the former for
ordinating individual values in the production of social policy, the latter as a
tool for investigating 'reality'. These are referred to by Horkheimer as
a Alasdair Macintyre 'A Crisis in Moral Philosophy: Why is the Search for the Foundations of
Ethics So Frustrating?' pp. 3-4.
5"subjective" and "objective" rationality respectively." Horkheimer sees the
development of Western society from the Enlightenment onwards as
characterised by a progressive undercutting of objective rationality by its own
internal logic. This allegedly leaves subjective rationality as the principal
logic of modernity.
"The philosophers of the Enlightenment attacked religion in the name
of reason; in the end what they killed was not the church but
metaphysics and the objective concept of reason itself, the source of
power of their own efforts ... 'Reason has liquidated itself as an agency
of ethical, moral, and religious insight." 6
An examination of the current literature in environmental ethics belies
Horkheimer's premature dismissal of objective rationality. As we shall see
(in chapter one) many theories do try to provide objective rationales, often
incorporating a blatantly metaphysical objectivism, in support of particular
environmental values. The existence of these theories, unsatisfactory as
they are, can be regarded as testimony to the inadequacies of subjective
rationality, its inability to capture the impersonal (or communal) depth of
ethical values.
Today, subjective, or instrumental rationality and its attendant conception of
the morally autonomous individual reign supreme. But, I claim, the solution
to the environmental crisis does not lie in a return to earlier conceptions of
& Max Horkheimer Eclipse of Reason. Horkheimer utilises a distinction between types of
rationality initially developed by Weber to account for the appearance of "subjective rationality"
(which is approximately equivalent to Weber's 'formal rationality") as a pervasive feature of
modern Western society. (See chapter 1.)
6 ibid. pp. 17-18 .
6objective values. Thus I will not refer to aspects of the environment as
possessing "intrinsic values" or being of "inherent worth" because these
terms might be taken to imply a particular ontological stance on the nature of
values and a particular epistemological stance on the nature of reason. For
example, Janna Thompson argues that "At a minimum....those who find
intrinsic value in nature are claiming ...that things and states are of value for
what they are in themselves and not because of their relations to us..." 7 If
this is an accurate portrayal of intrinsic value then it is not a position that I
adhere to. Not only would such a reversion to older conceptions of
independent objective values carry little weight in a society generally
skeptical of metaphysical entities, but it remains part of the humanist
problematic in accepting a radical objective / subjective divide.
The humanist categories "objective" and "subjective" are creations of the
social structure and forms of life prevailing in Western society. They are not
transcendental categories applicable to all times and places but expressions
of a particular cultural milieu. Society's inability to think beyond apparently
exclusive categories such as these represents a limit on the theoretical
options open to us, and forces us to recapitulate in only slightly differing
forms a stale dialogue without hope of reconciliation. Environmental ethics
in its humanist forms, whether utilitarian, deontological etc., simply replays
with novel environmental exemplars an old debate about the subjectivity or
objectivity of values. The current acceptance of this dichotomy reflects the
existence of a whole range of inter-linked humanist presuppositions which
ramify throughout our society.
7 Janna Thompson CA Refutation of Environmental Ethics' p. 148. [My emphasis.]
7My opposition to humanism extends to all those attempts to crudely quantify
moral values and develop abstract methods of comparison which ignore the
actual context and complexity of moral judgments. The creation of monolithic
philosophical systems justifying or ordering values (Le. axiologies) is, I shall
argue, a profoundly mistaken enterprise: an enterprise which is a feature
specific to the cultural, historical and environmental background of the
modern Western social formation. Western society, including Western
philosophy, has spread its influence world wide through commerce,
colonialism and war but remains riddled with a set of destructive humanist
ideological assumptions. Contemporary humanism, especially in its
subjective form, attempts to impose a global moral and political consensus
based largely upon an explicit brand of methodological individualism and
Hobbesian self-interest originally peculiar to European culture. This is
particularly true of the prevailing neoclassical economic conception of
human nature. (See chapter 2.) However, the instrumental subjective
rationality entailed by such a conception of society is itself a historical
phenomenon which must be understood in its cultural context before it can
be effectively opposed.
Given these criticisms, what is required of Western environmental philosophy
is nothing less than the deconstruction of its own traditions and history, a
critique of most, if not all, of its humanist presuppositions. To engage in this
deconstruction philosophy needs to be conjoined with components of anti-
humanist histories, sociologies and geographies of modern society. It needs
to excavate alternatives to humanism from those traditions which have
sought to oppose it. The anti-humanisms of social theory can be seen as
one such critical attempt to recontextualise Western conceptions of the
8individual and provide alternatives to the attendant conceptions of objective
and subjective ratlonallties." However, I shall not simply advocate a form of
philosophical anti-humanism as an easy solution to environmental problems.
Lest I should be misunderstood, I hope that it is obvious from what follows
that I am by no means blind to humanism's many merits. For example, this
thesis does not underestimate the importance of the individual subject, but
rejects certain claims about its absolute nature and foundational importance.
It rejects technological fixes and science's claims to provide 'factual'
knowledge but it is not anti-science. It rejects a 'neutral' rationality but it does
not condone irrationality. Although anti-humanism is a necessary corrective I
believe that environmentalism will best be served by those philosophies
which attempt to go beyond naive conceptions of the humanism / anti-
humanism debate and all such rigid dichotomies. We need to produce a
post-humanism. (See chapter 9.)
This thesis is not intended as a comprehensive account of either anti-
humanist perspectives or of theories of environmental ethics. Thus important
anti-humanists like Derrida, Heidegger and Deleuze appear infrequently and
even Foucault gets less mention than he miqht." Many environmental
ethicists are mentioned only in order to place them in the tentative taxonomy
of environmental ethics developed in chapter 2. This thesis attempts to
deconstruct and reorientate the whole field of applied ethics as it is currently
practised. Environmental philosophy has to be more than the application of
moral metrics to our concerns about 'nature'. It has to be more than the
simple extension into another realm of age old and tedious debates about
8 "Anti-humanism" is used here as a technical term and is not meant to have misanthropic
overtones. (See chapter 3.)
g For example, see Martin Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism' pp. 189-243.
9the relative merits of utilitarianism and deontological theories, of objectivism
and subjectivism etc. Instead, it must try to understand the production and
reproduction of moral values. It must look below the surface of moral
argumentation and question the nature of the relations between moral
theory and social practices. It has to ask how and why moral values change
and how they come to be inscribed at the heart of the concrete individuals
who compose societies.
If humanism, generally speaking, employs an objective / subjective divide
and a neutral concept of rationality, it becomes imperative that any anti-
humanism must both investigate and provide alternatives to the humanist
conceptions of the "subject" and humanist epistemology. This thesis
endeavours to fulfil these aims by adapting an Althusserian account of
ideology: ideology as the genetic structures within which reason is
embedded (the structures which delimit what counts as rational), and
ideology as the structures within which the individual subject comes to take
on her particular forms and to recognise herself. "Ideology" as a concept
might therefore be seen as the theoretical seed from which other aspects of
this essay germinate. For this reason a great deal of space is given over to
an account of the implications of various interpretations of ideology and to its
relations to other aspects of the anti-humanist theoretical problematiC
presented here.
The critique of the production and reproduction of ethical values developed
here has no pretensions about possessing absolute or timeless status but
only claims to provide a timely and reflexive alternative to work within the
humanist tradition. It criticises the ideological underpinnings of humanism
10
and develops alternative conceptions of "values" and "reason"; an ethics and
an epistemology intended to inform and strengthen a radical politics in
opposition to the destructive status quo. The emphasis placed upon
epistemology in a thesis primarily concerned with values might be found
surprising. However, the distinction between epistemology and ethics is, to
some extent, itself a feature of a humanistic distinction between facts and
values. Focusing upon "social practices" as the fields within which and
through which we construct our lives enables one to speak of the production
and reproduction of knowledge and values in the same breath."
This thesis originates in the dialectic between traditions within modernity - in
particular between humanism and anti-humanism. Solutions to our
predicament have to come, to a large degree, from our current social and
environmental world views via reflexive critique and practical experience.
Thus, although in one sense I argue that we need a radical paradigmatic
shift, away from an ecologically destructive humanist framework bereft of
solutions, we are not at liberty to Simply reject our intellectual inheritance out
of hand." We need an "epistemological break" with the past, but this break
can never be clean." As Herbert Marcuse puts it, "...the position of theory
cannot be one of mere speculation. It must be a historical position in the
16 "Epistemology", the ''theory of knowledge", is a very recent invention indeed. The
term was only coined by Eduard Zeller in 1862 in his 'On the Significance and Problem of the
Theory of Knowledge', See Ernst Cassirer The Problem of Knowledge p, 4,
11 The need for such a theoretical shift has been recognised by Riley E. Dunlap in his
paper 'Paradigmatic change in Social Science: From Human Exemptions to an Ecological
Paradigm', For a more guarded appraisal of this change see Frederick H, Butte I
'Environmental Sociology: A New Paradigm?' One recent attempt to incorporate
environmental matters into the heart of a theoretical paradigm can be found in Niklas
Luhmann's 'Ecological Communities',
12 See chapters 3 and 4 for the meaning of the term "epistemological break",
11
sense that it must be grounded on the capabilities of the given society." 13
Although we should not underestimate the potential benefits from a
constructive discourse with other traditions (for example, the traditions of
primary peoples, or Eastern religions), there are a number of reasons for our
being tied to our past.
First, we simply have no choice in the matter. The threads of the humanist
dialectic are part and parcel of our world-views: they are, because of the
cultural history of our society, an intimate and ineradicable component of the
very way we think. They are part of the ideological background of our society
and delimit to a large extent the horizons even of critical thought. Humanism,
to a large extent, defines our conceptual and perceptual home. Any attempt
to break its shackles on our thoughts also destroys ties to our past, a past
which has intimately shaped our very being. Thus any break from humanism
will entail both "a shudder at being uprooted and a sigh of relief at
escaping." 14
Second, these limitations have corresponding political implications for those
wanting to bring about social change. To be successful, such change needs
to appeal to a broad spectrum of people and can only do so by utilising, at
least to a degree, the frameworks of thought within which they are
accustomed to think.
13Herbert Marcuse One-Dimensional Man :Studies in the Ideology of Advanced
Industrial Societyp. xlvii.
14Jurgen Habermas The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity p.108. This thesis can, on
one level, be interpreted as a continuation of the traditions of "critical theorists" like Benjamin,
Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas, although it makes no claims to be a 'Marxism'.
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Third, uncritical attempts to regress to pre-humanist states, e.g. by simply
rejecting rationality or science en masse as indelibly tainted by Western
society's cultural and environmental carnage, might easily encourage eco-
fascism, a return to the "blood and soil" rhetoric of Nazi Germany. As
Horkheimer states;
"...we are the heirs, for better or for worse, of the Enlightenment and
technological progress. To oppose these by regressing to more
primitive stages does not alleviate the permanent crisis they have
brought about. On the contrary, such experiments lead from
historically reasonable to utterly barbaric forms of social domination.
The sole way of assisting nature is to unshackle its seeming opposite,
independent thouqht.""
15 Horkheimer op.cit., n. 5 above, p. 127. The role played by ideology of nature in Nazi
thought is exposed in Robert A. Pois National Socialism and the Religion of Nature.
13
"Today we have the capacity to turn the world into hell, and we are
well on the way to doing so." 1
CHAPTER ONE: HUMANISM
David Ehrenfeld has described humanism as "the dominant religion of our
time"," by which he means that we have, both consciously and
unconsciously, replaced faith in one omnipotent deity with faith in our own
species, its abilities, and its destiny. Ehrenfeld argues cogently that this
religion of humanism is responsible for our despoiling nature, for the mass
extinction of species and the destruction of the ecosystems upon which we
ultimately depend. Given our current environmental problems certain sorts
of solution present themselves as 'obvious' answers to humanists. These
might, for example, include the use of genetic techniques or fertilisers to
increase food production. But Ehrenfeld claims these obvious answers do
not so much provide solutions to our current environmental predicament as
constitute a part of the problem itself. Expensive genetic techniques have
become necessary because we have planted huge monocultures lacking
the natural diversity which might provide immunity to pest epidemics.
Agribusiness requires fertilisers due to the artificial economic structures
imposed on farming practices, and these fertilisers produce side effects
which pollute rivers and water supplies, causing the eutrophication of lakes
and encouraging poisonous algal blooms. Despite these setbacks, within
, Herbert Marcuse Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Utopia p. 62.
2 David Ehrenfeld The Arrogance of Humanism p. 3.
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the humanist paradigm the obvious answer is always to search for yet
another technical fix rather than address the root cause of the problem.
We seem incapable of learning from experience that our theoretical
understanding of complex natural systems lags far behind our technical
capabilities for intervening in these systems. In our search for continual
material progress we attempt to manage nature for our own ends, using
woefully inadequate conceptual schemes. These schemes inevitably have
unforeseen consequences which we then try to solve by further recourse to
technology or management, thus entering an unremitting and destructive
spiral. Ehrenfeld's analysis highlights three major aspects of humanism, its
separation of humanity from nature, its reliance upon, and optimism in,
scientific and managerial solutions to the problems that confront us, and its
linear and teleological conceptions of historical and societal 'progress'. We
can, however, expand this description of humanism into a more detailed, but
still schematic, list of features some of which are only implicit (or even
absent) in Ehrenfeld's own characterisation.
1). The separation of the human from the natural which usually implies:
a. Anthropocentism - the privileging of the human over the natural.
b. The treatment of nature as an 'object', an externality.
c. The recognition of an absolute divide between the objective world and
the subjective self.
d. A belief in an essential human nature distinguishing us from other
species.
2). A "representational" epistemology, Le. thought as the "mirror of nature","
This arises from the positing of two separate realms, that of the material
3A phrase used by Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
15
world and that of consciousness, (mind / body).
3). This is often associated (as in Descartes) with a thesis about the
transparency of thoughts to the thinker, i.e. thoughts (language and theory)
operate only at the level of their consciously apprehended semantics.'
4). An atomistic conception of the human individual as transcendent 'subject'
Le. essentially the same in all periods and societies.
5). A linear and frequently teleological conception of historical and
epistemological 'progress'.
6). Scientistic and managerial optimism; e.g. a reliance upon technological
fixes; faith in the scientific method.
7). The privileging of rationality as a neutral instrument
8). The separation of reason / emotion, fact / value.
9). The development of "formal rationality", Le. the increasing dominance of
explicit abstract systems of rules, laws and calculation within the social
sphere.
10). The production of "Grand Theories" which do not respect context (in the
case of ethics, axiological theories of normative values).
11). This frequently leads to reductive theoretical systems, e.g. "economism".
12). Ethnocentrism (European centred).
13). Androcentrism (Male centred)."
a This apparent transparency is believed to give theory its power to overcome the
mystification engendered by a-theoretical superstition.
S This list of features overlaps with other characterisations of our dominant worldview both
by environmental philosophers and social theorists. (See chapter 2 of this essay.) For
examples of the former see Bill Deval and George Sessions 'The Dominant Worldview and its
Critics', chapter 3 of Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered and Murray Bookchin The
Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism, especially chapter 2. For an
example of the latter see Kate Soper Humanism and Anti-Humanism passim.
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I shall not analyse each of these features in depth here as some of their
interrelations in various problematics form the structure of the following
thesis. To chart their complex interrelations would, in any case, require a
detailed historical genealogy of specific fields of society, for their relationship
defies easy summary. However, I claim that these features run very deeply
and often subliminally through the theory and practice of Western societies.
They are examples of humanist taxonomies, ways of dividing up the world
which both facilitate and constrain the possibilities of thought and
understanding. They are unquestionably accepted as the given basis from
which debate is to begin and are present in the form and use of our
language. In some cases they are explicit, in others only implicit, but none
the less influential.
No doubt other aspects could be added to this characterisation of humanism
and some of those characteristics listed may be regarded as more central
than others. However, I do not claim that any given viewpoint can be defined
as humanist simply because it exhibits one or more of these features, or that
to be humanist one needs to exhibit all of these features. The features are
not essential qualities which humanist ideologies necessarily possess.
Rather "humanism", as I shall use the term, comprises the normative
background which dominates modern society. It is within this background
that the majority of everyday practices are conducted and theories
formulated. In different spheres of society and at different times humanism
has taken a number of forms, but these forms are related to each other by
structures of similarities and differences forming, in Wittgenstein's
terminology, a "family" of inter-linked concepts and emphases. That is,
"...these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the
17
same word for all, - but that they are related to one another in many different
ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we
call them all by the same term", in this case humanist.' One cannot simply
draw lines which will classify, for example, the works of a particular writer or
the practices of a particular social group, as humanist or anti-humanist,
without specifying the particular context(s) in respect of which one makes
that claim.
Nor do I claim that there is any necessary entailment between certain
humanist traits and the destruction of nature. For example, taken by itself,
belief in a universal human nature does not necessitate that we must see
other species as unimportant. However, many of the worst forms of
environmental damage are justified, or simply taken as obviously right
because of the theoretical currency and ideological effects of these
taxonomic structures. Just how these structures are formed and operate in
relation to modernity is the major concern of this thesis. We must recognise
that such features have developed in, and been inextricably linked to, the
dominant and consuming practices of Western society. They are then, not
the original causes of environmental destruction, but are nevertheless part
and parcel of that destruction.
Roughly speaking, those theoretical stances which exhibit and positively
privilege certain of the aspects listed above can, in that context, be termed
humanist and those which criticise such positions can be termed anti-
humanist. Having said this, many of these traits do cohere, reoccurring
together in only subtly altered forms in different disciplines. It is also
• Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations §67 1985
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possible to trace these themes and their evolution through the history of
Western society.
This thesis will focus on the tripartite relationship between theory, ideology
and the environmentally and socially situated individual. As such it
emphasises certain of these humanist traits at the expense of others. Most
importantly it will question the way that humanist philosophers envisage
environmental ethics and philosophy generally. Environmental philosophy
cannot remain a side-show, the freak of the philosophical circus, whilst logic
and epistemology hog the big top. If properly practised, it will do more than
simply apply current philosophical principles, it will alter the very structure of
philosophy undermining its very foundations and rearranging the hierarchy
and divisions within philosophy. It will also bring into question the divisions
between philosophy and other disciplines now separated by institutionalised
barriers.
I want to try to unthink the obviousness of humanist dichotomies and traits
above. This work of paradigmatic change cannot be approached by
introducing a simple 'logical' argument which will lead us by the nose to
inescapable conclusions. Instead it requires us to change the structure of
our thought. It needs to provide an alternative "problematic", (a theoretically
informed world-view or research programme) within which we can come to
think and act. As Wittgenstein said, "When we first begin to believe
anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of
propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)" 7 Paradigmatic
change involves thinking the current limits of our thought: seeing how the
7 Ludwig WiHgenstein On Certainty §141 .
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categories and structure of thought, our theoretical problematic, constrains
as well as facilitates our actions and values. We need a paradigm that can
accept and speak of the environmental (and human) values which are
currently too easily excluded, which are, in many cases, literally unthinkable.
To engage with these three inter-linking themes (theory, ideology and the
situated individual subject), it is necessary to go into the theoretical relations
which have been thought to pertain between them in some depth. Chapter 3
sets out Althusser's anti-humanist theory which places these three
components together. The chapters which follow expand upon and redraw
this problematic to provide a more sophisticated, but still preliminary,
account. The remainder of this chapter and the whole of the next will try and
provide an adequate setting for the debate between humanists and anti-
humanists.
Humanism and the Environment
The links between humanism and our relations to the natural environment
are well expressed by Kate Soper, who states:-
"... a profound confidence in our powers to come to know and thereby
to control our environment and destiny lies at the heart of every
humanism. In this sense, we must acknowledge a continuity of theme,
however warped it may have become with the passage of time,
between the Renaissance celebration of the freedom of humanity from
any transcendental hierarchy or cosmic order, the Enlightenment faith
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in reason and its powers, and the social engineering advocated by
contemporary scientific humanists." 8
The continuity and coherence of humanism as an ideology is partly
explained by the long and common history which this family of humanist
traits has shared. As John Passmore has pointed out, the roots of certain
humanist distinctions go deep into the Graeco-Christian heritage of
European society.
"... the Stoic-Christian tradition has insisted on the absolute
uniqueness of man, [sic] a uniqueness particularly manifest,
according to Christianity, in the fact that he alone, in Karl Barth's
words has been addressed by God ... but also ... apparent in his
capacity for rational communication." 9
This history is reflected in the use of the term "humanism" to refer to the
revival of classical Roman and Greek Scholarship which preceded and
developed with the Renaissance. It is no accident that the rise of humanism
is associated with the recovery of ancient classics; that these products of
past city states were able to inform the inhabitants of late mediaeval cities.
Humanistic assumptions were common amongst the works of the
rediscovered ancients with their emphasis on humanity's special nature and
dignity, on humanity as the measure and measurer of all things. In both
cases the humanistic assumption of a qualitative distinction between the
human and the natural sphere came easily to those whose contact with
nature was limited to the confines of the city and who saw in their own
creations something apart from the inhuman otherness of nature.
8Soper op. cit., n. 5 above, p. 14-15.
g John Passmore 'Attitudes to Nature'.
21
Ehrenfeld places too many restrictions on his use of the term "humanism" in
order to give credence to his religious analogy. By stating that humanism, as
he uses the term, makes no reference to the study of the humanities nor to
the study of the classic texts of the ancient world he inadvertently confines
the scope of his analysis. These alternative associations are part and parcel
of the humanist paradigm. The insights of the classical scholars acted as an
intellectual catalyst for Italian scholars, and consequently our own present
world views. In Charles Singer's slightly overstated terms "[w]ith that
[humanist] reconstruction Greece lived again, the modern world was
ushered in, and modern science, arts, literature and philosophy were born.'?"
By excluding examination of the genetic links between these uses he
obscures from view the specifically European historical and cultural context
in which this now global humanist ideology originated.
The Humanist thinkers of the Renaissance included such figures as Alberto
Mussato, Geri d' Arrezzo and Petrarch. Most of the scholars associated with
humanism were not atheistic, as one current use of the term "humanism"
might suggest, but frequently married an intense religiosity with more
anthropocentric intellectual concerns." However, they all placed humanity
in a pivotal position. As the historian A. G. Dickens writes, "..the thinkers of
the humanist mainstream saw man [sic] as a comprehensible being standing
midway between God and the lower orders of nature." 12 Humanism
10 Charles Singer A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900p. 192.
11 Thus A. G. Dickens states that "By any standards Petrarch must be called a Christian."
The Age of Humanism and Reformationp. 11. H. J. Blackham equates humanism with the
denial of supernatural authority Humanism.
12 Dickens ibid., p. 5.
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developed as a philosophical and literary ethos in late fourteenth and early
fifteenth century Italy. Over the following decades and centuries the ideas of
the Italian humanists spread outwards to form the basis of a genuinely
European culture:" a culture which, though adapting and developing in
response to particular locales and traditions on its journey, began to express
that family of interlinked assumptions and presuppositions which still
.dominate our Western outlook today.
Humanist ideology now permeates our culture - it exerts a hegemonic
influence in all spheres of life. Those of us concerned for the non-human
world, and for those humans (primarily the poor) who suffer most from
environmental degradation, may wish to extirpate, or at least alleviate, its
baleful influences. But it is necessary to avoid naive generalisations about
humanism. First, we must avoid any tendency to reify 'humanism' as an
essential object of study. Whilst retaining the term as a useful shorthand, we
must always relate those aspects which we have identified as humanist to
their social, historical and theoretical context.
Second, it must be obvious that not all of humanism's presuppositions have
had uniformly evil results. For example, systems of ethics based upon
humanist presuppositions, like utilitarianism, originally promoted the
expansion of civil liberties. The rise of the natural sciences, which forms
such an important facet of humanism's ascendancy, has produced many
benefits in terms of life expectancy, health etc. Of course these benefits have
also entailed costs in other areas, but my aim in criticising humanism as an
ideology is not to decry its achievements en masse. My argument is rather
13 For a detailed account of the spread of Italian humanism into BrHainsee R. Weiss
Humanism in England During the Fifteenth Century.
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that the tenets of humanism are part and parcel of an anthropocentric ethos
which is largely unsuitable for tackling our current environments/crisis.
Third, humanism is not, as I use the term, equivalent to "modernity".
Although humanism provides the dominant ideological framework for
modern Western society it has been constantly opposed by a number of
equally modern traditions of thought and political action. Here one might
note the very selective way in which ancient Greek texts were used to bolster
the new humanist faith in progress. The tension which Walter Benjamin
identified between technological/managerial 'progress' and moral decline
also existed in the writings of the ancients.
"...the view that technological advance had been accompanied by
moral failure or moral regress was at least as widely held in antiquity
as it is at present... Some went further and posited a direct causal
relation between the two: for them technological advance had actually
induced moral decay, and was thus not a blessing but a curse - a line
of thought which issued logically in an extreme form of primitivism." 14
These tensions between humanist and anti-humanist features have been an
integral part of the outlook of European thought and occur over and over
again in different forms; in the Romantics' rebellion against the
Enlightenment conception of reason, in the pessimism of Western Marxism
faced with a triumphant capitalism, and in the current rejection of economic
rationality by radical greens. In this sense the dialectic between humanist
assumptions and anti-humanism is a feature of "modernity", its institutions
and its world-views.




Ehrenfeld is certainly not alone in seeing humanism, or at least some
aspects of it, as implicated in environmental destruction, but other writers
have chosen to emphasise different components of that complex family of
interlinking presuppositions offered above. I shall outline a few examples
which explicitly link the humanist assumptions listed above with the
exploitation of 'nature', and then set out the accounts of this relationship
provided by Max Weber and the Frankfurt School. As we shall see, the
emphasis placed upon these various humanist presuppositions differs from
analysis to analysis and few would include all of the features I have listed.
For example, whereas Ehrenfeld has little to say about the individual subject
this is the focus of Gary Snyder's critique.
"American society (like any other) has its own set of unquestioned
assumptions. It still maintains a largely artificial faith in the notion of
continually unfolding progress. It cleaves to the idea that there can be
unblemished scientific objectivity. And most fundamentally it operates
under the delusion that we are a kind of "solitary knower" - that we
exist as rootless intelligences without layers of localised contexts.
Just a 'self' and the 'world'." 15
Snyder argues that the development of the now commonplace egocentric
conception of the human subject, the subject as unitary and wholly
autonomous producer of thoughts and values, is far from being a universal
norm. This subject is the product of a specific history and society which
IS Gary Snyder The Practice of the Wild p. 60. This atomistic humanist subject is criticised
in chapter 7.
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originated in Europe and drew upon Greek and Christian roots. Snyder, like
John Passmore and Lynn White Jnr. before him, sees this privileging of the
subject over the metaphysically separated object, the external world, as
profoundly influential in the devaluation of nature. The subject I object
dichotomy, it is argued, goes hand in hand with the culture I nature division
and in both cases it is the former aspect which assumes the privileged
mantle as the locus of all values."
Whilst humanism may have had its origins in antiquity and been reborn in
the Renaissance, its philosophical apotheosis occurred in the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries, in the work of Descartes and the later
Enlightenment thinkers. Descartes explicitly states that the aim of his
philosophy is to enable us to "...make ourselves masters and possessors of
nature." 17 In Cartesian dualism a rigid subject / object dichotomy goes
hand in hand with a culture / nature division which privileges the human at
the cost of making nature both separable and exploitable. Indeed David
Pepper goes so far as to say that the blame for the separation of humanity
from nature lies squarely upon Descartes' shoulders.
"Cartesian dualism involved mind and matter, subject and object, and
it had a profound implication for the man-nature relationship because
nature became composed of objects metaphysically separated from
man... It was this dualism, rather than any specifically Christian
doctrine, which paved the way for a man-nature separation in which
16 Lynn White Jnr. 'The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis' pp.1203-1207. John
Passmore Man's Responsibility for Nature passim.
17 Rene Descartes Discourse on Method quoted in James Collins Descartes' Philosophy
of Naturep. 31.
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the former was conceived of as superior to the latter." 18
The "solitary knower" is also regarded as a central feature of modern
destructive society by those influenced by post-modern philosophy, although
here Descartes is seen as representative of a broader 'modernist'
epistemology rather than of humanism. Thus Jim Cheney speaks scathingly
of "[t]he modernist period in philosophy with its creation of absolute
subjectivity ..." 19
For Enlightenment thinkers working against the background of Cartesian
philosophy, whether they be Kant, Locke, Rousseau, or Hobbes, reason was
a feature common to all human minds, a distinguishing faculty of the human
species which, when exercised properly, could command universal
agreement on substantive matters.
"..the emphasis on reason declares that man's acts are those of a
thinking subject guided by conceptual knowledge. With concepts as
his instruments, the thinking subject can penetrate the contingencies
and recondite devices of the world and reach universal and
necessary laws that govern and order .." 20
Given certain conditions, reason would ensure that we all came to the same,
18 David Pepper The Roots of Modern Environmentalismpp. 51-52.
19 Jim Cheney 'Postmodern Environmental Ethics: Ethics as Bioregional Narrative'.
Cheney, contra Pepper, argues that Cartesian philosophy was 'a long time in the making' and
is as much a symptom as a cause of modernism. Insofar as Cheney's target is 'modernism'
rather than humanism his focus is too broad and misses some of the complexities and
contradictions present between modern ideologies. (See chapter 8.)
20 Herbert Marcuse Reason and Revolution p. 254.
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true, conclusions." The faith placed in reason by Enlightenment thinkers
was explicitly linked to other aspects of the humanist paradigm. For example
Kant could say:-
"As the single being upon earth that possesses understanding, and,
consequently, a capacity for setting before himself ends of his
deliberate choice he [man] is certainly titular lord of nature, and,
supposing we regard nature as a teleological system, he is born to be
its ultimate end." 22
Here Kant explicitly supports a division of humanity from nature and, whilst
privileging the former, expresses a teleological and anthropocentric
conception of history and endows the human subject with a faculty of reason
which enables him to make autonomous choices.
Robin Attfield chooses to emphasise yet another of the features listed above,
namely, the belief in linear progress found in many Enlightenment thinkers
and its subsequent permutations in later systems of thought.
"...the attitude in large measure responsible for environmental
degradation in East and West has been the belief in perennial
material progress inherited from the Enlightenment and the German
metaphysicians, as modified in the West by the classical economists
and sociologists, by liberal individualism and by Social Darwinism
and in Eastern Europe by the unquestioned deference accounted to
21These conditions might require, for example, that the people making such judgments
were not rationally impaired. A weaker concept of neutral reason might allow that two parties
might rationally disagree because of their possession of differing background beliefs but still
claim that certain arguments followed a universal underlying logic whilst others did not.
221mmanuel Kant Critique of Judgmentp. 94.
28
Marx and Engels." 23
Whichever aspect of the Enlightenment tradition one chooses to identify as
the primary source of our current predicament, the accounts above identify
two aspects which seem to me to be both particularly important and closely
interlinked. The first is the meteoric rise in the importance of "reason" which,
as this Enlightenment conception gained ground and hurried the demise of
religion and other sources of objective values, came to playa major
foundational role in Western thought. The second is the concept of the
human subject as a free and autonomous being who was also the locus of
the rational faculty. This conception of the individual which is, for example,
that of Hobbes and Locke, originated in a social critique of feudalism from
the standpoint of an emergent capitalist society" Its sources within this
social formation are actually very diverse and complicated but, broadly
outlined, this atomistic subject retains a central role in most humanist
problsmatlcs." (See especially chapters 2 and 7 of this essay.)
Ecofeminists like Carolyn Merchant have pointed out the close relationship
between subject / object and nature / culture dichotomies and the
23 Robin Attfield The Ethic of Environmental Concern p. 83. Strangely, having charted the
pervasive nature of this doctrine, Attfield seems to believe that one can simply reject these
influences in favour of a unitary ethic based upon a reinterpretation of Judeo-Christian
traditions.
241nMarxist analysiS the dualisms of bourgeois thought are traced back to the fundamental
contradiction between "use value" and "exchange value" which characterises the
commodification of social production in capitalist societies. See Georg Lukacs 'The
Antimonies of Bourgeois Thought' in History and Class Consciousnesspp. 110-148.
25Charles Taylor has produced a detailed account of the genesis of our modern
conceptions of the individual self in his Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity.
See also C. B. MacPherson The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism Hobbes to
Locke.
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homologous privileging of the male / female couple. For example, the
devaluation of women can occur through an identical form of economism to
that applied to nature "..the domination of women and nature is inherent in
the market economy's use of both as resources." 26 She makes further
connections between "gender", "reason", "science" and the destruction of
nature and rejects the idea that "The Earth is to be dominated by male-
centered and male-controlled technology, science and industry." 27
Feminists have also begun to point out the connections between the neutral
conception of reason utilised in the humanist framework and androcentrism.
They argue that rationality, as currently defined, is far from being an essential
and transcendental feature of human nature. Instead, as Genevieve Lloyd
argues, it is an aspect peculiar to our own European male dominated
cultural milieu.
"Reason has figured in Western culture not only in the assessment of
beliefs, but also in the assessment of character. It is incorporated not
just into our criteria of truth, but also into our understanding of what it
is to be a person at all, of the requirements which must be met to be a
good person, and of the proper relations between our status as
knowers and the rest of our lives." 28
The 'good person' is in fact, Lloyd claims, defined almost entirely in
masculine terms. Lloyd's position does not lead to a rejection of reason per
se but rather to a reflexive awareness of the values inherent in our current
28 Carolyn Merchant 'Ecofeminism and Feminist Theory' p. 100. Ecofeminismewas a term
apparently first used by Franscoise d'Eaubonne in 1974.
27 ibid., p. 101. See also Merchant's The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the
Scientific Revolution and Andree Collard & Joyce Contrucci Rape of the Wild: Men's
Violence Against Animals and Earth.
28 Genevieve Lloyd The Man of Reason: Male and Female in Western Philosophyp. xi.
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conception of reason and the restrictions imposed by such reason on those
who use it. These often astute comments by environmentalists and
ecofeminists do not, however, attest to a universal awareness and rejection
of humanist paradigms in environmental ethics. Far from it. Humanist
assumptions still form the unquestioned starting points for the vast majority of
works on environmental values.
Many 'environmental' philosophers continue to work entirely within utilitarian
or deontological frameworks soaked in such humanist assumptions. They
continue to hold fast to the idea that nature is a set of external objects
perceived and valued by a self-conscious human subject separated from
nature by essential differences. They refuse to see reason as anything
other than a neutral investigative tool with which we can formulate culturally
and historically transcendent systems of ethical values. Utilitarians try to
expand the applicability of a hedonistic calculus to non-human groups.
Deontologists similarly attempt to determine those essential features which
are to carry moral rights. As the next chapter shows, there are serious flaws
in both these approaches. Encouragingly, there does now seem to be
something of a consensus amongst radical environmentalists about the
intimate links between the features listed above, although there is also much
debate about the relative import of particular humanist dichotomies. Thus,
where Pepper sees the subject / object divide as the initial and critical
dichotomy leading to the devaluation of nature, Attfield claims that the
concept of progress is all important and ecofeminists argue that it is the male
/ female division which takes priority. Although these debates are not without
import, I believe that they are the philosophical equivalents of "chicken or the
egg" questions.
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It seems likely that all these divisions, mind / world, male / female, culture /
nature etc., have developed together in the context of European history and
Europe's encounters with the wider world. Together they form a closely
interlinked family of humanist presuppositions and have become, in many
respects, inseparable from each other. They reinforce each other, for the
most part, but are not completely at ease in each other's company. Those
who occupy places which bring home the force of one or other of these
dichotomies, e.g. women oppressed in a male dominated society, come to
experience this particular aspect of humanism as the primary axis of
oppression. However, feminists frequently recognise links with other aspects
of humanism and this recognition provides the basis upon which to build
alliances with other oppressed groups and an oppressed and devalued
'nature'.
These characterisations of humanism and its relation to the devaluation of
the natural environment also seem to beg another kind of question. We
need to be clear here about why such analyses of the writings of a few
philosophers and their arguments might be important. For example,
Langdon Winner finds Passmore's and White's theses on the intellectual
roots of the domination of nature unsatisfactory because they give no
account of how explicit ideas, found in the writings of philosophers from the
stoics onwards, actually came to influence a wider society. Indeed he sees
this as a problem "...endemic to writings on the domination of nature"
generally.29 A related point has been made by Andrew Brennan, who
argues that we must look for a much wider variety of influences than simply
philosophical and theological outlooks.
110 Langdon Winner Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in
Political Thoughtp. 115.
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"...[A]ny thorough analysis of attitudes to nature... will look at the
impact of theology, the life sciences, the physical science, artists,
poets, moralists, philosophers, farming practice and agricultural
technology, patterns of trade, the relative role of different social
classes, and a whole host of other data." 30
It is not simply a case of providing a plausible link between philosophers'
ideas and society's attitudes. The problem is not one of finding causal links
between the idea of a subordinate nature and its implementation in
destructive practices. Nor is it simply a question of providing more detailed
descriptions of those links, although these may both be important. We need
to ask how the explanations and reasoned arguments theoreticians provide
actually relate to our practical life within the world. It is a question of the role
of theoretical concepts and their place in the social and environmental fabric,
in other words a question of epistemology and ideology. (See especially
chapters 3 and 4). It is also, at the same time, a question of how values and
taxonomies are internalised by human individuals and then re-externalised;
of the creation of particular individual subjects in social and environmental
structures and the production of these structures by social and individual
actions. (See especially chapters 3,7,8 and 9.) Here again ideology plays
a pivotal role.
The philosophical theses of humanism should not be taken simply as the
causes of our attitudes and values - although they may well be one aspect in
the formation of such dispositions. Theory cannot be seen in isolation from
other aspects of society. That a society comes to denigrate or respect nature
is due to the particular system of social relations operating within that society
50 Andrew Brennan Thinking About Nature: An Investigation of Nature, Value, and
Ecologyp. 135.
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and between that society and the environment. There is a constant dialectic
between theory and other aspects of society. The argument of this thesis is
that these issues can best be resolved through an approach which
understands language, and hence theory, as parts of social practices. On
this point I agree with Charles Taylor that the central features of the modern
subject
"... arose because changes in the self-understandings connected with
a wide range of practices - religious, political, economic, familial,
intellectual, artistic - converged and reinforced each other to produce
it." 31
Once begun, this process can produce a positive feedback from practice to
theory and back again. It is this type of dialectic, widened to involve the
natural environment as an active participant influencing social practices,
which will be the subject of the work which follows. However, it is first
necessary to investigate further the interrelation between the production of
the self and the forms of rationality found in Western society.
Rationality and Humanism
The social theory of Max Weber focused upon the need to explain "...the
'specific and peculiar rationalisation' that distinguishes modern Western
civilisation from every other." 32 In this sense Weber is the sociologist of
31 Taylor op. cit., n. 25 above, p. 206.
32 Rogers Brubaker The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Social and Moral Thought
of Max Weberp. 1.
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modernity par excellance, as a number of recent texts have testifled."
The complexities and nuances of Weber's multi-faceted conception of
rationalisation are well documented by Kahlberg.34 But, for our present
purposes it suffices to say that rationalisation is associated with the decline
of religion and the secularisation of the world, which in Western SOCietyat
least (for the process varies in different societies), goes hand in glove with
the rise of science and the extension of scientific methodologies and world-
views. Rationalisation spreads into all sections of society, including
economics, law, politics, ethics and even music, and as it does so it produces
the disenchantment (Entzauberung) of the world." Those things which had
previously been value-laden and mysterious come to lose their inherent
value and be seen only as means to particular ends. Human activity in all its
forms becomes regulated and formalised in explicit rules and laws, and
becomes subject to criteria of calculability. This process has implications at
the level both of the individual and of society. At the individual level, people
come, via self-reflection, to act on the basis of instrumentality, treating things
as means to their own particular ends whatever they might be; this Weber
terms "subjective rationality". At the level of society, rules and systems of
calculation are developed to facilitate social exchange in an increasingly
depersonalised sphere. Weber is the first social theorist to give a detailed
33 See for example Dirk Kasler Max Weber: An Introduction to his Life and Work Oxford:
Polity Press 1988 and the essays collected in Sam Whimster and Scott Lash eds., Max
Weber, Rationality and Modernity. (Though Gunther Roth gives a more guarded appraisal of
Weber in his essay in this volurne.)
3. Stephen Kalberg Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of
Rationalisation Processes in History.
35 Kalberg claims that Entzauberung has a very specific context in Weber's discussions of
religion, but almost all other commentators express the wider application of the term outlined
here. ibid.
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account of the relation between the development of a subjective rationality,
that is the conscious reflection on one's individual aims, with a social and
formal rationality, the supra-individual processes by which particular types of
explicit rational structures ramify throughout the social arena. In this way he
links together two of the central features of modern humanism, its conception
of the subject as autonomous and self-interested, and the increasing role
played by instrumental reason in the public sphere. Weber refers to the
production of these twin components of modern Western society as
particular instances of the process of rationalisation.
"By emphasising the historical connection between new forms of
institutionalised control over men and a new ethos of self-control,
between institutionalised discipline and self-discipline, Weber
supplements institutional with psychological analysis in an effort to
clarify the relation between social structure and personality." 36
It may initially appear somewhat paradoxical that the rationalisation of
values, via formal rationality, occurs at the same time as the recognition of a
radical break between reason and value. This is not so puzzling when one
realises that the fragmentation of social practices, which accompanies the
increasing complexity of modern societies, reduces the possibility for shared
values within society as a whole. Values formed by the individual's
immersion in innumerable separate practices become increasingly
incommensurable. The only shared assumptions left for rationality to work
upon are those of (in my terminology) humanism, Le. the alienated
experience of individualism which this fragmentation of society gives rise to.
Ironically "reason" and "individuality" become the only extensive grounds of
38 Brubaker op. clt., n. 32 above, p. 35.
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communality upon which society-wide values can be founded.
Weber refers to society's recourse to calculus and formal rules as ''formal
rationality" and distinguishes this from "substantive rationality" which always
includes particular value commitments. An example of the latter might be
reflecting upon the best (most rational) method to further animal rights or
freedom of speech. Modern Western society is, according to Weber, peculiar
in the fact that it has become dominated by formal rationality, by a rationality
that has no communal substantive content but comes to regulate the life of its
citizens with its own internal logic of enhancing efficiency and calculability.
Formal rationality has important implications for Western society as it
becomes increasingly dominated by bureaucratic and economic structures.
Substantive rationality always implies that values and background beliefs
are important and integral parts of rational choice. This perspectival view
entails that groups with different backgrounds will occupy different value
spheres and often see each others actions as irrational. "Underlying
Weber's emphasis on the limits of rationality is the idea that irreconcilable
value conflict is inevitable in the modern social world." 37 This value conflict
can be resolved only by society's recourse to formal rationality.
Formal rationality claims to be a value-free field of abstract reasoning which
embodies no substantive claims, Le. a neutral rationality able to overcome
perspectival differences. A fragmented society thus finds its public sphere
ever more reliant upon formal rationality in all its terms." Yet this formal
rationality, by its application of abstract calculation and its promulgation of
31 'b'd 5I I "p, ,
38 See also chapter 9,
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fixed laws, comes to seriously distort the values held by individuals and
communities within that society. For, from a substantive perspective, the
application of formal rationality is simply irrational, i.e. it cannot recognise the
values which are an inherent part of the substantive rational process. There
is thus always a tension between formal and substantive rationality. For
example, within the terms of financial efficiency recognised by formal
economic reasoning the production of ozone destroying chemicals should
continue despite the fact that it will inevitably cause the death of thousands
from skin cancer, destroy plants etc.
Weber identifies a variety of features as responsible for the development and
hegemony of formal rationality. Foremost amongst these are the
development of capitalism and its associated economic rationale and
monetary calculus, and the burgeoning successes of mathematics and
abstract theories in the natural sciences. The pressure to extend these
methodologies and their accompanying ideologies to other spheres of
society became overwhelming. These developments in technology and
business and the consequent diversification of society, led to the alienation
of individuals from their traditional cultures and values. All that was
necessary to develop modernity in its present form was a re-orientation of
the individuals composing society so as to accept the right of formal
rationality to govern their lives. Weber saw the ''this worldly" and self-
reflexive aspects of the Protestantism which developed in Europe from the
Sixteenth century onwards as the necessary catalyst for the internalisation of
this process of rationalisation.
"Science, and modern rationality more generally, represents the
Puritan obsession with calculation, impersonal rules and self-
38
discipline without the Puritan belief in their divine origin. It is Puritan
epistemology without Puritan ontology." 39
Rationalisation takes different forms in different spheres of life, e.g. juridically
formalised laws in a legal system, or bureaucratic administration in
government. However, such formal systems reduce human beings and the
wider environment to mere objects, resources, or figures in calculations. (As
we shall see, this has obvious relevance to the reductive economism of such
people as Pearce and Beckerman and is also explicitly present in fields like
"human resource management".)
In one respect at least Weber was aligned with ethical humanism, Le. he
was convinced of the subjective origins of values (value-orientations) which
were both generated in and internal properties of human subjects. Hence
the need he felt for the appearance of Protestantism to account for the
psychological acceptance of formal rationality at the individual level.
However Weber also introduced the concept of 'value-spheres' which he
associated with the production of particular sets of value norms, often
irreconcilable with each other. These value spheres are levels of practical
activity which are relatively self-contained, e.g. politics, art etc., and in
38 Jeffrey C. Alexander 'The Dialectic of Individuation and Domination: Weber's
Rationalisation Theory and Beyond' p. 191. This connection between modern Western
society and the emergence of our current conception of the autonomous humanist individual
was made by Marx. "Only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society', do the various forms of
social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes,
as an external necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpOint, that of the isolated
individual, is also that of the hitherto most developed social (from this standpoint, general)
relations. The human being is in the most literal sense a zoon politikon, not merely a
gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society.
Production by an isolated individual outside society .... is as much of an absurdity as is the
development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other." Karl
Marx General Grundrisse p.84.
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allowing those engaged in these activities to develop certain specific
outlooks he seems to have produced a precursor to later anti-humanist
conceptions of value." For Weber, these value-laden backgrounds,
acquired through the individual's membership of particular social practices,
are not open to judgment by reason but form the unquestioned bedrock of
our values.
"These value constellations, even though for Weber they are
themselves largely manifestations of "irrational' historical, economic,
political, and even geographical forces ... constitute rationally
consistent world views to which individuals may orient their action in
all spheres of life." 41
Weber's analysis of the increasing dependency of modern society upon
formal rationality serves as a springboard for later critiques of modernity and
humanism. Weber himself had an ambivalent attitude towards the process
of rationalisation. He thought that it had brought undoubted benefits, not just
in terms of scientific advancement or social organisation, but in terms of the
greater freedoms enjoyed by the majority of those living in systems
dominated by self-reflexive rather than hierarchical religious world views.
On the other hand the growth of formal rationality now threatened the
individual with new forms of domination and oppression by ordering her life
according to rules of efficiency rather than according to her needs. The
same rationality which made individuality, as we now recognise it, a
possibility also, paradoxically, threatens its demise as substantive rationality
becomes marginalised in the public sphere .
•0 See chapter 2.
•, Kahlberg op. cit., n. 34 above, p.1170.
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Weber's ambivalence towards the rationalisation process turns into a
passionate repudiation of its totalitarian aspects by the Frankfurt School, a
group of Marxist social theorists grouped around the Institute for Social
Research. 42 These writers, including Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer,
Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, recognise a trend in modern society
towards that rationalised totalitarianism in which Weber referred to as the
Iiiron cage" of capitalism. Convinced of the power of formal rationality in its
unholy alliance with capitalism and the mass media they seemed to many
unable to offer any practical alternatives or hope for the future. Their bleak
prognosis led some critics, like Perry Anderson, to view their entire work as a
depressing and unproductive chapter in Marxist history. IIFor, no matter how
otherwise heteroclite, they share one fundamental emblem: a common and
latent pessimism." 43 However pessimistic the Frankfurt School may have
been (and in terms of environmental concerns there seem plenty of reasons
for being so) even Anderson has to agree that they were before their time in
opposing the destruction of the natural environment. "Adorno and
Horkheimer called into question the very idea of man's ultimate mastery of
nature." 44 Indeed this domination of nature is explained in terms very similar
to those discussed above. As Martin Jay puts it.
IIAt the root of the Enlightenment's program of domination, Horkheimer
and Adorno charged, was a secularised version of the religious belief
42 For an introductory account of the Frankfurt School see Tom Bottomore The Frankfurt
School. For more detailed accounts see David Held Introduction to Critical Theory:
Horkheimer to Habermas or Martin Jay The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt
School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950. See also Zoltan Tar The Frankfurt
School: The Critical Theory of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno and Susan J.
Hekman's chapter on critical theory in her Max Weber and Contemporary Social Theory .
• 3 Perry Anderson Considerations on Western Marxism p. 88 .
•• ibid., p. 89.
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that God controlled the world. As a result, the human subject
confronted the natural object as an inferior, external other. At least
primitive animism, for all its lack of self-consciousness, had expressed
an awareness of the interpenetration of the two spheres [the human
and the natural]. This was totally lost in Enlightenment thought, where
the world was seen as composed of lifeless, fungible atoms ..." 45
The Frankfurt School's debt to Weber is most obvious in the work of Max
Horkheimer, in particular in his Eclipse of Beesoti" Here Horkheimer writes
of that same process of the formalisation of reason, which he terms
"subjective reason", in modern society" He counterpoises this to "objective
reason" which although similar to Weber's substantive rationality, insofar as
it also includes value orientations, differs in that Horkheimer seems
committed to claiming that it is possible to produce a theoretical totality within
which one might mediate between the values and goals of different spheres
of society. From Horkheimer's perspective, the exclusion of communication
between value spheres in Weber's analysis is too relatlvistlc."
According to Horkheimer, following the Enlightenment, objective rationality
has turned inward upon itself in a critique of its own pretensions to objectivity
and "liquefied itself" undercutting its own claims. Reason is no longer seen
48 Jay op, cit., n. 42 above, p. 260.
48 Max Horkheimer Eclipse of Reason.
47 This should not be confused with Weber's more specific use of "subjective rationality".
See page 34 above.
48 Horkheimer states, "Max Weber ... adhered so definitely to the subjectivistic trend that
he did not conceive of any rationality - not even a 'substantial' one by which man can
discriminate one end from another". op. cit., n. 46 above, p.6n. Here he seems to foreshadow
Habermas' conception of communicative reason (action). See Jurgen Habermas' Toward a
Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics chapter 6. See also Habermas'
criticisms of Adorno and Horkheimer in lecture 5 of The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.
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as an objective principle but becomes a subjective faculty of the mind, a tool
for one's own purposes, i.e. only subjective reason remains.
"Man has gradually become less dependent upon absolute standards
of conduct, universally binding ideals. He is held to be so completely
free that he needs no standards except his own. Paradoxically,
however, this increase of independence has led to a parallel increase
of passivity ....Economic and social forces take on the character of
blind natural powers that man, in order to preserve himself, must
dominate by adjusting himself to them. As the end result of this
process, we have on the one hand the self, the absolute ego emptied
of all substance except its attempt to transform everything in heaven
and earth into means for its preservation, and on the other hand an
empty nature degraded to mere material, mere stuff to be
domlnatsd.?"
This passage nicely ties together some of the features of humanism, in
particular the dominance of formal rationality and the particular humanist
conception of the subject with the domination of nature. Formal rationality,
epitomised by the supposedly value-free methodologies of economics,
utilitarianism, etc., originally just a means of coordinating the complexities of
,
modern society, comes to produce its own moral criteria, those of efficiency,
growth etc. and to exclude any values outside of its remit. These issues
were followed up further in the work of Herbert Marcuse, who again saw
formal (or abstract) rationality as dangerous to both humanity and nature.
"Abstract reason becomes concrete in the calculable and calculated
48 Horkheimer ibid., p. 97.
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domination of nature and man." 50
Marcuse's work makes explicit some further connections between the
features of humanism outlined above. In particular he is interested in the
role of science and technology and the forms of rationality which accompany
them in producing a society with only "one dimension" - a society where it
becomes impossible to think outside of the limits imposed by these
rationales."
"One-dimensionality" refers to the increasing ability of modern industrial
8b Herbert Marcuse Negations. The recognition and repudiation of the disenchantment
due to formal rationality is common not only to writers on the left of the political spectrum but
amongst conservative commentators too. Thus Michael Oakshott picks out almost identical
points in characterising rationalisation. He claims that "...the Rationalist never doubts the
power of his 'reason' (when properly applied) to determine the worth of a thing, the truth of an
opinion, or the propriety of an action. Moreover he is fortified by a belief in a 'reason' common
to all mankind, a common power of rational consideration ... he is also something of an
individualist... He has no sense of the culmination of experience, only of the readiness of
experience when it has been converted to a formula ..." Rationalism in Politics and Other
Essays pp.1 -2.
51 Douglas Kellner states in his introduction to Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man
:Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society p. xxvii."Marcuse's theory
presupposes the existence of a human subject with freedom, creativity, and self-
determination which stands in opposition to an object-world, perceived as substance ..." To
this extent Marcuse must be deemed to be in the humanist camp. Marcuse sees critical
theory as "...a theory which analyses society in the light of its used and unused or abused
capacities for improving the human condition." Marcuse Rationalism in Politics and Other
Essays p. xlii. In these senses, as holding a rigid distinction between nature and humanity and
in his emphasis on the individual subject, he is squarely within the mainstream humanist
tradition. "Socialism is objectively 'humanism' by virtue of its specific place in the development
of industrial society." Herbert Marcuse 'Socialist Humanism?' in Erich Fromm ed.,Socialist
Humanismp. 100.
What so shocked his contemporaries was the extent to which he rejected technocentric
perspectives and beliefs in the efficacy of scientifiC 'progress'.
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society to confine the thoughts of its citizens within the very narrow limits
imposed by a self-perpetuating instrumental rationality. Science with its
belief in itself as rationality personified, sole arbiter of truth about the world,
embodies in its dominant positivist and empiricist philosophies both a
patently representationalist epistemology and an all encompassing ideology
with which it justifies itself. Epistemology is important here for as Anthony
Giddens puts it,
"...in instrumental reason truth concerns correspondence not
contradiction, and truth (or 'fact') is separated from values. Thus
values cannot be rationally justified in relation to the objective world,
but become matters of subjective assessment. Instrumental reason is
supposedly wholly neutral in respect of values, but actually preserves
as an overriding value the one-dimensional world of technical
prog ress." 52
Technological change becomes an end in itself. In this quest for increased
efficiency and material gain the scientific society feeds its ever more hungry
furnaces with fuel composed of the surrounding natural environment. At they
same time it excludes from its citizens the possibility of questioning its aims,
methods or values. Marcuse claims that our thought is constrained by the
ideological structure of society. We cannot think what we like, we can only
,
think within the limits which our already given social and historical
background allows. Formal rationality, as expressed in economic and
scientific efficiency, maintains very strict limits on such thought. It entails
"..the repression of all values, aspirations and ideas which cannot be defined
in terms of the operations and attitudes of the prevailing forms of ratlonallty'"
52 Anthony Giddens Profiles and Criticisms in Social Theoryp. 149. This is not Gidden's
own opinion but his explication of Marcuse's.
53 Douglas Kellner, Introduction to Herbert Marcuse One-Dimensional Manp.xii.
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However, this does not mean that we simply have to become reflections of
that ideology, perfectly integrated with its destructive and unsustainable
assumptions. We can also remold and alter those ideological
presuppositions within certain practical limits. We can produce "critical
theories" to inform our practical opposition to the status quo. (Always
remembering that there would be little point inventing utopias which had no
bearing on present society.) The critical element, the deconstruction of
ideology (negative dialectics) has to be practically applicable. To reiterate,
"...the position of theory cannot be one of mere speculation. It must be
a historical position in the sense that it must be grounded on the
capabilities of the given society." 54
This chapter has given an account of various aspects of that which I termed
"humanism" and pointed out certain possible theoretical understandings of
the connections between them. Many of these issues will be taken up in
more depth after an account of Louis Althusser's anti-humanism and its
potential. First, however, we shall examine instrumental rationality as it is
applied in the realm of environmental economics and in the axiologies of
many humanist theories of environmental values.
S' Herbert Marcuse One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial
Society. p. xlvii.
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CHAPTER 2: HUMANISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES
This chapter attempts to show how the various aspects of humanism
identified in the last chapter are embodied in economic and ethical
approaches to environmental values. Today, economics is the predominant
branch of instrumental rationality and in its current theoretical form,
"neoclassical economics" is inseparably connected with a view of the human
individual as "free", "equal" and "independent". Such instrumental rationality
also actively opposes ethical thought, at least insofar as ethical concerns lie
outside of the gratification of persona/desires. (See below chapter 7.) From
the perspectives of Weber and Horkheimer the economisation of all values
represents the culmination of the social processes which bring about the
triumph of the subjective component of the subject / object dichotomy.
Economics epitomises that "formal," "subjective" and "instrumental"
rationality which Weber recognised as "the specific and peculiar rationalism
that distinguishes modern Western civilisation from every other." 1
EnYironmental Economics
The growing discipline of environmental economics is perhaps the most
blatant attempt to reduce the complexities of human I environmental relations
to a uniform metric. The current tendency towards an overt economism of
values is exemplified in such documents as David Pearce et a/ B/ueprint for
a Green Economy, originally a report for the Department of the Environment,
1 Rogers Brubaker The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Social and Moral Thought
of Max Weber p. 1.
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and Wilfred Beckerman Pricing for Poliution? According to these economists
money is the institutional form best able to express human interests. The
report argues for the integration of environmental concerns into economic
policy. Pearce et al regard economics as a theoretical methodology able to
express the values underlying competing preferences, for example
preferences for more roads or an unspoilt landscape. It is claimed that all
'rational' people would wish to maximise their satisfaction. In a finite world
there are limits to preference satisfaction. To achieve maximum utility we
must be able to measure people's preferences; money is presumed to
provide this measure.
According to Pearce et al our past environmental problems have not been
caused by economic rationality but rather by the lack of a market place for
environmental services and concerns and by distorted accounting
procedures. Once this structural problem has been rectified industrialists
and developers will change their ways and we may leave environmental
decisions largely to the free market. Accounting methods which previously
regarded environmental damage as an "externality" simply need to be
amended so that the economic value of habitats, species etc. can be entered
into equations of costs and benefits. Th~ environment's true economic value
is to be determined by methods of contingent valuation. People will be
presented with a hypothetical market and asked how much they are 'willing
to pay' (W.T.P.) to protect any given environment or alternatively 'willing to
accept' (W.T.A.) in recompense for the loss of environmental quality. These
figures can then be entered into a cost benefit analysis alongside other more
2 David Pearce, Anil Markandya, Edward B. Barbier Blueprint for a Green Economy; Wilfred
Beckerman Pricing For Pollution.
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standard economic data. Thus, the economists say we have a 'rational' way
of making decisions on environmental issues that takes all important factors
into account.
However things are not &0 simple. Firstly, the figures that result from W.T.P.
and W.T.A. surveys vary widely. People generally ask for much higher
compensatory sums for losses than they are willing to pay for similar gains.
Can both methods be appropriate if their results differ so much? Secondly,
such monetarisation seems likely to reflect the depth of one's pocket rather
than the depth of one's feeling. As one environmental economist critical of
the over-extension of contingent valuation, Donald McAllister, has remarked,
"cost and benefit are typically added without attempting to adjust for the
likelihood that a dollar is valued differently by people at different income
levels." 3
More importantly, Pearce and his fellow economists ignore the fact that such
studies in contingent valuation of environmental matters typically meet with a
high proportion of protest bids and outright rejections of the hypothetical
scenario. Sometimes up to 50% of those surveyed refused to take part in the
surveyor required huge sums of money ~s compensatlon.' These protest
3 Donald McAllister Evaluation in Environmental Planning.
• Mark Sagoff has played a prominent role in exposing abuses of cost benefit analysis.
Mark Sagoff The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment. However,
Sagoff's analysis makes a distinction between subjective preferences amenable to economic
comparison and objective concerns which "involve matters of knowledge, wisdom, morality,
and taste that admit of better or worse, right and wrong, true and false ..." Ibid., p. 45. I do not
believe that such a distinction can be rigidly upheld. Rather than seeing economic rationality,
as Sagoff does, as a 'neutral' (though often callously indifferent) instrument, I hold that as a
methodology it is already value laden and dependent upon a particular conception of human
nature. It is never neutral.
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bids are simply ignored by the analysts, who seem blithely unaware that
many people do not share their conviction that environmental concerns can
be expressed so easily in financial terms. As McAllister puts it,
"For years certain proponents of CBA [cost benefit analysis] have
been selling it as a completely comprehensive evaluative method,
capable of incorporating in its grand index all the factors important to
public decisions .... But some of its serious limitations are inherent in
its fallacious premise that all important human values can be
adequately represented by money." 5
Pearce's valuation techniques make a number of questionable humanist
assumptions about what constitutes a 'rational person', about the nature of
our values, and about our relations to our social and environmental
surroundings. Beckerman and, to a lesser extent, Pearce et a/ represent an
extreme, but unfortunately all too common, form taken by "humanist"
anthropocentric attitudes. For example, many of the features detailed in the
previous chapter can be recognised in the assumptions of environmental
economics. Both Pearce and Beckerman think it unnecessary to question
the use of nature as a human resource. We can also identify in Pearce and
Beckerman that transcendental human subject which is everywhere and
,
always presumed to be a selfish ego pursuing its own atomistic preferences.
Neither economist shows any awareness of the ethnocentricity of this
conception - that they are extrapolating a conception of human nature
particular to elements of modern European society to produce a universal
and unalterable idea of human nature. In this respect they are following an
Enlightenment view of a fixed human nature as a solid and unalterable basis
g McAllister op. cit., n. 3 above, p. 143.
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for values and rationality. Thus, Collingwood's rebuke of Hume applies
equally to neoclassical economists.
"...Hume never shows the Slightest suspicion that the human nature
he is analysing in his philosophical work is the nature of a Western
European in the early eighteenth century ...He always assumes that
our reasoning faculty, ourtastes and sentiments, and so forth, are
something perfectly uniform and invariable, underlying and
conditioning all historical changes." 6
Pearce and Beckerman's arguments explicitly assume a technical and
instrumental account of 'reason' as a neutral instrument for reaching policy
decisions. On their account economics is the rational science of social
management. But, in their case, this technical rationality is compounded with
a particular world-view which sees values as one-dimensional and reducible
to a single metric. Their rationales are not neutral precisely because they
exclude those perspectives and values which do not fit into their economic
calculus. This form of rationality is supposed to be completely value free, but
is rather valueless for it replaces the complexities of political, ethical and
aesthetic values with a simple minded economism. This perspective sees
emotion and reason as polarities of a universal dichotomy which echoes the
,
fact / value distinction so beloved of post-enlightenment analytical
philosophy. Thus Beckerman sees his own views as "cool" and "logical" as
opposed to the "emotionally-charged reactions of the anti-growth school." 7
He is completely blind to his own humanist assumptions and values.
In the economists' eyes we are simply calculating bundles of self-interested
8 R. G. Collingwood The Idea of History p. 83. Collingwood might however have added
middle class, white, and male amongst the limitations affecting Hume's perspective.
7 Beckerman op. cit., n. 2 above, p. 22 & p. 29.
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preferences; economic morons completely lacking in ethical or aesthetic
sensibilities. This is simply not true. There are many areas of human life
where we recognise that consumer preferences do not have a place. As
Mark 8agoff remarks, few people would suggest that the outcome of murder
trials should be decided upon a criterion of willingness to pay, and only the
craziest of economists would argue for and against such issues as abortion
and slavery on economic grounds.s
We can question this across the board application of economics, especially
where ethical issues are concerned. For example, it is not possible for one
to work out an economic value for someone one loves; to do so would be to
treat them as a resource rather than a person. If asked the value of our
grandmother we wouldn't institute a hypothetical market for aged relatives.
We would quite rightly see the question as at least inappropriate if not down-
right evil. Nor are the values many of us place on the existence of rainforests
and whales reducible to dollars and yen. Environmentalism requires the
widening of our ethical and aesthetic concerns not just our preferences as
consumers. The questions involved are not just about the allocation of
resources but about morality and politics, about the very notion of treating
'nature' as a resource.
8 To be fair, the Pearce report itself does not envisage the wholesale application of market
forces across the board. For example the suggestion that pollution permits should be bought
and sold is only to apply to levels below that previously determined as safe. The problem lies
in the report's tendency to over-extend the application of economics in decision making
processes, particularly by the introduction of cost / benefit analyses. To this end perhaps the
most revealing diagram in the report is figure 5.2 labelled ''the costs and benefits of cost-
benefit analysis." According to this figure there are only benefits and no costs to be derived
from such a procedure. Who is fooling whom?
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If we continue to treat these questions at the superficial level of instrumental
reason the long term consequences will be disastrous. If the fundamental
reasons given for preserving habitats are those of human utility, then,
whenever and wherever the balance of utility favours habitat destruction this
will occur. Once destroyed they can rarely be replaced. Bit by bit the
wilderness is eroded until all that remains are a few curios, remnants of what
once was, to be stared at and picked over. This is not idle speculatton, but a
description of our current situation.
This argument is unlikely to shift some economists from their myopic
predilections. To even mention ethical considerations, or question economic
assumptions, will be seen by some, like Wilfred Beckerman, as "an
emotional over-reaction to some of the obvious disamenities [sic] of modern
life." 9 Beckerman holds that those who oppose such accounting methods
"are no doubt motivated by other considerations. [and he claims] In the
absence of any opportunity to subject them all to psychoanalysis it is not
possible ... to speculate on their inner motivations." 10 The implication being
that those of us who object to being characterised as selfish bundles of
personal preferences must be mad!
Of course not all economists are as shortsighted, or explicit in their
humanism, as Beckerman.11 However, any investigation of recent attempts to
value the environment in economic terms reveals the same set of
unquestioned assumptions about personal preferences - assumptions which
§ Beckerman op. cit., n.2 above, p. 22.
10 ibid., p. 29.
11 For a more sophisticated defence of "economic man" [sic] see J. G. Merquior 'Death to
Homo economicus?' pp. 353-378.
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depend upon a humanist conception of the 'rationality' and 'autonomy' of
individuals. 12
Axiological Extensionism. (The Expanding Circle)13
Humanist theories of ethics developed in an anthropocentric social setting
have to be adapted to some degree when applied to non-human realms. For
example, there are obvious difficulties with applying a moral system based
on human utility to the natural world. Any calculus of moral utilitarianism
would fare no better at expressing environmental values than homologous
systems of economic utility. The moral utilitarian may have a different metric
of utility, a hedonistic calculus instead of a monetary calculus, but her
methodology would be subject to identical drawbacks in so far as giving a
rationale for the preservation of wilderness is concerned." Whenever the
balance of utility, measured as maximised human happiness, favoured
habitat destruction or species extinction it would be deemed morally right.
12 The idea that every person is motivated only by self-interest is the focus of a detailed
critique by the economist Amartya Sen. 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural
Foundations of Economic Theory'. Sen argues that moral commitments frequently entail
counter-preferential action by individual agents. He thus creates a distinction between moral
values and personal preferences. He claims that economics is wrong to reduce the former to
the latter. (See also chapter 7 of this thesis.) For a more expansive discussion the
assumptions behind modern economics see Martin Hollis & Edward J. Nell Rational
Economic Man: A Philosophical Critique of Neoclassical Economics. Andrew Brennan
'Environmental Ethics and Moral Ratlonatty' has also criticised the use of economics as an
over-arching framework supposedly able to represent all values and advocates a moral
pluralism.
13 Some parts of this next section first appeared in my 'Letting in the Jungle' .
14 "Preference-utilitarianism" is the 'preferred' theory of rational choice theorists and most
modern non-Marxist economists.
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Humanists who wish to value at least some other species ethically but who
work within traditional philosophical paradigms thus need to find some other
way to expand the category of moral conslderaoillty,"
One such humanist conception of morality claims that if we look at the history
of Western society there seems to have been a uni-directional expansion of
the bounds of "moral considerability", from the immediate social group to
ever widening categories of moral objects." Peter Singer has noted that a
popular metaphor for describing this broadening of ethical horizons is that of
the expanding circle. A typical example he quotes comes from Lecky's
"History of European Morals" first published in 1869.
"...benevolent affections embrace merely the family, soon the circle
expanding includes first a class, then a nation, then a coalition of
nations, then all humanity and finally its influence is felt in the dealings
of man with the animal world." 17
This metaphor of the expanding circle encapsulates a humanistic concern
18 Some anthropocentric philosophers have argued that we should respect nature simply
on the grounds that we have a duty to respect the well being of future generations of humans
by not destroying potential future resources. There are a number of flaws in this approach.,
First, it is not at all clear that we should have any duties to future people at all. Second, as
Derrick Parfit has pointed out in his Reasons and Persons, we do not know what these people
will be like or want. Third, even if we assume that future people will be just like ourselves, the
potential number of such people is almost infinite and so, for example, any calculus which took
their wishes into account might deem that even very minor actions on our part might reduce
the potential well being of millions of people yet to come and so be immoral.
'8 Works on moral considerability of particular relevance to environmental ethics are
Christopher Stone Should Trees Have Standing?; Kenneth Goodpaster 'On Being Morally
Considerable'; Andrew Brennan 'The Moral Standing of Natural Objects'.
17 The Lecky quotation prefaces Peter Singer's The Expanding_Circle, Ethics and
Sociobiology.
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with the idea of a linear historical progression. Singer's own book The
Expanding Circle both elucidates and epitomises this humanist approach.
His thesis is that ethics originated in forms of biological behaviour such as
kin selection and reciprocal altruism, whereby apparently altruistic acts of
individuals are explained by their role in increasing the genetic contribution
of that individual's genome to the gene pool of the next generation. A mother
shares 50% of her genes on average with an offspring. Put in its crudest
form, those mothers who die saving more than two offspring will be selected
for. Thus altruism as a feature seems amenable to explanation in terms of so
called "selfish genes." 18
The altruistic faculty, according to Singer, comes to take on a new form for
humans because of our endowment with language and rationality.
Justifications of actions affecting the wider community come to be given in
terms of reasons. For example, I may justify my claim to a greater than
average share of the food on the basis that I do more work than most. This
might be accepted but then someone points out that Freda does more work
than I do, and so is entitled on this basis to more food still.
Once utilised, this form of rational argument suggests that we "cannot get
,
away with different ethical judgments in apparently identical situations." 19
Certain rational considerations can call into question previously held
prejudices about the limits of moral considerability. For example, if it is right
to help person A in a given situation then why not person B?
18 See Richard Dawkins The Selfish Gene.
1i Singer op. cit., n. 17 above, p. 93.
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Altruistic tendencies had in the first instance only extended to the immediate
family, or our own group, but the "autonomy of reasoning" entails a logic
whereby the boundaries of our own expand to the next largest community
with which we identify.20 Perhaps this community is a social class or a race
but once such an extension of moral considerability has been justified then
its boundary too is in turn open to questioning. Why for example should one
skin colour be preferable to another? Viewed in this way, the history of
morals comes to be seen as an increasingly enlightened view about those
we conceive of as having affinities to ourselves. Like the layers of an onion
the boundaries of moral considerability come to overlie each other as the
rational justification for each is formulated and then challenged.
Eventually we reach a stage where claims to moral status are justified in
terms of features of something called "human nature"; perhaps the
possession of a rational faculty itself. This stage is equivalent to the roughly
Kantian position, that if I am morally considerable because of my rationality
then all rational beings must be so considered. This being so, individual
members of different races, sexes and so forth apparently obtain equal moral
status (unless of course we can find reasons for doubting that all sections of
humanity are equally rational). In connection with the issue of moral
extensionism, it is worth noting the importance that has been attached at
different times to phrenology, La. tests and other 'scientific' methods of
20 ibid., p.113. Singer is proposing that autonomous rational argument is the primary
cause of the historical extension of moral considerability beyond kin and reciprocal altruism to
wider society. But, we might note that the development of a language complex enough to
produce and express such rational arguments might itself require a fairly stable and complex
society, presumably including some moral norms. The historical and causal primacy of rational
argument is therefore questionable.
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discrtmination."
But why should the policy of extension stop at the level of species? In a
famous quotation Bentham points out both the drawbacks in relying on
rationality or language to delimit moral considerability and suggests instead
that ability to feel pain or pleasure is the appropriate moral arbiter:
"It may one day be recognised, that the number of legs, the villosity of
the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally
insufficient [to skin colour] for abandoning a sensitive being... What
else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of
reason, or perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse
or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more
conversable animal, than is an infant of a day, or a week or even a
month old ... the question is not, can they reason? nor can they talk?
but, can they suffer?" 22
This is indeed the position that Singer takes, claiming that this is the outer
layer of the onion. The difference between sentience and non-sentience is
not, says Singer, a morally arbitrary boundary in the way that species
differences are. Singer's approach not only entails a linear conception of
historical progress in ethical development but requires there to be certain
essential features of humans, and some animals. His view of ''the autonomy
of reasoning" and his privileging of scientific information also means that he
epitomises the humanist approach. One obvious drawback with Singer's
21For a lucid account of such scientific prejudices see, for example, Stephen Jay Gould
The Mismeasure of Man.
22Jeremy Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and_Legislation p. 311.
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position, as far as environmentalists are concerned, is that a line drawn at
sentience excludes most of the animal kingdom and certainly plants,
waterfalls and whole ecosystems from moral considerability. However,
humanist ingenuity can fill out this notion of rationally argued affinities in still
other ways. Instead of using shared natural characteristics - genes, skin
colour, sex, human nature or even life itself to dictate moral boundaries one
could refer to shared interests. For example, our affinity with a particular
class might be a common interest in overcoming the exploitation we suffer
due to our social position. The less alike our social circumstances the less
likely we may be to consider someone as part of our moral community.
Now, if interests are of critical importance, the outer layer of moral
considerability will be bounded by an ability to possess interests. Singer
believes that the capacity to possess interests is co-extensive with
sentience, but others have a wider perspective. Why should plants not have
interests in obtaining enough water and nutrients? Thus, for philosophers
like Robin Attfield plants too find a place within the expanded circle. For him
the interests of non-sentient beings lie in "their flourishing or their capacity
for flourishing after the manner of their kind ..." 23
Paul Taylor proposes a 'biocentric' theory of environmental ethics where the
outer layer of moral considerability is to be determined by a thing's ability to
possess a "good-of-its-own". To have a good-of-its-own the object must
be capable of being harmed or benefited as a teleological centre of life,
having its own species-specific goals. The goals of an organism are
realised when it has successfully maintained "the normal biological functions
23 Robin Attfield The Ethics of Environmental Concern p. 154.
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of its species", thus developing to its full potential. A butterfly species, for
example, has a life cycle from egg to caterpillar to chrysalis to imago. To stop
any individual butterfly from playing each of these roles would constitute a
harm to it. Having a good-of-one's-own is then a necessary condition of
moral considerability (of having inherent worth in Taylor's terminology), but is
not sufficient. This distinction between things which have and which lack a
good of their own equates, according to Taylor, to that between the living and
non-living and constitutes the justification principle which marks the outer
boundary of moral standing."
To summarise the argument so far: The humanist presents us with a
succession of features or capacities that are supposed to determine the
bounds of moral considerability. All previous boundaries as they become
superseded are seen to have been mistaken, their core justifying principle
being too limited in scope. They were based on the wrong objective
essential characteristic: that characteristic, which has the role of carrying, or
at least grounding, value. But now the humanist faces a serious dilemma.
For, as the boundary principles become less and less specific to take
account of the wider categories of ethical objects we wish to countenance,
this form of rational argument brings with it a new and more expansive
egalitarianism.
If, for example, possession of interests is the criterion used there seems to be
no over-arching reason why the interests of one type of organism should
have more importance than any other. All things capable of having their
interests benefited or harmed are equally considerable whether aphids,
2. Paul Taylor Respect for Nature.
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dandelions or humans. This extreme position would be held by very few.
But, on the other hand, to relate everything to similarity of interests with
humans seems unjustifiably prejudiced. Faced with the possibility of
widespread natural egalitarianism most humanists backtrack and busy
themselves constructing rational justifications for their prejudice in much the
same way as others had previously tried to exclude various sections of
humanity from equal consideration."
Not all ethicists are equally culpable in these human centred prejudices.
Taylor is specifically concerned to promote this natural egalitarianism as the
heart of his 'biocentric' perspective. He states, "All animals however
dissimilar to humans they may be are beings that have a
good-of-their-own" and "..all plants are likewise beings that have a
good-of-their-own." 26
The first thing we do when we accept the biocentric outlook is to take the fact
of our being members of a biological species to be a fundamental feature of
our existence. We do not deny the differences between ourselves and other
species, any more than we deny the differences among other species
themselves. Rather, we put aside these differences and focus our attention
upon our nature as biological creatures,
".... we keep in the forefront of our consciousness the characteristics
we share with all forms of life on Earth. Not only is our common origin
25 For example, Robin Attfield op. cit., n. 23 above, p. 154, having extended the boundary
of moral considerability to those things capable of possessing interests, then constructs a
rational justification which, in effect, severely limits the degree of consideration we can actually
give things to their degree of similarity to humans.
2' Taylor op. cit., n. 24 above, p. 154.
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in one evolutionary process fully acknowledged, but also the common
environmental circumstances that surround us all. We view ourselves
as one with them, not as set apart from them. We are then ready to
affirm our fellowship with them as equal members of the whole
Community of Life on Earth." 27
Such is his theoretical standpoint, but when it comes to the practical
implications of this policy for human interaction with the environment he is
less candid. All that this egalitarianism practically requires is that; "certain
habitats used by wild-species populations are not destroyed, and some
wildlife is given a chance to survive alongside the works of human culture." 28
[my emphasis]
.. "Animals" [says Taylor] are not of greater worth [than humans] so
there is no obligation to further their interests at the cost of basic
interests to humans" [original emphasis)."
But surely there are cases where if equal moral status is to count for
anything, the basic interests of animals and plants will outweigh those of
humans. Indeed since Taylor's theory gives inherent worth to microscopic
individuals almost every act we do becomes of immense moral import,
harming and destroying millions of our fellow citizens. In spraying a crop we
destroy vast quantities of insects, fungi etc. all supposedly on an equal
footing with ourselves. Taylor chooses to ignore the potentially restrictive
27 ibid., p. 66.
28 ibid., p. 101.
28 For a full explanation of his principles "for the fair resolution of conflicting claims"
between humans and non-humans and the source of these quotations see Taylor ibid.,
chapter 6.
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nature of his thesis and instead makes some extremely bland
generalisations about living in harmony with nature.
Taylor fails to distance himself from the anthropocentric attitudes he originally
claimed to be resisting. He is also engaged in the development of an a-
historical, a-contextual and essentialist axiology which sees particular values
as having objective standing. In these respects he is clearly still working
within the humanist framework. Like the other approaches outlined above,
whether utilitarian and deontological, he utilises humanist conceptions of
reason. Either a reason which claims to be a neutral arbiter between all
values or a reason which claims to determine the scope of application of all
values. These are two sides of the same humanist dichotomy, the first sees
reason as neutral with respect to subjective values, the second as neutral
with respect to objective values.
The approaches I have called humanist, both economic reductionism I
resource utilitarianism and axiological extensionism are, I suggest, ethically
inappropriate, unworkable and vastly over-slrnplistlc." Similarities of faculty
are reified into universal demarcation principles in an attempted emulation of
the natural sciences. The only empirical evidence admitted is scientific
evidence on the distribution of the chosen demarcating faculty in the natural
world. Thus intelligence testing, biological taxonomy and sociobiology are
all admissible as evidence for the possible moral considerability of a class of
objects. What is not admissible, though, is evidence about whether people
actually do so regard an object. What is positively dismissed is the massive
30 Bernard Williams refers to utilitarianism's "...great simple-mindedness ...havlng too few
thoughts and feelings to match the world as it really is." in J .J. C. Smart & Bemard Williams
Utilitarianism For And Against p. 49.
63
plurality of 'reasons' why people can and do value things morally. The
humanist mania for objective theoretical criteria leads to a monolithic
reductionism combined with an unwarranted mystification of one particular
faculty as somehow bearing moral value."
Perhaps the clearest way to see the problems this view creates is by looking
at those things that are drawn out of moral bounds, things beyond the
periphery of the expanded circle. In discussing his concept of the good of a
being Taylor contrasts a child with a pile of sand. The sand, he writes, has
"..no good of its own. It is not the sort of thing that can be included in the
range of application of the concept entity-that-has-a-good-of-its-own. n 32
This being so, it is excluded from moral considerability.
Yet we certainly can, and do, extend moral considerability even to piles of
sand in certain contexts (the context is all important). The barchans, great
crescent shaped dunes found in the sand deserts of Arabia's "empty quarter"
51 Singer provides a clear example of the problems associated with humanist arguments
when he refers to genetic arguments about racial differences: "[e]quality is a moral idea, not
simply an assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming a factual
difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration
we give to satisfying there needs and interests." Peter Singer 'All Animals Are Equal' p. 152.
Singer must be arguing that since the boundaries of moral consideration based on racial
differences are mistaken, using as they do, the wrong criterion of moral demarcation, we need
no longer be interested in differences between individuals on these grounds. If moral status
depends not upon intelligence but upon sentience the degree of intelligence someone
possesses is superfluous. Singer just cannot mean what he says when he states that factual
differences are immaterial to moral considerability. If sentience is the boundary delimiting moral
standing then factual differences in ability to feel pleasure or pain will be crucial In moral
deliberation. (All the racist need now do is focus attention on sensitivity rather than
intelligence.) Like it or not, 'factual' differences are central to Singer's and other humanists'
argumentson the expanding circle.
32 Paul Taylor op. cit., n. 24 above, p. 61.
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have inspired the imagination of many travellers and moulded the lives of
people like the Bedouin who have lived amongst them. The sandstone of
regions like Exmoor or, more impressively, the Pakaraima mountains on the
border of Guyana and Venezuela, containing some of the world's highest
waterfalls, is directly responsible for their particular ambience. The feelings
and forms of life these "piles of sand" have generated can and have led to
their being valued for their own sake in ways that can best be described as
ethical. To take a different example, when oil spills from tankers onto sandy
beaches we think such avoidable occurrences morally reprehensible, not
just because they are unaesthetic but because it makes sense to talk of
desecration of the beaches.
I am claiming that we do not need, and cannot discover, objective values in
nature. But it is simply an empirical truth that people do value natural objects
for themselves in a manner precisely analogous to our moral valuation of
people. Environmental ethics, for the anti-humanist, is not a matter of
discovering abstract criteria by which one can judge such valuation right or
wrong in any absolute sense. Such criteria exist only for the humanist who
believes in neutral reason. Ethical values need to be explained in terms of
their context and origins, their production and their reproduction in particular
social and environmental circumstances.
paradigm Transformation; Biocentrism and Deep Ecology.
So far several different attempts to allocate values to the non-human world
have been examined. First, a simplistic economic reductionism and a
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homologous resource utilitarianism which suffer from identical
anthropocentric defects; second, a series of progressively more extensive
normative axiological theories. These approaches both account for values in
a humanistic fashion, although the anthropocentrism is less immediately
obvious in the latter case. However, there still remain a bundle of more
radical environmental philosophies, some of which fall under the title of
"deep ecology", but all of which attempt to break with the hegemony of
current humanist philosophical paradigms.
This description of three separable forms of value theories in environmental
ethics, i.) economic reductionism / resource utilitarianism; ii.) axiological
extentionism; and iii.) paradigm transformation, is not the only possible
taxonomy. For example, John Rodman has identified four forms of
"ecological consciousness". 33
The first, which Rodman terms "resource conservation" is motivated by
Identical anthropocentric considerations to my own category of resource
utilitarianism i.e. it argues for the preservation of nature only insofar as it is
useful for the long term survival of the human species, the well being of
human individuals and the continuance of civilisation. Rodman traces this
position to such influential figures as the American forester Gifford Pinchot
who claimed in true utilitarian fashion that forests should be used for the
greatest good of the greatest number (of people).
Rodman's second category is entitled "wilderness preservation" and
associates wilderness with the production of intrinsically valuable aesthetic
33John Rodman 'Four forms of Ecological Consciousness'.
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and spiritual experiences. Nature has what might be termed a "therapeutic"
or perhaps "romantic" value. Here again, the value of nature appears to
reside in its production of particular human experiences and, given the well
known vagaries of human tastes, Rodman assumes that this perspective is
unable, by itself, to furnish an 'objective' justification for preserving nature.
Rodman's rejection of this aspect of the conservation ethos is, I believe,
overhasty. Aesthetics may well be an inadequate basis for a universal ethic
but this very search for universal and objective rationalisations of particular
normative values is, as I have argued, profoundly mistaken from an anti-
humanist perspective. Aesthetic and spiritual judgments remain important
factors in many people's evaluations and, on this note, it should also be
pointed out that none of the approaches outlined here need provide an
account of ethical valuation by itself. One might hold that natural 'objects'
could be instrumentally, aesthetically and ethically valuable all at the same
time or in different contexts. None need necessarily be exclusive of the
others. There remains plenty of space for those interested in varieties of
moral pluralism to operate."
Rodman's third position is that of "moral extentionism" which includes those
systems of philosophy like Singer's which I refer to above as normative
axiologies. However, Rodman includes in this category only those systems
which retain an explicit hierarchy placing humanity at the top. Thus, whilst
theories that give intrinsic value to explicitly human characteristics like
sentience or intelligence, are, according to Rodman, examples of moral
extentionism, his third category does not include theories like Taylor's which
34lndeed, some philosophers have argued specifically for a moral pluralism. See
Christopher Stone Earth and Other Ethics: The Case For Moral Pluralism and Andrew Brennan
Thinking About Nature.
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rely on an identical rational methodology but refer to more abstract and less
explicitly human features, such as a generalised teleology, and advocate
biospheric egalitarianism. These theories form part of his fourth category
which he refers to as "ecological sensibility."
I have argued above that there is no significant methodological difference
between attempts to extend moral theories relying on intelligence or
sentience, like Singer's, and those which posit either interests or a telos, like
Taylor's, for other species. They both utilise exactly the same humanistic
rationales, both try to justify particular normative values and both are equally
problematic in terms of their prescriptions for moral action.
The motivation for Rodman's distinction between moral extentionism and
ecological sensibility can be found in his acceptance of the predominant and
humanist paradigm infecting current environmental ethics. This paradigm
makes a distinction between anthropocentric and biocentric theories of value
which mirrors the subject / object and culture / nature divides. Those
theories which distribute values in terms of human characteristics are seen
as anthropocentric and culture bound, those which distribute values in terms
of species-specific interests or teleologies are claimed to be biocentric; they
are, it is claimed, objective rather than subjective properties. But the very act
of positing such an objective / subjective divide ties one in to an implicitly
humanist framework, one that in no way transcends the problematic at the
heart of axiological extentionism.
What Rodman's and many other taxonomies of environmental ethics have in
common is that they clump together a variety of very different theoretical
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approaches, both humanist and anti-humanist, under the single title of
"biocentrism" or "deep ecology". But axiological biocentrism, as just outlined,
is theoretically antithetical to those deep ecological approaches which start
from assumptions which (try to) transcend, the humanist, subjective /
objective divide. It is these theories advocating paradigm transformations
that I wish to refer to under the title "deep ecology". This does have the effect
of excluding certain philosophers, like Paul Taylor and Lawrence Johnson,"
who think of themselves as deep ecologists, but, on the other hand, it has
numerous advantages. In particular, it comes closer to articulating the distinct
methodological differences between those who simply apply 'pure
philosophical' problematics to environmental issues and those who, in
dealing with such issues, actively challenge philosophy as it is now
constituted.
This definition of deep ecology also seems to have some support from a
number of radical environmentalists and ecofeminists. For example, Marti
Kheel has noted that the destruction of the world seems to go hand in hand
with the production of theories of environmental values; theories which whilst
giving a patina of respectability to a politically engaged philosophy actually
produce nothing but pale reflections of current common-sense intuitions,
always lagging behind the changes they claim to have caused." She sees
ecofeminism and deep ecology as united in their common rejection of
axiological theories and attempts to rationally appraise the values of
'objects'. Ecofeminism and deep ecology are also both allies in their
demands for a reappraisal of the role and nature of the self - the subject as
35 Lawrence Johnson A Morally Deep World. For further criticism of Johnson's approach
see my review of his book.
at Marti Kheel 'Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology'.
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masculinised ego. As Michael Zimmerman has pointed out, there are
genuine similarities in the programmes of deep ecology and ecofeminism
although these are sometimes masked in debates about priorities.
".... ecofeminism and deep ecology share many points in common.
Both are critical of atomism, dualism, hierarchialism, rigid autonomy
and abstract rationality. II 37
The purpose of my taxonomic realignment of ethical theories is not simply to
distinguish humanist from anti-humanist theses and to privilege the latter.
Although I reject both axiological extentionalism and resource utilitarianism
as irredeemably humanist in a manner that makes them both useless for
long term environmental purposes, I do not wish to decry all elements of
humanism. I do not believe, as many seem to, that humanist dichotomies
necessarily always devalue nature. Indeed I believe that in many respects
we are indebted to humanist modes of thought for many aspects of current
Western societies which I value very deeply. Nor do I hold that something
called anti-humanism will provide a panacea for our environmental ills.
What I do argue is that the time for a naive humanism is past, neither we
ourselves nor the wider environment can afford to continue down the line
which we currently follow. We need a society that is not tied to our current
humanist paradigms because they are, for the most part, unsustainable in
ecological terms. Thus there is little point, in appealing to humanist forms of
argument if they are constrained by those boundaries upon our actions and
thoughts imposed by "humanism in general" Le. humanist ideology. We
need to transcendthese boundaries and humanism itself if the things which
37Michael Zimmerman 'Deep Ecology and Ecofeminism: The Emerging Dialogue' p.142.
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environmentalists value are to survive." But, and this is an important but,
one cannot simply invent a transcendent philosophy anew. It ean only come
from the contradictions posed by the implementation and conceptualisation
of the old, and thus it is from the debate between humanism and anti-
humanism that any new paradigm which can mesh with our Western
traditions and forms of life must emerge. There is thus a continuity constraint
here, something of the old must survive in the new.31
Deep ecology, ecofeminism and a number of allied movements are
components of this process of evolution, both for environmental philosophy
and in a much wider sense for the society as a whole. They are not clean
breaks with the past but evolutionary developments from it, but for all that
they nonetheless represent a radical chanqs." Deep ecologists do not
succeed in breaking with all features characteristic of the humanist
paradigm. However, at a minimum, they show an awareness of the object /
38 ''The target of the deep ecologists' critique is not humans per se ( i.e., a general class of
social actors) but rather human-centredness(i.e., a legitimising ideology)" Warwick Fox 'The
Deep Eoology-Ecofeminism Debate and its Parallells' p. 19. Perhaps Fox should have made
his ideological target a little wider in certain contexts extending it to other aspects of
humanism. Fox also makes a distinction between biocentric, i.e. life centred, and eoocentric.
Ahhough some deep ecologists like Naess might find this division unnecessary, given their
very broad Interpretation of living things, one that includes rocks and streams, this taxonomy
would effectively separate out people like Lawrence Johnson who claim to be deep
ecologists but do not give intrinsic value to non-living organisms.
30 This amounts to a claim that paradigms are never entirely incommensurable. There
need be no essential shared features between old and new but some form of translation is
usually possible. (see the material on the idea of an epistemological break in chapters 3 and
4.) For a discussion of incommensurability see chapter 7 of W. H. Newton-Smith The
Rationality of Science and chapter 17 of Paul Feyerabend Against Method: Outline of an
Anarchist Theory of Knowledge.
40 This is not to imply some overt teleological progress but rather evolution in its proper
non-teleological Darwinian sense.
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subject divide and its anthropocentric implications. They attempt to
transcend this dichotomy in a wide variety of ways, for example, with Marxist
conceptions of the dialectic, with structuralist accounts of the self, in the
phenomenology of philosophers like Neil Evernden, by the mythic and poetic
approach of Gary Snyder or the holistic philosophy of J. Baird Callicott.41
The single most important figure in the development of deep ecology is that
of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. In a series of papers and books
Naess has set out and defended his own deep ecological "ecosophy", which
he characterises by a number of tsatures." Perhaps the most
philosophically relevant of these are:
a.) The IIrelational, total field image" which holds that what things are is partly
due to their relations with other things, we are thus all intimately connected to
our surroundings.
b.) A biospheric egalitarianism which holds that all species have an "equal
right to live and blossom".
c.) That diversity is an intrinsic good.
d.) Self-realisation as the ultimate end.
Taken out of context these aims are easily misunderstood. Many, like Taylor,
have taken biospheric egalitarianism as the central plank of deep ecology. If
41 Neil Evernden The Natural Alien; Gary Snyder The Practice of Wild; J. Baird Callicott 'The
Metaphysical Implications of Ecology'.
42 This characterisation can be found in 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology
Movement. A Summary: Other works include; 'Self-Realisation in Mixed Communities of
Humans, Bears, Sheep, and Wolves'; 'Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological
Attitudes'; 'A Defence of the Deep Ecology Movement', and Ecology, Community and
Lifestyle.
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one concentrates as biocentric axiologists do on "egalitarianism" it is easy to
overlook the radicalness of some of these proposals. AxioJogists like Taylor
have taken Naess's slogan in too literal and essentialist a fashion, awarding
equal 'rights' to individuals of all species. This is understandable given
Naess's early formulations." Naess's early positions are often ambiguous.
Thus he makes statements to the effect that his philosophy will deal with
"both norms, rules, postulates, value priority announcements and
hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our universe"." Or again he
states that one should see "Self-realisation as a top norm and long term for
an ultimate goal".45 But his later work shies away from such grand
statements of intent. His problematic relies deeply upon the philosophy of
Spinoza, a philosophy which as chapter three will show has provided the
inspiration for the development of an explicit anti-humanism in much the
same way as Descartes comes to represent humanist assumptions.
As Naess makes clear in his later writings what he has in mind is not the rigid
allocation of rights with all the contradictions this necessarily introduces but a
modus vivendi where human wants do not always override the needs of
other parts of the environment. He states:
"It is fairly unimportant whether the term 'rights' (of animals) is or is not
used in the fight for human peaceful coexistence with a rich fauna." 48
- 45 Arne Naess 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A
Summary' .
.. ibid., p. 79.
45 Arne Naess Ecology, Community and Lifestyle p. 84.
48 Naess 'Self-Realisation in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep, and Wolves'
p.231.
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Naess is aware of the importance of cultural traditions in informing our
values and responses to nature. He does not argue for a universally
applicable axiological system able to decree that certain species or natural
features are morally considerable and others not. The fact that he refers to
his philosophy as Ecosophy 'T is specifically motivated by a wish to show
that there are, and must be other perspectives requiring their own
ecosophies (whether 'A', 'B' or 'Z').
Thus the self-realisation which Naess refers to should not be read as the
self-realisation of the Cartesian subject. Rather, its purpose is to directly
challenge the boundaries of that subject, claiming that, when fully realised,
the self recognises that it is one node in a web of life, one component of a
larger whole. Having said this, there is no doubt that Naess does see his
notion of a wider self as representing the true situation, a self awareness that
we should aI/try to attain. In this sense his doctrines claim a spurious
universality. As soon as one tries to fill out what this true self actually is and
what its attainment means for our ethical relations with nature one is in
danger of falling back into notions of an essential human nature which we
should all follow, of deriving universal normative ethical implications in a
manner that differs hardly at all from mainstream humanism. Naess does
indeed attempt to fill out this notion of the 'true self' though usually in a way
which makes plain that he does this only for his own traditions and culture.
Other philosophers are not so coy about claiming universal status for norms
derived from a wider self. One such philosopher is J. Baird Callicott.
Callicott must in some ways be judged a border line case between Deep
Ecology and axiological extensionism. He does make a distinction between,
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on the one hand, the application of moral theories to environmental issues
and, on the other hand, the exploration of moral valuations and criticism of
moral theories from an environmental perspecnvs." But he also sees Deep
Ecology as both providing a non-anthropocentric axiology andcreating a
new paradigm in moral philosophy.
In a distinctly humanist frame he defines a number of tasks which any value
theory of the kind he wishes to develop must perform.
"An adequate value theory for non-anthropocentric environmental
ethics must provide for the intrinsic value of both individual organisms
and a hierarchy of superorganismic entities - populations, species,
biocoenoses, biomes, and the biosphere. It should provide differential
intrinsic value for wild and domestic organisms and species. It must
be conceptually concordant with modern evolutionary and ecological
biology. And it must provide for the intrinsic value of our present
ecosystem, its component parts and complement of species, not equal
value for any ecosystem." 48
It is obvious from this passage that in several senses Callicott's philosophy
could be labelled 'humanist'. Whereas the rationale for axiologically
extending moral consideration depended upon the sharing of certain
features or capacities judged to be of moral import, Callicott's method might
depend not on sharing anything with nature, but upon sharing in nature itself.
He takes a radical reductionist stance based on his interpretation of quantum
- at J. Baird Callicott 'Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics' p. 299.
4·lbld., pp. 299-309.
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physics, which might itself seem to represent a scientistic humanism." But,
according to Callicott, our apparent individuality and isolation from nature is
mistaken, for, at the level of quanta we are actually continuous with the world:
Callicott endorses Alan Watt's sentiment that "the world is your body" 50 •
If this is the case then Callicott thinks we can dismiss arguments about the
intrinsic value of different faculties, we need only posit that the self is
valuable: "nature is intrinsically valuable to the extent that the self is
intrinsically valuable." Environmental degradation is thus to be seen as an
attack on my extended person: "the injury to me of environmental destruction
is primarily and directly to my extended self, to the larger body and soul with
which I am continuous." 51
But humans do not operate ethically at the level of quanta. The fact, if it is a
fact, that we are one with nature at this level gives us no ethical guidance at
all, for so too are murderers, logging companies and industrialists. As
Zimmerman puts it: "[i]t is important to remember that relationships can only
obtain between individuals that have some measure of importance and
reality of their own." 52 This is not to say that the perception that we form a
part of a greater whole will always be morally insignificant. Such a view may
for example lead to the valuing of nature as a whole system. The
acknowledgement of holism may be central to particular ethical ideals in
- 16Callicott's philosophy is actually inspired by a reading of quantum physics through the
spectacles of Eastern religious traditions. See his 'The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology'.
50 J. Baird Callicott 'Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics' p. 274.
51 ibid., p. 275.
52 Zimmerman op. cit., n.37 above, Though why Zimmerman thinks that ethical
relationships have to be between individuals is unclear.
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other ways, as it was for the stoics and Spinoza." However, by itself,
Callicott's holism cannot give us any ethical guidance. To live in the world we
need to act differentially to parts of it. We have to relate on a human scale
with whales, mountains and other humans. Environmental ethics must be
about comprehending conflicting possibilities in our relations with our
environment. The existence of physical links does not necessitate that
conflict with our environment will cease or that, upon realising these links,
people will automatically come to respect 'nature'. As Freya Mathews has
pointed out, if we hold that we are one with nature,
"...if we identify deeply enough with such an indestructible nature,
seeing our Earth as a single manifestation of an infinite, inexhaustible
principle, a cosmic principle of life, then this alleviates our angst and
despair at the prospect of eco-catastrophe, because it means that eco-
catastrophe does not spell the "death of nature" in its widest sense." 54
Further, in terms of quantum physics it is very difficult to talk about
environmental destruction at all. The destruction entailed when a beefburger
is produced via a circuitous route from forest, to grassland, to cattle, cannot
be expressed in terms of quanta. It can only be expressed in terms of the
forest itself. Fundamental ethical dilemmas are left entirely unaltered by this
,
egocentric holism. Callicott's version of egoism is not itself unproblematic.
An egocentric holism could just as easily support a complete disrespect for
the surrounding world on the grounds that as the world is a part of my body it
is mine to do with as I wish.
53 A. A. Long Hellenistic Philosophy chapter 4, especially section 50
54 Freya Mathews 'Conservation and Self-Realisation: A Deep Ecology Perspective
ppo347-348o
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Callicott's holism is only partly based on quantum physics. It also rests upon
what might be termed eco-holism. Here the science appealed to is ecology
rather than physics. Ecology, it is claimed, reveals our place in nature as a
locus in an interdependent network of crqanlsms." This interdependency
should lead us to re-evaluate the worth of other natural things and see
ourselves as just one amongst many. Again, this may be true and have
important metaphorical and practical implications, but it seems far from clear
that it has any necessary ethical implications. One could clearly grasp an
ecological understanding of our place in nature and yet still treat other
organisms as mere means to human ends.
The eco-holist view reaches its scientistic apex in the Gaia hypothesis of
Lovelock which sees the earth as one giant self-regulating orqarusm."
Importantly, however, Lovelock differs radically from Callicott in resisting the
temptation to exaggerate the importance of humanity. In Lovelock's system it
is "Gaia" - the Earth itself - which will carry on whether or not humanity
survives. Lovelock is concerned to stress the scientific nature of his theory
and in his later work at least regards his theory as having no necessary
ethical implications. He states that "there is no prescription for living with
Gaia only consequences." 57 As Lovelock remarks, with only mild
approbation, some of his 'followers' have however taken his theory on a
different level as a mystical concept entailing specific modes of treating the
world. Lovelock's tacit approval for the mystical interpretation of his work
seems to stem from a pragmatic approach towards influencing others to care
- gg For more advanced formulations of eco-holism see Arne Naess 1984 'A Defence of the
Deep Ecology Movement' and Andrew Brennan Thinking About Nature.
56 J. E. Lovelock Gaia, A New Look At The Earth.
57 J. E. Lovelock The Ages Of Gaia p. 225.
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for their environment. For example, Christians might be persuaded to see the
Virgin Mary as embodied in Gaia and thus come to change environmentally
destructive practices. Whilst the mystical interpretation of GAIA will no doubt
appeal to some as a possible ecosophy, those of a less pantheistic bent will
remain unimpressed. In any event, this once again raises Freya Mathews
point about the dangers in assuming that a metaphysics need deliver a
specific set of normative morals.
Perhaps it is necessary here to return to points made earlier about humanist
dichotomies. Much intellectual energy has been expended on producing
arguments that purport to prove our close affinity, or unity with nature. This is
motivated by the thought that such affinities will lead to our valuing nature.
But, in some circumstances exactly the opposite is the case. Cravings for
affinities with nature are frequently another way of shoring up beliefs in the
centrality of the human species as the key figure in a web of nature. This
comforting myth finds reflections of humanity throughout nature's creations,
an anthropomorphism as well as anthropocentrism.
For example, the mystical interpretation of Lovelock's hypothesis is closely
akin to the pantheistic holism of Rom~ntics like William Wordsworth. In an
essay entitled "Wordsworth in the tropics" Aldous Huxley makes points
relevant to this argument about humanism and anti-humanism. He writes:
"It is only very occasionally that he [Wordsworth] admits the existence
in the world around him of those 'unknown modes of being' of which
our immediate intuitions of things make us so disquietingly aware.
Normally what he does is to pump the dangerous unknown out of
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nature and refill the emptied forms of hills and woods, flowers and
waters with something more reassuringly familiar - with humanity, with
Anglicanism. He will not admit that a yellow primrose is simply a
yellow primrose -beautiful but essentially strange, having its own
alien life apart. He wants it to possess some sort of a soul, to exist
humanly, not simply flowerily ... But the life of vegetation is radically
unlike the life of man.
The jungle is marvellous, fantastic, beautiful, but it is also terrifying, it
is also profoundly sinister. There is something in what, for want of a
better word, we must call the character of great forests ...which is
foreign, appalling, fundamentally and utterly inimical to intruding
man." 58
Later, he writes:
"A few months in the jungle would have convinced him [Wordsworth]
that the diversity and utter strangeness of nature are at least as real
and significant as its intellectually discovered unity "[my emphasis]"
We can now reconsider the general humanist rationale I have outlined
bearing Huxley's comments in mind. What we need to do, to borrow a
phrase from Kipling, is to let the jungl~ into our conslderanons." Jungle
epitomises, or at least epitomised in Kipling's era, wildness, ferocity, the
power of nature, the unexplained, the untamable, that part of nature over
which humans lacked control. It is a particular historical representation of the- Bi Aldous Huxley 'Wordsworth In The Tropics'. Stephen Clark pers. comm. has pointed out
that the "unknown modes of being" Huxley quotes from the Prelude (In. 393) is, in fact,
followed by a reference to mountains as =; huge and mighty forms, that do not live like living
men ..."
58 Aldous Huxley 'Wordsworth In The Tropics' p. 883.
eo Rudyard Kipling The Second Jungle Book.
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'otherness' of nature, the alien character described by Huxley. In our own
case let it refer to the deserts, the oceans and all the remnants of wilderness
left in the world, however small.
I want to suggest that the reasons for valuing the jungle or the primrose, the
desert or Antarctica are manifold and often concerned more with our
perception of their disparity from humanity than any affinities, whether these
are natural or intellectually contrived." However, one point of this thesis is to
subvert the whole enterprise of providing necessary criteria, or grounds for
moral considerability. The methods of humanist philosophy which depend
upon shared common features, (even shared 'otherness') reach the end of
the road where the jungle begins. They were never compelling in any case.
They serve only to impose too rigid a structure upon our moral beliefs and
values. If moral consideration is to be extended to non-humans this has to
be done not on the contrived and spurious basis of shared properties but on
due recognition of other natural phenomena for their differences as well as
their similarities and the many and varied ways we can relate to them.
The thesis of the expanding circle provides a graphic representation of
anthropocentrism. Humanity sits at the centre of a concentrically ordered
-
II It would however be wrong to take the present argument as putting forward 'alien
otherness' as itself a criterion for moral considerability. The perception of something as 'other'
does, in certain contexts lead to its being ethically valued, (e,g. Iris Murdoch makes the point
that, "More naturally, as well as more properly, we take a self-forgetful pleasure in the sheer
alien pointless independent existence of animals, birds, stones and trees." The Sovereignty
of Good p. 85. ) but it is by no means necessary that it should do so. As Stephen Clark points
out, 'Gaia and the Forms of Life' p. 187, our valuation of the environment as 'other' may be
dented when we realise that it now survives only by human protection. How alien is an area
enclosed in barbed wire or patrolled by uniformed rangers? This sort of question raises
problems for anyone wishing to treat 'otherness' as a criterion of moral considerability.
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nature, as the archetype of ethical value, both the measure and the measurer
of all things. In its theoretical development the humanist rationale develops
an abstract and unworkable egalitarianism. In practice, the greater the
difference between 'us' and 'them' the less is the gravitational pull on our
moral faculties. In reality the periphery of moral considerability is determined
by whatever arbitrary feature or concept we are happiest with in any given
historical and cultural circumstance. The continual discovery of new and
'better' demarcation principles is a fiction, a "Just So Story" to use another of
Kipling's phrases. In its dependence upon an a-contextual rationality it
ignores the vital place that context plays in our ascription of values.
This is no way to treat nature with respect. Nor will it provide any better a
barrier to habitat destruction than human utility. It is a parody of our ethical
valuation of nature on much the same level that Walt Disney's 'Jungle Book'
is a parody of Kipling's book, a cartoon fulfilling our inclinations to
anthropomorphize everything: the pyromaniac apes who want to be 'men'
[sic], the bear that wears a grass skirt. These sanitised symbols show nature
with a human face, obeying human rationales. The Walt Disney of humanist
philosophy allows us both to subjugate the' otherness' of nature and to
simplify ethical complexities into categories of the morally considerable and
those beyond the pale.
A striking feature of Kipling's jungle is its otherness. The wolves are wolves
and have their own world-view, the law of the jungle. Perhaps the only long
term chance for the survival of the jungle lies in us coming to see it as being
of intrinsic value on its own terms. The jungle offers us a chance to escape
a world where all we see reflects "humanity" back at us. The
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appropriateness of using ethical language in discussions of environmental
concerns lies not in the similarity of the moral objects to ourselves, but in
morality's ability to express concerns about a wider community, a community
not of equals but of inter-relationships. What we need to do is to let the
jungle into our moral considerations. If we have a passion for wilderness it
will not be stemmed by the humanist who calls us unreasonable. If it is
unreasonable to value rivers, if mountains are not morally considerable and
deserts not intrinsically valuable to humanists, that is because they have too
narrow a vision. Their eyes are closed.
To quote Bagheera: "We of the jungle know that man is the wisest of all. If
we trusted our ears we should know that of all things he is most foolish." 82
There is thus a need to put philosophical ethics into context: to try and
account for its apparent success and failures in capturing our ethical
intuitions as they pertain to our relations with our environment. This
contextualisation requires that philosophy becomes reflexive - throws over its
grandiose claims to universal significance and accounts for its 'stories' in
terms other than their being the logical working out of disinterested reason. It
requires a theorisation of society itself, and of society's place in historical and
natural environments.
62 Kipling op. cit., n. 60 above.
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CHAPTER 3: ALTHUSSER AND ANTI-HUMANISM.
Preliminaries
The previous chapters suggested that humanist theoretical frameworks are
too restrictive and carry too many anthropocentric presuppositions to provide
a paradigm within which our ethical concerns about the non-human
environment can be successfully accommodated. For this reason I now turn
to an examination of alternative paradigms which deconstruct and
recontextualise the roles of rationality and the human subject especially in
relation to the formation of values. The anti-humanism of Louis Althusser,
described in this chapter, provides a starting point for this critique of
humanism. Indeed this is how Althusser viewed his own work, claiming that
he made the ..... struggle against the world outlook [of] ...Economism (today
'technology') and it's spiritual complement Ethical Idealism (today
'Humanism')" central to his philosophy.'
In Althusser's terms "Humanism is the characteristic feature of the ideological
problematic from which Marx emerged and more generally, of most of
modern society." 2 To use another of his phrases it is the "very element and
1 Louis Althusser Lenin and Philosophy and other Essaysp. 20.
2 Glossary For Marx. "This concert is dominated by a single score, occasionally disturbed
by contradictions (those of the remnants of former ruling classes. those of the proletarians and
their organisations): the score of the Ideology of the current ruling class which integrates into
its music the great themes of the Humanism of the Great Forefathers. who produced the
Greek Miracle even before Christianity. and afterwards the Glory of Rome. the Eternal City. and
the themes of interest particular and general, etc .• nationalism. moralism and economism."
Althusser op. cit .• n.1 above. p. 146.
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atmosphere indispensable" 3 to modern life. This humanist ideology lies
hidden within the complex intellectual heritage of modern Western societies.
For most people living in these societies humanist ideology operates to
ensure that the elements of humanism listed in chapter 1, are simply
accepted as common sense. They constitute the repertoire of unnoticed and
unquestioned presuppositions underlying everyday life. These
presuppositions, although frequently unrecognised, nonetheless direct and
confine our activities and thoughts in certain specific ways. In unconsciously
structuring our relations to society and the environment, they do not just
provide a framework which facilitates the resolution of practical problems but
also exclude, by their very nature, a variety of other ways of comprehending
that problem.
As we shall see, one of the great merits of Althusser's account of ideology is
its ability to explain both the production of individuals and the reproduction of
society and its associated values. The importance of Althusser lies in his
introduction of the components of an anti-humanist conceptual repertoire
and the synthesis of these into a unitary explanatory framework.'
The (omni) presence of humanist ideol,ogy within the current structure of
discourses and practices has important implications for anti-humanism. It
brings into question the very nature of theory itself and thus the
epistemological status of a theoretical anti-humanism. Can a theoretical
perspective, like Althusser's, which recognises the pervasive nature of
ideology, claim the luxury of an objective or external standpoint from which to
3 Louis Althusser ForMarxp. 232.
4 Although some might thus see Althusser as unwittingly engaged in a form of humanism
himself in this attempt to produce a "grand theory".
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criticise humanist presuppositions? Discourses which attempt to identify and
criticise elements of humanism seem themselves to be tied to a language
and philosophical practice soaked in humanist presuppositions. Given the
global dispersal of Western culture we might all, to some degree, be held to
be influenced by humanism. Even anti-humanism seems, by its very
opposition to humanist tenets to depend critically, to a degree, upon those
tenets - it is constrained by the same dialogical structures. Althusser posits a
radical and revolutionary "epistemological break" with past ideological
discourses to overcome this problem. Chapter 4 will, to some extent,
question the nature of this break arguing that anti-humanism is not radically
new, it does not come from nowhere. Rather, it evolved out of the humanist
problematic and in opposition to the humanist problematic. I claim that the
evolution of theoretical paradigms takes place within the limits of our past
thoughts and practices much as the biological evolution of species is
constrained by its raw material, by previous bodily anatomies and behaviour
patterns. This biological analogy can be stretched further. Just as the
evolutionary adaptation of species takes place against a background of
changing environments, the varieties of anti-humanism now current might be
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seen as theoretical responses to our changing environment."
The term "anti-humanism" is most frequently associated with French
structuralist and post-structuralist philosophy. For example, David Hoy refers
to Derrida's philosophy as an "anti-humanism" which he then defines by a
number of features.s Amongst these are Derrida's rejection, following
Heiddegger, of any philosophy of universal essences, especially a universal
human essence. Derrida deconstructs the human "subject" as the given
basis for theoretical abstraction, both in terms of the concept of a
transcendental human individual unchanged by historical or social
circumstance and in terms of the primacy of the ego, the constituting
consciousness of the subject. As Hoy points out, anti-humanists like Derrida
are also frequently critical of the idea of epistemological and socio-historical
progress. They reject a conception of reason as a neutral instrument to be
utilised by disciplines like philosophy and the sciences to unravel the nature
5 The positions termed humanism and anti-humanism represent not so much two
antithetical polarities but the present reformulation of debates constrained by their history, the
playing out of previous ideological preconceptions through discourses marked by their
insistent use of dichotomous categories. The current debate between modernism and
postrnodernism might be seen as just one more evolutionary (and non teleological) stage in
this process. There are few writers who could be said to be anti-humanist in repudiating all the
aspects of humanism characterised in chapter 1 and even the most optimistic humanist may
sometimes express doubts about central tenets of their faith.
Contemporary anti-humanism is not a developmental stage in a linear progression from
ancient Greece to mediaeval Italy to the Twentieth Century France of Derrida, Levi-Strauss and
Althusser. I shall argue that current dissatisfaction with the mainstream humanist tradition has
its roots in complex interactions between its component parts influenced by, and in turn
influencing, the societies and environments of which they form a part (and from which they are
only analytically separable).
6 David Hoy 'Derrida'.
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of the world and humanity.'
The anti-humanism of Althusser is particularly important in terms of i). his
holistic and anti-reductionist social theory, ii). his decentering of the abstract
humanist subject, iii). Althusser's concept of ideology as lived experience
and its relation to the internalisation of ethical values, and iv). his
epistemology. This chapter focuses on each of these aspects in turn,
showing how they inter-relate and provide a distinctive critique of humanism.
Althusser's own assumptions will be critically examined in the chapters that
follow.
If, as chapter 1 suggested, humanism developed in the cities, was
dependent upon Western civilisation and achieved its most explicit
formulation at the height of the industrial revolution (I am particularly thinking
of philosophers like Auguste Comte heres ), it is unsurprising that problems
with that industrial civilisation might lead to a questioning and re-formulation
of its basic tenets. If, as others have suggested, theoretical humanism can
be seen as providing an acceptable philosophy and polity for the new
industrial age then, in some senses, anti-humanism might be seen as part of
our dissatisfaction with that same lndustrlal age and the dubious benefits
which science and human egoism have produced. Anti-humanism as a
deconstructive practice may be a philosophy for the strange situation we now
find ourselves in where industry consumes the surrounding world in a vain
attempt to outrun environmental changes.
,--
7 These anti-humanist concerns can be seen in (oppositional) relation to the list of
humanist features in chapter one.
8 See Ronald Fletcher's remarks in his introduction to The Crisis of Industrial Civilisation:
The Early Essays of Auguste Comte.
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The Western Marxist tradition, in which Althusser developed, represents a
body of thought which is at once antithetical to many aspects of humanism,
e.g. the object / subject divide, and yet Marxism is internally riven by its
attempts to both distance itself from and contain its own humanist
assumptions. Western Marxism, though breaking with certain aspects of the
humanist paradigm, is still intimately connected to it. Even Marxists who are
aware of the destructive aspects of modern society remain humanists in
other ways. Thus Marcuse can state that
"...socialism is humanism in as much as it organises the social division
of labour, the 'realm of necessity' so as to enable men to satisfy their
social and individual needs ..." 9
In other words, according to Marcuse, socialism sees society as to be
organised with certain progressive aims in mind - aims to be reached by an
organisational rather than a technological fix. Marcuse's rejection of
technical 'progress' does not mean that he rejects the concept of progress
itself out of hand. In one sense this is inevitable for, insofar as the concept of
progress implies the possibility of change for the better, it seems to be a
necessary part of any opposition to current trends in society.
Althusser. Spinoza and Environmental Ethics
Any theoretical discourse will consist of a framework of concepts in structural
relations to each other - relations which dictate both the meaning of those
concepts, and, the questions, interests and presuppositions appropriate to
e Herbert Marcuse 'Socialist Humanism?' p. 99.
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the theory as a whole. These relational frameworks, or 'problematics',
exclude certain possibilities from consideration, make some concepts
central, others peripheral and so create a position, "a particular unity of a
theoretical formation", which "bi nds" those who use it. The problematic is not
just a theoretical tool to be applied to the world but the framework in which
problems develop and within which proposed solutions are judged. A
problematic both creates and emphasises particular theoretical relations to
the world."
This thesis appropriates certain concepts from the work of Louis Althusser
and is thus, to an extent bound by his problematic. This problematic is a
theoretical framework which brings to the foreground certain philosophical
themes and conflicts, questions of "humanism" and "anti-humanism", the role
of ideology, economism, metaphysical holism and the links between
philosophy and poutlcal practice. Althusser takes an original approach to
these issues which are central to contemporary debates within
environmental ethics. However, he was committed to posing these questions
from within what was, in some respects at least, an orthodox Marxism. He
has little to say directly about ethics and his concerns are primarily with the
internal relations of human societies rather than relations between humanity
and nature. For this reason, when some of Althusser's concepts are
adoptedin later chapters they will also be adapted, stretched beyond their
original 'places' in his problematic. The boundary between appropriation
(devoting to special purposes) and expropriation (taking away) is easily
10 In this sense the term "problematic" has close affinities with what Imre Lakatos refers to
as a research programme. See Imre Lakatos & A Musgrave eds., Criticism and the Growth of
Knowledge and W. H. Newton-Smith The Rationality of Science chapter 4.
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crossed, for a change of use inevitably implies a change of meeninq" A
different, (theoretical) context necessarily implies a displacement of concept,
(a connection made in Oerrida's term "differance")12 The problematic
outlined in later chapters is not identical with Althusser's and insofar as it
covers different territory, its concepts come to form a different structure of
inter-relations, and hence acquire different meanings and emphases." Thus
whilst this thesis is indebted to Althusser, and strives to avoid
misrepresenting his ideas, there will be some necessary theoretical
differences. Analogously, Althusser's terminology represents his own
reading and development of his varied precursors, of whom Spinoza, Marx,
Comte, Bachelard and Lacan were perhaps the most influential.
Considerations of Althusser almost invariably focus upon his union of
Marxism and Structuralism. His philosophical merit is frequently judged from
the standpoint of one or other of these theoretical systems, or by his
'success' at producing a palatable blend of the two. That these criteria
should predominate is partly the fault of Althusser himself, for he was always
concerned to remain within an orthodox Marxist framework, so much so that
11 Ludwig Wittgenstein Phi/osophica//nvestigations.
12 Oifferance (with an a) "is the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, of
the spacing ... by which elements refer to each other." Jacques Oerrida quoted in John
Sturrock ed., Structuralism and Since p. 165.
13 Althusser's textual comparison of Marxist and Hegelian concepts in his essay
'Contradiction and Overdetermination' (op.cit., n. 3 above, pp. 87-128.) applies this notion of
problematic. He rejects any idea of transferring the 'essential' meaning of a concept to a
different theoretical framework merely by using the same word. In this particular case he
denies that Marx's conception of the "dialectic" can be simp/yan inversion of Hegel's. The
structural role of Hegel's dialectic, is different having an "intimate and close relatiorl' ibid., p.
104., with his world outlook. The concept, "dialectic" is not extracted pure and simple and
inserted unchanged, or even simp/yinverted, into a new theoretical framework, rather it is the
concept's relations to other parts of the whole framework which gives it the meaning it has.
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he became one of the most effective Marxist critics of his own work.
Retrospectively his early work came to be seen as infected with
Structuralism. Friend and foe alike seem to agree that
"His "flirtation with structuralist terminology", as he was later to admit
did much to make him successful - there are fashions in philosophy as
in everything else - but I fear it will do little for his survivaL" 14
Merquior notes, in a particularly vitriolic article, that "Althusser got rid of the
humanist rhetoric only to plug Marxism into structuralist phobias." 15 The
division is made even clearer in Assiter. "I believe, in so far as Althusser is a
Structuralist, he is not a follower of Marx and vice versa. II 18 But to judge
Althusser in this limited fashion is to miss both his immense creative
originality, and to underestimate the variety of influences upon his work. First
amongst these, after Marx, is Baruch Spinoza whose affinities with
structuralism, post-structuralism and critical theory are only just beginning to
be fully appreciated." Much of the revival of interest in Spinoza amongst
contemporary French philosophers like Balibar and Macherey is directly due
to Althusser's influence. I will argue that structural and Spinozistic elements
- 14 Andre Comte-Sponville 'A Shattered Master's Truth'
15J. G. Merquior Western Marxismp. 147.
16 Alison Assiter Althusser and Feminism p. 7.
17See for example Christopher Norris Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory.
Althusser explicitly records the importance of Spinoza for himself and Marx,especially in
relation to epistemology, "If we want a historical predecessor to Marx in this respect we must
appeal to Spinoza rather than Hegel", ForMarx op.cit., n.2 above, p. 78n. and, "I cannot hide
the fact that in this matter [the question of knowledge] I depended heavily on Spinoza.
Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientistsp. 224. See also Louis
Althusser Elements of Self Criticism pp .132-141 .
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are central, not peripheral, to Althusser's theoretical concerns." To believe
that one can ignore these components is to demean his contribution to both
Marxism and philosophy in general, it is to mistake a part of his theoretical
problematic for the whole. Only with the inclusion of structural and
Spinozistic perspectives can Althusser's anti-humanism and other central
theoretical concerns make sense.
Althusser suffers four-fold from contemporary philosophy.
First, orthodox Marxists condemn his theoretical writings for their perceived
misinterpretation of Marx's texts - especially his thesis of a radical break in
the nature and epistemological status of Marx's works before and after 1845.
Second, humanist Marxists see in his theoretical anti-humanism a return to a
reactionary orthodoxy, a defence of Stalinism or Maoism.1Q It is notable that,
despite the divisions between these "orthodox" and largely "humanist"
schools of Marxist thought, they both agree that Althusser erred in his
(supposed) separation of theory from "revolutionary practice".20
Third, he is completely ignored or marginalised by those in non-Marxist
academic circles working within a Spinozistic framework. Environmental
"ln contrast John Mepham holds that "[i]n fact almost everything in For Marx survives a
Criticism of the structuralist general concept of practice" and that "Althusser's anti-humanism is
not specifically dependent on his use of the concepts of his analogy" [between Marxist and
structuralist concepts] 'Who Makes History: Althusser's Anti-humanism' p. 23.
10e.g. E. P. Thompson The Poverty of Theory.
20 Thus Michael Young, a humanist Marxist can say "I think Althusser's work, at least in the
way it has been taken over by English Marxist intellectuals, has been almost as much an
obstacle for developing a theory that might inform revolutionary practice as the dogmas of
Stalinistic orthodoxy that Althusser sought to oppose." 'Althusser's Marxism and British Social
SCience' p. 130. His other grounds for criticising Althusser are his academicism leading to a
concentration upon theory rather than practice, his structuralist orientation and the theoretical
opacity of his ideas and language Le. his elitism. He also charges, (quite rightly) that
Althusser's views may help develop a "highly sophisticated relativism". ibid., p. 129.
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ethics must be the example par excellence of this phenomenon,"
Fourth, there is a new generation of philosophers who, unacquainted with
his work, merely consider him as an influence on Foucault and other 'post-
structuralists', a superseded stage in their own 'progressive' development.
There is also a fifth line of attack that does not deserve philosophical
attention. This merely consists in personal abuse against both him and his
followers. All invariably mention his murder of his wife Helene in the tragic
circumstances of a mental breakdown in 1980. This has no possible bearing
upon his theoretical work of the previous decade."
Structure and the Social Formation
Althusser's social holism is analogous to, and in part derived from, Spinoza's
metaphysical holism and closely aligned to Structuralism. Norris states that
"Althusser goes so far as to claim that Spinoza was a veritable structuralist
avant la lettre" 23 The temptation to read Spinoza in this light can be easily
appreciated in passages such as:
"[t]he reason why a circle or a triangle exists, or why it does not exist,
21 For example, Arne Naess has made a great deal of use of Spinoza. 'Spinoza and
Ecology' in S. Hessing ed. Speculum Spinozarum 1677-1977. See also Genevieve Lloyd
'Spinoza's Environmental Ethics'.
22 Merquior says" For a time Althusser's structural Marxism passed for a powerful
sophistication of Marxism in the form of a long overdue epistemology of social science. That
such an impression could ever have been entertained says much about the degree of
philosophical literacy [in 1960's France]. ... For in reality Althusser's science-mongering was
no sophistication. Rather it was sophistry." Western Marxism op. cit., pp.152-153. He also
states, "Althusser was for a while a patient of Lacan - which apparently did not prevent him from
strangling Mme. Althusser." Ibid. p. 149.
23 Christopher Norris Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory p. 35.
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does not follow from the nature of these things, but from the orderof
the whole corporeal nature." 24
That it is the relations between the parts of a complex and dynamic whole
which dictate the nature of those parts is a sine qua non of structuralist
problematics. Objects do not have an unchangeable essence or preexisting
form. In Spinoza's case this ''whole" is the monistic substance of God or
Nature (the terms being interchangeable). In Althusser's case the whole is
the complex material fabric of a society at a given historical period. This
synchronic view of society is referred to as a "social formation" (formation
sociale). Brewster, with Althusser's explicit approval, defines the social
formation as
"The concrete, complex whole comprising economic practice, political
practice and ideological practice at a certain place and stage of
development." 25
Althusser adds, "A concept denoting 'society' so called." 26 Although the
social formation is to be understood as a synchronic cross section of society
it incorporates that society's past history. It is historicised just as for Spinoza
the present condition of the world is historically determined by what has
gone before. Spinoza, Althusser and structuralist theorists like Levi Strauss
all claim that parts of society (or the w9rld) can only be understood in terms
of their relations to each other and the whole. Nothing is complete in itself
except the whole system. Correspondingly, the "whole" is not reified as an
object itself, it is simply the totality of these relations and configurations.
There is also a parallel between Althusser's and Spinoza's metaphysical
24 Baruch Spinoza The Ethics and Selected Letters Pt. 1, Prop. 11, 0.2. [my emphasis]
25 Ben Brewster 'Glossary' in Althusser op. cit., n. 3 above.
26 ibid., p. 251.
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holism and their holistic epistemologies. Just as the meaning and adequacy
of a theoretical term is is dictated by its "place" in relation to other terms in a
problematic so objects are determined, to a degree, by their place in the
structure of nature as a whole. If "... by substance they would understand
that which is in itself and conceived through itself; that is that the knowledge
of which does not require the knowledge of any other thing", 27 then as
Spinoza makes plain, this only applies to Nature as a whole. "There can be,
or be conceived, no other substance but God." 28
Althusser's view of social formations as a complex whole implies a radical
anti-reductionism, a refusal to reduce anyone sphere of activity completely
to any other, a refusal to accept that anyone sphere can be explained and
understood completely in terms of any other. This is very different from a
common interpretation of Marxism which argues a one-way and rigorous
causal determination of the superstructure by the economic base (the base
being the economic modes and relations of production, the superstructure
being culture, theory, politics etc.). Such a simple reductionism is patently
inadequate for understanding the complex and multifarious interactions of
the superstructural components of societies. Althusser's structural
conception of social formations is a radical emendation of the inaccurate
oversimplification inherent in the naive interpretation of the base /
superstructure model. In contrast, he recognises that superstructural
components have important and direct effects both upon each other and
reciprocally upon the economic base. These components are also partly
self-constituting, they have a relative autonomy. They are not reducible to
" .....____---~~---~-
27 Spinoza op. cit., n. 24 above, Pt.1, Prop. 7, Scol. 2.
28 ibid., Pt. 1, Prop. 14.
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one another, but nor can they be understood in isolation from each other.
Like Spinoza's modes they do not act or exist solely from their own nature.
The components of the whole are determined by the structure of the whole.
Just as Spinoza's modes "are in something else and ... conceived through
something else" 29 so Althusser's social components ("practices", "levels" or
"instances") are in social formations and conceived through their respective
roles in them.
Althusser recognises four principal and relatively autonomous "practices" in
society, the economic, the political, the ideological and the theoretical. Each
practice is a "process of transformation of a determinate raw material into a
determinate product, a transformation effected by a determinate human
labour using determinate means (of 'production')" 30 The transformations
undergone at each level are theoretically analogous but the elements of the
process change in each case. For example, political practice transforms its
raw material, "social relations", to new social relations whereas, in ideology,
the 'object' of transformation is human consciousness. These practices
together form the complex unity of "social practice". (See fig. 1.)
Althusser introduces a relatively autonomous theoretical sphere in addition
to the three "levels" recognised by Engels and Marx. These "levels" are not
simple but are in turn composed of relatively autonomous aspects. Thus
ideology includes practices such as ethics, religions etc. which can each, to
"------_r-::-:"-:--:~---=~___=_
20 ibid., Pt. 1, Defn.5.
30 Althusser op. en, n. 3 above, p. 166. Althusser utilises Marx's concept of "labour" as the
determinate mode of transformation to enable him to theorise a series of practices - each with
their own form of labour operating alongside each other. Thus political, ideological and
theoretical practices become modes of production in their own right relatively independent of
the economic mode of production. (See fig. 1.)
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a degree, be considered in their own right.
Althusser's "practices" do not develop evenly alongside one another or even
have equal and opposite effects upon each other. They are not the
mechanistic billiard balls of Newtonian physics but the relational 'modes' of
Spinoza's Ethics. They are not elements but dynamic, changing and inter-
related components. These components of social formations differ in their
capacities to affect each other in different eras and societies. The relative
balance between components thus varies from social formation to social
formation. This apparently reduces the importance of the economic level to a
historically transient dominance of society in capitalist societies, robbing
Marxism of one of its characteristic features, its explanation of social features
by reference to the economic base. An acceptance that "[t]here is only and
always a complex articulation of determination and levels" appears to be a
denial of economics' absolute given privilege in determining the forms taken
by the other levels of society. Having gone so far Althusser has to engage in
some verbal qualifications to retain his Marxist credentials. He reinstates
economic privilege by emphasising, with Engels, that the economic is
determining "in the last instance": that after all, the economic is somehow
'transcendentally' dominant in aI/social formations. Thus despite Althusser's
recognition of the fragmentation of the modern social formation into disparate
practices, he still tries to retain a social 'totality', a totality bound together, in
the last instance, by the economy.
The tension, made explicit in the formula "in the last instance", between
Marxist and Spinozist influences is never fully resolved in Althusser's work.
This formula marks only the most obvious example of Althusser's many
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conceptual elisions, his continual changes of emphasis to try and satisfy two
conflicting strains of thought. To satisfy Marxist criteria the economic level of
all social formations must be finally determining "in the last instance", but to
retain his structural conception of a complex whole Althusser states that
"From the very first moment to the last, the lonely hour of the 'last instance'
never comes"." The economic instance only exists in relation to the other
levels of society, it cannot be taken out of society and examined in isolation.
Althusser's elision, both reducing and retaining the efficacy of an economic
analysis, did not satisfy the more conservative upholders of dogmatic
Marxism.
Orthodox Marxism had a deep influence upon Althusser, as his retention of
membership of the French communist party (P.C. F.) in the late 1960's (a
time of disillusionment with all forms of centralised authority) attests. As the
tide of criticism enveloped his earlier works he began to cover their radical
and structuralist implications with a veneer of orthodoxy, starting with his
preface to the Italian edition of Reading Capital and English editions of For
Marx and culminating in a series of essays in sslt-crtttclsrn." It is, however,
my contention that despite first appearances these autocritiques are rarely
more than changes of emphasis and do not alter the fundamental structure of
the problematic outlined in the essays of For Marx and in Reading Capital.
Althusser, like Lukacs and so many other Marxists before him, makes a
public recantation of the heretical tenets of his philosophy. A close reading
of Althusser's work reveals that Structuralism and Spinoza continue to be
key components of even his last works. This creates a continual and
--------w~~~~----------Si 'b'd 113I I "p, '
32 Some collected later as Louis Althusser Elements of Self-Criticism,
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unresolved tension between Marxist (orthodox positivist and humanist
Hegelian) elements of his thought and Spinozist and structuralist elements
which are, after all, what makes his reading of Capital at all different from
previous interpretations of Marxism. His works become increasingly full of
difficult conceptual balancing tricks, sleights of hand and necessary
ambiguities in an attempt to allow his work to be read as merely that of an
interpreter of Marx. Althusser's case is complicated by the conservative
aspects of his own thought which form one element of the inquisition. This
being said, the Spinozistic elements clearly win out against thoughtless
conformity; Althusser is not afraid to defend his holism and epistemology
against the orthodoxy of a John l.ewis." These defences, far from making
large concessions, are frequently rewordings of previous positions with the
addition of thinly veiled contempt for his opponents.
Social formations are then structured wholes, the parts of which have
determinate but changing relations to each other. The social formation is a
dynamic system and that dynamism is powered by the manner in which the
parts are constructed and articulate with each other. Social formations are
not merely conglomerations of a few fixed components found in different
proportions and differently arranged ln-contrastlnq epochs. Changes in the
structural relations between components mean that both their content and
their articulation into the social whole are changed accordingly. The way
each component is articulated into the social whole is referred to as a
"contradiction". The structure of social formations is such that the
components do not develop evenly. This is the universal "law of uneven
33Louis Althusser Essays on Ideology pp. 61-139.
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development"." Some components have more influence than others, and
there will always be a dominant contradiction in all societies although the
particular contradiction in dominance vanes." In capitalist societies it is the
articulation of the economic "level" which is dominant. The particular forms
in which the components articulate at a given time necessitate that one
contradiction becomes structurally dominant. The social formation is a
'structure a dominante'. "[T]he complex whole has the unity of a structure
articulated in dominance"." Which contradiction dominates is the result of
'overdetermination' (Uberdeterminierung, a term borrowed from the
psychology of Freud). Put simply, a number of structural components stand
in such a relation to each other that their contradictions combine to
collectively cause a particular effect - which is the relative dominance of one
contradiction over all the others.
Overdetermination also has a second connotation which conveys a sense of
redundancy" Not all components will be necessary to bring about a
particular structure, contradictions need not work 'additively' to promote a
structure in dominance, some may act synergistically or induce cascade
effects, whilst others are of negligible importance. The effects of these
contradictions ramify throughout the entire system in a determinate manner
- saAlthusser op. cit., n.3 above, p. 201.
35 "[T]he dominant element is not fixed for all time, it varies according to the
overdetermination of the contradictions and their uneven development." ibid., p. 255.
36 ibid., p. 203. It is never explained why only one contradiction can dominate rather than
two or more being of equal importance.
37 Sheelagh Strawbridge 'From 'Overdetermination' to 'Structural Causality': Some
Unresolved Problems in Althusser's Treatment of Causality' cites the following quotation from
Freud's "On Aphasici' as an example of this connotation. ''The safeguards of our speech
against breakdown appear overdetermined, and it can easily stand the loss of one or other
elements." p. 11.
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analogous to Spinoza's causal chains. Another psychological term used by
Althusser to express the emergence of a structure in dominance is
"condensation"." In its original context it identified the formation of a
symbolic meaning determined by "instinctual" (Le. material) effects. This
connotation of determination between relatively autonomous 'levels' is
important because it emphasises that overdetermination is a result of
interactions between radically different aspects of society. Condensation
and overdetermination are the necessary outcome of Althusser's social
interconnected whole.
" the mode of organisation and articulation of the complexity is
precisely what constitutes its unity." 39
Althusser is at pains to emphasise this distinction between his own Marxist
holism (which is a Spinozistic holism) and that of Hegel and other simplistic
substance monisms." It is the uneven development of the complex whole
qua structure in dominance which is, for Althusser, the important feature of
Marxist totalities.
"if the complex whole were taken as purely and simply the
development of one single essence or original and simple substance,
then at best we would slide back from Marx to Hegel, at worst, from
Marx to Haeckel! But to do so would be precisely to sacrifice the
special difference which distinguishes Marx from Hegel: the distance
which radically separates the Marxist type of unity from the Hegelian
,~----"Ir'::~-~~--
38 The use of this psychological terminology reflects the influence of Lacan upon
Althusser's thought.
30 Althusser op.cit., n. 3 above, p. 202.
40 Norris goes so far as to say "It is no exaggeration to say that the entire project of
Althusserian Marxism comes down to this issue of Spinoza versus Hegel." op. dt., n. 17
above, p. 35.
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type of unity, or the Marxist totality from the Hegelian totality." 41
There are many philosophies containing a concept of ''totality", but these
should not be confused with each other. The place of the concept ''totality'' in
the theoretical frameworks of Sartre, Hegel and Althusser determines its
meaning. All these ''totalities have in common is (1) a word; (2) a certain
unique conception of the unity of things; (3) some theoretical enemies." 42
The Hegelian totality is not structured in dominance, it does not develop
unevenly and has no principal contradiction, only reciprocally negating
contradictions. It is unified by the concept of a teleological Geist and as
such, the prinCiple of its organisation is an essentialist concept beyond
investigation. Althusser's structural and complex holism contrasts sharply
with this idealist conception.
Althusser does not suggest that structure is something separate from social
components but that it is immanent in the components' arrangement and
constitution. Again this is analogous to Spinoza for whom, "God is the
immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things." 43 The immanent cause of
Althusser's social formations is the structural articulation of the parts of those
social formations. We cannot look beneath the skin of society and expect to
find the structure labelled as if it were a feature on an anatomical atlas. This
structure is not like the "skeleton" or "musculature" of a body, but the
constitution and arrangement of the parts of the social components with
respect to each other and the whole. The structure is the synchronic
arrangement determining both the boundaries of any particular part, and its
relations to other parts in the whole body of society. The structure is not then
"Althusser op. cit., n. 3 above, pp. 202-203.
42ibid., p. 203. See also Martin Jay Marxism and Totality.
43Spinoza op. cit., n. 24 above, Pt. 1, Prop 18.
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a separable, preexisting cause, or (causa transiens), but an immanent
expression of the articulation of social practices with each other. Social
formations are not visible results of structural causes but rather the structure
is the relations between the parts in the whole. Thus Althusser says, ''the
superstructure is not the pure phenomena of the structure, it is also the
condition of its existence." 44
For Althusser as for Spinoza, "all things are determined ....not only to exist but
also to act in a definite way." 45 The forms things take and indeed their very
existence is determined by past relations within the complex whole. The
world and its contents unfold as they must, not teleologically but because,
"[t]hings could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any
other order than is the case." 46 What we think of as contingency is merely
due to our insufficient grasp of the causal inter-connectedness of events.
"Nothing in nature is contingent, but all things are from necessity of the divine
nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way." 47 A ''thing is termed
contingent for no other reason than the deficiency of our knowledge." 48
These Spinozistic points are echoed in Althusser. The structure in
dominance in any particular social formation can be investigated (using the
44Althusser op. cit., n. 3 above, p. 205.
45Spinoza op. cit., n. 24 above, Pt.1, Proof 29.
46 ibid., Pt. 1 , Prop 33. Jonathan Bennett, in A Study of Spinoza's Ethics discuses this at
length. But see especially p. 120.
47Spinoza op. cit., n. 24 above, Pt. 1, Prop. 29.
48ibid., Pt. 1, Prop. 33, Scol. 1. This deficiency of our knowledge is in turn a product of our
necessarily limited perspective as parts of the whole of nature. No God like view is possible
without actually being God i.e. the whole of nature. Any such view would have little
connection with our own very limited human form of understanding. We should not push our
anthropocentric perspectives to extremes and imagine that we have access to incontrovertible
truth.
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science of historical materialism) but if this structural dominance was merely
aleatory then no such science would be possible.
"For the domination of one contradiction over the others cannot, in
Marxism, be the result of a contingent distribution of different
contradictions." 49
Althusser, like Spinoza before him, is positing a material determinism, the
patterns of which theory can express insofar as it theorises the complex
whole. The link between uneven development, overdeterminancy and
immanence of structure is made by Althusser as follows.
"In this complex whole 'containing many contradictions' we cannot
'find' one contradiction that dominates the others as we might 'find' the
spectator a head taller than others in the grandstand at the stadium.
Domination is not just an indifferent fact, it is a fact essentia/to the
complexity itself. That is why complexity implies domination as one of
its essentials: It is inscribed in its structure." 50
In summary the metaphysical similarities between the systems of Spinoza
and Althusser are striking. Althusser's totality is contrasted with other
totalities like Hegel's because of its complexity and unevenness and it is
Spinoza not Hegel that Althusser reads as Marx's closest ally. Both Spinoza
and Althusser have conceptions of complex wholes which are deterministic,
dynamic and non-teleological and contain within themselves the structural
causes of their own formation. With this overview of Althusser's anti-
reductionist 'metaphysics' of society in mind we now turn to his anti-humanist
account of the human subject, an account that centres on his theory of
',-......
aoAlthusser op. cn., n. 3 above, p. 207.
50 ibid., p. 201.
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ideology.
Ideology and the Interpellation of the Subject.
The role and presence of ideology is central to Althusser's analysis of social
formations. The most extended formulation is to be found in his essay
"Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an
investiqation)"," which is concerned with the maintenance of power relations
within society over time, i.e. with the reproduction of particular modes and
relations of production.
Althusser makes a distinction between the organs of the State itself, the
police, army, government, administration etc. which he terms the "Repressive
State Apparatuses" (RSA's), and what he terms "Ideological State
Apparatuses" (ISA's). The latter are not usually under the direct control of the
state, tending to be defined as part of the private rather than the public
political domain. ISA's include institutions like the family, the media, trades
unions, religious organisations and education. Whereas the State functions
predominantly by repression, sometimes even violent repression, the ISA's
function predominantly by the transmission of ideology which in a class
society is always the ideology of the ruling classes. In modern capitalist
- s, Althusser op. cit., n. 33 above, pp. 1-60. This essay is occasionally taken to represent a
change in Althusser's concept of ideology from the earlier formulation found in For Marx and
Reading Capital. (See for example Ted Benton The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism:
Althusser and his influence pp. 96-107). The later formulation is, however, in no way
incompatible with these earlier works and is best seen as a politically orientated development
of them.
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states the LS.A.'s maintain the hegemony of the ruling classes, making the
present relations between the components of society seem natural and
unalterable. If a challenge to the prevailing ideology is strong enough then
the LS.A.'s will be supplemented when necessary by State repression. In
mediaeval society the foremost LS.A. was the church coupled with the family,
today, Althusser claims, it is the education-family couple.
Ideology functions, in all cases, as the 'cement' of society, binding it together
in common mythical representations of individuals, relationship to reality.
"[W]hat is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of real
relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary
relation of the individual to the real relations in which they live." 52
Humans necessarily live this imaginary relation. Ideology is not an illusory
brico/age of 'ideas', it is a /eve/of the structural complex whole, an immanent
part of social relations. Ideology then is a structurally immanent and
theoretically omnipresent feature of social formations. Ideology has a
material existence.
"..an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice or
practices. This existence is material." 53
The material existence of ideology cannot be identical in ontological terms
with that of 'solid' objects like paving stones. Althusser sees ideology as
existing in a different 'modality' from 'solid' objects, a modality which is
however rooted "in the last instance in 'physical' matter." 54 This distinction
between modalities should not be read as positing different kinds of material
- it does no such thing. There are two distinct aspects to the claim that
52 Althusser op. cit., n. 33 above, p. 39.
53 ibid., p. 40.
54 ibid., p. 40.
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ideology exists materially. First, it explains the causal links between the
'ideas' of experienced human consciousness and their inculcation via
ideological practice.
"ideas are his [sic] material actions inserted into material practices
governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the
material ideological apparatus from which derive the idea of that
subject. " 55
This emphasis upon materiality is not merely an attempt to counter the
philosophical idealism of Descartes or Hegel. It is not Gust) an ontological
claim about substance monism but serves to emphasise that ideology does
not usually function to affect consciousness via the direct transfer of ideas. It
involves largely unconscious acceptance of certain taxonomies,
interpretations etc., but is brought about, primarily, by the person's material
relations to ideological structures, rather than, say, economic or political
structures. Ideology is not contained within individual subjects' minds.
Althusser's position is not equivalent to a physicalist philosophy of mind,
indeed it is not a philosophy of mind at all. Rather, ideology, as a structural
component of social formations, serves to create our common-sense notions
of the nature of individuality and minds.
The material referred to in "material practices" is not physical material per se
but our apprehension of that material via our practical contact with it.
Althusser's is a dialectical materialism, not a reductive materialism like
Feuerbach's. This links this first aspect of modalities of practice to the
second, namely, that all practices are reducible "in the last instance" to
55 'b'd 43I I ., p. .
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material substance. These epistemological aspects will be taken up in the
next section, but it is necessary here to emphasise that Althusser, like Marx,
specifically criticised materialists for their separation of objects from their
knowledge of them.
"The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach
included) is that the things, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in
the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous
human activity, practice, not subjectively." 58
In other words, Marxism, and Althusser, holds that we are all part of a
material world and that our thoughts are a creation of that world, in
opposition to idealists who hold that the world is primarily a psychological
phenomenon. But Marxists hold that we do not know the material world, as it
'really' is, but only through the mediation of our active experiences of it - via
"practices". All knowledge is necessarily knowledge acquired through these
practices, ideological practice, political practice etc. The material world's
existence, of which even these mediations are a part, can only be lnfsrred."
It is absolutely crucial to understand that Althusser's conception of ideology
is not one of false consciousness. Ideology is neither false nor, for the most
,
part, consciousness. Ideology is an absolutely necessary part of any
society, even socialist societies. The representation is mythical because it is
not theoretical not because it is wrong, i.e. not because it entails mistaken
ideas about the world." Ideological relations to the world are inherently
56 Karl Marx 'Theses on Feuerbach' §1 in Early Writingsp. 421.
57 This is treated in more depth in the section on Spinoza and coherence theory below.
58 The inadequate nature of ideology will become clearer in the discussions of Althusser's
epistemology below, especially in connection with Spinoza's 'knowledge of the first kind' i.e.
uncriticised belief into which systematic reasoning does not enter.
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inadequate because of the nature of human relations to the world.
"[I]t is the imaginary nature of this relation which underlies all the
imaginary distortion which we can observe (if we do not live in its
truth) in all ideology." 59
Althusser's conception of ideology is, despite its occasional negative
connotations, functionalist and dialectically materialist. "Ideology
Interpellates Individuals as Subjects." 60 In other words we come to take up a
particular role in society and act and think within the frameworks that society
imposes on us from our birth onwards. We are "always - already subjects." 61
Ideology could be seen as equivalent, in ecological terminology, to the
structural determinant of the individual's "niche" in society. Our niche space
qua subject is determined by the immanent ideological structure of the social
formation. Ideology, just like the niche, is not logically prior to subjects, it is
not as if the structure of society was somehow 'given' and then individuals
were slotted into it. Individuals as subjects are necessary constituents in the
formation of ideology which could not exist without them, but there is a
reciprocity in this constitution.
"..the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology, insofar
as, all ideology has the tunctlon-twnict: defines it) of constituting
concrete individuals as subjects." 62
We are all subjects, and live in ideology. "Man [sic] is an ideological animal
by nature." 63 In social formations "..ideology hails or interpellates concrete
S8 Althusser op. cit., n. 33 above, p. 38.
80 ibid., p. 44.
81 ibid., p. 46.
82 ibid., p. 45.
63 ibid., p. 45.
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individuals as concrete subjects." 84 This is clearly spelled out in Reading
Capital.
"the structure of the relations of production determines the places and
functions occupied and adopted by the agents of production, who are
never anything more than the occupants of these places, insofar as
they are the 'supports' (Tragef) of these functions." 85
So far as Althusser is concerned, the true 'objects' of Marxist analysis are not
humans qua individuals but subjects insofar as they are interpellated into
roles or niches within the production processes of social formations.
Individuals who are wholly within ideology are subjected to structures
beyond their control, yet still see themselves (wrongly in capitalist societies)
as empowered beings with tres-wlll."
aa 'b'd 47I I ., p. .
IS Louis Althusser & Etienne Balibar Reading Capita/po 180. This theoretical anti-
humanism is, Althusser claims, derived from the 'scientific' writings of the mature Marx e.g. the
Marx of capital. "Individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications of
economic categories, the bearers of particular class-relations and interests." Marx quoted in
Alex Callinicos Making History.
II This attack on the human subject is echoed in the works of other structuralists and post-
structuralists. Thus the anthropologist Levi-Strauss believes that the human sciences should
not constitute but dissolve the human subject.
Levi-Strauss does not regard individual consciousness as a possible basis for
anthropological study. 'We are not, therefore, claiming to show how men think the myths, but
rather how the myths think themselves out in men and without mens' knowledge." Quoted in
Edmund Leach Levi Straussp. 51. Leach interprets Levi-Strauss as positing a "collective
unconscious", a kind of transcendental 'mind'. This is, I believe, profoundly mistaken. It
makes far more sense to interpret him as recognising that discourses which are closely tied to
particular ''forms of life", not simply the creations of individuals but, in part, actually create
them. Myths relate a kind of taxonomic structure which human thinkers find themselves
embedded in rather than in control of. (See also chapters 7 and 8.)
----~------------ .....-
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There are two interpretations of this kind of claim which are difficult to prise
apart. First, that from the perspective of the scientific study of social
formations, individuals are only relevant insofar as they are engaged as
"subjects" in productive practices. Since Althusser's definition of productive
practices is very broad, encompassing economic, political, ideological and
theoretical production this may not seem to be too extravagant a claim. If, for
example, Beethoven had composed only in his head keeping his musical
talents to himself, then his effect on society at large would not have been that
of a composer, his social import would have been negligible. (The question
of "production" is taken up in chapter 6.)
The second connotation is that people's places in the social formation are
wholly determined by aspects of that social formation, and that people are
fitted for their role in the present modes and relations of production by
ideologies which are completely beyond their control. This interpretation of
the Tragerthesis as one of social determination is encouraged by the words
"never more than" in the above quotation.
Now whilst it may be accepted that "ideology" necessitates that we have a
mythical representation of our relations to the world, it does not follow and is
not true that individuals have no part in the creation and alteration of
ideology and the modes and relations of production. It does not follow that
there is no individual effectivity in history, i.e. that anyone could have been
Beethoven. If such a reading were correct then people in Althusserian
science would be wholly reducible to their predetermined roles in society,
they would be functionallyessentialised and have no independent agency.
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Althusser may never have held this extreme position and he certainly rejects
a completely reductionist social determinancy in his later work,
acknowledging criticism from humanist Marxists.s7 However, the first
interpretation is insufficient by itself to explain how people are subject to as
well as subjects in ideology, for it is almost true by definition that people only
affect society insofar as they interact with it. The originality of Althusser's
theoretical construction lies in his emphasis on social effectivity rather than in
any comprehensive social determinism." It is this emphasis which is an
important strand of his anti-humanism. No longer is the individual at the root
of all social change, an isolated figure who, at crucial moments, consciously
enters the fray to change the course of history. Instead people are only part
of an immensely complex causal network, much of it beyond their control,
their own conscious and unconscious life being determined by their place in
relation to the whole. Human individuals cannot be isolated from society and
examined for the essence of their greatness or poverty, for they can only be
understood fully in the appropriate social context. This emphasis upon the
relations between parts of society, upon the importance of wider contexts,
sets Spinoza, Structuralism, Althusser, and Marx apart from humanist,
reductionist, and essentialist theories.
This structuralist conception of the human subject as simply the bearer of
social roles is in direct opposition to the humanist vision of the autonomous
rational agent. This difference marks the poles of the structure I agency
debate in social theory. This debate concerns the forms of explanation that
67Althusser op. cit., n. 32 above.
66 As Althusser later admitted, "I did consciously 'think in extremes' about some points
which Iconsidered important and bend the stick in the opposite direction." Louis Althusser
Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the SCientists op. cit., n. above, p. 210.
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social theory can / should give for social events, Le. whether it can provide a
·scientific' language which removes any anthropocentric bias about social
theory or whether the social sciences need to give an entirely different form
of explanation from those prevalent in the natural sciences due to humanity's
apparent possession of rational and reflexive capablftles."
The interpellation of the individual in ideology should not be confused with a
person coming to accept a particular political creed or a narrowly defined
world-view. Ideology operates at an altogether different level from this - in
structuring the configuration of a person's relations to the world. It is not as
given ideas that ideology functions, but as structures delimiting the possible
frameworks in which any thought at all takes place.
"ln the majority of cases these representations have nothing to do with
'consciousness': they are usually images and occasionally concepts,
but it is above all as structures that they impose upon the vast majority
of men. [sic]" 70
It is not simply that ideology dictates a certain perspective from which the
individual is constrained to see the world. Ideology operates on that subject
such that these perspectives seem second nature and unquestionable. It
does this in a very specific manner at the heart of the individual constructing
both object and subject at the same time in a dialectical process. The
subject internalises her external environment and reproduces it, objectifying
it for others to internalise in their turn. In this way society both reproduces its
values and produces a certain kind of individual. Ideology mediates the
Ii For introductory but detailed accounts of the structure / agency debate see Anthony
Giddens Central Problems in Social Theory and Alex Callinicos Making History: Agency,
Structure and Change in Social Theory. The question of agency is again raised in chapter 7 in
relation to personal preferences and ethical values.
70 Althusser ForMan< op. cit., n. 3 above, p. 233.
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construction of a particular and historically specific dialectical relationship
between the 'subjective' consciousness and 'objective' world. Both are
equally the creations of the engagement of the biological individual in
ideological practices.
Althusser offers as an example the operations of the church in interpellating
an individual as a subject. Interpellation has much wider implications than
merely that individual coming to see a particular relation between herself
and God, (qua a funny old man with a beard)
"they are always-already interpellated as subjects with a personal
identity ... it [religion] obtains from them the recognition that they really
do occupy the place it designates for them in the world, a fixed
residence." 71
In other words the person recognises what she takes to be herself in a
particular relation to God which alters structurally her other relations to the
world or social formation. The very acceptance of this ideological relation
brings with it a host of other relations, religious and non-religious, which now
seem 'natural' and inevitable to her. This necessarily ideological, mythical,
relation between the world and human individual is always present in some
,
form and as Althusser says, it was Spinoza who "explained this completely
two centuries before Marx, who practised it but without explaining it in
detail." 72
it Althusser op. cit., n. 33 above, p. 52.
72 ibid., p. 49.
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The Epistemological Break: Ideology. Marxist Science and Philosophy.
Althusser is famous, or infamous, for his thesis of an "epistemological break"
in the work of Karl Marx. This break divides the early works under the
influence first of the idealist works of Hegel and then the humanist works of
Feuerbach from those post 1845. (Starting with the "Theses on Feuerbach",
and The German Ideology.) The later works, Althusser argues, provide a
genuine scientific understanding of societies in their historical and material
circumstances, rather than simply a reflection of current ideology at the
theoretical level. Marx developed a science of society (historical
materialism) based upon new concepts such as the forces and relations of
production, the base / superstructure, ideology etc. This represented "a
scientific discovery without historical precedence in its nature and effects." 73
For Althusser science is rigidly distinguished from the ideological
perspectives which preceded it and involves not just new concepts but a new
epistemology rejecting the foundational role of the categories of "subject"
and "object". The epistemological break also involves the formation of a new
philosophy, Marxist philosophy or "dialectical materialism". This replaces all
previously ideologically tarnished philosophies and provides a problematic
,
within which "historical materialism", the Marxist theory of society, can be
situated. Science epitomises the level of theory and Marxist philosophy is, in
Althusser's earlier works at least, the Theory (capital T) of theoretical
practice. In later works Althusser partially revises his view of the
'revolutionary' nature of this epistemological break insofar as he suggests
that the change in philosophical outlook takes place over many years. The
new dialectical materialism is still to a degree entangled with older concepts
73 Althusser op. cit., n. 3 above, p. 13.
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both idealist, such as the "negation of the negation" and humanist, e.g.
"alienation". The "break" may thus have lost some of its dramatic appeal but
it is still irreversible. The lengthy formation of a Marxist philosophy in no way
weakens Althusser's respect for Marx's scientific achievement or his belief in
a strong ideology / science dichotomy.
The epistemological status of "ideology" with respect to ''theory" is of central
importance in Althusser's work. At stake is the status of Marxism itself both
as science (historical materialism) and as philosophy (dialectical
materialism). The status of Althusser's 'science' may be better understood
by making reference to three frequently distinguished theories of truth,
namely, "correspondence theories", "coherence theories" and
"conventionalism". The similarities and differences between Althusser's
epistemology and these analytic archetypes may help illustrate and evaluate
Althusser's position.
The correspondence theory is epitomised by the empiricist approach to
science Le. a scientific theory represents the world in some fashion,
scientific knowledge relates directly to a-theoretical empirical data, 'facts'
.'
and 'observations'. (We have previously referred to this view as theory as
the "mirror of nature". See chapter 1, n. 4.) This approach typifies
humanism, but to try to squeeze Althusser into this mould would be
absolutely wrong, so wrong that it is difficult to see how anyone could
approach Althusser's work in such a way were it not for the prevalence of
positivist readings of Marx's own works and positivist traces still current in
Althusser's own writings. Althusser's interpretation of Marx is the antithesis
of the epistemologies generally associated with the subject / object divide of
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humanism, and, whether or not his interpretation of Marx's philosophical
positions is correct, he is explicit about his own anti-positivism and anti-
emplrlclsrn."
A second reading interprets science along the lines of a coherence theory of
truth. This suggests that knowledge is the systematised ordering of concepts
and that we gradually approach a single coherent and complete system of
thought. Propositions, on this view, are not true or false depending upon
their correspondence with 'facts' but, more or less true, depending upon the
adequacy of their role in the system. The coherence of a theory is its own
guarantee of truth. This has affinities with Spinoza's quest for knowledge
sub specie aeternitatis, a knowledge encompassing the whole world in all its
aspects in a transcendental theoretical system.
The third view may be termed conventionalism and, whilst sharing the
approach to knowledge as systematisation, it is quite distinct from any
coherence theory insofar as it recognises its own necessarily historicised
position in a particular social formation. Conventionalism sees sciences as
theoretical systems suitable only for particular historical and social
7. ibid., p. 12. At this point it is necessary to say a few words in clarification of Althusser's
somewhat ambiguous relationship with positivism. This requires that we distinguish between
two different traditions of positivism, the largely Anglo-American schools of (empiricist) "logical
positivism" typified by such philosophers as A. J. Ayer and the largely French positivist
tradition derived from Comte and influencing Althusser through the philosophy of science of
Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem. (See chapter 4.) In so far as positivism is
associated with empiricism and a correspondence theory of truth Althusser is implacably
opposed to it. In so far as posltlvism privileges science and condemns metaphysics he is
clearly aligned with it. The French school of positivism retains these latter aspects whilst
developing broadly speaking, conventionalist and coherence theories of truth based in
scientific practice, Le. knowledge is constructed not found.
118
circumstances and subject to constant change. It denies the possibility of
knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, claiming that all knowledge is sub
specie durationis. It also suggests that there might always be more than one
possible coherent theory.
Althusser is influenced in different ways by all three of these schools of
thought but his own position is closest to the second. In this case however
this affinity with Spinoza is not merely the result of a direct theoretical
influence but also arises from competing pressures from empirico-positivist
(humanist) and conventionalist critiques. The Spinozistic position on
coherence allows him to maintain that Marxism is, in some sense a
transcendentally true theory as the only theory suitable for explaining
complex wholes. To satisfy humanist political pressures, e.g. from the P. C.
F., this 'truth' has to be ambiguous enough to be read as "corresponds to the
way the world really is." Althusser also struggles with conventionalist
arguments according to which Marxism has to see itself as a historically
situated theory. I argue that Althusser's solution to this problem lies in
stressing the hermeneutic aspects of Marx's thought and in an emphasis
upon practices of knowledge aquisition. I shall therefore sometimes refer to
his position as "constructivist".
Correspondence Theory. Humanism and Althusser
Taken out of context, Althusser's science / ideology dichotomy is easily
misconstrued. There is a natural tendency to read "science" as that practice
which describes the 'objective' condition of the real world, and "ideology" as
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an unenlightened and 'subjective' acceptance of distorted images of reality.
But this view is seriously mistaken. It reads into Althusser the very humanist
and empiricist conceptions of epistemology which he attacks. It is doubly
wrong. First, because it returns to the old conception of ideology as "false
consciousness" which is not Althusser's but that of Lukacs. Ideology, as
previously noted plays a largely functional and material role in Althusser's
Structuralism, interpellating "subjects" and, in capitalism, promoting the
interests of the ruling classes. Ideology is pre -scientific, but in Canguilhem's
sense that it is insufficiently theorised and historically prior to science, not
necessarily 'wronq'." Second, to confuse Althusser's science with an
"objectivism" where science is the privileged arbiter of true representations
of the world is to completely misread his position. As we shall see, scientific
truth for Althusser is something quite different, it is a function of the distance
between scientific practices and other aspects of the social formation.
A correspondence theory of truth, in its simplest form, will hold that there is
an external world which we can study by testing hypotheses against non-
theoretical empirical data, observations that are 'pure' and not themselves
sullied by theoretical implications. It founds its claim to true representation
upon the existence of a fully independent reality. This has an obvious
connection with materialism which claims that there are 'solid' objects in the
world which exist independently of our thoughts of them in the sense thatthe
world is not the creation of our ideas. Because of this perceived connection,
there is a danger of Althusser's anti-empiricism being read as anti-
materialism or idealism. Some see him as opposed to any empirical
750n Canguilhem's influence, (specifically about the use of the term "epistemological
break") Althusser says, "my debt to Canguilhem is incalculable, and it is my interpretation that
tends in the direction of his, as it is a continuation of his" ibid., p. 257.
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investigation at all. Thus Merquior claims that Althusserian science floats
free of empirical data altogether and accuses him of an
" appalling ignorance of most modern philosophy of science (not a
word about Popper or Quine, Reichenbach, Nagel, Hempel, Lakatos
or Putnam)" 78
In fact this only shows up Merquior's own ignorance of Althusser's
philosophical precursors in the philosophy of science." Almost all
philosophers of science now agree that there are no such things as pure and
unadulterated empirical data, they are always ''theory laden". Althusser's
attack on empiricism is an attack upon the philosophies associated with
methods that do not fully take into account the nature of the relations
between theory and experience, that experience which, he claims, without
theory is a/ways ideologically mediated and never simply raw data.
Because of the close analogy between materialism's and humanism's view
of an 'independent' world, the correspondence theory of truth is carried over
into naive readings of Marxism. From Descartes onwards, and to some
extent even before this, common-sense notions of knowledge have echoed
this mirroring relationship between mind (and its "glassy essence") and
body," But, Althusser claims, this 'whole metaphysical view is ideological; it
represents a humanist and inadequate understanding of human relations to
78 Merquior op. cit., n. 15 above, p. 148. He also states that for "Althusser science spins
concepts perfectly undisturbed by the world they are supposed to explain, and thought
becomes a silkworm, drawing on itself alone." ibid., p. 148.
77 In particular French traditions, not a word about Duhem, POincare, and only a passing
mention of Canguilhem and 8achelard! This is not to suggest that Merquior is ignorant of
these philosophers but to emphasise that the philosophers referred to in any text has more to
do with the traditions upon which the author calls than with his or her philosophical ability.
78 See Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
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the world which Marxism is designed to overcome.
The pervasive nature of the ideology of correspondence theories of
knowledge is such that it is extraordinarily difficult to eradicate, causing
serious difficulties for an understanding of any Marxist epistemology. This
problem arises in two ways. First, the humanist analysis of the world and our
relation to it is unquestionably accepted by the majority of people living in
Western societies. This leads to the interpretation of Marxism as positivist
science - in the sense that it reaches and exposes the underlying laws of
nature and society.
Second, those who advocate materialism oppose it to idealism as an
alternative philosophical position. The error is then to advocate materialism
because it corresponds to the world whereas idealism does not. This
smuggles in the correspondence theory again, this time under the guise of
philosophy. Both these tendencies have to be resisted, for in accepting any
correspondence theory vulgar Marxism becomes, ironically, tied to a dualist
conception of the world in which theory has no material being itself but is
merely that which mirrors nature - the very dualist conception of object and
subject which the dialectic is intended to overcome.
Althusser's critique of humanism is also a critique of the inherent
reductionism of over-simplified conceptions of materialism. In the naive, and
orthodox, Marxist view materiality is centred upon the archetypal mode of the
concrete physical object (like concrete paving stonesl) and theory has to be
reducible to this modality of material, it can be nothing more than an
epiphenomenon of a material object, Le. the brain. Althusser's modalities of
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materiality correspond with his attempt to de-center this fixation with 'solid'
material and allow a space for non-reducible levels of substance, constituted
in practices. Theory now becomes not epiphenomenal 'ideas' but a
structured and structuring aspect of social realities, with a relative autonomy.
This conception has the advantage that theory is no longer immediately
associated, by a knee-jerk reflex with ideas and "idealism". It does not
specify the form that the material of social formations must take, as it is not a
simple substance monism but a complex Spinozistic holism. Theory has its
own structural efficacy which is not reducible to other levels of the social
formation.
The humanist misreading of Althusser exactly parallells the naive materialist
misreading of Marx, and for the same reason, namely that both understand
dialectical materialism as Feuerbachian materialism, a simple reductive
materialism opposed to idealism. But dialectical materialism rejects this
idealism / materialism dichotomy, replacing it, as noted, with the notion of
productive practices. This "practice" is not the psychological collapsing of
the division between 'object' and 'subject' envisaged by Kant, but is
explicated instead in terms of social practice rather than human
consciousness." In this way it avoids the subject / object dichotomy of
humanism. (Marx's concept, unlike Kant's, is also historicised.) In other
words it is in practical activities that we come to know the world.
As previously noted this does not mean that Althusser was uninfluenced by
positivism. Ironically this influence comes about because of the nature of his
76 See David Rubinstein Marx and Wittgenstein: Social Praxis and Social Explanation
p.167.
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break with humanism and empirico-positivism, with the whole ideology that
sees truth as correspondence with the world. In making this break his
problematic becomes so different from common-sense approaches that few
are able or willing to understand it. But the political purpose behind
Althusser's work was to renew Marxist theory and provide an understanding
of societies which could facilitate revolutionary practice, Le. a practice
involving the very people who labour under common-sense ideology. It was
therefore necessary for these people to break from their own ideological
positions in order to be able to understand them. The dilemma is how to
bring about this understanding. Althusser cannot simply alter his theoretical
stance to make it translatable into common-sense terms, for in this case its
avocation of science would appear as positivism. Nor can he reject
common-sense perspectives altogether, as incompatible with his
problematic, as this runs the risk of being too theoretical. This dilemma is
spelt out by Althusser in relation to past readings of For Marx in the later
introduction in the English edition. His emphasis on the unity of the
epistemological break (in respect to the simultaneous origins of historical
and dialectical materialism) made him open to positivist readings, but when
he emphasises the importance of theory in its autonomous aspects he is
read as idealist, or at least too far removed from revolutionary practice."
Although Althusser does not repudiate the importance of theory (how could
he?) he does accept this latter political reading of his work to some extent
and attempts to 'correct' it.
Althusser's movement towards Marxist orthodoxy in his later works is,
/
however, more apparent than real. Most essays are merely simplified
10 See Althusser op. cit., n. 3 above, pp. 13-14.
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expositions of his early positions. The "Reply to John Lewis" is a classic
example. Ironically it was Ralph Milliband, no friend of Marxist structuralism,
who saw the importance of Althusser's theoretical works; ironically, as he
opposed the perceived Althusserian tendencies of Marxist theoreticists like
Poulantzas; discussing Althusser's anti-empiricism (so misunderstood by
Merquior), he states,
"This is ... not a crude (and false) contraposition of empiricist versus
non- or anti-empiricist approaches; it is a matter of emphasis- but
emphasis is important." 81
The theoreticist aspects of Althusser's work, from which he later seemed to
backtrack, were the focus of many attacks, which questioned the motives of a
Marxist philosopher who derides common-sense. E.P. Thompson's essay
"The Poverty of Theory" is perhaps the best known example of such an
approach."
Althusser quite openly admits to these theoreticist tendencies which,
nonetheless are no more than a proper lack of emphasis upon the political
import of his work. His later self-criticisms are an attempt to take into account
.t Ralph Milliband Class Power and Sta~e Powerp. 30.
82 See for example his witty attempt to show how far removed Althusser's concepts of the
interpellation of the subject and overdetermination would be from dissatisfied factory workers
in Longbridge car plant. E. P. Thompson op. cit., n. 19 above, p. 335. Thompson reminds
theoreticians that there is a real need to keep in mind the polltical implications of the work they
produce. For example, too much philosophy, including that in the field of environmental
ethics, is too far removed from the practical problems of everyday 'green' issues. This being
said the theoretical arena is a necessary part of the environmentalists' struggle especially
when faced with a pervasive ideology of economism. The theoretical sphere has a relative
autonomy which environmentalists must use to further their ends.
Thompson actually completely misunderstands Althusser's political motive which was to
re-establish the credentials of science and make a case for it as a practice which should not be
subordinated to the political sphere as Stalin had attempted to do.
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that as Marx said,
''the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human
activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood
only as revolutionary practice." 83
In only one important area does he significantly change the basis of his
theories. This is in altering his definition of Marxist philosophy from that of
the "Theory of theoretical practice" to that of "class struggle in the field of
theory." 84 This change, brought about by political pressures to give his
theories an 'obvious' (and common-sense) relevance, pushed him towards
an instrumentalism at odds with his Spinozistic inheritance. This redefinition
risked reducing Marxism's epistemological and theoretical import to that of
political practice, it comes to be valued only for its effectivity in other spheres.
This justification of knowledge has a ring of desperation about it. One of the
Twentieth Century's greatest philosophers when asked to justify Philosophy
answers first with an original explanation in terms of its relatively
autonomous role in the overdetermination of social formations. This answer,
misunderstood because of its radical nature is simplified to a new
formulation, one that then runs the risk of being interpreted as support for
pragmatism, a reductionism of philosophy to politics in complete contrast to
that philosophy's inherent anti-reductionism. To echo Milliband "emphasis is
important". Althusser ironically recognised exactly the phenomenon of which
he was later to become a willing victim in his earlier analysis of the dearth of
good French philosophy.
"[The French Party] very rarely attracted men [sic] of sufficient
philosophiea/formation to realise that Marxism should not be simply a
83 Marx op. cit., n. 56 above, §3 p. 422.
84 Althusser op. cit., n. 33 above, p. 108.
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pohncal doctrine, a 'method' of analysis and action, but also, and over
and above the rest the theoretical domain of a fundamental
investigation." 85
Spinoza. Althusser and Coherence Theories of Truth
For Althusser theory has two aspects, historical materialism (Marxist
science), and dialectical materialism (Marxist philosophy). Science is not
concerned to establish a correspondence between theory and (so called)
'facts', or 'empirical data': the existence of pure empirical data is a positivist
myth. Althusser's is an attempt to construct a theoretical framework in which
historical events and conceptual terms are given meaning, in the only way
that anything can be meaningful. Althusser holds, as does the later
Wittgenstein, that there can be no understanding except by grasping a
concept's "place", its relation to other concepts and its use. This must not be
taken to mean that concepts float free from the world, rather, the
metaphysical aspects of the theory require concepts to have a certain
practical and active relation to our perception of events to be acceptable. If a
science cannot predict events which it is supposed on its own claims to do
then it will be found wanting. Any coherence theory of knowledge makes a
necessary distinction between the object and knowledge of that object, '
between in Althusser's case the real-concrete and the concrete-in-thought.
A theory that was only a coherence theory, in the sense of a doxastic theory
where concepts only relate to other concepts would be idealism. Spinoza
and Marx avoid this problem in different ways. In Spinoza the problem is
85 Althusser op. cit., n. 3 above, p. 26.
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solved by the necessary connection between "idecf and "ideaturrl', the
parallelism of the two attributes of substance. Marxism rejects the idealism /
materialism divide altogether and proposes knowledge as practice,
inherently and always a mediation of object and subject." In this sense the
theoretical concepts employed by Althusser are only relatively autonomous,
not, as in idealism and empiricism, completely autonomous. (In idealism
theory constitutes the world according to its own categories, in empiricism
empirical data is, to a degree at least, independent of theory.) For Althusser,
practices determine (overdetermine or underdetermine) the success of any
theory.
Althusser and Spinoza both believe that there is a convergence of all
science and theory into a single whole and transcendental theoretical
system. Increasing knowledge depends upon placing concepts within an
increasingly inter-linked rational theoretical system.
"As we ascend the scale of levels of knowledge ... to scientific
knowledge, our ideas ... become more and more 'concatenated or
logically coherent, and so we can be said to understand more and
more fully ..." 87
In Spinoza's case this increasing systematisation approaches the view of
nature sub specie aeternitatis. A view which is all inclusive and hence
neither historically or socially particular. In Althusser's case this is Marxism,
historical and dialectical materialism as the science and philosophy of social
86 The process that produces concrete knowledge takes place wholly in theoretical
practice. It does concern the real-concrete but this real material world "survives in tts
independence after as before, outside thought." Althusser op. cit., n. 3 above, p. 186.
87 Stuart Hampshire Spinoza p. 76.
128
formations. i.e. the Theory of Althusser's complex whole."
If we experienced ideas merely as strings of thoughts haphazardly
connected no adequate understanding would be possible. Adequate ideas
only come about when we logically connect them together into a coherent
whole. Truth, or adequacy, is for Spinoza and Althusser a matter of
coherence, not of correspondence to external objects. As truth in coherence
theories is a matter of the degree of concatenation of concepts, these
concepts cannot be said to be absolutely false.
"There is no sense allowed in Spinoza in which any judgment or idea,
considered in isolation from other judgments or ideas, could be said to
be absolutely false; for, given the doctrine of the law of infinite
Attributes, every idea or judgment must have its ideatum and therefore
no question of an idea utterly failing to correspond to some
independent reality can possibly arise." B9
As Hampshire puts it,
"Spinoza insists that error is always a privation of knowledge; to say
that an idea or proposition is false is to say that it is relatively
incomplete or fragmentary ... the falsity is corrected as soon as the
idea is placed in connection with other ideas in a larger system of
88The possibility of such an increasingly all encompassing theoretical problematic
depends, in Spinoza's case, upon there being a unitary absolute substance, and this
suggests that the analogous totality for Ahhusser would be the totality of the social formation.
This in turn raises the question of what constitutes the grounds for Althusser's claim that the
social formation can be regarded as a totality given the fragmentation of practices within the
social formation. As we have seen he cannot, and does not, rely upon substance monism in
any essentialist manner to construct this totality but upon the notion of the relative autonomy
of practices.
8t Hampshire op. cit., n. 87 above, p. 74.
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knowledge." 90
Of course, neither Althusser or Spinoza thinks that a state of perfect
systematisation has been reached. The perfect metaphysics is something
both strive to achieve. In Spinoza's case our limited nature as modes of the
whole substance makes such a perfect understanding impossible but the
use of our rational faculties can overcome this at least to a degree.
"We as mind bodies have access to the infinite intellect of God when
we impose upon our confusing perceptions ... those features of logical
and mathematical coherence, and those solid principles of rational
explanation, which are in reality everywhere valid." 91
For Althusser an acceptable account of the superstructure has yet to be
formulated, but Marx laid the foundations in his theoretical break with
previous ideological understandings of social formations.
''there is no pure theoretical practice, no perfectly transparent science
which throughout its history as a science will always be preserved ....
from the ideologies which besiege it." 92
In referring to Althusser's and Spinoza's theories as coherence theories I do
not mean to imply that the truth or falsity of a statement is dependent solely
upon its place in a theoretical problematic. Both systems also assume
particular kinds of relation between the theoretical and non-theoretical,
between theory and practice in Althusser's case and between idea and
ideatum in Spinoza's. In this sense they both give hermeneutic justifications
for their epistemological claims. Both Althusser and Spinoza have
80 ibid., p. 87.
81 ibid., p. 13.
82 Althusser op. cit., n. 3 above, p. 170.
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conceptions of inadequate and adequate knowledge and both see
knowledge proceeding by a critique of common-sense. Both operate with
what might broadly be called coherence theories of truth and both have a
faith in the power of theory. But, rather than drawing exact parallells as
Christopher Norris has tried to do, e.g. between Spinoza's "knowledge of the
first kind" and ideology, and between higher levels of 'adequate' knowledge,
we need to recognise the differences in their problematics as well as their
similarities.
Althusser's adherence to Marxist and structuralist problematics means that,
although his levels of ideology and theory are material modalities, it is by
their relatively autonomous structuring of social formations that they affect
individuals rather than via a physical or biological modality as Spinoza
seems to suggest. This is also indicative of a further important difference.
Spinoza is continuing Descartes' quest for individual enlightenment and
truth. Althusser places emphasis on the effectivity of theory at the societal
level, his practices are social practices which affect individuals.
For all these reasons epistemological parallels must not be pushed too far.
Adequate knowledge comes to represent both science and Marxist
philosophy and, for Althusser, theoretical forms of knowledge e.g. bourgeois
philosophy are more or less consigned to the level of ideology as
inadequate although critical concepts. On Spinozistic terms there is no a
priori reason for choosing to relegate any type of theoretical work to the level
of "knowledge of the first kind". Althusser has to relegate all non-Marxist
philosophy to ideology to maintain his ideology (qua prescience) / science
distinction. It is not sufficient for him that ideas be actively systematised
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rather than passively received to disti nguish adequate from inadequate
ideas. All prescientific theory and pre-Marxist philosophy (including Marx's
own early works) is inadequate and ideological. In this respect Althusser's
philosophy is partisan in the extreme.
There are however other interesting parallells that can be drawn.
Spinoza's "knowledge of the third kind", or intuitive knowledge, proceeds
from knowledge of the second kind, adequate ideas of the properties of
things, to an adequate idea of the essences of things. It achieves this
qualitative leap via the adequate knowledge of God or Nature achieved in
knowledge of the second kind, Le. via a knowledge of the complex whole.
This does have a parallel in Althusser's conception of Marxist philosophy, if
one reads science as a possible equivalent to knowledge sub specie
durationis. Dialectical materialism is able to discuss the status of scientific
practice only via the proper understanding of the social formation as a
complex whole achieved by historical materialism. Only after Marx had
produced historical materialism, a science providing adequate knowledge of
social formations (the complex whole), could one proceed to Marxist
philosophy.
''the foundation of the science of history by Marx has induced the birth
of a new, theoretically and practically revolutionary philosophy, Marxist
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philosophy or dialectical materialism." 93
The very existence of ideological and theoretical levels only came to be seen
after Marx's theoretical formulations in the "Theses on Feuerbach" and "The
German Ideology". But any justification of such a holistic science must be
dependent upon that science for its own explanatory power. The apparent,
and real, circularity is a necessary result of maintaining a holistic coherence
theory, which has no external standards for comparison and must therefore
posses a self-reflexivity. Althusser recognised that only Spinoza had ever
previously come close to such a discovery.
"The only theoretician who had the unprecedented daring to probe
this problem and outline a first solution to it was Spinoza. But as we
know, history had buried him in impenetrable darkness. Only through
Marx, who however had little knowledge of him, do we even begin to
guess at the features of that trampled face." 94
This raises the whole issue of the status of coherence theories and the
respective rationales of Spinoza and Althusser for advocating such a view.
03 ibid., p.14. In Louis Althusser & Etien~e Balibar Reading Capital, Althusser had
discussed the epistemological break in Marx's work as one that was at the same time both
scientific and "philosophical".
The radicalness of this rupture had the benefit that it seemed to occlude the question of
how a Marxist Theory of social formations arose in a particular social formation in which
philosophy was just a reflected form of ideology. Le. How did Marx himself escape from the all-
enveloping ideology without already having to hand a theory of Ideology-in-general? If the
epistemological break was sudden and both philosophical and scientific then it can be passed
over as a work of genius, a flash of inspiration or just in silence. But critics like John Lewis
pointed out that the break in Marx is not at all sudden. Concepts like "alienation", a humanist
concept, and "negation of the negation", a Hegelian concept, keep reappearing in Marx's later
works.
04 ibid., p. 87.
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In one respect, Althusser's and Spinoza's adherence to a coherence theory
of truth is the result of holistic and deterministic aspects of their metaphysics
which require that everything is, in the last instance, causally related to
everything else, and therefore potentially fully understandable only within
one single unifying system of thought. Althusser never questions that
Marxism is the transcendental science and philosophy of society; that it is the
only serious contender for the status of a Theory of complex wholes.
Althusser's claim for the authority of Marxist theory above all others, is that it
is the only theory which coheres with other scientific views of the world and
the only theory which can properly explain its own origins.
Althusser sees science as a possible route of escape from the imposition of
specific forms of ideology present in class societies. "[W]hile speaking in
ideology, and from within ideology, we have to outline a discourse which tries
to break with ideology." 95 Althusser was aware that claims to have made this
break altogether have to be treated with scepticism
''those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition outside
ideology ... As is well known, the accusation of being in ideology only
applies to others, never to oneself (unless one is a Spinozist or a
Marxist, which, in this matter, is to be exactly the same thing)." 96
By this Althusser means that both Spinoza and Marx are aware of their own
positions as theorists within particular social and historical contexts, they
both comprehend the difficulties inherent in proposing a theory which has to
explain its own origins and status. To this extent at least they could both be
seen as hermeneutic philosophers.
05 Althusser op. cit., n. 33 above, p. 46.
i6 ibid., p. 49.
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"That Marxism can and must itself be the object of the epistemological
question, that this epistemological question can only be asked as a
function of the Marxist theoretical problematic, that is necessity itself
for a theory which defines itself dialectically, not merely as a science of
history (historical materialism) but also and simultaneously as a
philosophy, a philosophy that is capable of accounting for the nature
of theoretical formations and their history and therefore capable of
accounting for itself, by making itself as its own object. Marxism is the
only philosophy that theoretically passes this test." 97
Spinoza, Marx and Althusser believe that theory allows one to escape from
particular circumstances, at least to some degree, to generalities that are
fundamentally a-historical. In other words they see their own theories as
paradoxically escaping from ideology. To justify this they all posit an a-
historical qualitative difference between different levels of knowledge in one
form or another. Althusser's own problems with this paradox crystallise
around the theoretical role of the science / ideology dichotomy. He wishes to
privilege the Marxist science of society (historical materialism) as breaking
with old ideological conceptions of society, yet to do this he has to maintain
that in effect the level of theory was, at least in relation to social and historical
matters, before 1845 ineradicably "ideological" Le. not theory at all. Marx, by
himself, created a theory of society which led to the recognition of ideology
and (after Althusser) of theoretical levels within society. Marx had to break
with previous views of the relations of human thought to the world. He
accomplished this with a general theory of "practices". Marxism itself has to
be situated in this general theory and according to Althusser represents a
separate and potentially self-reflexive theoretical practice. It is the fact that
17 Althusser op. cit., n. 3 above, pp. 38-39.
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Marxism can achieve this hermeneutic or self-reflexive feat that justifies its
own elevation to become the sole occupier of the theoretical level insofar as
the social sciences are concerned. For any non-Marxist this must appear
unforgivably arbitrary.
Jorge Larrajn and the 'Objects' of Theory.
If this thesis is correct in identifying and emphasising the Spinozistic
influences on Althusser, this interpretation should clarify some of the
difficulties theorists have raised in respect to his work. Larrain provides one
of the more comprehensive critiques of Althusser's concept of ideology.
Larrain perceives three changes of emphasis in Althusser's use of the
concept "ideology".98 (Schaff, according to Larrain, "finds at least ten different
definitions, not all of them compatible with one another." 99) First, a structural
conception of ideology as the cement of society. Second, ideology as
necessarily distorted and false. Third, a functional conception whereby
ideology interpellates concrete individuals as subjects, and serves the
interests of the dominant classes.
have argued that Larrain's second emphasis is one that is read into
Althusser because he panders too much to conservative (and positivist)
Marxist conceptions of science. The first and third emphases are aspects of
a single theoretical concept in no way incompatible with each other.l°O
08 Larrain The Concept of Ideology p. 155.
99 ibid., p. 239n.
100 "In effect, in the article on the ISA, Althusser formalises a distinction foreshadowed in
his first writings." ibid., p. 158.
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Larrain's claim is that Althusser has replaced an idealist conception of
humanity (that of a shared human essence in all social formations) with an
equally a-historical and hypostatised conception of ideology, which is
Althusser's concept of "ideology in general". Ideology in general has no
history. "If there is any truth in it [the general theory of ideology] the
mechanism must be abstract with respect to every real ideological
formation." 101 It is "endowed with a structure and functioning such as to
make it a non-historical reality Le. an omni-historical reality." 102 Although
specific ideologies have particular histories, ''the formal structure of all
ideology is always the same." 103 Larrain states
"Althusser's distinction between the theory of ideology in general and
the theory of particular ideologies is highly problematic for a Marxist
approach. It entails the pretension of constituting ideology as an
immutable object of study across the various modes of production." 104
In other words having disposed of a concept of human nature Althusser
allegedly reintroduces a conception of social nature which implies that
ideology is always and everywhere a part of social formations. (Incidentally
but perhaps more importantly for Althusser's anti-humanism, this would also
reintroduce a concept of human nature, in which to be human is to be a
being which find its place in social formations through ideology.) If one were
to ignore the Spinozistic elements of Althusser's thought then this would
indeed seem to be a logical reading, but this diminishes Althusser's own
distinction between "ideology in general" and "ideology in particular".
,6, 'b'd 58I I ., p. .
,02 ibid., p. 35.
'03 ibid., p. 51.
,oc ibid., pp. 159-160.
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Without wishing to write an apology for all aspects of Althusser's
epistemology this distinction is nonetheless crucial to his work.
Larrain's question raises two issues. First, what sort of an 'object' is
ideology? Second, is this 'object' immutable or a-historical? Althusser might
answer that "Ideology in general" is a structural concept at the level of
theory. That is, it belongs to a discourse which is relatively autonomous,
separated (to a degree) from particular instances of other parts of the social
formation such as the economic and the ideological. "Ideology in general" is
a concept used in understanding particular features of social formations, it
plays a part in the scientific analysis of social formations, i.e. in historical
materialism and in dialectical materialism. "Ideology in general", does not
exist in any ontological fashion except insofaras all concepts are also a part
of the complex social whole: i.e. it exists in the theoretical modality. On the
other hand, ideology in particular is the actual experience of the world
produced through given historically and socially specific ideological
practices. It is ideological "knowledge" of the world not theoretical
knowledge.
Larrain appears to underestimate the epistemological emphasis of
Althusser's work. He compares Althusser's abstraction of ideology in
general to Marxist generalities like "labour", "production", etc. and points out
that for Marx these categories are all ultimately historicised and never
proposed as causally effective 'objects' in their own right. This is to miss
Althusser's point, for he is comparing ideology to other practices. e.g.
economic practice. Ideology is an epistemological analogue of these,
having exactly the same status. Just as economic activity in particularis
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regarded in Marxist theory as having social effectivity, so does Althusser's
ideology in particular. Ideology in particular is not the pure material, of
something called ideology, it does not correspond to a material object, but is
a theoretical term in a coherence theory, used to indicate the presence, of a
particular instance of a theorised ideology in general. This presence is not a
real-concrete object, but a part of ideological practice, of a certain form of
experience, understood in a concatenation of theoretical terms. All of the
concepts discussed here - whether Larrain's or Althusser's, are to be seen in
this coherence view as theoretical. They are once removed from the
elements of practice they discuss and yet are paradoxically still a part of the
same physical materlauty.'" Althusser is working with an entirely different
105This is where a reference to Spinoza may help clarify these difficult entanglements. In
appendix 1 Althusser's levels of society are compared with Spinoza's modes, or "affectations
of substance". Roughly speaking, modes are the forms in which finite parts of the infinite
whole express themselves, the 'states' of things.Spinoza op.cit., n. 24 above,Pt. 1, Defn.15.
Similarly, for Althusser different levels are modalities of the complex whole which are
nonetheless still parts of that whole, not distinct from n.
But in this regard n is interesting to compare the 'modalities' of material to that of the 'attributes'
of substance. Whilst the status of Spinoza's attributes is matter of some contention (See for
example R. N. Beck 'The Attribute of Thought' pp.1-12. and A. Donegan 'Essence and the
Distinction of Attributes'), they operate as a compromise between Cartesian dualism and
Spinoza's substance monism. Spinoza defihes an attribute as ''that which the intellect
perceives of substance as constituting its essence." Spinozaop. cit., Pt. 1, Defn. 4. Humans
because of our limited natures, perceive only two attributes, those of extension and of
thought, but. from the perspective of nature there are an infinite number of attributes. ibid., Pt.
1, Prop. 11. Althusser's levels or practices are the perceived 'essences' of his social
formation, those attributes that our current social relations allow us to distinguish. Thus
Althusser's statement that "in the last instance" theoretical modalities are reducible to the
physical material seems to be simply a statement of a monistic philosophy. Insofar as the
analogy between social formations and Spinozistic substance holds then, the practices
represent the necessary ways in which people come to experience the world and are to this
extent akin to Spinoza's attributes. However whereas Spinoza's "attributes" are properly
autonomous but Althusser's modalities are only relatively autonomous.
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taxonomy of the world, Le. his fourfold division of practices, rather than a
humanist taxonomy which recognises two distinctions, that of theory and that
of materiality (of language and world) one of which is then held to represent
or correspond to the other.
Perhaps now we can make some sense of Larrain's views that Althusser
"borders on idealism" 106 and decide whether or not ideology is immutable.
He is quite simply wrong on both counts, for lIideology in general" is not
constituted as an immutable 'object', for study, nor is it reducible to ideas,
rather it is precisely, particular ideologies which are objects for study and
particular ideologies, far from being immutable, vary everywhere and always.
Ideology in general Le. the concept of there being an ideological level of
societies, is a concept of Marxist science and philosophy; it is a Theoretical
concept (with a capital T, Le. in Althusser's terminology Marxist theory) and in
this sense it is a recent theoretical invention.
Althusser constitutes ideology as an immutable object of study only in the
'phllosophtcal" and self-reflexive sense that Marxism constitutes any other
theoretical concept as an immutable object of study. In an exactly parallel
argument about the status of history Althusser says
'that the concept of history can no longer be empirical Le. historical in
the ordinary sense, that, as Spinoza has already put it, the concept
dog cannot bark." 107
To treat 'ideoloqy" in general itself as an 'object' of study, requiring the
justification and explication of the concept as it originated in Marx's theory,
108Larrain op. cit., n. 98 above, p. 160.
107Althusser op. cit., n. 65 above, p. 105.
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was developed by tucaks, Althusser etc., is to do Marxist philosophy rather
than Marxist science. The fact that "ideology" as a concept has developed at
all shows that it is not immutable. In this way we can understand both
Althusser's early view of dialectical materialism as meta-theory (and theory
as meta-practice) and his later remarks that philosophy does not have an
object "in the sense that a science has an object ... Although philosophy has
no object.. ..there exist 'philosophical objects'; objects internal to
philosophy." 108
Larrain's error is in treating Althusser as promoting a correspondence theory
of truth with a physical object that theoretical discourse corresponds to. But
as Althusser makes plain, and as we shall see in the deeper discussion of
''theory'' in the next chapter, philosophy, like science, is a holistic form of
coherence theory which in part constructs the objects recognised by theory
and through theory.
Where Larrain is correct is that insofar as Althusser wishes to view the
conceptual categories of Marxism as the final answer for the social sciences,
as a problematic which they must necessarily continue to work in, then these
categories gain transcendental theoretical status. This is however a problem
which faces all Marxists and transcendental theorists, not just Althusser.
Conventionalism.
The claim that only Marxism can explain itself, and is therefore the only 'true'
108 Althusser op. cit., n. 68 above, p. 77
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theory, is an attempt to combat conventionalist critiques of coherence
theories. An important influence on Althusser's philosophy of science was
Gaston Bachelard under whom Althusser studied. The concepts of
"problematic" and "epistemological break" owe much to Bachelard's
influence. In conventionalism, as in coherence theories, scientific theories
are structures within which concepts obtain a particular meaning. The
structure will exclude certain questions from consideration and make other of
crucial importance. A problematic develops which that particular science is
concerned to explain within its own terms, for
"the categories structuring the conception of reality must be those
employed in the expression of the objective knowledge of it." 109
Scientific concepts can only have meaning within a structure which includes
a conception of what constitutes an adequate scientific explanation. Even
the conceptions of adequacy change. As Mary Tiles puts it, the question of
what a science is trying to discover
"is specifiable only against the background of a structural
epistemological field, it is not independent of the forms structuring the
field, but is constituted as possible knowledge, possible content by
them." 110
Prescientific theorising is, according to Bachelard, marked by its closed
structure, as opposed to the open-ended ness of science. The science
emerges after an epistemological break when a new 'theoretical' structure
takes over. This epistemological break is akin to Kuhn's later conception of
paradigm shifts within science, but, in 8achelard's case, it marks the
109Mary Tiles Bachelard: Science and Objectivityp. 184.
110 ibid., p.183. Here again one can see similarities with Lakatos' concept of a research
programme. See above, n. 10.
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boundary between science and prescience."
Bachelard's conventionalism entails that theoretical works, whether scientific
theories or philosophies, are relative to both historical and social "place".
Scientific conventionalism grew from the work of Poincare and Duhem after
the immense upheaval caused by the overthrowing of Newtonian physics at
the turn of the Twentieth century. In conventionalism ''theory" is
underdetermined by empirical evidence and theoretical reasoning. There
are always other possible explanations for events or happenings. For
Bachelard the structure of a science cannot be fixed once and for all.
''the scientific activity of any period takes place within an
epistemological field (a problematic) which is structured by its
explanatory ideals, its conception of the goal of objective knowledge.
The description of this goal can only be schematic in character. It
requires a schematic account both of the nature of reality (a
metaphysics) and of what it would be to have objective knowledge of
that reality." 112
Althusser's work cannot ultimately withstand the conventionalist critique for
the simple reason that it could always be the case that there is more than
one potentially suitable theory - even more than one self-reflexive theory.
The only defence against this kind of critique is to hold a metaphysical
position akin to Spinoza's parallelism which as noted includes a necessary
element of one to one correspondence to the world. However, Althusser's
Bachelardian background never allows him to hold the coherence position
t11 Thomas Kuhn 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'.
t12Ti1esop. cit., n. 109 above, p. 183.
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with Spinoza's confldence.:" Marxism is always open to revision but is
nevertheless the basis for an understanding of all societies. The ever
present tension is the necessity to accept the social and historical constraints
upon his own and Marx's theories whilst assuming their transcendental
accuracy. By assuming a fully conventionalist position in regard to the
possibility of other explanations emerging he could avoid this but political
(and humanist) pressure pulls his work in the direction of absolutism.
The importance of placing Althusser firmly in the context of Spinoza and
Bachelard can be seen when reading critiques that follow what can only be
termed a positivist line like Kowlakowski's.!" Kowlakowski's shallow
analysis presumes to find in Althusser only "common sense banalities
expressed with the help of unnecessarily complicated neologisms"
compounded by a crypto-Stallnlsrn.:" Yet despite these bold statements one
wonders whether he had actually read any Althusser at alii He claims that
Althusser is vague about his definition of ideology,116 and nowhere explains
what practice rnsans.:" This is simply untrue, indeed both are explicitly
defined in the glossary to For Marx and their explication is implicit in many
pages of text for those who can be bothered to read them carefully.
Kowlakowski treats Althusser's anti-empiricism as merely an anti-
113Spinoza's formulation is not however designed, as Althusser's is to uphold the privilege
of one particular theoretical discourse i.e. Marxism. Instead it represents a general privileging
of the principles of rational thought themselves. It is a testament to our potential to escape the
mundane, passively received, and inadequate knowledge of the first kind using our critical
faculties. Althusser restricts the effectiveness of theoretical discourse to the physical
sciences and to Marxism as the science and philosophy of social formations.
II. Lezek Kowlakowski The Socialist Register.
lIS ibid., p. 112.
Ilsibid.,p.113.
117 ibid., p. 127n.
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essentialism and goes so far as to claim that science is about "empirical
verification".118 He nowhere grasps the importance of a holistic coherence
theory to Althusser or even shows any inkling that there might be non-
correspondence theories of truth. The fact that Kowlakowski has since
published a three volume history of Marxist thought (which incidentally
hardly treats of Althusser at all) in no way reduces the appalling ignorance
he shows in this paper which is typical of those who have dismissed
Althusser without understanding him.
Althusser tries to occupy a ground which is in one sense between a
historicised conventionalism and an a-historical coherence theory, a ground
which corresponds roughly to the area now termed "critical theory"?" (In this
sense despite all his differences with the Frankfurt School he can be aligned
with them in this attempt to find a role for theory, in attempting to escape an
all encompassing ideology. The following two chapters will assess
Althusser's success in this manoeuvre.)
Conclusions
The preceding exposition cannot hope to have covered in any detail all the
issues raised in Althusser's philosophy. This was in any case not its
purpose. Certain issues and influences have been underplayed. Perhaps
the most obvious exclusion is any judgment on the accuracy of his readings
of Marx. Other omissions include his relation to Balibar with whom he co-
Ita ibid., pp.116-117.
lIe The reference here is to the epistemological positions of critical theory and Ahhusser
with respect to 'reason' not their attitudes towards science which are often quite opposite.
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wrote Reading Capital and the deep influence of the works of Lenin and
Comte. This chapter has sought to place Althusser in a philosophical context
as the heir not only to Marx but to Spinoza, influenced not only by
materialism but by Structuralism, and whose constructivist theory of
knowledge exhibits aspects of holistic coherence and conventionalist
epistemologies He was, I claim, a philosopher who was hermeneutically
aware. Such a variety of influences are bound to create tensions within any
problematic and it is a mark of his brilliance that his theory was at all
coherent. Some of these tensions have been highlighted here as important
theoretical elisions which point the way to a constructive critique and
application of his theories. This critique will be the subject of the next
chapter.
Excursus on Althusser and Structuralism
Given Althusser's obvious indebtedness to Structuralism what are we to
make of his repudiation of Structuralism? The distinction between
Althusser's Spinozistic metaphysics and his Marxist dialectical epistemology
is the key to this repudiation and points to the differences between Althusser
and professed Marxist structuralists like Maurice Godelier.
Godelier draws heavily upon the writings of Levi-Strauss but there is an
ambiguity in the ontological status given to structures in both Levi-Strauss
and Godelier that Althusser would find problematic. Thus Levi-Strauss
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"The term 'social structure' has nothing to do with empirical reality but
with models that are built up after it... social relations consist of the raw
materials out of which the models are built, while social structure can,
by no means, be reduced to the ensemble of social relations in a
given society." 120
The anti-empiricism is obviously grist to Althusser's mill but the metaphor of
models is ambiguous, for there is a possibility of interpreting this to mean that
the models are directly comparable to society, that the sociologist's theories
somehow 'correspond' to reality. This is the line taken by Godelier when he
speaks of structures expressing a hidden 'deeper reality'.
"what is visible is a realityconcealing another, deeper reality, which is
hidden and the discovery of which is the very purpose of scientific
cognition." 121
From Althusser's perspective this is to fa" back into the very abstractionist
empiricism which the dialectic is concerned to overcome. Social structures
do not represent the deep reality of the world, we can only ever work with
those relations made visible to us in practices. The structures which
Althusser posits do not reflectthe 'truth' in empirical terms at a". The deep
structure, the real organisation of the world remains forever unknown and
unknowable whether by science or any other means. The only guarantee of
Althusser's structures conforming to reality is the interactive nature of the
dialectic, the fact that practice necessarily fuses human and nature, subject
and object. Structuralism itself has to be seen as a theory trying to give a
coherent understanding of the world, it is not a defect of this theory but a
120 Levi-Strauss Structural Anthropologyp.279.
121 Maurice Godelier 'The Problem of the 'Reproduction' of Socioeconomic Systems' p.
267.
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necessary condition, according to dialectic materialism, that it can never
ground itself in the structure of the world per se but only in the structure of
social experiences of that world. This is the crucial distinction between the
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"With philosophers you know what to expect: at some point they will
fall flat on their faces ...... Scientists can also fall flat on their faces ...But
when a philosopher fails .... things are different: for he falls flat on his
face within the very theory he is setting forth in order to demonstrate
that he is not falling flat on his face. He picks himself up in advance!
How many philosophers do you know who admit to having been
mistaken? A philosopher is never mistaken!" 1
CHAPTER FOUR: SCIENCE. THEORY AND IDEOLOGY
Introduction
The previous chapter attempted to give a generally sympathetic account of
Althusser's theoretical position, defending it against a variety of previous
misrepresentations. This chapter takes a more critical approach towards his
epistemology, in particular his absolute insistence on the qualitative
difference between ideology and theory (or science) which, I suggest,
contains the seeds of its own deconstruction.
This distinction between ideology and theory as two levels of knowledge,
separated by an epistemological break, inevitably raises historical questions
concerning the emergence of theoretical practices. Can they be
uncompromised by the ideological structures inherent in any particular social
formation? Can Althusser's epistemology sustain his claims to provide a
scientific critical appraisal of the very society in which it developed? What
features, if any, of "theory" facilitate such an epistemological privilege
, Louis Althusser Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the SCientistsp. 77.
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enabling it to escape from ideology; how is one to decide whether any given
conceptual scheme or practice is theoretical/scientific or ideological?
To consider these questions it is necessary to appraise the roles of "science",
"ideology" and "philosophy" both inside Althusser's theoretical framework
and in relation to influential alternative discourses. To this end related
concepts of ideology found in the work of Karl Mannheim, Georges
Canguilhem and the early work of Michel Foucault are sketched. The critical
comparison of these various perspectives on ideology is carried forward in
chapters 5-9 to produce a revised synthesis which nevertheless maintains
many of the original features of Althusser's framework. I shall argue that
Althusser cannot maintain a rigid ideology / science distinction which places
Marxism, together with positive sciences, on one side of the divide whilst
classifying all non-Marxist philosophy as ideological. There are three main
reasons for the unsatisfactory nature of Althusser's division;
1) Althusser's inability to provide a convincing demarcation principle or a
coherent account of the origins of the ideology / theory divide.2
2) His failure to appreciate fully the complexity of scientific practices and the
differences between them in their interactions with philosophies, ideologies
and the wider world.
3) The powerful arguments for a more 'conventionalist' approach which arise
once the importance of social and historical factors in the production of
knowledge are conceded. Such conventionalism need not entail a full
blown relativism and I argue that Althusser is correct in seeking to maintain
the relative autonomy of certain critical practices from other aspects of the
-----------~~-----~~~~ .2 The very attempt to institute such a dichotomy between science and non-science
reveals the positivist and humanist aspects of Althusser's theorising. See appendix 1.
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societies in which they occur. I hold that certain theories, particularly those
found in the natural sciences, are not conventional in the sense that they are
arbitrary inventions of scientists or simply mirror in theoretical form the
customary presuppositions of everyday social practices. Rather they consist
of active critical endeavours which exert a relatively autonomous influence
on other components of the social formation. Althusser unfortunately
exaggerates this autonomy, opting for a simple two tier "epistemology". In
contrast to this, I claim the degree and form of autonomy is not identical for all
theoretical practices; varying with the subject matter concerned, the
methodology utilised and that theory's articulation with other components of
the social formation.
Philosophical Criticism of Althusser's Epistemology.
There are several areas in which Althusser's justification of the science /
ideology divide and his own theory's scientific status have appeared to be
problematic. In particular his justification is often held to be circular. This first
form of criticism is exemplified by Benton who states that Althusser's theory
"fails on account of its circularity: the correspondence of scientific
discourse to its object is what has to be proved whilst the method of
proof presupposes this, at least in his own case." 3
However, as the last chapter argued, Althusser is not concerned with
correspondence as the criterion for scientific or theoretical knowledge.
Indeed, Benton's evocation of "correspondence" makes it obvious that he
has not grasped the central role played by a holistic coherence theory of
3 Ted Benton The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism: Althusser and his Influence p. 184.
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meaning and truth in Althusser's work. That Althusser should continue to be
read in this humanist fashion by many Marxists, like Benton, who are
generally sympathetic to his philosophical project is ironic. It stems from a
failure to take Althusser's interpretation of dialectical materialism seriously.
Althusser's theory is not a view of science as corresponding to its object at
all. Rather, science produces its theoretical 'objects' via a practical operation
on ideological generalities.4 Knowledge is a product of a dialectical
practice, not the reflection of reality. The essential nature of the world in itself
is always beyond our ken. The connection between the "concrete in thought"
and the "real concrete" is to be understood via the metaphysics of the theory
of dialectical materialism which presupposes that all objects can only be
known in thought and not in their 'real' state. It is precisely for this reason
that Althusser does not argue that there is any necessary correspondence
between the form taken by the 'object' in theory and the object outside
theory.
"knowledge is knowledge of a real object (Marx says: a real subject),
which (I quote) 'remains, after as before, outside the intellect and
independent of it'." 5
Knowledge proceeds from the abstract to the concrete, it proceeds
"in thought, while the real object, which gives rise to the whole
process, exists outside thought." 6
The 'objects' of our thought are constructed through our practical interactions
with the world. They do not mirrorthe world or represent it, they are not
Plato's distorted shadows. These ocular metaphors all too easily produce a
See fig. 1.
5 Althusser op. cn., n. 1 above, p. 227.
6 ibid., p. 226.
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humanist epistemological problematic which results in a correspondence
theory of truth. For Althusser, the practical interaction between the world and
society which produces knowledge remains irreducible. We are inside a
hermeneutic circle and cannot achieve knowledge of either 'object' or
'subject' independently of each other. Just as there is no pure data about the
world there are no transparent thoughts about the self, these categories are
themselves creations of social practices.
Many Marxists fail to grasp the epistemological implications of Althusser's
interpretation of dialectical materialism. One possible reason for this failure,
which has already been aired, is that political considerations make it difficult
to accept the anti-common sense implications of a coherence theory of truth.
Le. one not grounded by direct understanding of objects but only grounded
indirectly by the dialectical practical and irreducible relation of theory and
experience as a whole. They continually fall back into the ideological and in
Althusser's terms empiricist trap of seeing Marxism as truly corresponding to
reality. However, Althusser continually stresses the necessary self-
justificatory nature of theory.
"it is in fact because and only because we have a true idea that we
can know that it is true, because it is index sui." 7
Benton sees Althusser as caught between a conventionalism, dictated by
due regard for history, and the need for his (Althusser's) theory to correspond
to reality. The actual tension in Althusser's problematic is between a
coherence theory of meaning and truth (Le. dialectical materialism) and a
conventionalism / constructivism which would suggest that one must see
Marxism not as universally transcendental but as a theory suited to, and
7 ibid., p. 221.
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developing in, particular times and places. The easiest way for
commentators to avoid the conventionalist critique, the call of tu quoque, is
to insist that that Marxism does correspond in some way to reality in a
stronger sense than the dialectic would seem to allow. Thus Benton sees the
problem as one of Althusser's
"attempting to reconcile the 'conventionalist' commitment to the
socially constructed character of knowledge, with the requirement that
at least some knowledge-claims make an objective reference to a
reality independent of the mind." 8
But this is not Althusser's problem at all, it is Benton's. Althusser recognises
that all claims can make some reference to a reality independent of the mind,
indeed they necessarily do, for they are, in part, the result of that reality.
Althusser's problem, and indeed a problem for Marxism in general, is rather
that he has to reconcile a historical conventionalism with a commitment to a
transcendentally applicable Marxism. Althusser recognised that in
epistemological terms the only form such a reconciliation could take was as
a type of all inclusive, and hence self justifying, coherence theory.
Althusser is a materialist, but a materialist who holds that only one particular
coherence theory has been found which explains the nature of materialism
itself. Thus Benton is also wrong to suggest that
"the requirement, for the possibility of objective knowledge, of a
determinable correspondence of these irreducibly separate and
incommensurable 'objects' (the real concrete and the concrete in
thought) is at the root of all Althusser's uncomfortable shifts of position
on the question of the distinction between science and ideology." 9
'Benton op. cit., n. 3 above, p. 192.
g ibid., p. 181.
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In no sense does Althusser need a determinable correspondence, indeed
the nature of dialectical materialism means that, although the relation
between the real-concrete and the concrete in thought is determinate, it
cannot be determinable for this would require that we somehow have access
to the material word as it 'really' is and not as it is experienced in social
practice. This experience achieved through our daily practices and its
subsequent structuring in other ''theoretical'' practices is all there is for
knowledge to be. Althusser's uncomfortableness over the science / ideology
distinction is caused, largely, by his adherence to historical materialism as a
final (but as yet incomplete) social theory.
That Althusser has understood the nature of the difficulties inherent in his
position and Benton has not is shown by the features Benton picks to prove
that Althusser has shifted towards relativism. First, his decentering of the
human subject as the locus and arbiter of meaning, and second, his
"exclusion of the function of reference from the theory of linguistic meaning"
l.e., Althusser's coherentist epistemology. These moves towards 'relativism'
are the direct result of overcoming the humanist subject / object dichotomy
and are the central tenets of his philosophy, not some overlooked error on
Althusser's part. Any and all forms of Marxism that take the implications of
dialectical materialism seriously need to face this epistemological dilemma
posed by conventionalism / historicism. The point overlooked by Benton is
that it is the metaphysics of dialectical materialism which provides its own
guarantee of the connection between objects and our conceptions of them.
Where Spinoza posits a necessary parallelism between idea and ideatum
and thus avoids falling into idealism
"Marx protects himself in another way, more seriously, by use of the
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thesis of the primacy of the real object over the object of know/edge,
and by the primacy of this first thesis over the second: the distinction
between the rea/ object and the object of know/edge. n 10
Althusser does not have a theory of linguistic meaning as such or indeed a
theory of knowledge in its traditional analytic form. i.e. one where ideology
and theory might be seen as levels of knowledge which the individual has
purely epistemological grounds for believing better or worse. This change of
emphasis is in part due to his decentering of the subject. Thus there is no
discussion in his work about what it is for a person to know something but
rather about the social roles and forms taken by types of human social
production, including the production of knowledge. The extent of Althusser's
'traditional epistemology' is limited to the relations between an unknowable
material 'reality' on the one hand and our social experience on the other.
This relation is set out in the theses of dialectical materialism. Since the
actual nature of the material elements of this relationship are strictly
unknowable he concentrates on the social roles and internal structures of
different forms of knowledge, their relations to each other and to other
components of social formations. He does not explicitly discuss problems of
linguistic meaning i.e. the relation between practical experiences and the
linguistic expression of them. However, as will be shown later, much of his
emphasis on social practice is amenable to a parallel Wittgensteinian
interpretation of linguistic meaning as embedded in the network of practices
which make up the forms of life."
- '6 Althusser op. cit., n. 1 above, p. 228.
'1 I do not mean to imply by this that Althusser's and Wittgenstein's conceptions of
"practice" are identical but that there are many similarities in their epistemologies. See chapter
5.
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This in turn explains what is often seen as Althusser's 'rejection' of
epistemology in his later work. Althusser states in a later review of his work
that he "introduces neither a 'theory of knowledge' nor its surrogate, an
epistemology; I think that it only expresses the minimum of generality without
which it would not be possible to perceive and understand the concrete
processes of knowledge." 12 This is not to claim that there are no differences
in the quality of knowledge produced in ideological and theoretical practices,
but serves to demarcate his own project from those traditionally associated
with philosophical epistemology, particularly correspondence theories. The
epistemology of Althusser has a wholly different emphasis. The guarantor of
'truth' is not the content of a theory's propositions, but the form of practice
which has produced it and its articulation with other aspects of that practice
and other theoretical practices. It is an emphasis on dialectical materialism
replacing epistemology, an emphasis on a theoretical production that is
necessarily always in thought, the concepts of which depend on the
perceptions and images, "the stand-ins", for real objects obtained in our
practical relations with the world.
The failure to appreciate the nature of Althusser's coherence theory has led
to a second objection which claims that dialectical materialism is circular
12Althusser op. cn., n. 1 above, p. 225. This claim is somewhat disingenuous because this
minimum of generality includes the full epistemological implications of dialectical materialism.
As Piaget notes, the major concern of Althusser was to provide the .....means to furnish
Marxism with an epistemology ..." Structuralismp. 125. Descombes Modern French
Philosophy p. 135 posits a break in the work of Althusser suggesting that he moves away
from his early epistemological concerns towards political concerns. Although there is some
truth in this it does not mean that Althusser rejects his earlier epistemology, rather, he refuses
to refer to his work as epistemology, a term associated with overt theoreticism and which he
personally associated with empiricism.
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because of its self-justification, i.e. Althusser fails to produce an acceptable
rationale for non-Marxists to justify Marxism's view of itself as the privileged
discourse. But, as pointed out in chapter 3, this is not a problem specifically
for Marxism, but for any coherence theory which claims to be all inclusive.
The nature of a coherence theory of knowledge is such that any claim about
the epistemological status of that theory can only be justified by recourse to
itself. Such circularity cannot be held to be an argument against coherence
theories, indeed Althusser is not alone in making Marxism's ability to
explain itself a positive polnt in its favour. As Habermas says,
"Historical materialism aims at achieving an explanation of social
evolution which is so comprehensive that it embraces the
interrelationship of the theory's own origins and application." 13
Of course this circularity does entail that it is difficult for those 'outside' the
theory to find external grounds for believing that theory true. In this sense the
belief in the scientific nature of the epistemological break seems to require a
Kierkegaardian leap of faith. However, Althusser not only refuses to provide
external philosophical grounds for accepting his theory, but, in his early work
at least, remains consistent by refusing to appeal to extra-theoretical
!
considerations like pragmatism as a justltlcation." His theory is not right
because it achieves a particular end or provides a useful technique. It is
able to instigate reactions within society because of its coherence. A theory
is of use because it provides a coherent framework for understanding social
practices. The only 'proof' of a coherence theory can be its ability to make
ideas, concepts, and our practical experiences of the world cohere and thus
13 Jurgen Habermas Theory and Practice p. 1-2.
14 A tendency to justify his theory in politically pragmatic terms creeps into his later works.
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our acceptance or not of Althusser's theories will depend upon their abilities
to coincide with, and make sense of, our own practical experiences."
The important deficiency in Althusser's theory is neither a failure to justify its
correspondence to the real world nor its self justificatory circularity but in its
inability to justify the rigid demarcation it draws between ideology and
science in its own terms. The justification of the privileged status of historical
materialism, qua the science of society, is incoherent since his theory does
not provide a mechanism to allow or explain the possibility of a qualitative
leap by science and dialectical materialism out of ideology. Althusser lacks a
proper account of the differences between sciences and ideologies. This
lack can perhaps be most clearly felt in the absence of any justification for
aligning experimental sciences, like biology, chemistry etc., together with
meta-theoretical discourses, like dialectical materialism, in a single practice
of theory." Despite their obvious differences these disparate practices are
all automatically consigned to the realm of the theoretical. This humanist
(scientistic) taxonomy of practices actually receives very little evidential
support from Althusser's texts. Even disregarding the differences between
individual sciences, one needs some explanation as to why Marxism is the
only social theory which is held to cohere with the sciences in general.
To accept the transcendental nature of Marxist theory we need some account
15 As mentioned in chapter 3, Althusser's epistemology might be referred to as a
"constructivism" where knowledge is producedin theoretical practices. The products of each
theoretical practice cohere with knowledge derived from other such practices. This emphasis
on coherence is partly responsible for the synchronic tendencies of Althusser's theoretical
perspective as it tends to fix the relations between different sciences.
"Indeed Althusser frequently seems to forget about the experimental aspects of the
natural sciences altogether.
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of why the sciences should have this ability to escape the ideological
limitations of time and place whereas alternative philosophies, even
coherent ones, cannot. This problem cannot be solved by claiming the
divisions of the social world recognised in historical materialism, including
that between ideology and theory, are justified by the theory of dialectical
materialism. For one could hold an epistemological theory akin to dialectical
materialism and yet still dispute the ultimate separability of theory and
ideology.
Althusser's determination to maintain a strict boundary between ideology
and science is actually undermined, to some extent, by his own metaphysics.
For, according to this metaphysics, practices are only ever relatively
autonomous, yet he wishes to defend a monolithic Marxism which holds that
historical materialism is, epistemologically speaking, wholly autonomous:
that Marxism's theoretical account of society can continue to be seen as the
account of all social formations yet remain uninfluenced by the social
formation in which it emerged. It is a theory of historical development and
change which excludes itself from any radicalchange.17 The only argument
that Althusser presents to support his transcendental claims is the
I
exceptional coherence of a Marxist theory able to explain even its own
origins. But this very attempt to privilege Marxism introduces a radical
incoherence, for he nowhere explains how such a theory can come to have
transcendental status with respect to particular social formations. Indeed, on
- " Althusser is certainly not against developments within a Marxist framework, indeed he
states that "Marxist theory can fall behind history, and even behind itself, if ever it believes that
it has arrived." op. cit., n. 1 above, p. 231. However, he does not countenance the
replacement of Marxism's central tenets e.g. the epistemology of dialectical materialism, nor
does he question Marxism's applicability to other cultures. His scientism is also
ethnocentrically occidental.
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all accounts historical materialism's emphasis on the social particularity of
the production of ideas should undermine any claim it might have for its own
theoretical omniscience. Althusser sidesteps the issue by making dialectical
and historical materialism's close alignment and special relationship with the
natural sciences the guarantor of its transcendent status. However, as the
remainder of this chapter demonstrates, this only pushes the problem one
stage further back, as Althusser gives no account as to why science is so
privileged.
The question of "science" is best evaluated in the light of a second but
contiguous debate in the sociology of knowledge where "ideology" is again a
central and contested term. The status of theoretical practices can be linked
with the tension between a purely epistemological stance demarcating
different qualities of knowledge some of which transcend social
particularities, and a sociology of knowledge which emphasises the social
relativism of any epistemological claims. On the 'epistemological' reading,
"theory" is a second order discourse developed from, but qualitatively
different from, ideology, which remains always tied to other aspects of
society. In contrast, the sociology of knowledge emphasises the impossibility
of escaping social influences even at the level of theory. To explore this
tension I shall introduce different conceptions of ideology and theory found in
the work of three philosophers and sociologists who hold a range of
positions spanning this issue. In briefly discussing the work of Mannheim,
Canguilhem and Foucault the complexities of the relations between the
sciences and social ideologies will become obvious. The following
discussion is not meant to provide a comprehensive or exhaustive coverage
of the terms "ideology" and "science" but, in outlining a variety of positions
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from the extreme social reductionism of Mannheim to the 'scientism' of
Canguilhem a number of important issues arise which will be further
developed in the next chapter,"
Karl Mannheim
Karl Mannheim has exerted a profound influence on the theory of ideology
and the sociology of knowledge in the Twentieth Century." He distinguishes
between two descriptions of ideological influence; the "particular" and the
''total''. "Particular" accounts refer to the determination of particular 'mistaken'
aspects of an individual's views or actions in terms of the influence of wider
social and psychological explanations; e.g. "Sharon only believes that cars
are necessary because she owns a petrol station". The clear implication is
that her opinion is not an objective judgment but is biased by personal
financial considerations. By contrast, the "total" conception of ideology is
concerned with the underlying world-views (Weltanschauung) of whole
classes of society, indeed of whole societies, Le. "the composition of the total
structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group" 20
The total view "attempts to understand ... concepts as an outgrowth of the
18 For a comprehensive historical survey of the term "ideology" see Jorge Larrain The
Concept of Ideology.
18 Durkheim too has a theory of ideology with similarities to Althusser's later formulation.
Durkheim also sees ideology as epistemologically prior to science and as a necessary and
pervasive aspect of human societies. Paul Q. Hirst uses an approach derived from the work of
Althusser to interpret and criticise Durkheim's epistemology in Durkheim, Bernard and
Epistemology.
20 Mannheim Ideology and Utopia p. 50.
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collective life in which he partakes." 21 The occupants of discrete social
formations are inhabitants of different intellectual worlds - worlds without
common ground and with fundamentally divergent thought systems. There
are obvious similarities between this total conception of ideology and
Althusser's all encompassing ideology, especially when taking into account
the implied anti-humanism of Mannheim's total conception.
''the total conception uses a more functional analysis, without any
reference to motivations, confining itself to an objective description of
the structural differences in minds operating in different social
settings." 22
We describe the world in this functional manner when we "consider not
merely the content but also the form, and even the framework of a mode of
thought as a function of the life situation of a thinker". When we make such a
description we are involved in theory, and in particular in a sociological
theory of ideology. Mannheim develops a "relationism" whereby he maps
ideas onto the social system in which they develop. Since all ideas are
socially derived, and hence value laden, the sociologist makes no value
judgments about the merit of these ideas but only investigates the relation of
ideas to the observable phenomena of society.
Mannheim's concept of ideology is, however, dissimilar from Althusser's in
that it refers to ideas or thoughts rather than particular ways in which social
structures function. Althusser's conception is more complex, treating
ideology as a separate practice involving material aspects of societies e.g.
2' 'b'd 50I I ., p. .
22 ibid., p. 51.
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the I.S.A's. and not just 'ideas' in a conceptual sense. Nonetheless he is
close to this Mannheimian view in many respects.






The job of sociology is to provide a non-evaluative, general and total account
of particular ideologies. Mannheim's distinction between partial and total
ideology refers to the kind of explanation given for holding a particular view
and is not an intrinsic feature of the views themselves. For example an
aspect of a scientific theory could be explained by reference to the personal
history, psychology etc. of the holder and would therefore be explained in
terms of partial ideology. Alternatively, it can be explained as a part of a
general world view present in that person's social formation, hence total. An
example of a partial explanatjon of ideological influence might be that of
explaining the racist theories of intelligence by referring to the scientists'
personal histories. Thus one might interpret the racist use of intelligence
tests by people such as the American scientist C. C. Brigham biographically,
by referring to past events in his life.24 A total (but specific) analysis would
23 Adapted from Brian Longhurst Karl Mannheim and Contemporary Sociology of
Knowledge.
2. See S. J. Gould The Mismeasure of Man [sic] p. 224.
164
focus instead upon the general attitudes towards immigrants prevailing
amongst early Twentieth Century white Americans and on the roles played
by different races in the prevailing social structures.
We can examine Mannheim's views by utilising widely acknowledged
examples of ideology's interference with scientific practice, for instance that
of the Lysenko scandal in the U.S.S.R. In this case, the Soviet authorities
decided that Mendelian genetics did not fit with a strict interpretation of
elements of Marxist-Leninism, and because of this "no genetics text books
were published between 1938 and the early 1960's and genetics was not
taught to generations of medical students." 25 An equally obvious example
from the western world can be seen in the role played by Sociobiology in
supporting the 'traditional', Le. modern capitalist, views of the family, race
and sexual stereotypes. Thus E. O. Wilson, the doyen of Sociobiology, states
bluntly that "In hunter-gatherer societies, men hunt and women stay at
home." And, since "Human sociobiology can [supposedly] be most directly
tested in studies of hunter-gatherer life" (which Wilson presumes is the
primitive form of all human societies) we are left with the inevitable
conclusion that women are naturally fitted to playa domestic role. This
conclusion fits neatly with Western male stereotypes. (This despite the fact
that women actually produce two thirds of the worlds tood.)"
25 Bob Young 'Getting started on Lysenkoism' p. 83.
26 The political ideological implications of sociobiology and other genetic debates are
exposed in Steven Rose, R. C. Lewontin and Leon J. Kamin Not in our Genes which is only a
part of the immense literature that this area has stimulated. Elizabeth Badinter provides a
destructive analysis of the appeal to genetic rather than historical and social causes for the
roles played by women and the family in her history of motherhood in Eighteenth Century
French society. The Myth of Motherhood.
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In these latter two cases no psychological or partial explanation will suffice
by itself to explain the theories' general social acceptance. One can only
account for these cases of social bias by appealing to the structure of society
as a whole. But in invoking a total conception of ideology one cannot without
being inconsistent leave one's own perspective unquestioned: Le. why do
we come to see aspects of Lysenkoism and Sociobiology as polltlcally
biased? How can the social sciences provide a 'total' account of ideology
when this science is itself part and parcel of society?
Mannheim recognises this problem and the need for reflexivity it entails. He
holds that to apply social theory to other views and not ones own is
inconsistent. What is needed is a "general" application of the theory rather
than a "special" one.
"As long as one does not call his own position into question but
regards it as absolute, while interpreting his opponent's ideas as a
mere function of the social positions they occupy, the decisive step
forwards has not yet been taken." 27
To say that one needs a general rather than a special application of the
theory of ideology is to say that it must be reflexive, questioning its own
position in the same light as its opponents'. This, of course, leads to a rather
paradoxical role for any theory of ideology. As Paul Ricoeur states,
"The extension of Marx's concept of ideology itself provides the
paradox of the reflexivity of the concept according to which the theory
becomes a part of its own referent. To be absorbed, to be swallowed
by its own referent, is perhaps the fate of the concept of ideology." 28
21 Mannheim op. cit., n. 20 above, p.68.
28 Paul Ricoeur Lectures on Ideology and Utopia p.8.
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On one level Althusser appears to agree with the need for reflexivity, but
although he emphasises the all pervasive nature of ideology, which is
present even in socialist societies, he never goes far enough in accepting its
influence upon either the later Marx or himself. Whilst his whole
epistemological edifice is necessary because of the omnipresence of
ideology, the practice of theory is supposed to be able to break out of these
ideological constraints into a realm of coherent 'truths'. But, as Mannheim
points out.
"There is scarcely a single intellectual position, and Marxism furnishes
no exception to this rule, which has not changed through history and
which even in the present does not appear in many forms ... It should
not be too difficult for a Marxist to recognise their social bias." 29
Claims to possess the truth are always open to conventionalist arguments
that truths only hold for particular places and times.
Both Althusser and Mannheim wish to create a standpoint which evades, at
least to a degree, simply reflecting society's norms. However, they differ over
the form which their epistemological escape route from ideology takes.
,
Mannheim regards the sociology of knowledge as this "new intellectual
standpoint" whose aim is to discover the "situational determination" of ideas
and see these as functions of its "life conditions"." This new standpoint is
objective i.e. non-partisan, due to the social position of the scientists
employed and the 'disinterested' social groups from which scholars are to be
recruited (the social scientists are members of a 'free intelligentsia'). The
2e Mannheim op. cit., n. 20 above, p. 69. Unfortunately, in the past Mannheim otten proved
over-optimistic in his assessment of some Marxists' ability to recognise this need for change.
30 ibid., p.69.
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sociology of knowledge is the "non-evaluative" study of the empirical
relations of knowledge to social practice and as such it becomes simply
descriptive, leaving no place for epistemological (qua philosophical)
concerns. This non-evaluative model is one which "challenges the
'autonomy' of theory" 31 and as such is obviously antithetical to Althusser's
attempts to maintain the autonomy of some types of theory.
The 'objectivity' of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is maintained by
dubious claims about intellectuals' 'distance' from the social settings they are
to study, and at the cost of reducing sociology to a practice of correlative
empiricism and a theory of social functionalism. In contrast, Althusser retains
the critical bite of theory in a different way. Instead of appealing to the 'value-
free' study of the sociology of knowledge he appeals to the paradigm of
science and to its theoretical practice as ideology-free. (Or at least as
transforming ideology into a new theoretical product.) Perhaps the most
glaring bias in Althusser is his willingness to account for ideology in almost
purely functional terms but his refusal to countenance that theory may also
be so explicable. Although one may agree that dialectical materialism is not
reducible to the terms of a sociology of knowledge we are left in the dark
,
about just why it is that so called "ideological philosophies" can be so
reduced. Although Althusser is aware of the theory-Iadeness of empirical
data he shows relatively little awareness of the value-Iadeness of scientific
theories. Putting to one side the very real structural and material differences
between Althusser's and Mannheim's concepts of ideology their recourse to
'new standpoints' as breaks with the past are remarkably similar. Despite
their initial claims to the contrary both end with partisan and monolithic
31 Tim Dant Ideology, Know/edge and Discourse p. 15.
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interpretations of society justified by the supposed all-inclusiveness of their
particular theory of ideology. In this sense the study of Mannheim's system
has important implications for Althusser since it underlines the
conventionalist argument that coherence by itselfis not enough to justify a
theory's claims to transcendence since there can be many theories with such
potential.
Althusser is however right to reject some aspects of Mannheim's push
towards sociological functionalism. He is right not to overemphasise the role
of the social setting of knowledge to such an extent that knowledge is
reduced to a mere function of social conditions. Theory, including
philosophy, needs to retain a (relative) autonomy as distinct social practices.
Althusser's metaphysics provides a theoretical resistance to the reduction of
all theory to its social concomitants. He denies Mannheim's simple formula
that,
"With the emergence of the general formulation of the total conception
of ideology, the simple theory of ideology develops into the sociology
of knowledge" 32
Scientific Practice. Philosophy and Ideology
Althusser explicitly states that the status of all philosophies is determined by
their relationship with the sciences as the archetypal theory.
"The relation between philosophy and the sciences constitutes the
specific determination of philosophy ... "[T]his relation is constitutive of
32 Mannheim op. cit., n. 20 above, p. 69.
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the specificity of philosophy. Outside of its relationship to the sciences,
philosophy would not exist." 33
The difference between dialectical materialism and other philosophies is that
"the majority of philosophies, be they religious, spiritualist or idealist,
maintain a relation of exploitation with the sciences." 34
They use science to bolster their own positions rather than facilitating its
investigations in the world. In contrast dialectical materialism is unique in its
denunciation of such exploitation, and Althusser claims, scientists know this
to be the case. He offers no evidence for his claims and indeed as his own
writing notes, in certain cases, such as the scandal of Lysenkoism, the very
opposite has been the case.
Althusser was greatly influenced by Gaston Bachelard's view of science as
an open ended practice, a practice that does not assume that its answers or
explanations need be in accordance with religious or ideological
presuppositions. This Bachelardian inheritance, which stresses a break
between social normativity and scientific practice, is expressed in passages
like the following
"In the theoretical mode of production of ideology (which is utterly
different from the theoretical mode of production of science in this
respect), the formulation of a problem is merely the theoretical
expression of the conditions which allow a solution already produced
outside the process of knowledge because imposed by extra-
33 Althusser op. cit., n. 1 above pp. 108-109.
34 ibid., p. 129. It is interesting to note that Althusser refers to the majority of philosophies
and excludes reference to those alternative materialist philosophies (such as the conservative
anti-religious humanism of many empiricist philosophers e.g. A. J. Ayer) which see their
function as one of winning philosophical battles against religion and for science. Such an
omission can only favour his interpretation of the relations between philosophy and science.
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theoretical instances and exigencies (by religious, ethical, political or
other interests) ..." 35
Once again this is both to denigrate all non-Marxist theories and to refuse to
recognise the very real influence of external social values on all scientific
research. To be fair Althusser does attempt to give some account of science
as it is actually practised and of the relations between scientists in their
social setting and their objects of study. The .gist of this account is that
scientists work with a spontaneous philosophy which they believe explains
their relations to their objects of study. This spontaneous philosophy has two
distinct aspects.
Element 1 - which is the basically materialist belief in the reality of the
'objects' of scientific practice.
Element 2 - which is of "extra-scientific origin - it is a reflection on scientific
practice by means of philosophical Theses elaborated outside this practice
by the religious, spiritualist or idealist-critical 'philosophers of science'." 36 In
other words to explain (or explain away) the value-laden nature of science
itself he has to resort to claiming that all such values are infections of
scientific practices rather than inherent parts of them. The questions then,
remain as to what comprises "pure and unadulterated" science and how to
recognise it. Althusser's answer seems to be that only Element 1is pure
science Le. those aspects of scientific theories which agree with dialectical
materialism! Hence it is hardly surprising that Althusser can claim that
dialectical materialism does not obstruct true scientific progress because by
his definition they necessarily have a mutually determining relation.
35 Althusser Reading Capita/po 52.
38 Althusser op. cit., n. 1 above, p.133.
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This division of the spontaneous philosophy of scientists into two Elements is
an attempt to overcome the static nature of his conception of science and
,
take account of the reality of constant theoretical changes within science.
There seems little doubt that the natural sciences actually evolve a new
terminology and create a new domain for themselves over a (sometimes
considerable) period of time. They do not suddenly appear ready made. As
they develop they become more clearly demarcated from their past and
develop into relatively autonomous practices. There may also be conceptual
revolutions within a scientific practice, for example between Newtonian and
Einsteinian physics. Althusser seems unable to capture this evolutionary
aspect of a science's internal and external development because of his
insistence that the science springs forth ready formed and demarcated as the
result of the simple application of a theoretical transformation. Althusser's
position is one of theoretical revolution followed by a stasis, or only gradual
change within the now constituted scientific theory.
Althusser wants to protect the integrity of scientific theory which plays so
necessary a part in his defence of Marxist epistemology. He therefore faces
serious problems because of the th~oretical dynamism which genuine
historicism would seem to imply. There is an inevitable tension between a
historical evolution of science as a practice away from the ideology of
everyday life and Althusser's continual emphasis upon science as a
revolutionary break from preceding ideology. It is in an attempt to defuse this
tension between a historical view of science and science as it figures in his
epistemological thesis that Althusser introduces the conception of competing
Elements of philosophy in the spontaneous philosophy of practising
172
sclsntlsts." By this he hopes to maintain both the revolutionary nature of the
change between science (as Element 1) and ideology (as Element 2) and
show how the tendency of Element 1 to overcome Element 2 leads those
involved in scientific practice towards an increasingly scientific perspective.
The important thing to note is that Althusser is attempting to displace an
argument about the ideological penetration of scientific theories with a
debate about the ideological penetration of the philosophy of scientists
themselves, his motivation being to keep the actual day to day theories and
practices of science pure and unadulterated by ideology. Scientific progress
is a process of weeding out the idealist concepts present in the philosophyof
the individual scientists. This distinction between the ideological influence
upon the scientist's philosophy of practice and those practices themselves
allows us to see that Althusser's attempt to marry evolution and revolution
fails: for it is not only the scientists' accounts of the status of their theories, but
these theories themselves which have ideological ramifications. It was not
Galileo's philosophy of science that so upset the papacy but his actual
theories themselves and the practical implications for religion of a solar
centred rather than an earth centred cosmos. Althusser's introduction of,
these two elements within the philosophy of science does not resolve the
problem of the degree of autonomy of science itself.
37 Rather than positing a developmental model, where science becomes ever more
separated from other practices, it might be more fruitful to recognise a genuine dynamism in
the interactions between scientific theories and wider social ideology. At different times a
science might find itself closer to, or further from, prevailing ideological presuppositions and as
such will be a potential focus for supporting or opposing the current status quo. One example
of this phenomenon might be the change in attitudes towards a concept of evolution in
general, from its original radical political overtones at the time of Darwin's youth to its more
general acceptance by the rising Bourgeoisie at the time of the publication of the Origin of
Species. See Adrian Desmond and James Moore Darwin.
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Althusser seems to believe that it is the exogenous philosophy of the
scientists (Element 2) which is responsible for placing fetters upon scientific
development and that the greater the extent to which a materialist philosophy
is adhered to the greater the autonomy granted to the science itself and the
more open-ended its practice can become. If only scientists could free
themselves from 'idealist' elements of philosophy then their practice would
flourish. However, this does not actually maintain the purity of scientific
practice: for if the ideological component (Element 2) of scientists'
philosophy does retard science's theoretical development then it can only do
so by restricting the nature of scientific theories themselves; in other words
there must be the equivalent of, or at least the results of, Element 2 at the
level of theory and practice, Le. science is never pure but always partially
ideological.
Althusser needs to explain how an unchanging theory of historical
materialism can always remain aligned with science, if the content of the
sciences changes continuously. Althusser does not recognise any internal
dynamic within the structure of the s~iences because he wishes to maintain a
fixed relation between them and dialectical and historical materialism. If
individual scientific problematics change then one would expect that the
relations between these problematics would also alter. In positing a formal
relation between science in general and Marxist Theory Althusser seems at
odds with his Spinozistic metaphysics.
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Cangujlhem
The work of Georges Canguilhem is closely akin to Althusser's, sharing as it
does a common Bachelardian heritage. Although Canguilhem lacks, in
some respects, the epistemological sophistication of Althusser he makes the
tension between static and dynamic conceptions of science mentioned
above central to his problematic. He wishes to retain a universal distinction
between science and ideology but at the same time recognises that science
itself changes. To do this he introduces a special prescientific ideology
distinguished from other types of ideology and defines its boundaries by a
historically recursive method."
Althusser and Canguilhem both hold that a newly emerging scientific
practice simultaneously explains an area of knowledge and creates it.
Creates it in the sense that it becomes demarcated from other practices and
discourses both scientific, and more importantly, ideological. The scientific
practice works upon its ideological raw material and reorders it into a
coherent theoretical whole. This re-ordering changes the relations and
hence the meanings of old ideologic~1 terms. It forms a new problematic, a
research programme, enhanced and developed by the introduction of novel
terminology and practices.
Where Althusser's conception of science appears excessively static
Canguilhem's approach is more dynamic. Rather than confine ideology to
the spontaneous philosophy of the scientists Canguilhem recognises that
Si Canguilhem posits a scientific ideology which in every domain "precedes the institution
of science". Ideology and Rationality in the History of the Life Sciencesp. 38.
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science itself contains elements of past ideologies which are, he claims, then
removed over time by a process of critical correction. This internal criticism is
a feature of science, indeed for Canguilhem the process of correction is the
important distinguishing feature of scientific practice. "A science is governed
by critical correction." 39
Canguilhem continues to see the distinction between ideology and science
as one which is epistemological in form. Sciences are practices which
inherently provide a qualitatively different form of knowledge from previous
practices
"it [scientificity] is precisely a question of merit, for 'science' is a kind of
title, a dignity not to be bestowed lightly." 40
Canguilhem holds a view of science as a pragmatically successful critical
practice which proceeds under its own momentum. This, it must be said, is
hardly an adequate definition or demarcation for many areas of knowledge
can be said to have their own canons of critique. His view of science is
adapted from that of Bachelard which was developed for mathematical
disciplines in which a theory's successor is to be preferred, as Oavailles says
"not because the present contains or supersedes the past but
because the one necessarily emerges from the other." 41
Canguilhem realises that there are problems in merely applying this
conception to other sciences but nonetheless holds fast to its central tenets.
This perspective gives an almost complete autonomy to science; its
3i ibid., p. 11.
• 0 ibid., p. 27 .
•'Jean Cavailles from Sur /a Logique et /a theorie de /a science Quoted in; Canguilhem
ibid., p. 14.
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development is seen as the working out of its own intrinsic programme. He
argues against Lecourt's claim that
"epistemologists are wrong to attempt to reconstruct the history of
science without referring to the history of society." 42
Science is a teleological process of unfolding and purification, removing past
ideological influences and expanding to become ever more complete in its
scope.
As a historian of science Canguilhem has the great merit of incorporating a
critical dynamism into his description of the relations between those aspects
of society from which science proper emerges. The recognition of
prescientific ideology has to be recursive, that is it can only be recognised as
such after it has been replaced by a fully formed science
"A scientific ideology comes to an end when the place that it occupied
in the encyclopaedia of knowledge is taken over by a discipline that
operationally demonstrates the validity of its claim to scientific status,
its 'norms of scientificity'." 43
There are, then, two important elements to Canguilhem's position. Firstly,
that we can distinguish science as a practice by certain critical
methodological norms different from those in non-scientific areas. Secondly,
that a scientific ideology is recognised retrospectively by the historian of
science. Scientific ideology 'stands over' (superstare) the position
eventually to be occupied and altered by the emergent science. This
relationship can only be recognised and discussed from the present
understanding of that science. Thus, as Canguilhem states, a history of the
42 Quoted in Canguilhem ibid., p. 17
43 ibid., p.33.
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precursors of Genetics written before the discovery of D.N.A.'s structure in
1953 will recognise different antecedents from one written after this date.
Science itself changes and "what is now obsolete was once considered
objectively true." 44 This is at variance with a static view like Althusser's
.which posits a scientific plateau which once reached is filled by the
accumulation of theoretical knowledge. For Althusser purification is only
necessary at the philosophical level where the scientifically derived Element
1 increases over time at the expense of the ideological Element 2. What
Canguilhem stresses is that what is considered to be scientific at one stage
of reflection will be seen from a later perspective to have been mistaken. It is
not so much that the older theories were themselves simply ideological, but
that such a progression is a necessary part of the critical process of science.
Scientific ideology is that which is recognised post hoc as the theory
prevalent in an area before science proper arrived. Nor should one see
scientific ideology as being wrong or mistaken; it is simply that which is
prescientific. It apes a scientific theoretical stance in a realm as yet
untouched by the scientific process.
"a Scientific ideologies are explanatory systems that stray beyond
their own borrowed norms of spientificity.
b In every domain scientific ideology precedes the institution of
science. Similarly every ideology is proceeded by a science in an
adjunct domain ..." 45
The break from scientific ideology to science proper is one in which the
imitator of scientific method is replaced by a new critical form of knowledge
untied to its past. Scientific ideologies are subject to a theoretical revolution
U'b'd 39I I " p. ,
.5 ibid" p. 38,
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which reconstitutes them as a discipline with a new successful and coherent
paradigm which can be regarded as a science in its own right.
In this recursive history of science, one continually has to rewrite the history
of the sciences as the present perspective changes. The scientific content of
a theory, which in Althusser's theories is formal and set, becomes neither
formal nor set. Although one can still maintain a distinction between science
and ideology from any given stage in a science's development, what one
once took as the importance, nature and the relevance of the moment of the
epistemological break may have to be revised in the light of that science's
subsequent development." There may be ideological elements in any
theory which lie hidden until a later perspective reveals them. Those
elements which form the scientific ideologies are revealed as they develop
into a new science, the mistakes are expunged.
"The events of science are linked together in a steadily growing
truth ....At various moments in the history of thought the past of thought
and experience can be seen in a new light." 47
Thus despite his recognition of the conventional or normative nature of the
description of a science's past, Canguilhem (like Bachelard and Althusser) is
involved in "an epistemological history of the sciences", a description which
as Foucault says,
"takes as its norm the fully constituted science; the history that it
recounts is necessarily concerned with the opposition of truth and
46 This may be what Althusser refers to when he says of Canguilhem ''Canguilhem has not
used this term [epistemological break] systematically, as I have tried to do." op. cit., n. 35
above, p. 323.
47 Bachelard Quoted in Canguilhem op. cit., n. 38 above, p.11.
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error, the rational and irrational, the obsolete and fecundity, purity and
impurity, the scientific and the non-scientific." 48
Instead of positing a formal and transcendental distinction between the
content of ideology and science, Canguilhem develops a perspective which
though allowing us to distinguish a science from its preceding ideology
recognises that changing boundaries and content are an inevitable outcome
of a practice which lives by criticism of its own theses. Sciences are
inevitably subject to discontinuity. Canguilhem recognises too that an
epistemology of discontinuity should not dismiss the importance of periods of
continuity in the history of the sciences. In this sense he may be seen to be
accepting a picture at least superficially like that of Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn
gives an account of the everyday practice of 'normal science' which occurs
within a paradigm accepted by the scientific community. This is punctuated
by periodic crises comprising a loss of confidence in the prevailing paradigm
followed by a 'revolutionary' upheaval from which a new paradigm
smerqes." Yet Canguilhem is opposed to Kuhn's reduction of "normal
science" to a "mere social psychology". The view he espouses is one that
recognises the relevance of epistemological claims and is one of
Bachelardian epistemological "normality" rather than the sociological
reductionism of Kuhn."
For Canguilhem a formal and transcendental distinction between science
and ideology is impossible, but a historian of science needs to be able to
mark a discontinuity between science and non-science whilst at the same
48 Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledgep. 190.
48 Thomas Kuhn 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'.
50 See Canguilhem op. cit., n. 38 above, pp. 12-13.
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time recognising the developmental links between the two. Canguilhem thus
has a twofold concept of science
a) Science as an ongoing process, a critical cultural form
b) Science as whatever is currently endowed with this 'meritorious' title.
Whether or not the normative content and the critical process aspects of this
position are fully compatible is not my concern here, but one can at least see
how the building of a relation of sorts between science and non-science is of
central importance to any historical account.
"Distinguishing between ideology and science prevents us from
seeing continuities where in fact there are only elements of ideology
preserved in a science that has supplanted an earlier ideology.
Hence such a distinction prevents us from seeing anticipations of the
Origin of Species in Rousseau's Dream of D'Alembert
Conversely, recognising the connections between ideology and
science should prevent us from reducing the history of science to a
featureless landscape." 51
That is, we would be wrong to see a recursive reading as drawing superficial
links between views that appear similar yet are from completely different
contexts, yet we should not see science as emerging fully formed from
'nowhere'. Where there are prescientific discourses that have influenced
and formed parts of a later discipline these need to be given due recognition.
It is important to realise that Canguilhem's view of the autonomous unfolding
of the critical process of science means that he has to make a distinction
- Si ibid., p. 39. The reference to Rousseau here is puzzling for it was Diderot who is
generally accredited with preempting some of Darwin's evolutionary ideas in a work of this title.
See Peter France Diderotp. 58. Foucault correctly refers to Diderot as the author in The
Archaeology of knowledge p. 183.
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between scientific ideology and other forms of ideology and that his
epistemological bias leads him to reduce other non-scientific ideologies to
the status of simple falsehoods. He states that "scientific ideology, unlike a
class ideology, is not false consciousness. Nor is it false science." 52 In one
sense this begs the question about the relationship between science and
ideology posed by thinkers like Althusser, for Canguilhem is only concerned
with the relationship between scientific ideology and science and scientific
ideology is itself dependent upon the existence of a science to ape. There
still exists a formal barrier between ideology in the sense of the wider views
and ideas held by society on the one hand and scientific ideology and
science on the other hand. Canguilhem only seems to introduce an
emasculated form of ideology, one that has been severed from all
connections with the more general social and historical background; he
cannot speak of the relations between the social formation as a whole and
the scientific theories which originate in it.
Canguilhem represents the "epistemological" end of the spectrum of views
on the status of scientific knowledge. His importance lies in his historical
perspective which necessitates the introduction of a recursive methodology,
a dynamic normative historicism which, when not focused on the question of
locating demarcations, could provide a basis for an account of (relatively)
autonomous scientific change which Althusser lacks. (See the section
entitled, Althusser, Ideology and Science below.)
52Canguilhem op. cit., n. 38 above, p. 32. Althusser uses the term "scientific ideology" but
simply to represent those obstacles in the path of development of a science. See
Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the SCientistsp.88.
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Foucault
There is a genuine tension between the extreme view of science as
constituting a purely epistemological break with previous forms of
'knowledge' and the perception of science as a family resemblance of
practices to be reductively described simply in terms of their social and
historical correlates. On the one hand Althusser and Canguilhem posit a
level of discourse that is autonomous insofar as it generates a discourse not
dependent on agreement with other aspects of the current social
background. On the other hand, Mannheim claims that all discourse is
socially perspectival and that knowledge is merely an epiphenomenon of
certain forms of social practice.
These sociological/historical and epistemological perspectives meet in a
constructive fashion in Foucault's The Archaeology of Knowledge. In no
sense does Foucault have Mannheim's faith in the objectivity of social
scientists or historians of science but he is nonetheless concerned to
translate the epistemological claims of the sciences into functions of their
place in the wider social formation, or more accurately the background of a
discursive formation.
"...in any discursive formation one finds a specific relation between
science and knowledge; and instead of defining between them a
relation of exclusion or subtraction ... archaeological analysis must
show positively how a science functions in the element of knowledge.
It is probably there, in that space of interplay, that the relations of
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ideology to the sciences are established." [my emphases] 53
It is important too that Foucault is not seen to be engaged in a sociological
reduction a la Mannheim, he is not interested in 'grounding' science in social
practices so much as drawing connections between scientific disciplines and
the discourses associated with a variety of other practices. He states that
"To tackle the ideological functioning of a science .... is not to uncover
the philosophical presuppositions that may lie within it; nor is it to
return to the formulations that make it possible, and that legitimated it:
it is to question it as a discursive formation; it is to tackle not the formal
contradictions of its propositions, but the system of formulation of its
objects, its types of enunciation, its concepts, its theoretical choices. It
is to treat it as one practice among others." 54
In other words a history of any particular scientific theory can be constructed
from a plethora of preceding discourses in its social and historical
background. Rather than treating science's claims to knowledge at face
value one should see these claims themselves as resulting from that
science's role in the interplay of a variety of discourses. The emergence of a
new discipline from the previous bricolage of background discourses, Le. the
discursive formation, might be said to be overdetermined by those
discourses' interactions with each other as loci of power in society.
53 Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge p.185. This book was written at a time when
Foucault was heavily influenced by structuralism despite his refusal to accept such a label for
his work. It precedes his later concentration on the mediation of power by and in discourses.
In this discussion I focus almost entirely upon Foucault's early 'structuralist' works as my
intention is not to provide an exegesis of Foucault's work but to throw light upon certain
aspects of an anti-humanist problematic in general, in particular as it relates to ideology.
5. ibid., p.186.
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Here we have a non-epistemological perspective on the ideology / science
divide, one which condemns the drawing of formal and transcendent
boundaries and sees the history of science as a particular recursive re-
ordering and break from elements of other discourses which preceded it.
But, Foucault's view of ideology is by no means as limited in its discursive
contents as Canguilhem's 'scientific ideology.' In Madness and Civilisation
Foucault sought to establish the development of a 'discipline' of psychiatry
from the previously existing discursive formation of nervous diseases,
delirium, melancholia etc. 55 Before these became a coherently formulated
whole under the influence of what might be termed historical 'accidents', Le.
the social conditions that happened to be prevailing at that time, there was a
discursive formation without a discipline. But, Foucault asks,
"By discursive formation, does one not mean the retrospective
projection of sciences on their own past, the shadow that they cast on
what preceded them and which thus appears to have foreshadowed
them?" 56
In complete contrast with Canguilhem he answers this question with a
decisive nol Foucault has a sophisticated position to which I cannot do
justice here. He does not make the common mistakes either of seeing
r
ideology as simply a reflection at the level of ideas of social norms or of
science's appropriation by extraneous political forces to predetermined
technological aims. But nor, unlike Canguilhem's scientific ideology, does he
see the discursive formation as that which breaks the ground where science
proper comes to tread. The discursive formation is the complex background
of socially and historically particular communicative practices on which, and
--------~~~~--~~55 Michel Foucault Madness and Civilisation.
56 ibid., p.180.
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because of which, the science comes to emerge as a coherent practice in its
own right with specific social functions, a discipline.
"If the question of ideology may be asked of science, it is in so far as
science, without being identified with knowledge, but without either
effacing or excluding it, is localised in it, structures certain of its
objects, systematises certain of its enunciations, formalises certain of
its concepts and strategies ... In short, the question of ideology that is
asked of science is not the question of situations and practices that it
reflects more or less consciously; nor is it the question of the possible
use or misuse to which it could be put; it is the question of its existence
as a discursive practice and of its functioning among other praotlces.?"
Foucault effectively opposes the positivist and humanist elevation of science
as a privileged form of knowledge. He does not deny the differences
between particular practices and their respective forms of knowledge, but he
wishes to trace the history of their development in the multiplicity of social
discourses which shaped their present form. The function of Foucault's
discursive formation is to remind us both of the holistic nature of society and
that science does not emerge from a linear singular prescientific ideology.
For example, Biology is frequently seen as merely an extension and
development of Natural History. The historian of science notes affinities and
connections between certain of these discourses and creates a genealogy of
science recursively from one of many possible positions. The background
elements from which the genealogy is constructed include amongst the
relevant determining factors in that science's development "Fiction,
reflection, narrative accounts, institutional regulations and political
57 Foucault op. cit., n 53 above, p.185.
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decisions." 58 This serves as a salutary reminder of the dangers inherent in
Canguilhem's conception of science as autonomously progressing within the
confines of its own particular area of practice seemingly independent of
political influences.
Althusser's more sophisticated demarcation between scientific and political
ideology does not fall into Canguilhem's overt scientism. Althusser has
explicitly recognised the importance of Foucault's work in showing that
'scientific' disciplines like psychiatry and the concepts which they use were
overdetermined by a
"whole series of medical, legal, religious, ethical and political practices
and ideologies in a combination whose internal dispositions and
meaning varied as a function of the changing place and role of these
terms in the more general context of the economic, political, legal and
ideological structuring of the time." 59
Also, Althusser's conception of ideology is wider and less restricted in at
least one sense than Foucault's, for it is not only, or even primarily, as
concepts or ideas carried by discourse that ideology functions but as a whole
level of the structure of social formations with its own material apparatuses."
Foucault does not find the concept of an ideology particularly useful because
he starts from a position which regards all discourses as 'epistemologically'
equivalent. Some discourses, like the sciences, carry with them a self-
authenticating epistemological privilege but, Foucault says
58 ibid., pp.183-184.
59 Althusser op. cit., n. 35 above, p. 45.
60 Althusser's social formations are in one sense, (and insofar as the differences in
problematics allow) the holistic equivalent of Foucault's discursive formations. They are the
background practices out of which all disciplines emerge and with which they must articulate.
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"I believe the problem does not consist in drawing the line between
that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or
truth, and that which comes under some other category, but in seeing
historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which
in themselves are neither true nor false." 61
One cannot therefore identify the discursive formation recognised by the
recursively constituted history of science as its original background with
ideology in either Althusser's or Canguilhem's terms. It is neither a
prescientific practice, nor a non-scientific social background, but simply the
discursive whole including other 'scientific' disciplines out of which a new
science is seen to have emerged. Foucault, whilst recognising that science
does make claims about its epistemologically privileged status, believes in a
manner akin to Mannheim that
"[t]he intellectual can [though in a limited fashion because of her still
existing class and professional associations] operate and struggle at
the general level of that regime of truth which is so essential to the
structure and functioning of our society. There is a battle 'for truth' or at
least around truth." i2
Epistemology is on this view a form of rhetoric and the philosopher's job is to,
identify not what constitutes truth but
"the ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are
separated and specific affects of power attached to the true." 63
Foucault's emphasis on language in his early work to the exclusion of al/
other forms of social relations does however signify a return to what
6' Foucault Power / Knowledge p. 118.
62 ibid., p. 132.
63 ibid., p. 132.
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Althusser could only see as an idealism, where discourse operates by itself
to determine the form of the world rather than as a material but only
relatively autonomous part of the world." However this defect is overcome
to a large extent in Foucault's later work which concentrates on the links
between power and knowledge and sees discourses as only one form of
power relation.
"Against modern theories that see knowledge as neutral and objective
(positivism) or emancipatory (Marxism), Foucault emphasises that
knowledge is indissociable from regimes of power .... The circular
relationship between power and knowledge is established in
Foucault's genealogical critiques of the human sciences." 65
A more genuine point of difference between Foucault and Althusser is their
attitude towards 'totalising' theories. Roughly speaking, for Althusser, the
greater the degree of coherence and inclusivity a theory has the greater its
epistemological value (hence the overwhelming importance of Marx's
materialism). But for Foucault, and for many others who may be provisionally
labelled 'post-structuralist', such theoretical structures are loci of potential if
not actual oppression. Where Althusser seems to see theory in an uncritical
.'
manner as uniformly liberationary some post-structuralists go so far on
occasion as to suggest that theories may be indifferently oppressive. (See
Chapter 8.)
---------n~~--~~~.4Ahhusser puts it like this. "Foucault: his case is quite different. [from Canguilhem'sJ He
was a pupil of mine, and 'something' from my writings has passed into his, including certain of
my formulations. But. .. in his thought even the meanings he gives to formulations he has
borrowed from me are transformed into another quite different meaning than my own."
Althusser op. cit., n. 35 above, p. 324.
65 Steven Best and Douglas Kellner Postmodern Theory: Critical Investigations p. 50.
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Althusser. Ideology and Science.
It appears that discussions of the relations between ideology and science
(the archetype of theory) reach something of an impasse. The optimism of
Canguilhem in the in-built epistemological superiority of science and its
separation from ideology seems misplaced. On the other hand, Mannheim's
total and general conception of ideology reduces every discourse to
epiphenomena of society Le. theory lacks both autonomy and effectivity.
The discourse relativism of Foucault, whilst avoiding these faults, dismisses
ideology as a term of little practical value once epistemological questions in
their traditional form are abandoned.
However, the usefulness of"ideology" as a concept lies not, as Canguilhem
and Foucault (in their very different ways) see it, as the opposite to true or
scientific knowledge, but rather in its sociological and political role, Le. in the
role that Althusser gives it as a structural and relatively autonomous aspect
of society which operates to reproduce the social structure through the
interpellation of individual subjects. Perhaps we should take Althusser's
,
remark that he did not intend to produce a theory of knowledge or an
epistemology at face value. This does not mean that his work is a
reductionist variant of the sociology of knowledge a la Mannheim. Although
his work indubitably leans in this direction he nevertheless gives a relative
autonomy and privileged status to theory over and above the ideological raw
materials it depends upon. This has been puzzling to many, but it should not
be, for once one has exorcised the ghost of the correspondence theory of
knowledge "epistemology" becomes something very different. In making a
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formal separation of ideology and theory he makes the only sort of
epistemological claim now open to him. He claims that there are different
loci around which knowledge can cohere and that one of these loci (science)
does not have a dependent relation upon the ideological presuppositions
currently holding sway in society at large but maintains a degree of
autonomy that enables it to transcend particular social formations. Althusser
makes a very simple point, which despite its importance is constantly
overlooked. Namely, that there is a crucial asymmetry in the internal form of
relations between sciences and other theoretically expressed ideologies.
At the end point of the transformation of raw ideological material (which
Althusser refers to as Generality 1, see figure 1.) into theoretical structures
(Generality 3), theories cohere as part of a unified level of society. There are
reciprocal relations whereby each science is seen to mesh within a
structured organic framework composed exclusively of other sciences. Each
science to be accepted must articulate 'positively' with the others in a relation
which is mutually informative, critical and strengthening. (See fig. 2 below.)
Fig.2.
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For example genetics is moulded by, and at the same time informs, other
constituted disciplines in the field of biology, evolutionary science,
biochemistry, chemistry etc. Genetics is a relatively autonomous practice,
whose relations are primarily with other sciences. This coherent relation of
reciprocity between the sciences is touched on in the course of Althusser's
discussion of the ideological nature of lntsrdisclplinarlty" Althusser rejects
interdisciplinary studies between sciences and non-scientific subjects as
ideological fabrications. By contrast, regarding those apparently
interdisciplinary studies between sciences, subjects like biochemistry,
biophysics etc. Althusser remarks
"These exchanges are organic relations constituted between the
different scientific disciplines without external philosophical
intervention. They obey purely scientific necessities purely internal to
the sciences under consideration." 67
Althusser describes these differences in terms of relations of 'application'
and 'constitution'. "Application" as the term suggests, is a relation of
externality where one practice is applied instrumentally to another. By
I
contrast the relation of constitution is one of internality within the sciences
concerned, one of "mutual exchange". Although one may apply a science
like mathematics to a subject outside its pure domain, unless it is actually
working in tandem with that subject, and is therefore closely and intrinsically
related to that subject (as for example maths is, according to Althusser, to all
the sciences), then the relation is not one of interdisciplinarity in a genuine
66 Althusser op. cit., n 1 above. See also chapter 3 of this thesis.
67 ibid., p. 87.
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sense but a simple instrumental application."
The relations between 'theoretical' constructs at the ideological level are
qualitatively different. These relations are not reciprocal and mutually
informative but much more unidirectional and uncritical. This is because
ideologies are arranged hierarchically with the dominant ideology always
being that of the ruling classes. Thus at the level of 'bourgeois theory' (e.g.
the non-Marxist philosophy which forms part of Generality I) relations have to
be pictured quite differently. (See fig. 3. Below.)
Fig.3.
DOMINANT IDEOLOGY
Here theories are acceptable only insofar as they mesh with the dominant
ideology, and their role is primarily supportive or communicative of this
ideology. They are consequently restricted in their own internal workings
because of the necessity of conforming to a limited social particularity.
One can speculate, although Althusser does not, that the Natural Sciences'
68 Whilst not agreeing with Althusser's formal separation of the scientific from the
ideological realm, his notions of relations of constitution and application have important
applications in the realm of environmental studies. The study of the environment is currently
dominated by the latter whilst, what is really needed is a genuine organic interdisciplinarity. . .
See my criticisms of humanist attempts to apply ethical theory to the environment in chapter 3.
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apparently socially transcendent explanatory power is due to their being
engaged in a dialectic with 'nature' which is relatively unmediated by other
aspects of society. (See chapter 6.)
I would suggest that holding a simple two tier system of knowledge based on
a formal methodological or epistemological distinction is untenable.
Althusser is guilty of this fault, to an extent, but not to the extent usually
attributed to him. His work can be read and developed in a different direction
which brings him close to critical theorists like Adorno and Horkheimer.
Althusser takes the establishment of the natural sciences for granted. It
would be easy to criticise him for not realising the possible ideological nature
of this unquestioning acceptance but to do so would miss the point. It would
be to treat Althusser's work as one of pure epistemology and to forget the
social setting that his inherently Marxist approach always brings to the
foreground. Sciences do hold a privileged place in the iconography of
Twentieth Century Western society: this privilege has to do with their success
at explaining the world in their own terms, in their autonomy from the general
background of society. Science does not have some magical ability to reach
the heart of the matter where the world is concerned, to reveal ultimate
reality. Dialectical materialism specifically repudiates this quest for a direct
correspondence between theory and the world. Rather sciences, because of
the extra-societal material of their study, have been given and fought for a
degree of autonomy not reached in other areas of discourse. Their success
has been due to the fact that they do not continually have to mesh with all the
underlying ideological and socially variable aspects of particular social
formations. Attempts like Lysenkoism to so treat them fail.
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It is possible to square the Enlightenment perception of science as a new
level of knowledge dispelling superstition with Althusser's concept of science
as relatively autonomous from the prevailing ideological background. This is
not because the scientific method gives us privileged access to the way the
world is but because science gives us a new body of knowledge (which a
social theory like Althusser's can attempt to cohere with and inform rather
than dominate). Theory becomes merely a locus of relatively independent
knowledge, relatively independent from the hegemony of current ideologies;
a body which is open-ended and forms an alternative focus for other theories
to converge upon. Science is historically and socially so structured as to rely
largely upon internal coherence rather than relations of external submission.
Althusser's reconceptualisation of the difference between science and
ideology is a subtle form of scientism that, unlike most, does not try to import
and impose a distinctive scientific methodology upon social sciences, politics
and philosophy, as a guarantor of epistemological purity. Instead he
recognises the importance of science as a locus in society, an alternative
standpoint, which critical theory can cohere around. The imposition of
ideological limits on a science's deyelopment reduces its autonomy and
alters the focus of its primary articulation from that of other sciences to that of
the dominant ideology. It therefore hampers its ability to develop theoretical
innovations necessary to maintain its coherence with other sciences.
By pushing Althusser's problematic beyond his explicit statements we can
unearth his criteria for any new science or theoretical practice. In producing
a new domain of theoretical practice it seems necessary, but not sufficient,
that the new practice be internally coherent, for this might also be the case
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with many 'idealist' systems of thought. It must also mesh with other areas of
scientific knowledge. Indeed it is this external coherence with other scientific
theories which guarantees its scientific and privileged status. Just as
importantly, and corresponding to this scientific coherence is its separation
whether gradual or revolutionary from its ideological past in which it was
held in fetters. The new science as part of an autonomous practice is free to
develop in an open-ended fashion without restraint from other ideological
practices.
To give an example. Genetics was not simply a 'scientific' description of
previous ideologically accepted 'facts' about inheritance. Before a
theoretical genetics came into being there were no 'facts' for genetics to
explain. Genetics creates a subject area - a domain which did not in a sense
exist before. This is not to deny that inheritability was recognised prior to
genetic theory nor to deny that there were a number of explanations for it
(and it is certainly not to claim that the physical nature of the world has
changed). It is simply to say that there was no suffiCiently coherent body of
theory and practice which meshed with other recognised sciences. Genetics
has a role to play in other subject areas: taxonomy, evolutionary biology,
ecology and so on. In these areas it operates not in isolation but in tandem
with other scientific theories. To understand population dynamics, genetics
has to be conjoined with evolutionary theories, theories of resource
utilisation etc. These conjunctions are 'internal' to scientific practice - they
are relations of 'constitution'. It is the ability of genetics to mesh with other
accepted scientific theories which is as important in its establishment as a
source of satisfactory explanations as its proficiency in its own area.
196
This explanation seems to fit with Althusser's description of his own
problematic and it explains why it is he does not believe that he is involved in
producing an epistemology, which he associates with correspondence
theories of knowledge. Importantly, it also explains how it is that Althusser
sees science and historical and dialectical materialism to be mutually
supportive of each other and why science might provide a basis for a critical
and to a degree socially transcendental perspective on the society of which it
is still a part."
Of course such divisions of social practices are not unproblematic and
massively oversimplify the real situation. An obvious question is that of how,
if sciences are to a large extent justified in their privileged status by their
coherence with other sciences, any science first came to obtain this
privileged position. Since Althusser nowhere introduces any pragmatic
considerations, his only option is to refer to the open-endedness of scientific
practice, its self-constituting role. But open-endedness and self-constitution
would, by themselves, not be enough to explain science's origins. A science
would also have to be a practice which helped explain its own practice in
relation to other non-scientific areas, of social life and initially at least these
other areas would be wholly ideological. The early sciences cannot have
broken radically with ideology but must have cohered with aspects of that
«0 Importantly it also shows why an anti-humanist environmental problematic need not be
anti-science. Science is not essentially tainted by humanism, but can actually provide an
alternative theoretical locus from which to criticise the hegemony of humanism. Ecology, as a
science, has certainly played this role on many occasions by highlighting the dangers and
damage associated with our current way of life. Almost every book on environmentalism will
reveal this critical relation between society and ecology. But see for example Hannah Bradby
Dirty Words: Writings on the History and Culture of Pollution and David Cooper & Joy A.
Palmer The Environment in Question: Ethics and G/oba//ssues.
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ideology. Althusser seems to recognise this to a degree and supposes that
sciences (or at least scientists' philosophy of science) has a historical
tendency to distance itself from ideology, a tendency facilitated by materialist
philosophy. However, as we have seen, he holds a very formal distinction
between science and ideology and only allows this tendency to occur within
the philosophy of science rather than the practice of science itself.
In summary, there are five other important points highlighted by this
comparison. First, there is no obvious reason why science should provide
the basis for a philosophical critique of society as a whole. Insofar as it is an
autonomous practice it may be used for a buffer or defence of social
privileges, to consolidate the hegemony of humanism, just as easily as to
criticise it. If science gains its transcendental privilege by its separation from
society there is no a priori reason why it should prove an ally of radical
critique rather than reactionary ideology. (Any theory can be politically
reactionary. Even Althusser's theories themselves may, on occasion be used
by reactionary parties or states.) Conformity with science is no guarantee of
a theory's political status and role. There is no radical essence to any theory
and it is only its articulation with the, other components which will determine
its political stance. Thus science can be appealed to by both anti-humanist
radical environmentalists and by humanist supporters of the status quo.
Second, theory does not necessarily escape from an ideological background
just by dint of its coherence. Foucault criticise this as a form of scientism.
"By correcting itself, by rectifying its errors, by clarifying its formulations,
discourse does not necessarily undo its relations with ideology. The role of
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ideology does not diminish as rigour increases and error is dissipated." 70
The incredible tangle which Althusser weaves to distinguish elements of
scientific theories is only necessary to distinguish ideology from science and
maintain the scientific nature of Marxism. Yet everywhere one tries to draw
this demarcation line ideology creeps back. To hold a formal and
transcendental demarcation one requires more and more theoretical
adjustments and auxiliary hypotheses. Ideology is present
i) as part of the raw material of scientific practice, i.e. Generality 1
ii) as the "usually dormant" Element 2 in the spontaneous
philosophy of the scientists
iii) in the social interpellation of the scientist herself in society via
education etc. and in many other less direct ways via other practices, e.g. the
political decisions made as to which research to fund, who to employ etc.
Given all these factors it is difficult to imagine how science and theory in
general can claim to be 'epistemologically' wholly autonomous from the
social formation which, in part, it seeks to explain. We need to change the
balance of Althusser's arguments back in favour of the relative autonomy of
the sciences which his thesis of a definitive science / ideology distinction
contradicts.
Third, 'totalising' theories, like Althusser's overlook the particularity of events
and practices by their very generality. This is a criticism which is applied to
the history of science itself by Michel Serres.
"Everyone talks about the history of science as if it existed. But, I don't
know of any" 71
70 Foucault op. cit., n. 48 above, p.186.
71 Serres Quoted in Canguilhem op. cit., n. 38 above, p. 18.
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There can, according to Serres, be histories of individual sciences but not of
science as such. For all sciences have different relations to the other
components of the social formation of which they form a part. They each
articulate in different ways, to greater and lesser degrees, and
generalisations about them are difficult to make or even impossible. This
criticism, which is akin to Foucault's, goes right to the heart of Althusser's
concept of science as a singular cohesive practice.
Fourth, we must, like Canguilhem's recursive histories of science, take into
account that science and ideology can only be distinguished from our
present perspective. Any division we make between science and ideology
cannot be absolute but is open to emendation. Althusser's conception of
ideology as all pervasive is one that is akin to Mannheim's total and general
ideology. Because of this, we must assume that ideological presuppositions
occur precisely where they are least obvious. Past experience has shown us
that the assumed and unquestioned aspects of theories do not provide
neutral grounds or certain foundations. The fact that some aspect of theory is
today recognised as 'obviously' materialist and coherent does not guarantee
that it will not, in future or from some, other perspective, come to be seen as
ideologically inspired. Even though we recognise certain elements of a
practice or philosophy as cohering with scientific practices and theories there
may still be deep seated underlying ideological assumptions behind this
recognition.
Fifth, the majority of theories utilise a mixture of both the dominant ideology
and a scientific perspective; this is, I claim, the case with ethics.
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"...and write with confidence "in the beginning was the deed ....
Goethe (quoted by Wittgenstein1 )
"All social life is essentially practical' Karl Marx2
CHAPTER 5: PRACTICE AND THEORY
As we have seen, Althusser emphatically rejects those theories he refers to
as "empiricist", which includes all those with a representational
epistemology, a view of language (and theory) as mirroring nature. He
replaces this with a concept of theory as a relatively autonomous field of
practice. Theory does not correspond to 'reality' but constructs theoretical
'objects' in theoretical practices, for which the natural sciences provide the
role model.
However, despite the complex nature of his epistemology, Althusser lacks a
theoretical account of how language is connected to social practices, of how
language comes to function in particular ways in particular contexts. This re-
contextualisation of language can, I argue, be largely provided by the later
works of Wittgenstein. For this reason, this chapter first examines the
production of theory and different interpretations of theoretical practice, it
then turns to an examination of Wittgenstein's work. The critique of
Althusser's attempt to separate theory from ideology in terms of denoting two
separate kinds of discourse - one of which is epistemologically privileged
, Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty §402
2 Karl Marx 'Thesis on Feuerbach §l' in Early writings p. 423.
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over the other (see chapter 4) - proves to be a necessary preliminary for the
development of a theory of practice which can reflexively explain its own
origins. I aim to outline a general anti-foundationalist model within which
theories, including 'bourgeois' philosophies such as humanism, can all be
seen as expressions of, and influences on, particular times and places, and
then judged on their relative merits and demerits hermeneutically, from
within a particular social and environmental world. This removes the last
remnants of Althusser's attempt to produce an absolute philosophical
epistemology in favour of a hermeneutic critical theory.
The preceding chapters placed in context the formal and transcendental
nature of Althusser's taxonomy of social practices; his recognition of four
"essential levels'l3 of society, the "economic", the "political", the "ideological"
and the ''theoretical''. The epistemological status of Althusser's own theory
was questioned. It seemed implausible that these levels could be the only
coherent way of classifying social practices and elucidating the structural
relations of al/ social formations. What vantage point could possibly enable
Althusser to justify such a theoretical analysis? His position, although
complex, boiled down to a belief in science's ability to transcend otherwise
dominant social ideologies. More specifically it claimed that dialectical and
historical materialism provide such a vantage point because of their organic
relations to the natural sciences. Althusser claims that Marxist theory is the
only theoretical explanation of society which coheres with the sciences,
supports them, and yet does not fetter them. These arguments were
challenged on a number of grounds,
a). It was argued that science, qua theory, is not completely autonomous but,
3 Althusser For Marxp. 167.
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even in Althusser's professed metaphysics, only relatively autonomous.
Science cannot therefore be unaffected by ideology, indeed it depends upon
ideology in a number of important ways. Sciences are not independent
points of reference from which to examine society, but practices within that
society with a limited degree of freedom in their own formulations.
b). The transcendental claims of dialectical materialism and historical
materialism cannot be supported by coherence with the contents or
methodologies of the sciences since these are not timeless and
unchangeable but alter constantly.' Scientific theories, to be sure, may
change at rates not whollydetermined by the dominant ideology, but they
change nonetheless. As dynamic processes the natural sciences cannot
thus provide firm and final foundations or grounds for theories of society. As
the nature of the sciences change, so may the relevance of dialectical and
historical materialism. This recognition of the historical evolution of the
sciences applies not just to the current theoretical content of physics,
chemistry etc. but to the relations between and existence of these branches
of science as a whole.
One might read Althusser as claiming that Marxist theory coheres with
scientific methodology rather than specific scientific theories. For example
the sciences seem to reject explanations couched in subjective terms as
does Althusser's Marxism. This however leads to two problems. First, there
are obviously vast differences between the operation of Marxist theory and
most of the natural sciences, most glaringly in the importance attached to
experimental and empirical data in the natural sciences. We will examine
a I use the term ''transcendental'' here in terms of an absolutism which sees theories as
uncovering timeless truths which can be applied outside of the particular historical and social
circumstances which gave birth to them; Le. as attaining a God's eye view, rather than simply
being innovative - going beyond current conceptions.
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this disparity below. Second, this relationship seems to be too vague to
justify any confidence in the actual content of Marxist theory. There are many
systems of thought which Althusser would regard as ideologies, ranging
from Buddhism to forms of postmodern theory, which also reject this
humanist grounding of explanation in the abstract individual subject. Why
should Althusser's be preferred to any of these? There is also more than
one possible meta-theory of society which would fit the criteria of coherence
with, and non-interference in the natural sciences. For example,
Mannheim's view of knowledge would not hinder the 'open-ended'
development of science. (Although the guarantors of scientific objectivity
might not be proletarian but bourgeois intellectuals.)
These arguments provide a necessary preliminary to understanding the
meaning and importance of "practice" in Althusser's problematic. This
chapter attempts to develop a conception of practices, in particular
ideological and theoretical practices, in the light of these criticisms and by
introducing aspects of the later thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein.6
If we approach the question of Althusser's levels of society from an
epistemological angle, i.e. as the four main social practices through which
we come to experience and understand the world, certain problems arise
concerning the status of the practices themselves. What exactly are these
practices and how do they relate to each other? I shall outline three different
interpretations of Althusser's concept of practices. First an objectivist or
naive materialist interpretation and then its opposite idealist interpretation.
These are rejected as falling back into humanist modes of thought. The third
5 In particular Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.
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option presented I refer to as a hermeneutic interpretation.
j) Practices as Material Objects.
The last chapter bought out a tension in Althusser's problematic which
resulted from the requirement of retaining a privileged scientific position for a
theoretical Marxism vis-a-vis ideology. However, in one sense, this ideology
/ science division is symptomatic of a greater tension throughout his work.
This tension might be portrayed in terms of an apparent clash between his
relational Spinozistic metaphysics and what often seems to be an
essentialist and transcendental notion of social practices. Althusser is not a
naive essentialist, that much is obvious, for as demonstrated in chapter 3 his
appropriation of Spinoza, rather than Hegel, entails a rejection of any view of
society as the development of a "single essence".6 However this conception
seems to be rejected only to be replaced with a view of society as the
predetermined working out of four essential levels, the major practices which
constitute the social torrnatlon.'
How should one interpret these levels and the claims Althusser makes for
them? One approach might be to see these levels as simply divided on the
basis of their material concerns - the material they work upon, the material
they produce together with the appropriate means of production. This might
seem to be Althusser's position when, following Marx, he makes the
distinctions between levels dependent upon the "type of object (raw
8 Althusser op. cn., n. 3 above, p. 202 and see also chapter 3 of this thesis.
7 Obviously Althusser's taxonomy of practices cannot be completely timeless because
theory is admitted to be a relatively new participant allowing the analysis of social formations.
\!>
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material) which it transforms, its type of means of production and the type of
object it produces"." (See fig. 1.)
"We think the content of these different practices by thinking their
peculiar structures, which in all these cases, is the structure of a
production; by thinking what distinguishes between these different
structures, Le., the different natures of the objects to which they apply,
of their means of production and of the relations within which they
produce ..." 9
This in turn may suggest to some a simple ontological thesis whereby
practices become completely autonomous at the level of the material they
transform and produce or the type of labour employed.
Presented with such a taxonomy of social formations an initial reaction might
be to inquire which category certain 'objects' in that social formation fall into.
e.g. Is a cash register a material part of economic practice? Or a speech in
Parliament a part of political practice? These questions arise naturally in
what Althusser in his very broad definition terms the "empiricist" problematic
Le. a problematic which still works with an objective / subjective dichotomy at
its heart. But, the wording of this question about 'objects' should alert us to
the presence of an incipient tendency towards 'objectivism', a tendency to
reify the components of theory as elements of the external world. As
Bernstein states
"'political economy' is not a single, selective dimension of human life;
it is a congealed or crystallised form of human activity - of praxis. To
8 Althusser Reading Capita/po 59.
e ibid., p. 58.
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think of economic categories as referring to a single abstract
dimension of human life is to be guilty of what Marx himself called
'fetishism'." 10
Althusser's claim about the material nature of the raw materials and products
of each level has to be understood in the context of the dialectic itself. In
other words Althusser is not espousing a naive materialist thesis which
abstracts the essence of certain objects as necessarily political, economic
etc. Nor is the operative category which justifies this distinction simply the
type of labour involved. It would be mistaken to see Althusser's taxonomy of
the social formation as cutting society up into boxes or levels all with
separate material contents from each other whether the 'objects' concerned
are discursive or otherwise. This would obviate the whole point of
introducing the dialectical notion of practice in the first place, which was to
understand the apparent properties of objects in the context of the relations
perceived through human social action. It is to ignore Marx's opening
remark in the 'Theses On Feuerbach' that
"The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism ... is that the thing,
reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object of
contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not
subjectively." 11
To essentialise the material bases of production and transformation in this
way is ironically to treat practices themselves as "objects of contemplation",
as elements of philosophical ideology rather than Marxist "science".
Althusser actually makes practices their own criterion of demarcation by their
'6 Richard J. Bernstein Praxis and Action p. 58.
" ibid., p. 421
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combination (Verbindung) of their various components of material, modes
and relations of production. For example, economic 'objects' are only
recognised as objects because of their role in the processes which
accomplish their transformation by economic labour and their insertion into
economic relations. We can only recognise economics as a practice
because of our relation to, and participation in, economic practices.
However, having said that practices are not definable in terms of their
'objects', it does seem that to the extent that Althusser tries to make certain
discursive statements elements of a scientific practice and contrasts these
with other discursive statements, e.g. in philosophy, which he claims are
inherently ideological, Althusser falls into this essentialist and objectivist
trap. To revert to an essentialism about the objects of practice, as one does
when claiming that the products of theoretical practice are essentially
superior to that practice's raw material, theoretical ideology, is to dissociate
the products from the the social formation as a whole.
The division of society into neat and apparently well defined levels results in
an almost irresistible tendency to translate these terms into a view of a
society divided materially into formal categories all with exclusive contents.
This can only be avoided by realising that, in a taxonomy of social practice, it
is not just the 'object' and its inherent properties which are classified but the
'object's' role, function and relations. Any particular 'object' or activity may
be playing more than one role at a particular time, and therefore may be a
component of more than one practice. For example, an 'object' might easily
be part of an economic exchange which in turn is politically motivated and
ideologically active all at the same time. Of course the 'object' is only
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knowable through practices, but these practices may combine to
overdetermine a particular conception of an object, mutually reinforcing each
other (or alternatively they may lead to contrasting and competing
perspectives where the nature of the object is under-determined).
Althusser is actually positing the existence of four (relatively) independent
forms of involvement in the world, forms which are self-referential levels of
practical experience and in which are constituted the 'objects' of their own
raw material, those they produce, and those that provide part of the means
for these transformations. Here one must bring to mind the analogy made
previously with Spinoza's attributes of substance. (See above p. 138 n.10S.)
Althusser can be interpreted as positing four attributes of the social
formation. For example, the objects of economic practice are only knowable
insofar as they relate to the actual practical interaction of labour's
transformative action upon raw material to produce certain products. Thus it
is wrong to ask whether a cash register, qua material object in isolation, is a
part of economic practice, because, strictly speaking, it can only ever be
known through one or other of these practices. In other words the cash
register, by itself, is not an object of any practice, indeed by itselfit cannot be
known at all. It is only when it is part and parcel of a practice that it becomes
'objectified', a part of a public practice open to public scrutiny i.e. an object of
knowledge. As an integral part of an economic practice it becomes an object
of that practice, an integral part of that activity. Which practice it becomes a
part of depends not only upon its own properties but upon its relations to the
(labouring) activities of humans.
This of course has precisely the outcome Althusser wants where theories,
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the objectified products of theoretical practices, are concerned. For one
cannot simply appropriate the terms of a theoretical discourse, such as
biology, physics or historical materialism, and apply them outside of their
self determined remit. To do so would be to cease to be engaged in
theoretical practice, hence these theoretical concepts would cease to be
theoretical 'objects'. The epistemological guarantee of theoretical
knowledge comes not from the 'object' of that knowledge by itself but only
from its application theoretically, within the bounds that theory has delimited
for itself. This enables Althusser to operate with a very strict demarcation
principle for science, and by including Marxist theory within the realm of the
theoretical he isolates it absolutely from ideological contamination.
Thus when used as a repository for Party funds or thrown from the twelfth
floor of an apartment block at a passing head of state a cash register
becomes primarily part of a political practice. It is not arbitrary that it does so.
As a materialist one must presume that it has properties which help it to fulfil
this function, such as a certain mass. In its day to day use the register might
playa role in interpellating its user into a certain place in society and so act
as a part of ideological practice. T~e point is that there is nothing inherently
or exclusively part of such objects which links them essentially with any
particular practice. Furthermore, the object's roles within any practice may
be either reactionary or radical, conservative or critical. This is equally true
of discursive propositions, problematics etc. Just as the cash register,
produced to fulfil a particular role in an economic practice, may serve as a
symbol of oppression or a weapon against a dominant hierarchy so too there
is nothing about a given ''theory'' or "science" which makes its content
essentially non-ideological or critical of society. A scientific theory can, and
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usually does, play an ideological role, even if only in interpellating those
scientists who come across it into a particular scientific practice which forms
a part of the larger social formation. A scientific theory can be used to
support a dominant hierarchy and ideology, e.g. in the application of
eugenics in Hitler's Germany, or it can be used disruptively as Ecology is
today by certain environmentalists in both capitalist and communist
societies.
In attempting to make a formal distinction between ideology and theory,
Althusser has fallen into precisely this trap of giving certain 'objects' (in this
case scientific theories) an essential and unchanging role in societies. 8y
giving an unquestioned privilege to science which then acts as the point
around which Marxist theory turns, he hopes to ensure both their persistence
and epistemological privilege over time. This implies a static essentialism
which sees certain theoretical constructs as inherently radical, critical and in
constant opposition to any non-socialist dominant ideology. 80th Althusser's
faith in the objects of science and his essentialism seem indefensible and
radically at odds with his relational metaphysics and dialectical
epistemology. The boundaries be~ween ideology and theory cannot be
drawn in this manner if indeed they can be drawn at all in any definite and
final sense. Just as sciences (and Marxism) have frequently been used in
conservative roles to uphold the dominant ideologies of oppressive states,
so called 'ideological' discourses have frequently been major contributors to
social change in opposition to dominant ideologies. For example, one need
only look at the importance of the religious discourses of the disestablished
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churches in the origins and growth of the labour movement in Britain."
Althusser seems to make his levels transcendental in an absolute sense, he
rejects a self-reflexive historicism which would deny the very possibility of
science (and hence Marxist theory) escaping wider social influences. From
this historicist perspective science would be seen as producing coherent but
not qualitatively (in any absolute sense) different frameworks for conceiving
the world from other theoretical frameworks. In summary, Althusser's
distinction between ideology and theory has been criticised for being too
rigid, making these two practices wholly autonomous rather than relatively
autonomous. If theory is completely autonomous as a practice, then
theoretical discourse seems to run the risk of losing any obvious relation with
other aspects of the world; its concepts merely articulating, in an ill defined
way, with other truly theoretical problematics. This tendency is well
expressed in the following passage.
"theoretical practice is indeed its own criterion, and contains in itself
definite protocols with which to validate the quality of its product ....
This is exactly what happens in the real practice of the sciences: once
they are truly constituted an,d developed they have no need for
verification from external practices declare to the knowledge they
produce to be 'true' Le. to be knowledge ... the truth of this theorem is
a hundred percent provided by criteria purely interna/to the
practice. "13
12E. P. Thompson The Making of the English Working Class chapter 11. In his later work
Althusser recognised that this emphasis upon the content of Marxist theory leads to a
theoretical paradigm which seems divorced from other aspects of Marxism. Hence Althusser's
redefinition of dialectical materialism. See below p. 217.
13 Althusser op. cit., n. 8 above, p. 59.
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This self-validation of practices has important repercussions for Althusser's
anti-humanist metaphysics and epistemology and to fully understand it we
need to make a short detour into Gaston Bachelard's philosophy of science,
for Althusser's conception of science is genetically related to that of
Bachelard. This discussion will also bring us to examine the charges of
idealism levelled against Althusser's conception of practices.
iD Practice and Idealism.
Althusser's construal of historical and dialectical materialism as science is an
extension of the applied rationalism of Bachelard and Canguilhem.
Bachelard too rejects the subject I object divide. On the one hand he states
that
"Our task will therefore be to show that rationalism is in no way bound
up with the imperialism of the subject, that it cannot be formed in an
isolated consciousness." 14
But, on the other hand, theory does not simply depict objects as they appear
to be - representing them in discourse - it makes a theoretical break with past
conceptions of the world.
"We have only to speak of an object to think that we are being
objective. But, because we chose it in the first place, the object
UGaston Bachelard quotation from 'Le Rationalisme Applique' in Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-
Claude Chamboredon & Jean-Claude Passeron eds., The Craft of Sociology:
Epistemological Preliminaries p. 224. For a much more detailed account see 'The
Epistemological Break: Beyond Subject and Object in Modern Science' in Mary McAllister
Jones Gaston Bachelard: Subversive Humanist: Texts and Readings.
" )
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reveals more about us than we do about it... Sometimes we stand in
wonder before a chosen object; we build up hypotheses and reveries;
in this way we form convictions which have all the appearance of true
knowledge. But the initial source is impure: the first impression is not
a fundamental truth. In point of fact, scientific objectivity is possible
only if one has broken first with the immediate object." 15
For Bachelard, scientific progress is a process whereby critical discourse
and practice purifies its material by detaching it from its illusory first
appearances. Science rejects common-sense views of the constitution of
the world and formulates new theoretical problematics which lead to a
deeper understanding of the world. It reconceptualises the obviousness of
an 'object' in a novel and coherent discourse forming part of a new scientific
practice, including also its own appropriate methods of investigation. Thus,
for example,
"Chemistry, guided by its rational a prioris, gives us substances
without accidents, frees all matters of the irrationality of their origins." 16
What this application of scientific practice entails can best be seen through
an example. In the 'Psychoanalysis of Fire' Bachelard describes how
"Fire, that striking immediate object, that object which imposes itself as
a first choice ahead of many other phenomena, no longer offers any
perspective for scientific investigation." 17
Originally fire was held to be one of the four primary elements and as such
15 Gaston Bachelard The Psychoanalysis of Firep. 1.
18 Bachelard in Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron op. cit., n. 14 p. 233.




had a central place in the explanation of phenomena. Today most chemistry
text books hardly mention fire at all. It has been replaced as a term in any
mode of explanation by a theory utilising concepts like "oxidation". "Fire is
no longer a reality for science." 18 Rather, what is now important are the
processes theoretically envisioned at atomic and sub-atomic levels. This is
not to deny that fire still has other important roles in our culture, as an object
of reverie, as an object for the poet, the writer etc., but it is no longer an
object for science or theoretical knowledge - it is not a part of scientific
practice.
As Gary Gutting has pointed out, Bachelard, prefiguring Althusser's
confidence in the content of Marxist Theory, believes that some scientific
achievements must be seen as permanently valid. There "are concepts so
indispensable to a scientific culture that we cannot conceive being led to
abandon them." 19 There is a degree of permanence about some concepts, a
timelessness such that even after a change in scientific paradigm (brought
about by what Bachelard refers to as an "epistemological act") these
concepts nonetheless remain valid as special cases of the new more
general thesis. For example, Ne~onian mechanics might be seen as a
limited formulation of relativistic physics still suitable for dealing with certain
clrcumstances."
la ibid., p. 2.
le Bachelard 'L'activite rationaliste de la physique contemporaire' in Gary Gutting Foucault
and the Archaeology of Scientific Reasonp. 20.
20 This however is a hotly contested issue in the philosophy of science. Some writers such
as Paul Feyerabend hold that consecutive scientific theories are literally incommensurable
with each other. ''The content classes of certain theories are incomparable in the sense that
none of the usual logical relations (inclusion, exclusion, overlap) can be said to hold between
them." Paul Feyerabend Against Methodp. 223.
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Bachelard's science, like Canguilhem's makes a complete break with its
unscientific theoretical precursors.
''Technical materialism essentially corresponds to a transformed
reality, a rectified reality, a reality which has precisely received the
human mark par excellence, the mark of rationalism." 21
Ironically, the humanist rationalism inherent in Bachelard's formulations is
used by Althusser to provide a scientific and anti-humanist view of humanity
itself where human nature and the abstract human individual no longer exist
as scientific 'objects'. Society is thus purified from its past ideological
associations by a new Marxist science of social relations.
An initial objection to a close analogy between Bachelard's conception of
science and an Althusserian science of society arises when we begin to
consider the scientific status of Althusser's theory itself, as a part of
dialectical materialism. This, it seems, constitutes less a new science than a
new contemplative philosophy. The vital area of experimentation seems
under-theorised in Althusser's framework. In a natural science like chemistry
there are definite practical connections between theoretical concepts and
experimental work which guide and influence each other as a unified whole,
as an experimental and conceptual scientific practice.
Bachelard makes theory qua theoretical formulations and practice qua
experimentation combine in a theoretical practice which is genuinely co-
2' Bachelard in Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron op. cit., n. 14 above, p. 224. This
statement brings out Bachelard's views on the mutual interdependence and co-constitution of
subject and object in any scientific project. Bachelard is both a rationalist and a realist at the
same time. Scientific theories must reflect both the patterns of human thought and the
patterns of the objects of study, but his dialectical methodology enables him to avoid falling
into any form of subject or object essentialism.
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constituting - where both are inter-dependent. Althusser neglected the
relation of his formulae to the question of political change - he seems, as
many Marxist critics have charged, to produce a theoretical practice which is
actually wholly composed of theoretical formulae divorced from any
transformative intent. In making theory an autonomous practice in its own
right, he seems to sever the connection of theory to the material world, and to
the world recognised in economic and political practice. In Bachelard's
problematic theory and practice are co-constitutive of each other.
"...if scientific activity is experimental, then reasoning will be
necessary; if it is rational, then experiment will be necessary." 22
Althusser seems in danger of falling into a form of theoretical idealism where
an unconstrained rational process simply creates the objects of theory. He
seemingly develops an inward looking critical theory with no actual
theoretical correlation with the world. For example, Roy Bhaskar claims that
Althusser's "...failure to give any apodeitic status to the real object rendered it
as theoretically dispensable as the Kantian thing-in-itself and helped to lay
the ground for the worst excesses of post-structuralism." 23 Bhaskar sees
Althusser's error as an inadequate,theoretisation of the relation between the
"real-concrete", which he refers to as the "intransitive" dimension, and the
''transitive'' 'object' of theory. Whilst agreeing with Bhaskar, it is important to
see that this failure to speak, in depth, about the role of the real-concrete
stems from Althusser's humanist scientism, his wish to defend the autonomy
of the sciences in opposition to ideology.
22 Mary McAllister Jones Gaston Bachelard: Subversive Humanist: Texts and Readings p.
48.




Michael Sprinker has attempted to rebut Bhaskar's charges. He emphasises
the differences between Althusser's earlier and later formulations of Marxist
philosophy. He claims that this represents a change from a "philosophy of
science" to a "philosophy forscience".24 However, this makes little difference
to Bhaskar's point. Althusser's evolutionary change is important because it
attempts to regain the practical (experimental) connections of theory to other
aspects of the social formation. His formulation of "philosophy as class
struggle at the level of theory" goes some way towards defusing politically
motivated charges of idealism by re-emphasising the relevance of
Theoretical practice to political practice. It does little to re-articulate the real-
concrete which underlies al/ social practices with the 'objects' of knowledge.
This is what I take the point of Bhaskar's criticism to be. This omission on
Althusser's part, this failure to recognise the fundamental importance of the
real-concrete, the unknowable non-human world which underlies all our
activity, is one more example of the anthropocentric humanism latent in
Althusser. This is not Althusser's fault alone but is shared by any theories
which see human labour as the only active input into the transformative
processes of the dialectic. Any proper account of the dialectic must attempt
to include the inevitable effects of this active, but unknowable, ingredient; of
the "intransitive" world, on our societies. (This point is taken up in detail in
chapter 6.)
It is this apparent lack of experimentation - the loss of the element of practice
which is in part constituted by the active involvement of the real-concrete -
which Althusser refers to when he admits that,
"If I did lay stress on the vital necessity of theoryfor revolutionary
24 Michael Sprinker 'The Royal Road: Marxism and the Philosophy of Science'
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practice, and therefore denounced all forms of empiricism, I did not
discuss the problem of the 'unity of theory and practice' ... No doubt I
did speak of the union of theory and practice within 'theoretical
practice', but I did not enter into the question of the union of theory
and practice within political practice ... I did not examine the concrete
forms of existence of this fusion." 26
From this later emphasis which appears from his 'Elements in Self-Criticism'
onwards Althusser makes explicit that Marxist theory is irreducibly bound up
with political practice, its experimental aspect is that of revolutionary practice.
"behind the theoretical options opened up by Marxism there
reverberates the reality of political options and a political struggle." 26
But, as I remarked in chapter 3, this lays him open to the very charge of
political pragmatism which he strove to reject.
iii) practices as Hermeneutics.
So far I have outlined two different interpretations of Althusser's practices,
the objectivist conception which sees them as transcendental strata each
with their own objects, and the idealist interpretation of his theoretical
practice which sees it as essentially divorced from other levels of the social
formation. In his later philosophy Althusser is fully aware of the possibility of
being read in these objectivist or idealist manners. He also realises that
many have misinterpreted Marx in precisely the same way.
25 Althusser op. cit., n. 3 above, pp.14-15.
26 Althusser Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists p. 243.
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"...he no doubt employs formulae that can be interpreted in the sense
of a transcendental philosophy of practice. And some have persisted
in resorting to this active subjectivity, conceiving it as legitimising a
humanist philosophy, while Marx is referring to something different
since he expressly declares it to be 'critical' and 'revolutionary'. But in
this enigmatic sentence [Thesis on Feuerbach §1] in which practice is
specifically opposed to the 'object-form' and the contemplative-form,
Marx has not introduced any philosophical notion on a par with the
'object-form' and the contemplative-form'. and hence destined to
replace them in order to establish a new philosophy, to inaugurate a
new philosophical discourse. Instead, he establishes a reality that
possesses the particularity of being at one and the same time
presupposed by all traditional philosophical discourses, yet naturally
excluded from such discourses." 27
Marxism, says Althusser, sees purely contemplative philosophy as merely a
struggle for ideological hegemony, "a kind of theoretical laboratory in which ...
the constitution of the dominant ideology is experimentally perfected in the
abstract." 28 Yet although Althusser claims that [Marxism] "never presented
itself in the direct form of a philosophical theory", 29 he never fully rectifies this
lack of an account of theory's articulation with other practices. Indeed
Althusser seems, in places, to want to save theory from contamination by
common-sense ideology by removing from it any reference to the objects
recognised in ideology, politics etc. It is not spurious to expect an account of
how the 'objects' of science, including practices, relate to the objects of
everyday life in ideology - just as it is one of the functions of chemistry to
27 ibid., p. 247-248.
28 ibid., p. 260.
at ibid., p. 247.
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explain how fire as an object is related to the 'objects' of chemical theory like
atoms. If chemistry failed to make these two forms of discourse
commensurable at some level it would quite rightly be thought somehow
inadequate. In eliminating the last vestiges of empiricism he runs the risk of
making his theoretical discourse incommensurable with everyday practical
experiences of the world. In making theory one hundred percent self
referential he faces the even greater danger of losing all sensuous contact
with the world at all Le. idealism. This pronounced tendency could be
accounted for as part of Althusser's critical anti-Stalinism, his wish to insulate
theory from political predation.
Althusser's later work can be seen as an unsuccessful struggle to reforge the
links between theory and practice which he broke under the influence of the
Bachelardian inheritance of applied rationalism. In his 'Elements of Self-
Criticism' he makes the fatal error of bending the stick too far towards a
political pragmatism (see Chapter 3). Later attempts were less reductionist
and strove to keep theory as a relatively autonomous field, distinct from, but
not unconnected to, politics." Yet this tension remains and Althusser's
mature theory requires that politics be at one and the same time the practical
(qua experimental) side of Marxist theory and a practice (qua level of
society) in its own right.
It is important not to make a hard and fast distinction between "theory" and
saThe ''Transformation of Philosophy" written in 1976 (and included in the collection
Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists) was an attempt by Althusser
to redress the balance between theory and political practice. To my mind it does not make the
fatal error of his earlier Elements of Se/f- Criticism where he had been too accommodating to
pressure from the P.C.F. and was reduced to stating that dialectical materialism was "in the last
instance, class struggle in the field of theory." Althusser Essays on Ideologyp. 67.
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"practice" as if they were two separate entities. Theory is always connected
to the non-theoretical even if the connections sometimes appear tenuous.
As Althusser himself points out there is a tendency to treat theory as a
counter to practice. But we must avoid this trap and
"recognise that there is no practice in general, but only distinct
practices which are not related in any Manichean way with a theory
which is opposed to them in every respect. For there is not one side
to theory, a pure intellectual vision without body or materiality - and
another of completely material practice which 'gets its hands dirty." 31
It is certainly the case that theory can hold a dialogue with itself and that as it
thus turns inwards it can produce what can only be seen as a theoretical
practice. Philosophy is perhaps a perfect example of this, but there are
others whose connections with the wider world appear even more tenuous
e.g. theoretical physics. However, even in these cases theory cannot
separate itself entirely from non-theoretical aspects of the social formation
and those that ignore this are likely to invite ridicule. Such ridicule has
justifiably fallen on the heads of some philosophers who have lost their
balance walking the tightrope between theory and practice and fallen into
the most bizarre interpretations of the world. The end result of this
systematised foolishness is to inculcate and foster an indifference to
anything but a 'common-sense' approach, thus ensuring the predominance
of interpretations made 'obvious' by the dominant ideologies.
We are perhaps now in a better position to judge the nature of Althusser's
practices. The interpretation of the nature of practices themselves exactly
31 Althusser op. cit., n. 8 above, p. 58.
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mirrors those available for other worldly 'objects'. There are three basic
options available. The materialist (objectivist) and idealist options have
already been alluded to. The third option is to hold that our very notions of
practices are themselves achieved through our socio-practical experiences
of the world. If this is so then they are neither 'real objects' nor 'arbitrary
concepts' but socially mediated concepts achieved through immersion in,
and interactions with, particular forms of social environment and articulated
theoretically. As such they can have no essential and transcendent nature
but are themselves in their very constitution part and parcel of given social
formations. The upshot of this is that if one wishes to retain the dialectical
aspect of any conception of social formations one must be willing to give up
claims about the essentia/characteristics of those practices which compose
society.
If practices themselves can only be defined hermeneutically through the
dialectic - for Marxism the socially productive interactions between the world
and humanity - then they can have no objective reality in a non-dialectical
sense. They do not simply express properties of certain 'objects' in the
world. Indeed, practice is by its nature something which is inherently
dependent upon the social relations of a society. The very existence of, for
example, economic practice requires that there be a certain form of social
formation with particular structures and relations. This hermeneutic
perspective has certain implications.
1). New practices may arise and attain import - old practices may disappear
or become irrelevant.
2). We cannot hold that certain discourses are essentially theoretical in any
timeless or transcendental sense. Discourses constitute a part of theory only
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insofar as theory is now recognised as a separate practice and only from
certain positions within the social formation.
3). The very notions of practice and dialectic themselves may at some stage
become inappropriate or outmoded.
If we exchange Althusser's synchronic emphasis on scientific theory, for a
diachronic dynamism where theory is presumed to change, we move
beyond any temptation to essentialise and therefore necessarily objectivise
or idealise objects in the world towards a truly relational metaphysic. This in
turn opens the way to forging links between practices and in particular to link
theoretical discourse with other social practices.
The recognition of practices has to become less constrained, more
expansive, and historicised. "Practice" is used to identify the constitutive
components of the social formation, the predominant fields of socially
mediated experiences. Specific conceptual schemes are moulded, formed
and constituted by and within these social practices. The identification and
taxonomy of these practices and their components becomes an important
part of epistemology, to illuminate the particular arrangement and historical
genealogy of conceptual schemes and to understand the effects of these
practices upon the beliefs and values of those engaged in them. However,
these practices can only be defined from within the society itself,
hermeneutically. (This is also to recognise a particular site of ideology's
functioning, for particular standpoints within these practices lead to
unconscious and obvious conceptions of the relations between practices
and their elements.)
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The remainder of this chapter attempts to outline an alternative non-
essentialist, but not functionalist model of social practices. In so doing I will
alter the place and form taken by the demarcation line between ideology and
science in Althusser's problematic, but try to retain, insofar as is possible, the
many positive aspects of Althusser's theories. The model suggested will
also incorporate points made by the three social thinkers treated in the last
chapter. In particular Canguilhem's concern for a recursive history of the
science / ideology divide, Mannheim's view of total and general ideology
and something of Foucault's idea of the discursive formation.
As we have seen, the lack of a proper account of the relations between
theory (qua discursive and conceptual elements) and practice (qua
experimental elements) is a serious drawback to Althusser's theory. In
positing too rigid a demarcation between levels by following the applied
rationalism of Bachelard and Canguilhem, he makes contemplative
philosophy and Marxist philosophy two completely different phenomena.
They are apparently created from different materials, by different means and
with different results. This (as chapter 4 showed) is a difficult position to
maintain in the light of a reflexive critique of the social origins of Althusser's
own Marxism.
It also seems to conflict with Althusser's exposition of ideology as operating
largely unconsciously and structurally. For at least some of the participants
in contemplative philosophy have to be admitted to be self-reflexive and
critical at a very conscious level. All things considered, it seems better to
drop Althusser's qualitative distinction between Marxist philosophy and
bourgeois philosophy and allow that they are both forms of theory to be
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judged on their relative merits as coherent accounts of how the world is
structured. This judgment cannot of course be an objective one but must
come from the social situatedness of those making such judgments. For my
part I have argued that dialectical materialism can provide the basis for an
epistemology superior to that of any representational theory of truth and
meaning. In this light I want to propose a common theoretical framework for
linking "practice" and "theory". The prime focus of this attempt to link the
practical-experimental with the discursive-theoretical will depend heavily
upon the later work of Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein and Practices
Drawing connections between Wittgenstein and Althusser may initially
appear bizarre. Could any two philosophies be more different in style and
emphasis than Althusser with his explicitly political stance and Wittgenstein's
apolitical detachment? Politics and style are not the only points of
difference. Althusser states that "Philosophy consists of words organised
into dogmatic propositions called theses." 32 The primary function of these
theses is to "draw a line of demarcation between the ideological ... and the
scientific." 33 But, as Johnston has pointed out, ''the fundamental premise
underlying Wittgenstein's method is the claim that philosophy should be
descriptive, that it should advance no theses." 34
The advancing of theses and the descriptive project of philosophy are
32 Althusser op. cit., n. 8 above, p.77.
33 ibid., p. 83.-
3. Paul Johnston Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy p. 2.
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perhaps not as distinct as Johnston imaqlnes," but nonetheless there is no
doubt that Althusser and Wittgenstein do start from positions situated within
radically different philosophical traditions. The interesting point is that
Althusser's work does connect very well with Wittgenstein's later philosophy.
In particular both philosophers utilise varieties of holistic coherence theories
and both place "social practice" at the centre of their philosophical agendas.
In this they show the influence of 'anthropological' rather than purely
philosophical considerations. This might be explained, at least in part, by
the indirect influence of Marxist sociological thought upon Wittgenstein.
There is a tendency to see Wittgenstein as the archetypal philosopher
recluse, and indeed for long periods of his life he was, but he was also
profoundly influenced by other contemporary thinkers and especially, in his
later philosophy, by the Italian Marxist economist, and fellow exile from
fascist Europe, Piero Sraffa. Sraffa, forced to leave Italy after openly
criticising Mussolini, was found a post at Cambridge University by Keynes.
Wittgenstein and Sraffa met on a regular weekly basis for philosophical
discussions over the period that Wittgenstein was composing the work now
,
35 This can be seen when Wittgenstein states 'We must do away with all explanation, and
description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its
purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems: they
are solved, rather, by looking into the working of our language, and that in such a way as to
make us recognise these workings; in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The
problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always
known. Philosophy is a baHle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of
language." Philosophical Investigations §109. The emphasis on the theoretical rejection of
both 'common-sense' and empiricism and the need for a theoretical re-ordering of our
conceptions of the world to overcome these problems is very reminiscent of A1thusser's and
Bachelard's applied rationalism. However, as other parts of this passage show, Wittgenstein's
conception of philosophical theory is only distantly related to his conception of natural science
which is always referred to as empirical.
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known as The Philosophical Investigations.
In his comprehensive biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk states that "Sraffa
had the power to force Wittgenstein to revise, not this point or that point, but
his whole perspectlvs'" We also have Wittgenstein's own word for the
importance he placed on these discussions in the development of his later
,
philosophy and in repudiating many aspects of his earlier work. Even more
than the influence of discussions with Frank Ramsey, Wittgenstein said,
"I am indebted to that [criticism] which a teacher of this university, Mr. P.
Sraffa, for many years unceasingly practised on my thoughts. I am
indebted to this stimulus for the most consequential ideas of this
book." 37
Such an explicit statement cannot be treated lightly and, I would suggest, of
the ideas developed in the Philosophical Investigations none are more
consequential than the derivation of meaning from a word's uses within
social practice together with the concept of "forms of life". That is,
Wittgenstein not only points out that language finds its meaning in its use,
but it also follows from this that "to imagine a language means to imagine a
form of life." 38
This shift from a representational theory of meaning to the primary
importance of the connection between languages and social practices is the
56 Ray Monk Ludwig Wittgenstein the Duty of Genius p. 260.




single most important characteristic of his later work." As Monk notes
"Wittgenstein once remarked to Rush Rhees that the most important
thing he gained from Sraffa was an 'anthropological' way of looking at
philosophical problems." 40
My purpose in making these and the following remarks is not to belittle the
originality of Wittgenstein's work, far from it; but to point out its connections
with a wider set of influences than is generally recognised, especially where
the social aspects of his philosophy are concerned. The general consensus
seems to be that Marxism's influence upon Wittgenstein was Hmited to the
attraction of the Soviet Union as a place where he might live an ascetic and
morally uplifting life. (He tried to obtain employment in the Soviet Union
through a number of Marxist contacts in Britain.) Although it is certain that at
the theoretical level he was at least ambiguous in his attitude towards
Marxist politics he was perhaps closer in philosophical terms than either his
aristocratic social background or empiricist philosophical surroundings
would suggest possible. 41
38 The best known adaptation of Wittgenstein's arguments to social science is that by
Peter Winch in his The Idea of a Social Scierlce. The debates surrounding this work are
however outside the scope of the present thesis. See also Ted Benton 'Winch, Wittgenstein
and Marxism' pp.1-6. Also Alasdair Macintyre 'The Idea of a Social Science' .
•0 Monk op. cit., n. 36 above, p. 261. Susan M. Easton 'Humanist Marxism and
Wittgensteinian Social Philosophy', notes that Von Wright also suggested that Sraffa was
"largely responsible" for Wittgenstein's changes in his later philosophy. "It was above all
Sraffa's acute and forceful criticism that compelled Wittgenstein to abandon hiS earlier views
and to set out upon new roads. He said that his discussions with Sraffa made him feel like a
tree from which all the branches had been cut." G.H. Von Wright in LudWig Wittgenstein: a
Memoir p.15 .
•, It would also be easy to overestimate the similarities between Wittgenstein's conception
of practice and that of Marxism which is always a form of productive practice mediated by
human labour. (This particular difference is taken up in chapter 6.)
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Althusser and Wittgenstein share their common rejection of a naive
correspondence theory of meaning and truth, a rejection which is epitomised
in Wittgenstein's repudiation of his own earlier 'picture theory' of meaning
presented in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.42 In his later work he
rejects entirely the representationalist view that the meaning of a word is the
object it stands for. In complete contrast to this he states "the idea of
'agreement with reality' does not have any clear application. II 43
His rejection of the representational theory of meaning and truth is total.
"Well if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it -- is
it then certainly true? One may designate it as such. ---But does it
certainly agree with reality, with the facts? --- With this question you
are already going round in a circle." 44
'Reality' is chimerical - one can only know the world as mediated in social
practice.
"Unlike Kant, and much more like Marx, Wittgenstein considers the
experience of the world to be mediated through social training, and
through other forms of social life, rather than through the synthetic
power of consciousness. Our/language, defined narrowly, is only part
of the social construction of reality." 45
Wittgenstein attempts to overcome the idealism-conventionalism /
objectivism-naturalism divide. Language has neither an arbitrary connection
with the world nor is it determined by it. Consequently reality is not
determined by thought but nor are thoughts simply reflections of an external
ail Ludwig Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
43Wittgenstein op. cit., n. 1 above, § 215.
44ibid., §191.
45David Rubenstein Marx and Wittgenstein p. 174.
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reality. As Susan Easton puts it
"Language for Wittgenstein as for Marx, is an activity in which one
engages when interacting with the natural world, imposing a structure
upon it. The world may be presented to us in an organised fashion but
this classification and organisation is undertaken and acquired in
learning the language, which is an activity inseparable from learning
how to live in the world." 48
Easton provides an informative comparison between Marxism and
Wittgenstein's later work. However, her humanist and t.ukacian influences
mean that Althusser is almost entirely neglected and that ideology is treated
primarily in terms of individual and class consciousness, underplaying its
unconscious effects. Her humanist presuppositions exclude her from
recognising many of the important similarities between Wittgenstein and
Marxist anti-humanism, in terms both of his decentering of the subject as the
locus of meaning and of his anti-essentialist rnetaphyslcs." Hanna Pitkin
has explicitly characterised Wittgenstein's epistemology as dialectical.
"Wittgenstein ... attempts to hold a dialectical balance between the
mutual influences of language and the world." 48
Wittgenstein holds that language is necessarily a social phenomenon, there
is indeed no possibility of a private language. As such there have to be
some similarities between participants in a common language-game so that
the possibility of their speaking to each other remains open. Language is
48 Easton op. cit., n. 40 above, p. 84. Rubenstein thinks that ''the concept of 'social
praxis', derived from Marx and Wittgenstein, can resolve many central facets of the debate
between objectivism and subjectivism, in large measure by undermining some of the implicitly
shared premises of both perspectives." Rubenstein op. cit., n. 45 above, p.1.
47 These points of criticism are echoed in John Burnheim's review of Easton's book.
48 Hanna Pitkin Wittgenstein and Justice.
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'rule governed', but those rules can only exist because of the genuine
similarities between people at a number of levels from the biological to the
social. Here again we can see the connections with aspects of Marxism
"As regards the individual, it is clear e.g. that he relates even to
language itself ss his own only as the natural member of a human
community. Language as the product of an individual is an
impossibility. But the same holds for property. Language is the product
of a community, just as it is in another respect itself the presence
(Dssein) of the community, a presence which goes without saying." 49
In this sense, as Rubenstein has remarked, it is also true to say that
"...Describing Wittgenstein as a linguistic philosopher is potentially
misleading, for in his view language is inconceivable apart from social
life, and the understanding of language thus requires an analysis of
the forms of life in which it is implicated." 50
Wittgenstein's work does not just agree with Althusser's in a negative sense
of rejecting correspondence theories, he also accepts what can only be
referred to a a holistic coherence theory of meaning and truth. This can be
seen in the similarities of his pronouncements on the mesning of words to
Althusser's conception (discussed in chapter 3) where the concept's place in
a problematic is vital. For Wittgenstein the relevant context is even broader
than that of a theoretical problematic, depending upon the whole linguistic
context of which concepts form a part i.e. the language-game.
"When language games change, then there is a change in concepts,
and with the concepts the meanings of the words change." 51
.0Karl Marx Grundrisse p. 83.
50 Rubenstein op. cit., n. 45 above, p. 173.
51 Wittgenstein op. cit., n. 1 above § 65.
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Beliefs only have a sense when placed in relations to other aspects of a
particular system and cannot be isolated, abstracted and dissected for their
essential meaning. We need to look at the totality of their relations, thier
place within a discourse.
"When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a
single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns
gradually over the whole)" 52
Of course a discourse is not isolated from the world of its practical
application. Although discourses may have a relative autonomy from it, a
word gains its significance through its use; this may be a theoretical use or it
may be a "practical" use: "[a] meaning of a word is a kind of employment of
it." 53
The meaning of terms is always tied to concrete social practices and "in the
last instance" their use can only be explained by reference to the social
practice of which they form a part. It is in this sense that Althusser and
Wittgenstein can both be said to employ holistic theories of meaning. The
meaning of a word depends not only on its relations with other words and
concepts but on its relations with the complex whole of society which must of
necessity also include the physical non-human world.
I
However, in Wittgenstein, the connection between the theoretical (qua
discursive) and the practical is drawn more explicitly and filled out in very
different ways from Althusser. Of vital importance in understanding how
Wittgenstein fills out the theoretical relation of discourse to practice in a non-




life" appears only five times in the Philosophical Investigations. and only
seven times in the whole of Wittgenstein's published works, but it is more
important by far than the frequency with which it occurs might suggest. That
"forms of life" are central to an understanding of Wittgenstein's arguments is
recognised by almost all commentators, including Norman Malcolm, Stanley
Cavell and P.F. Strawson." As the phrase occurs only a few times it would
be well to list their contexts.
1.) "It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders or reports in
battle.--- Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for
answering yes and no. And innumerable others.---- And to imagine a
language is to imagine a form of life" 55
2.) "Here the term "language game" is meant to bring into prominence the
fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life." 56
3.) "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what
is false? ---It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree
in the language they use. That is,not agreement in opinions but in form of
life." 57
4.) "Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the
5.For references to these and other authors together with commentary on 'forms of life'
see Nicholas Gier's excellent article 'Wittgenstein and Forms of Life'. Other references to
forms of life can be found in Guido Frongia & Brian McGuiness Wittgenstein; A Bibliographical
Guide.
55Wittgenstein op. cit., n. 37 above, §19.
56 ibid., § 23.
57 ibid., § 241.
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use of language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this
complicated form of life. (If a concept refers to a character of human
handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write)." 68
5.) "What has to be accepted, the given, is---so one could say----forms of
6.) "Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in the
last judgment?" 60
7.) "Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to
hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life.. But that means I want to
conceive it as something beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as
something animal." 61
These then are the sum total of Wittgenstein's references to form[s] of life and
at first sight they seem to be used in a variety of contexts which are difficult to
relate to each other in any coherent manner. Hunter proposes four possible
interpretations which can be approxlmately summarised as follows." That
"form of life" is
A) equivalent to a "language game".
B) a package of related behavioural tendencies
C) a fashion or style of life linked to certain aspects of SOCietylike class
58 ibid., p. 174.
58 ibid., p. 226.
loWittgenstein 'Lectures and Conversations' quoted in Gier op. cit., n. 54 above, p. 242.
II Wittgenstein op. cit., n 1 above, §358-359 - abridged here following Gier ibid., p. 242.
12J. F. M. Hunter "'Forms of Life" in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations'.
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structure, values and religion.
D) Something typical of a living being, that is a biologically based
phenomenon.
Hunter finds the fourth alternative the most promising and his analysis, which
is confined to the material of the Philosophical Investigations, would seem to
gain support by the inclusion of the last Wittgenstein quotation from On
Certainty; that they are "something animal".
I think that Hunter's summary dismissal of the third option in a few
paragraphs is mistaken, and that the options he proposes are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. Phillips develops a more sophisticated view
of Hunter's biological thesis and interprets "forms of life" as "referring to
various differences in biological and mental properties amongst different
organisms." 83 Despite this rather limited perspective, what he says about
Wittgenstein's relation to relativism is supportive of the position I try to
develop here.
"For Wittgenstein, various language-games are partly dependent on
certain contingent facts of nature: that human beings think, use
language, agree in judgments and reactions and share certain
common interests. In this sense language is a product of human
activity in the world, it is a product of the facts of human and physical
nature. But, at the same time, language is also a producer of meaning
and new forms of human activity. Wittgenstein, then, does not want to
endorse a position which holds that facts of nature completely
determine language; nor, on the other hand, does he want to say that
13 Derek L. Phillips Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge p. 80.
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the facts of nature are totally creations of language." 84
I propose to argue that "form(s) of life" represent the variety and totality of
social practices and their contexts found in given social formations, in which,
and against which, our activities take place and are understood. 'Forms of
life' are the background of our social activities: a background which is, at the
same time largely composed of social activities and can only be understood
through social activity. I will take each of Wittgenstein's uses of the phrase
'forms of life' in turn to show how they can be seen as supporting the
interpretation of a background against which language games are played
and of which they form a part.
1) "It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders or reports in
battle.--- Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for
answering yes and no. And innumerable others.---- And to imagine a
language is to imagine a form of life"
This quotation makes a specific connection between a language and the
context of that language, the form it takes - orders, reports - and the use it
has, its functional role in battle. In the early sections of the Philosophical
Investigations Wittgenstein imagines a very simple language used by a
community of builders consisting of just the phrases "slab", "block" and so
on. Even in this very simple example the practical context of the word's use
is seen to be all important in determining its meaning. There is always a
necessary connection between practical social context and linguistic
meaning, between a language's development and its use. The language
cannot be separated from its context and to think of a word's meaning is to
64 ibid., p. 83.
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imagine the context in which it is found. Thus 2) "Here the term "language
game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of
language is part of an activity, or a form of life.
3.) "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what
is false? ---It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree
in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of
life. "
This should be read as an argument against a naive conventionalism - one
which holds that definitions are merely arbitrary decisions made by collective
agreement. This form of conventionalism reintroduces a form of idealism in
the sense that it leaves it open for humans to decide upon any theoretical
taxonomy of the world which they choose. Wittgenstein transcends this
natural/conventional distinction, for him rules are certainly not arbitrary but
they could have been otherwise given different circumstances. The
emphasis on forms of life points to the necessity of a common linguistic
'framework' which is itself only produced because there are similarities in
our modes of experiencing the world. Our engagement in social practices
ensures that experience is shared, not in an essentialist manner but in terms
of similarities at a number of levels, through having similar sensory
equipment, similar social background and so forth. Definitions are not then
arbitrary in any strong sense but only in a weaker sense that they are not
predetermined by the world a/one prior to engagement in a practice.
4) "Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the
use of language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this
complicated form of life. (If a concept refers to a character of human
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handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write.)"
Wittgenstein here emphasises that our concepts are ineluctably tied to the
sort of animals we are and the sort of society which we inhabit. We only
have certain concepts, e.g. calligraphy, letters, postmen, because of the
development of particular practices e.g. hand-writing. Hoping for something
entails conceptions of certain desired ends which can only be done
(Wittgenstein claims) within a language - thus to talk of a dog 'hoping' for its
owner's return would be inappropriate if one were to take it literally. Certain
human activities depend intimately upon language acquisition and this in
turn depends upon certain biological features which humans tend to have
but squid or earthworms might lack.
5) "What has to be accepted, the given, is---so one could say----forms of
life. "
This shortness of this passage belies its importance. "Forms of life" are
given, not in the sense of being unchangeable essential features of the
human situation but because, as a concept, "form of life" plays the role of
highlighting all those unspecified elements of the background, whether
physical or discursive, which allow a particular language-game to proceed.
What these elements of background actually are depends upon the context
and particular situation, but for a discourse to be possible at all there have to
be at least some common features, whatever they might be. I take this
passage to undermine any claims that there might be a neutral philosophical
rationality which underlies all argumentation.
6) "Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in the
last judgment?"
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The possibility aired here is that one's background might easily be effective
in producing a deeply held religious belief; that the conceptual
understanding of the world generated by involvement in particular social
practices is such that a belief of this form may spring 'naturally' from them.
This by itself is not a radical thought but what Wittgenstein is suggesting that
there may be limits to how, for example, the arguments of an atheist could
reach such a person. For the starting point of any argument has to be within
the experiential totality of that person's past. 'Rational argument' may find no
common basis from which to get a foothold. Indeed the very features of the
world which could provide such a basis may be interpreted completely
differently in the religious and non-religious forms of life.
To give proper sense to the last reference 7) one needs to quote it in a larger
textual context, something which Geir fails to do," By omitting this he also
obscures Wittgenstein's reservations about this particular formulation.
"My "mental state", the "knowing", gives me no guarantee of what will
happen. But it consists in this, that I should not understand where a
doubt could get a foothold nor where a further test was possible.
One might say: "I now express comfortable certainty, not the certainty
that is struggling."
Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to
hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly
expressed and probably badly thought as well.)
85Geir op. cit., n. 54 above, p. 242.
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But that means I want to conceive it as something beyond being
justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal." 88
Once placed in these textual surroundings we can see that it occurs in the
context of explaining what "knowledge" is and why we think that we have
knowledge of something in certain circumstances. The explanation that
Wittgenstein gives for this is not that it lies in a justification by
correspondence to the world as it really is, nor yet is it a purely psychological
state of the believer.67 What matters is that it simply seems to the human
subject, given their background, that there are no grounds for possible
doubt. i.e. that X is obvious, or comfortable and fits so well with the
background of that person that there is no possibility of any other
interpretation. In other words it fits with the forms of life that person has
experienced; it is ideologically successful, fully interpellating knowledge into
the background of practices brought to bear upon it consciously and
unconsciously.
To summarise: The role of the concept ''form[s] of life" is not to pick out any
particular feature shared by all members of a given society, but to express
dWittgenstein op. cit., n. 1 above, § 358-359.
17 This refusal to talk of the justification of knowledge in terms of representationalism
(although Wittgenstein, like Althusser, does not deny that words are used in some
circumstances to "stand in for" objects) caused confusion amongst early commentators. A. R.
White, for example states "no attempt is made to explain how, e.g., the certainty of a person is
related to the certainty of an event or how certainty is distinguished, on the one hand, from
knowledge and, on the other, from such notions as confidence and conviction. At the
beginning, indeed, Wittgenstein explicitly says 'The difference between the concept of
"knowing" and the concept of "being certain" is not of any great importance at ali." A. R. White
review of Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty.
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the many similarities that we experience on all planes of existence that allow
us to understand, to place a word in the social context which determines its
meaning. "Forms of life" are those aspects of any situation which serve to
ensure the commensurability of discourse by locating the language game
being played within particular social practices and linking the concepts'
location and use to planes other than that of the original discourse itself; to
biology, social structure, mythology or tradition etc. Forms of life are the
contextualised backgrounds which serve to anchor discourses to each other
and to the world experienced in social practices."
Only when faced with a form of life that has no points of contact at all with our
own does discourse become genuinely incommensurable. And of course
this does not happen between societies made up of our own species
because we always do have points of contact if only in similar biological
needs and abilities. This is the point of Wittgenstein's reference to
"something animal". It is, as Geir puts it, that "nature does have something to
say" 69 about our use of language and the way we relate to the world and
each other. Wittgenstein specifically tries to speak of cases where there
might be thought to be no polnts of contact, no shared form of life, most
specifically when he states "If a lion could talk, we could not understand
him." 70 That we could not understand or translate "Iionish" is not because
we do not share a common history of linguistic derivations, as from Latin or
ancient Greek, this is true of many more distant human languages; it is
because we have no points of contact, no practices that are similar enough
IiThere are also parallells here with Heidegger's concept of "Oasein" and Husserl's "Iife-
world". But these are outside of the scope of the current thesis.
siGeirop. cit., n. 54 above, p. 248.
70Wittgenstein op. cit., n. 37 above, p. 223.
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to us both. Of course, there are in fact similarities between lions and
ourselves, largely biological similarities, we can understand such 'common'
occurrences as hunger. We know when our pet cat wants to be fed and
presumably a lion keeper understands her charges at least to this extent. To
find an example of a society that was completely incommensurable would be
difficult for the very reason that we would not recognise it as a society, we
would not know what to look for.
This interpretation of forms of life is similar in many respects to that proposed
by Lynne Rudder Baker. She attempts to explain why it is that Wittgenstein
was so vague about the meaning of ''forms of life". The point is that
"pervasive as they are, however, the practices that shape human life
form no system. Wittgenstein, to the chagrin of many philosophers,
would have deep reasons to reject a request for identity conditions for
forms of life. It is no more promising to attempt to describe what would
count as a form of life per se than to attempt to describe what would
constitute a background per se." 71
''the forms of life rest finally on no more than the fact that we agree,
find ourselves agreeing, in the ways that we size up and respond to
what we encounter." 72
This is what Lear refers to when he speaks of a form of life as 'a community
that shares perceptions of salience, routes of interest, feelings of
71 Lynne Rudder Baker On the Very Idea of a Form of Lifep. 277.
72 ibid., p. 278.
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naniralness"." Baker admirably sums up the place of forms of life in
Wittgenstei n's ph ilosophy.
"The idea of a form of life emerges as the result of a transcendental
argument: We have language that we use to communicate; we could
have no such language if the focus of meaning were the individual or
any facts concerning individuals; therefore, meaning requires a
community. 'Form of life' is Wittgenstein's way of designating what it is
about a community that makes possible meaning. Given this role of
the idea of a form of life, it is hardly surprising that little meaningfully
can be said about it." 74
In other words the whole point of the concept "form of life" is to allow one to
speak of the countless possible backgrounds that practices when treated in
isolation have to be seen against. What that background comprises
depends upon the practice being discussed, on the contexts of the
discussion and upon those partiCipating. The background is rarely the
totality of all social practices but only a finite selection of those practices
which are considered by those communicating to be important. In other
words the background is not arbttrary but socially (and biologically etc.)
determined and most likely unconscious. Discourses proceed by operating
with a set of (usually unconscious) 'rules' governing the scope, meaning and
relations between words and between words and the world. These 'rules'
are not eternally fixed points of reference operating transcendentally, but are
contingent upon the forms of life in which they originate.
73 Jonathan Lear, Ethics, Mathematics and Relativism p. 40. Also quoted in Lynne Rudder
Baker ibid., p. 282.
74 Baker ibid., p. 288.
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The largely unconscious and assumed backgrounds on which discourse
depends function in a manner closely akin to Althusser's general and omni-
historical practice of ideology. Different societies accept different points of
reference, different stories of origins, different taxonomies of the world
because of their different forms of social practice, their different relations to
each other and the world. The individual is orientated around these largely
unspoken background assumptions - the unconscious rules which govern
social interaction at all levels - is interpellated and interpellates herself within
this complex network of the 'obvious'. Ideology might then be said to
function by limiting the recognition of and participation in the total possible
set of 'rules' to a very limited subset 'accepted' within any particular social
formation. Just as with Foucault's discursive formation this ideological
formation determines what can and cannot be said by imposing
unconsciously accepted limits to any discourse.
"a discursive formation is not distinguished by any unity of e.g.,
objects, concepts, method. Rather, a discursive formation is a "system
of dispersion" for its elements: It defines a field within which a variety
of different, even conflicting, sets of elements can be deployed. Thus,
the unity of a discursive ~ormation is due entirely to the rules which
govern the formulation of statements .," 75
It is these rules which operate like the rules of a Wittgensteinian language-
game as an unspoken set of assumptions, taxonomies etc. - an
unconsciously and socially contingent background which allows discourse
and theory to occur but at one and the same time delimits what it can say. As
both Althusser and Wittgenstein make clear, such limitations are necessary
and inevitable. For Althusser the individual has to function in this way by
75Gutting op. cit., n. 19 above, p. 232.
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recognising herself as a nexus in a particular set of social relations. For
Wittgenstein, the shared background is precisely what makes meaningful
language possible. Ideology, defined as the interpellative role of this
background is inescapable.
Ideological practice thus includes all those attempts to order and classify
society and the natural world. Indeed, ideology is pervasive in the same way
that Mannheim's general and total conception of ideology pervades all
discourse. Ideology operates by drawing connections within and between
practices, by ordering, classifying, and explaining, that is by structuring the
perceived components of social formations and the wider environment.
Ideology situates, (places) objects and activities of all kinds in particular
relations to each other. Always remembering that the 'objects' ideology
structures are not 'real' objects, but our perceptions, ideas, and experiences
of those objects gained in a variety of practices. This then is very similar to
Althusser's position which sees ideology as
" ....an organic part of every social totality. it is as if human society
could not survive without these specific formations ... Human societies
secrete ideology as the very element and atmosphere indispensable
to their historical respiration and life." 76
However where Althusser sees ideology as necessarily conservative and
76 Althusser op. cit., n. 3 above, p. 232. Ideology is thus posited as a timeless and
omniscient 'presence' in society but this should not be translated in terms of an objective
reality but as the best way of understanding certain of our relations with the wOrld. It is a
theoretical term which does not represent a 'real' object but rather arises from our practical
experiences of the world at the discursive level as we attempt to organise them within
theoretical systems. It arises from an immanent critique of the shared ontology of (in
Althusser's terms) empiricism and idealism - a critique which specifically denies that we can
have knowledge of 'real objects' but only and always objects as experienced through the
practical and social relations of the dialectic.
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static (as a component ensuring the reproduction of society) I want to allow
that even non-Marxist discourses can exhibit a dynamism able to produce a
novel ordering and change our perceptions of the social structure.
Forms of life act as the background within which and against which ideology
operates to create a particular co-constituting relation between the concrete
subject and the material world by that subject's immersion in practical
activity, in social practices. The "forms of life" and the subject's constitution in
and interaction within them are responsible for the development of particular
values, beliefs and presuppositions about the subject and the objective
world themselves. When Wittgenstein states that "To be sure there is
justification; but justification comes to an end", 77 that end is the particular
'given' form of life and the subject's practical relations to it.
"Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; -
but the end is not certain propositions' striking us as true, i.e. not a
kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of
the language game." 78
Forms of life are "..patterns in the fabric of human existence and activity on
earth." 79 Geir advocates seeing them as frameworks.
"The concept of Lebensformen is not to be taken as a factualtheory,
one dealing with certain biological, physiological, or cultural facts.
Forms of life are the formal framework that make society and culture
possible, but they cannot serve any sociological theory -
Lebensformen do not answer any why question; they have no
77Wittgenstein op. cit., n. 1 above, § 192.
78ibid., § 204.
78Pitkin op. cit., n. 48 above, p.132.
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explanatory power. They are found as the givens at the end of any
chain of explanation." 80
Geir's view is correct insofar as backgrounds can have no specific causal
role assigned to them but this is not to say that they are without
consequences for a sociological deconstruction of philosophy. Also one has
to be careful about the use of the term ''framework". As Duerr states
"It can therefore be misleading to compare a form of life too much with
a 'framework', or with something that determines experience. For the
'framework' exists only as a result of experience, and these
experiences are not fixed in any particular way." 81
Perhaps now we can again approach the question of social practices.
Social practices are domains of activity within social formations which are
recognised (from a certain perspective, not objectively) as possessing a
degree of relative autonomy. They would usually consist of a series of
actions undertaken in particular social contexts (or a private context e.g.
'reverie' which is nonetheless recognised as occurring by the wider society,
for otherwise there would be be no name and hence no recognition by
society of it as a separable practice) integrated together in some often
complex manner. (They may be practices with a purpose but need not
always be, as traditional Marxism claims, a form of production. See chapter
6.) As an integrated whole practices may have a specialised language
associated with them, intermingled with ordinary language some of which
may acquire specialised meanings in its new context. The language forms
an integral part of the practice which may not in many cases be able to
- 8°Geirop. cit., n. 54 above, p. 257.
8t Hans Pater Duerr Dreamtime p. 97.
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proceed without it. Take for example the plethora of new language
associated with computing, some refer to physical elements of the practice of
computing, e.g., "hardware", "Mouse" etc. some to computers' abilities, e.g.
"memory", some to actions involving computers, to applications e.g. "word
processing" and so on.
Computing then is recognised as a practice with a degree of relative
autonomy, it is something socially recognised because it has developed into
an important part of society, influenced by it and in turn influencing it.
Pressing button A on a computer is not recognised as a separable social
practice as it stands, not because of any intrinsic quality it possesses or does
not possess but because it is something which only ever occurs in the
context of other practices whether they be producing electronic music,
entering codes for fighting a war or whatever. The point is that practices are
not ordinary linear slices through society, they do not divide it up into set
elements as one would slice a cake, the components of one practice may be
a part of many, many more very different practices and it depends upon the
context which practice we deem them to belong to. Le. where we interpellate
things in relation to the social whole. For example we could take the
curriculum taught at the Bauhaus school of Architecture as related by Walter
Gropius.
1) Practical Instruction in the handling of Stone, Wood, Metal, Clay, Glass,
Pigments, Textile-Looms; supplemented by lessons in the use of Materials
and Tools, and a grounding in Book-Keeping, Costing, and the Drawing up
of Tenders: and
2) Formal Instruction under the following headings
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(a) Aspect
The Study of Nature
The Study of Materials
(b) Representation
The Study of Pure Geometry




The Study of Volumes
The Study of Colours
The Study of Composition 82
It does not take too much imagination to see how other practices overlap with
the list of components presented here: how these elements find themselves
considered as parts of other practices, sculpture, biology, weaving,
accountancy, mathematics, etc., and how these practices interrelate in the
complex network that compose any given social formation, meeting at both
the theoretical and the non-theoretical levels.
A "practice" is at once both the most commonplace and the most mysterious
of ideas. Common because we all engage in countless examples of
practices every day, eating, brushing one's teeth, thinking, building, farming
etc. These practices are by no means all built on a general pattern which
underlies them, but are rather activities which together comprise the setting
for our social and personal contact with the material environment. It is
through these activities that we come to understand the world around us and
82 W. Gropius The Architecture of the Bauhaus.
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our particular place in it. "Activities" does not in this context necessarily
mean conscious actions, it could equally well be applied to thoughtless
reverie or 'instinctive' reactions to given circumstances e.g. a knee jerk in
response to a blow.
Practices are only mysterious because when we try to count them or to
demarcate them one from another we encounter immediate difficulties. We
find that a single activity can be classified as part of many different practices,
brushing one's teeth might be a practice by itself, or a part of hygiene,
preparing for work etc. and the right description of it depends upon the
context which surrounds that activity, who one is explaining it to, the purpose
behind it, and a thousand other things. In other words our definition of any
given practice is itself dependent upon the surrounding social context. Thus
in choosing to use "practices" as the elemental components of social
explanations rather than say human individuals one radically alters the
picture of society. When society is seen as a mere agglomeration of
individuals, knowledge is something to be accounted for in terms of
individual human consciousness and perception. These individuals share
certain faculties and properties and explanations are to be given in terms of
these shared properties. But when the problematic centres on practices the
whole perspective shifts. Practices do not have fixed essences but are
relational and socially constructed divisions. Individuals may have similar
experiences of, for example, "coal mining" but the way in which coal mining
articulates with other aspects of their lives may be very different and thus the
meaning and experience of mining may be very different. It may, for
example, be valued by one person and abhorred by another.
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There may still seem to be a rather puzzling gap between a practice like
'"coal mining" or "bricklaying" and the apparent meta-practices of Althusser's
social formations, the economic, political, ideological and theoretical. These
practices serve to provide a taxonomy of social formations as a whole and
their difference lies precisely in this theoretical function which they perform.
(There are two points here. First, that in modern society the theoretical
aspect of many practices has become increasingly important and second
that the increasing presence of the theoretical leads to it becoming a practice
in its own right, an attribute of society.) A practice like bricklaying might be
said to be relatively (though only relatively) self-contained in the sense that
needs little articulation at the theoretical level. Bricklaying, of course, has its
own rules to learn - the use of spirit levels, mortar, ties etc.: but it makes no
theoretical attempt to understand its relations with other practices. In
contrast, Architecture as a whole might represent a practice with a
substantive body of theoretical knowledge, both in its concerns with
structures, designs and so forth, and in the criteria it uses to separate itself
from other practices. Bricklaying operates within a very restricted field of the
social domain but is nonetheless linked to all other aspects of a modern
society. But if we want to understand the role and relations between
bricklaying, architecture, and other areas of the social formation, this relation
may need to be articulated at the theoretical level. (The role of abstract
theory in modern society is further explored in chapter 9.) This is precisely
the function of a theoretical practice like Althusser's philosophy. In other
words we need to take some account of the degree of theoretical abstraction
involved. However, one should not accept as Althusser does that just
because one is engaged in theoretical rather than a-theoretical practice one
has somehow escaped ideology, one is now disconnected from the forms of
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life which one is investigating.
This emphasis on practices implies a radical anti-foundationalism and anti-
essentialism. In these respects as well as in the rejection of representational
models of language and theory both Althusser and Wittgenstein are clearly
anti-humanist. Althusser, however, refuses to recognise the full implications
of this contextualisation of theory and tries to retain an epistemology which
a-contextually privileges one type of discourse - theory, over another-
ideology. This absolutism is not only unjustifiable given the basic tenor of his
problematic but also detracts from the possibility of developing a less
humanist conception of the relation of theory qua abstract discourse to other
practices; one which would recognise the role played by ideology qua the
practical inculcation of certain roles, values and beliefs in concrete
individuals via theory itself.
Whilst Althusser makes the important first step of seeing theory as a part of
practice, and in modern Western society as an important and relatively
autonomous structure around which our experiences of the world crystallise,
he fails to push this insight far enough. His retention of a scientistic
humanism leads him to posit two levels of discourse only one of which
operates ideologically. He continually strives to attain a position of
epistemological privilege. (Although he does not make the mistake of
seeing this as privilege as an objectivity, a "view from nowhere", but one
actively based in the practical experiences of the working class.) For this
reason Althusser's concept of ideology has to fulfil two quite different
functions. First, as the mode of society's interpellation of subjects into the
social structure thus ensuring its own reproduction. Second, as a spurious
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form of incoherent discourse. I shall suggest that we should abandon this
latter interpretation which harks back to the concept of ideology as "distorted
knowledge" and retain its more instructive anti-humanist meaning at the cost
of being unable to privilege any particular discourse in an absolute sense.
The question of how abstract theoretical practice comes to be a constituent
level of modern society and how it operates ideologically in its own way is
left until chapter 9. It is now necessary to turn to another aspect of "practices"
which has tended to ensure their anthropocentric bias, namely the concept
of "production".
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CHAPTER 6: PRODUCTION AND 'NATURE' IN SOCIAL
PRACTICE.
The concept of "production" has retained a central role in all varieties of
Marxism. Traditionally economic practices mediated by industrial or
agricultural labour are the paradigmatic forms of the productive process. In
the recent past, the specificity of this economic paradigm has lent Marxism
an air of authority, underlining its relevance to the plight of the working
classes in modern societies. But, as industrial labour seems to play an
increasingly peripheral role in developed Western societies this very
specificity has become detrimental to the development of Marxist theory and
practice. Concepts like "production" which were regarded as inviolable by
traditional Marxists have increasingly come to be regarded by critics on the
left as anachronistic shackles on progressive thought. Many
environmentalists who, for good reason, regard industry and agriculture as
the major despoilers of 'nature' have an obvious rationale for rejecting this
"economist" variety of Marxism. Unfortunately this frequently takes the form
of a wholesale rejection of all strands of Marxism.1
This tension between theoretical orthodoxy and radical innovation has
parallels in debates between other non-class based political movements and
Marxism over the past few decades. For example, radical feminists claim
that Marxism has undervalued those activities of women such as child-
rearing, housework etc. which are accomplished largely outside of
- 1 Thus Jonathan Porritt declares that communism is as culpable as capitalism in ignoring
the green critique of modern society, both being committed to economic growth above all
else. Seeing Green p. 44. See also the reactions from the Green Party to suggestions by
Robin Cook M.P. that socialism and environmentalism have a common cause. Guardian.
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mainstream industrial processes. Marxist apologists have tried various
strategies to link women's social roles to the modes of economic
'production' prevalent in capitalist soctettes." If women's exploitation is at
root economic then the overthrow of capitalism should result in the automatic
re-evaluation of women's roles. Unsurprisingly, many radical feminists are
skeptical of these economist claims for much the same reasons as
environmentalists. The appalling record on both gender and environmental
issues of those states like the Soviet Union which professed to be
implementing a Marxist creed has not gone unnoticed. What has largely
gone unrecognised by radical feminists and environmentalists is that, in
general, twentieth century Western Marxism has show a distinct movement
away from concerns with the economic mode of production per se towards a
more general interest in the cultural sphere, Le. in elements of the
superstructure. This movement has potentially valuable implications for
environmentalists and feminists alike but has not gone unrecognised or
unchallenged by more traditional Marxists.3
Despite the criticisms of both non-Marxist radicals and orthodox Marxists a
considerable volume of work critical of economist frameworks has been
developed within the left itself. Althusser is only one, and perhaps in many
ways one of the less radical, critics of economism. Initially regarded as
heretical, the work of left environmentalists such as Rudolf Bahro and Andre
- 2 See for example, Lise Vogel Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Towards a Unitary
Theory.
3 See for example Perry Anderson Considerations on Western Marxism. The Frankfurt
School provide the perfect example of the expression of these wider concems.
',)
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Gorsz has now started to gain widespread recoanltlon.' With the collapse of
the Soviet Union even the major communist parties have begun to question
the relevance of past shibboleths. Thus David Cook, one time national
organiser of the Communist Part of Great Britain writes that the
"...intersection between red and green traditions, transformed by
feminism and the experiences of the ethnic and other minority groups,
is the fertile seed bed for a distinctive polltlcs which can inspire wide
support.
There will be ideological clashes. The emphasis on production in
much socialist economic thinking often underminds [sic]
environmental needs." 5
I have been careful to speak so far of "economism" rather than "productivism"
as the bone of contention between different factions. But, from the last
chapter it must be obvious that the debate might be carried on in wider terms.
Wittgenstein would obviously be opposed to any reduction of the concept of
"practice" to one that merely reflected economic modes. His concept of
"practice" is much more eclectic and elaborate than one which views all
important social activities as "productive" in any sense, whether economical,
ideological, political, etc. The Wittgensteinian conception is one of a plurality
of practices each different from the next and having no essential features in
common. From this anti-reductionist perspective "economism" might be seen
as just a less restricted form of "productionism".
- 1Both of these writers have produced a considerable volume of work but see especially
Andre Gorsz Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay on Post-Industrial Socialism and
Ecology as Politics. Rudolf Bahro Socialism and SuNival and From Red to Green.
S David Cook Socialistp. 9.
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We need first then to investigate the criticisms of production in general. I will
argue that Althusser's rejection of economism can be amended to provide an
adequate theoretical basis for a social theory which can reconcile the
conflicting interests of both red and green. This social theory would also
have to give full recognition to a Wittgensteinian brand of anti-humanism.
shall argue that those environmentalists who have found common cause
with certain postmodern thinkers like Jean Baudrillard are mistaken. There
is no need to regard (as Baudrillard does) all Marxisms as modernist
theories which are mistakenly attempting to impose totalising descriptions on
the social and natural worlds. (This line of argument is epitomised in the
work of Jim Cheney and is taken up in chapter 8.) Baudrillard's critique of
"production" does however provide an obvious starting point from which to
discuss these issues.
In The Mirror of Production Baudrillard is concerned to argue that
productivism of any form is indelibly stamped with an economic rationality.
The Mirror of Production is described by Baudrillard's English translator,
Mark Poster, as a marshalling of his earlier work "for a systematic critique of
Marxism"." Not only is the work a critique of Marx's own writings but it
6 Mark Poster Introduction to Jean Baudrillard The Mirror of Production p. 1. Baudrillard's
later work attacks the concept of rational thought itself. However, some critics have, on
occasion, treated all Baudrillard's writings as if they were equally anti-theoretical and
unreasonable. Thus Christopher Norris, in What's Wrong With Postmodernism? pp. 166-1 68
prefers to argue against a brand of Rortyian relativism which he associates with Baudrillard
rather than debate the specific points which works like The Mirror of Production raise. It is
necessary to separate the earlier Baudrillard, who has serious points to make about the
relevance of the production paradigm, from that progressively more obscure writer who
descends in egocentric circles towards a variety of mental onanism. His writings perhaps reach
their absurd apogee in his vacuous commentary upon the impending Gulf War. (A war he
claimed could never be fought. Guardian.)
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extends to all those philosophies which have emerged from Marxism and
carry over the metaphor of 'production' into their new problematics. (This
includes, for example, as Poster indicates, such postmodern thinkers as
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari who refer to the production of desire.' )
Baudrillard considers this retention of the production metaphor a conceptual
conservatism which is both theoretically and practically stifling. "Production"
becomes a singular and universal "sign" which rules our thought and
actions.'
Baudrillard argues that the problem lies in Marx's critique of his
contemporary political economists. Despite all appearances this critique
was simply not radical enough. Marx only succeeded in replacing current
myths with "a similar fiction, a similar naturalisation - another wholly arbitrary
convention, a simulation model bound to code all human material and every
contingency of desire and exchange in terms of value, finality and
production." 9 Marx failed to deconstruct and hence escape the constraints
imposed by the categories of production and labour. As Poster puts it
"Marx's theory of historical materialism .... is too conservative, too rooted in the
assumptions of political economy." 10 The sign of "production" becomes
reified as as an objective and essential process necessary to all human
- 7 Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia.
S Baudrillard further claims that Marx's materialism epitomises 'modern' theory in so far as it
replaces the spectrum of possible symbolic values with a simple dichotomy of use and
exchange values to characterise of capitalist society. The radical shift which Baudrillard seeks
is the reinstatement of a symbolic multiplicity which he supposes will subvert modernist values.
See Steven Best and Douglas Kellner Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations chapter 4
especially pp. 115-11 6.
"Baudrillard op. cit., n. 6 above, pp.18-19.
10 Mark Poster Introduction to Baudrillard ibid., p. 1.
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social being. Under this tyranny of the sign humans become 'productive'
animals. In effect Marx merely substitutes "human labour" for "rationality" as
the new universal human essence. According to Baudrillard Marxist
epistemology and philosophy are irretrievably contaminated by their
dependence upon economic categories. To see every practice in the light of
production and labour implies far too reductive a view of human activities.
Baudrillard questions the very possibility of extending a paradigm of
production to cover the totality of human practices in all their different forms.
"A specter haunts the revolutionary imagination: the phantom of
production. Everywhere it sustains an unbridled romanticism of
productivity. The critical theory of the mode of production does not
touch the principle of production. All the concepts it articulates
describe only the dialectical and historical genealogy of the contents
of production, leaving production as a form intact." 11
The extreme reductionism of Soviet Marxism and those positions which hold
rigidly to the base / superstructure model have obviously over-emphasised
the role of the economic in determining the social formation. However, one
might argue that this form of economic reductionism is precisely that which
Althusser attempts to overcome. Althusser's concept of production is by no
means tied strictly to the paradigm of economic production, for he introduces
what amounts to separate paradigms of production for the political,
ideological and theoretical spheres. All that they have in common is that
they theoretise transformative processes. But this does not really touch
Baudrillard's point. We can introduce, as Althusser does, different forms of
production, but the question still remains as to why one should call e.g.
11 ibid., p. 17.
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theoretical practice productive at all? In what does theoretical practice's
similarity to factory or agricultural labour lie? How can 'production' be an
appropriate or adequate metaphor to signify the multiplicity of practices
found in all societies?
Perhaps Althusser's attempt to reconstitute the category of productive labour
is already stretching the concept both too far and not far enough. On the
one hand Althusser still relies on the economic both for its primary role in
structuring society and for furnishing a metaphor for all practices. On the
other hand it seems simply bizarre to think that, so long as economic activity
is regarded as the epitome of productive practice, all human activity could be
accommodated within a framework of "production". Such things as taking
country walks, mountaineering, playing chess or saving someone's life just
do not fit into categories of productive practice without an immense and
distorting effort, a theoretical contrivance that stretches credulity." One
could, if one so wished, argue that these practices were productive of
enjoyment, or fitness etc., but this is a very etiolated conception of production
and of labour. It seems that as Seidman states
"The category of "productive" activity either expands to include
virtually all human practices, in which case it is useless as a
conceptual strategy, or it narrows arbitrarily to economic labouring
- 12 Habermas too has noted the problems associated with the development of a concept of
production by economic activity. Such a concept of practice appears absurdly narrow and
restrictive. Habermas questions how ''the paradigmatic activity-type of labour or the making of
products ...[can be] related to all the other cultural forms of expression of subjects capable of
speech and action." Habermas 'Excursus on the Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm'
in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity p. 79.
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activity." 13
Although Althusser's metaphysics manages to uphold, to a degree, the
possibility of a holistic but anti-reductionist strategy, his continued reliance
upon the economic metaphors of "production" and "labour" as the only forms
of mediation between society and nature seems to reintroduce a
constraining form of economic reductionism, an economism which is also a
humanism because production is something that al/ humans engage in.
Althusser is caught between his attempt to overcome the reductive base /
superstructure model and the need to retain economic production, not as the
sole determinant of social formations, but as the sole metaphor and
paradigm for human activity. This might, after all, be thought of as the
minimum requirement for anyone to retain Marxist credentialsl
There is, however, a problem with Baudrillard's analysis. To some extent he
reads into Marxism the very uniformity which his critique requires. It helps to
paint Marxism as a totalising theory if one can present it as an essentialist
endeavour. But one cannot, as Baudrillard does, simply excise the term
"production" from the extremely variable problematics which provide the
context to give it meanings and simply claim that they are all inevitably
tainted by past economic associations. This is not to deny that a word's past
associations do influence the way we interpret its meaning, but merely to
point out that one must take each case as it occurs. Baudrillard must
introduce an essential meaning of "production" to underpin his anti-
13 Stephen Seidman 'Postmodern Social Theory as Narrative with Moral Intent' p. 57. One
'Althusserian' solution might be to define all these non-economically productive activities as
examples of ideological production. But to simply lump together such a variety of activities
seems somewhat arbitrary. In any case these activities are not primarily concerned with the
interpellationof individuals into the social formation.
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essentialist critique. Many theoreticians use "production" in a manner which
does not look for its archetype in Marx's later economism at all.
Poster in his own work has tried a different critical approach. He notes that
major economies such as the United States are now underpinned not so
much by industrial or agricultural labour but by service industries which use
information as their raw material. He claims that it is the transformation and
utilisation of this communicative raw material which should now provide the
paradigm for production. For, with the rise of mass communications soon
"[p]eople will stay put while pulsations of electronic information will flow
through the social space." 14 But, to take this line, which might be clumsily
termed informationism i.e. a reduction of society to flows of information,
seems as blunt and unrewarding a direction as reductionisms of the
economic kind. I would argue that the production of information is just as
amenable to analysis as other forms of production. It does not mark a
qualitative break with those societies which have gone before. (Marx and
Althusser were well aware of the power of the printing press!)
Baudrillard himself amply demonstrates the danger inherent in removing the
relative autonomy of the various aspects of society and making one feature
paradigmatically prominent. The Mirror of Production might be termed a
work of transition, marking as it does, the shift from Baudrillard's, broadly
speaking, Marxist problematic to semiotic anarchism. Baudrillard's
obsession with discursive communication means that in later works the
- 14 Foucault's work, which is the main concern of Poster's book, can be just as well
accommodated in the general and non-reductive theory of productivism which I will sketch
here. Mark Poster Foucault, Marxism and History: Mode of Production versus Mode of
Information p. 53.
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relative autonomy of the symbolic sphere is progressively transformed into a
complete autonomy. Society can now be discussed wholly in terms of
semiotics and, Baudrillard claims, no definite or necessary relations between
signifier and signified exists. Signification becomes completely arbitrary, and
language becomes a form of idealistic conventionalism. Further, this
conventionalism is necessarily instilled with meanings which are part and
parcel of the oppressive power structures of society. The 'progressive'
individual must therefore strive to overcome this ideological function of
language by constantly changing her terminology and subverting received
meanings. The danger inherent in this approach is that in attempting to
produce a private language, or at least a language restricted to a small
'intellectual' group of disciples willing to follow his continual discursive shifts,
Baudrillard becomes less and less socially relevant. What is the point in
producing a subversive language which no one except Baudrillard can use
to relate to their everyday experiences? 15
The meaning of the term "production" depends upon whether one interprets
Marxism as a form of economic reductionism or as an anti-reductionist
theoretical framework: a framework which attempts to understand the social
world whilst maintaining the relative autonomy of the various components of
society. Paul Ricoeur's analysis of Marx, like Althusser's, initially falls within
this latter category. But Ricoeur, in opposition to Althusser, sees a trend of
increasing economism from the early to the later works of Marx. That is,
Ricoeur interprets the early Marx in a non-reductionist fashion and the later
'scientific' Marx as, generally speaking, an economic reductionist.
15 One might argue that Baudrillard succeeds in encapsulating the alienation and
loneliness caused by mass culture, but his work seems to represent an acceptance and
furtherance of this condition rather than an attempt to overcome it.
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Marx states in the 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' that religion,
family, state, law, science, art, etc. are only particular modes of production
and fall under its general law. However, Ricoeur holds that Marx did not
mean by this that the economic base determined the superstructural
elements. Instead, Ricoeur interprets this statement as proposing an
analogical form of theory to encompass all human practices. The analogy
used is that of economic practice and physical labour. But the term
producktion, as Ricoeur points out, has a much wider application than simply
physical transformation by labour.
"In German the word producktion has the same amplitude as
objectification - thus Marx's statement does not express an
economism. The reductionism of classical Marxism is nevertheless
nourished by the word's ambiguity." 16
In other words, Ricoeur believes that the later Marx and indeed many of his
followers came to take this productive analogy too seriously and in
attempting to disassociate himself from his Hegelian and Feuerbachian
influences shifted his problematic inexorably towards an economism of
society. The politica/capital to be gained by this manoeuvre was obviously
an influential factor. "Production", once reified in this manner, lost its more
general implications and instead its economic signification became
fossilised in the base / superstructure model. A broader conception of
production is exactly what Althusser requires to maintain the relative
autonomy of his social levels. But the analogical conception in his mentor's
early philosophy is unavailable to Althusser precisely because of his wish to
16 Paul Ricoeur Lectures on Ideology and Utopia p. 59.
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maintain the break between the pure theory of the later Marx and the
ideology of his earlier works. So far as Althusser is concerned Marx's
analogical conception of production is not a part of his science. Thus
Ricoeur's wider interpretation of "production" falls outside the self-imposed
boundaries of Althusser's philosophy.
So what exactly are the implications of Ricoeur's insight? The term
"production" should on this reading be taken to mean something like "making
available for society" or "interpellating into society through practical action".
In this very broad sense production is not tied to economic activity at all but is
equally relevant to the production of works of art, texts, policies and values.
Nor need one carry over any of the more 'mystical' concepts linked with the
term "objectification' in Hegel. One does not need a concept of Geistto
make sense of objectification. What production entails is not the creation of
an object as opposed to a subject, but rather creating something which
becomes a part of society, something that is socially recognised, potentially
utilisable, now of value, etc.
To revert to the Beethoven analogy which was used in chapter 3 to explain
Althusser's anti-humanism. If Beethoven had composed for himself, in his
head or alternatively had destroyed the composed material before anyone
heard or saw it he would have had no effect on society qua composing. With
respect to our present concerns we can say that in fact, no matter how
complex and beautiful the works inside his head he would have produced
nothing. No matter how long and lonely the process of individual thought
(which neither I nor Althusser deny or underestimate), what becomes of
crucial importance for any socia/theory is the production of some effect by
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that thought. This is not a form of functionalism, it in no way reduces the
thought of individual to the effects they have, it merely states that so long as
they remain just private thoughts they are unlikely to have any effect at all
(except, perhaps, making the thinker more likely to be run over by a passing
car.) Theory must be married to practice, not in terms of physical labour but
in terms of producing something which affects and reacts with society. Any
introduction of new material into society causes a corresponding change in
the relations of the components of that society, and just as terms change their
meaning in different problematics so actions and theories change their
effects in different social formations. Thus similar actions might produce
very different political, ideological, etc. effects in different times and places.
Production happens at all levels of society. Thus although the transformation
of 'physical material' into economic goods might be thought to be the
paradigm for economic production, the transformation of social relations into
new social relations becomes the paradigm of political activity. For example,
a tree may be converted to sawn wood and then into tables or book shelves.
Production is the process of transformation which marks its entrance and
interpellation into the social structures of society. Not only is the table a
material-physical product at which we sit or write our philosophy, it is also
interpellated into other aspects of society. Its production might mark a shift in
power relations between the tribal peoples of the tropical rainforests and
industrial giants like Mitsubishi in the Northern hemisphere. In other words it
is also politically interpellated. Similarly the tree and the table are
associated with different social meanings, signs and values which all affect
its use. It is also ideologically interpellated. This stresses the point made in
the last chapter that one must avoid the temptation of treating these different
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levels as separable elements of society. The forms of production do not exist
in isolation from each other. Althusser is pushed close to this position, which
Bernstein equates with a form of tenshtsm," because of his inability to
resolve the tensions inherent in the productive paradigm in any other way,
e.g. by appealing to the earlier Marx's conception of producktion.
Although this interpretation derived from Ricoeur is open to criticism as an
interpretation of Marx's own thought I believe that it provides a useful
theoretical handle with which to grasp this analogical and philosophical
understanding of society. From this perspective we can take on board
Baudrillard's condemnation of reductionist economism and yet not dismiss
entirely the power of production as a unifying analogy for social theory.
Many Marxists have fought themselves into an economist corner by ignoring
the more philosophical aspects of productive practices. Ironically, this
interpretation and its use of the early Marx also supports Althusser's
adaptation of the standard Marxist metaphysic, though not without
considerable emendation.
If this first section has pointed the way to overcoming the different
conceptions of practices in Marxist problematics it has done so at a certain
'cost'. Namely, it shifts the emphasis, in all cases, away from individual
consciousness and towards a more socially structured arena. We shall also
examine the implications of this anti-humanism, particularly as it relates to
ethical values, in chapter 9.
- '7 ".. .'political economy' is not a single, selective dimension of human life; it is a congealed
or crystallised form of human activity - of praxis. To think of economic categories as referring to
a single, abstract dimension of human life is to be guilty of what Marx himself called 'fetishism'."
Richard J. Bernstein Praxis and Action p. 58.
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It should also be noted that although these proposals raise many interesting
questions about interpretations of Marx's theory the present work is not an
exposition of the Marx's own problematic(s) but rather an attempt to re-
structure Althusser's problematic so as to reduce the anthropocentric
features which cripple it. This task will also require the extension of
Althusser's anti-humanism from a simple critique of consciousness and anti-
economism to one which also redefines the dialectic itself to include an
active rather than a passive nature. Thus a further detour is necessary to
examine these issues.
Nature and the Dialectic. Active and Passive Roles.
A growing environmental awareness has sparked some debate about how
far Marxist theory might need to be adapted to retain its relevance. Reiner
Grundman has portrayed three types of Marxist response in this debate. The
first is to reject environmental issues as overplayed bourgeois concerns and
to stick within a pure Marxist orthodoxy. He suggests that Ernest Mandel
might belong in this category. The second is to argue, by selectively quoting
from his works, that Marx himself was a 'Green', "albeit a Green mafgre tut',"
The third strategy he terms Marxist dissident, because those in this category
abandon one or more of the central elements of Marxism, arguing that Green
issues cannot be contained within so narrow a framework. One example of
someone in this category would be Rudolf 8ahro.
18 Reiner Grundman 'The Ecological Challenge of Marxism' p. 103.
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I shall reject the first line of response out of hand. I hope that even the small
amount of detail which is included later in this section will be enough to
dispel the myth that environmental concerns are simply an invention of
Twentieth Century bourgeois society. In all ages and all times there seem to
be examples of environmental occurrences which have profoundly affected
the way societies have developed. It should also be obvious that in most
cases it has been, and still is, the poor who are least able to protect
themselves against any deleterious results of these 'experiences' of the
environment. The mediaeval poor left to die in the cities full of plague, the
modern poor of the Third World left at the mercy of earthquakes and
typhoons, the poor sleeping on the streets who feel the icy cold of winter
nights. This being the case I take it as axiomatic that environmental
questions are of import and deserve serious consideration, Le. an
unamended Marxist orthodoxy is completely inadequate.
The second strategy, of claiming that Marx was a Green before his time is
described by Grundman as "wishful thinkinq"." This may be so given Marx's
opposition to those theories, like that of Thomas Malthus, which emphasised
such 'natural' limitations above all else. Thus Barbier writes
"...although Marx did write about the processes of environmental
degradation - notably soil erosion - he did not consider the possibility
of an absolute natural resource scarcity constraint on an economic
system resulting from ecological collapse." 20
Although Grundman does not believe that Marx was any more
environmentally aware than the majority of his contemporaries he still holds
Ii ibid., p.103.
20 Edward b. Barbier Economics. Natural-Resource Scarcity and Development:
Conventional and Alternative Views p. 21.
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that the framework which Marx created to analyse society is adequate to
account for environmental problems and concerns. In this sense he rejects
any radical reconstruction of Marx's theoretical problematic.
Grundman reduces environmental problems to three basic categories, those
of pollution, depletion of resources and population growth. The
anthropocentric bent of these categories is immediately apparent, habitat
loss and species extinctions are simply subsumed under the depletion of
resources, thus automatically excluding the "deep ecological" ethical case
for environmental values by the use of a typically narrow humanist taxonomy.
This anthropocentric attitude in defining environmental problems is mirrored
in Grundman's technocratic attitude towards environmental influences upon
human society in general; specifically in his apparent rejection of there being
any natural limits upon production that can not be overcome by resource
switching and technical knowledge. Thus Grundman assumes that nature
has no active role in the dialectic - it simply consists of a material
environment which constrains humanity. These constraints are to be
overcome by a process of transforming nature's 'raw materials' into novel
social goods. There is a simple dlchotorny between negative natural
constraints and positive human achievements. Grundman's main target is
the work of Ted Benton who, Grundman holds, goes too far in his attempt to
reconstitute Marxism.21 For example, Benton has openly criticised the
Marxist concept of productive labour; ".... in a number of respects Marx's
account of capitalist production employs a limited and defective concept of
21 The conservative nature of Marxist orthodoxy is well shown by the fact that even
Grundman has been criticised for his (very slight) shifts from traditional Marxism. See John
Mattaush Review of Reiner Grundman's Marxism and Ecology.
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productive labour-processes." 22
Benton posits a tension in the later writings of Marx and Engels between
economist strands of thought and their materialist philosophy. Like Ricoeur
he recognises the extent to which economic categories come to dominate
the later Marx's thought and paraphrases Baudrillard when he remarks that
the tension "derives, ... from an insufficiently radical critique of the leading
exponents of Classical Political Economy, with whom he shared and from
whom he derived the concepts and assumptions in question." 23
Benton is however, no ally of Baudrillard in his critique of production. He
wishes to amend rather than replace the traditional conception of the
dialectic between humanity and nature." The debate thus becomes one
between a rigidly economist reading of nature - where nature is simply
passive (Grundman) and a less humanist stance where nature retains a
degree of activity (Benton).
Grundman criticises Ted Benton's claim that many productive processes
(indeed all transformative processes like agricultural production where
22 Ted Benton 'Marxism and Natural Limits: An Ecological Critique and Reconstruction' p.
74.
23 ibid., p.55.
24 Benton however, retains some degree of economism in wishing only to produce of "an
ecologically adequate economic theory" ibid., p. 64. Although I agree with Benton that a form
of economism lies at the heart of the traditional Marxist enterprise, I do not enter debates
about the relations of 'use values' and 'exchange values' to nature. My reformulation of the
dialectic may well have implications for these matters but I retain a focus primarily upon
epistemological and ontological questions rather than economics. I address the natural limits
imposed on the development of human societies' knowledge and values, not the natural limits
to the creation of wealth.
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humans merely mediate already existing natural processes of plant growth
etc.) have natural limits placed upon them which are relatively impervious to
human action. By contrast Grundman claims that modern technology has
brought about a situation where the possibility exists of overcoming all these
natural limitations.
"...it is ironic that Benton stresses the rigid character of 'contextual
conditions' and 'natural limits' in a world where actual industrial
societies explore the possibilities of pushing these barriers further and
further back - the substitution of raw materials, development of new
synthetic materials, genetic engineering and information technologies
being the main examples." 25
Grundman simply equates environmentalism with Neo-Malthusian concerns
over the limits to growth.26 The inevitable consequence of this partisan
treatment of nature is that Grundman sees ecological problems as simply a
lack of human control over the environment, one caused by lnsufflclent
domination rather than resulting from an attempt to dominate. He gives
ecological systems no autonomy outside of their roles as the raw materials
for human productive practices.
25Grundman op. cit., n. 18 above, p. 108.
26Benton quite rightly rejects those approaches from within Marxism which "equate the
ecological perspective with neo-Malthusian conservatism" , Benton op. cit., n. 22 above p.
52n, although it is by no means the case that all those accepting a Neo-Malthusian label are
politically conservative. (See, the work on Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie later in this chapter.) This
equation reoccurs frequently even amongst those theoreticians on the left most receptive to
'green' concerns. Thus Tim Haywood refers to the risk that a "utopian socialism will pass via
catastrophism into a neo-Malthusian ecofascism". Tim Haywood 'Ecosocialism- Utopian and
Scientific'. Whilst not underestimating the plausibility of the development of ecofascism one
can certainly argue about the causal route most likely to lead to it. One scenario might be to
see it arising as a reaction by disempowered people against a neoclassical conservatism in
economics which continues to reduce all values to economic values, something the left has
been just as guilty of as the right.
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"... we term ecological a problem that arises as a consequence of
societies dealings with nature .... It does not mean that the very fact of
dealing with nature (manipulation, domination, harnessing or
inducing) is the crucial point, the cause, so to speak, of ecological
problems. Ecological problems arise only from specific ways of
dealing with nature. To repeat my earlier claim: both societies
existence in nature and its attempt to dominate nature are compatible;
human beings do indeed live in, and dominate nature." 27
Grundman seems to miss the whole point of an ecological critique which has
never denied, and indeed has emphasised that we live in nature but denies
that the form this life takes should be, or can be, in the long term, one of
domination. If Grundman would step outside his humanist anthropocentrism
for a moment and allow that nature can be active participant in the dialectic
he might begin to understand the 'green' perspective is far more diverse and
complex than his characterisation allows. Grundman simply cannot
comprehend that people might value nature for itself rather than for its
human utility. Thus his statement, that issues like the extinction of species
and the destruction of wilderness can be subsumed under the depletion of
natural resources." In other places he dismisses, without justification,
biocentric claims as simply "inconsistent". Humans simply can't see nature
- 27 Grundman op. cit., n. 18 above, p. 113.
28 ibid., p.10S.
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from anything but a human perspective." Of course, he is right to think that
the concept of "nature" makes no sense without reference to humanity but
that does not mean that the only interests humanity can have in nature are
instrumental. Nor does it mean that nature does not have an active role in
the dialectic. In this respect, one can point to an analogy between class
domination and environmental domination. Capitalism's attempt to dominate
the lower classes inevitably breeds resistance from a section of the
community which is not simply passive putty to be moulded any which way.
Similarly, the attempt to dominate nature brings about active responses
which do not conform to the intent of the dominators. The greenhouse effect
is a prime example of this. Similarly, the environment is a complex and
relatively autonomous feature of the world which cannot be entirely
encompassed within the technocratic scheme for the very simple reason that
the technocratic theories are only derived from a dialectic with nature and do
not represent nature. We do not and cannot know the 'truth' about nature,
we can only experience it through our practices. Grundman can then be
read by his own criteria as an unreconstructed Marxist of the old school.
Tim Haywood tags Gnmdrnan's-arqument "Promethean" .30 This echoes a- 26 The ecological position which Grundman attempts to attack is in any case a form of
ecological fundamentalism which neither Benton nor the vast majority of environmental
philosophers would recognise. Eco-centric approaches he says "define ecological problems
purely from the standpoint of nature." ibid., p. 112. This is simply untrue, the vast majority of
the literature upon environmental degradation points to the effects that our interference in
natural processes will have upon human society in both the short and the long term. But, in
addition some environmentalists also try to see ecological problems from a perspective which
gives some non-instrumental account of the non-human.
30 Tim Haywood 'Ecology and Human Emancipation'. Haywood wishes to distinguish
between the belief that one can transcend nature as a whole and the idea that one can
transcend particular necessities imposed upon us in terms of survival etc. However his
distinction is not clearly drawn.
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comment made by Seyla Benhabib and directed at schools of (in my terms,
"humanist") thought found in both liberalism and Marxism who, she says,
"...share the Promethean conception of humanity in that they view
mankind as appropriating an essentially malleable nature, unfolding
its talents and powers in the process, and coming to change itself
through the process of changing external reality." 31
Grundman's analysis of the relationship between human society and non-
human 'nature' is shallow in the extreme. His technological optimism is
intimately linked with his blindness towards a number of important aspects of
this dialectical relationship.
1) He only mentions in passing the unintended consequences caused by the
application of human technology. He seems to regard this as a contingent
rather than a necessary feature of human / nature relations. That is, he fails
to take into account the epistemological relationship which necessitates that
we can neverknow nature in itself, neverunderstand it fully, but only come to
derive knowledge through social practices. These practices can never give
a complete picture." In other words we shall always have an incomplete
and unrepresentative account ot the world-in-itself. Stable societies which
have come to have particular forms of practical relations with their local
environments develop a modus vivendi, an understanding by which they
know roughly what effects their actions will have, they come to know their
place in that environment. (See chapters 8 & 9.) However, the more rapidly
we change our world, and the greater the variety of practices we engage in,
the more likely we are to be taken by surprise at their cumulative effects.
--- 31 Seyla Benhabib Situating the Self p. 69.
32 C.f. the account of Althusser and Spinoza given in chapter 3.
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Only a naive humanist faith in progress and the ability of theory to represent
nature allows this highly dangerous game of Russian Roulette to continue.
Grundman's advocation of the humanist faith does little to show any
understanding of the environmentalist's fears.
2) Allied to this technological optimism is Grundman's rejection of any
absolute natural constraints upon humanity. This is not to say that coal, gas
etc, might not be exhausted but rather that Grundman thinks that technology
and human ingenuity will find alternatives. That is, we will simply switch
between resources. There are two faults here. First, this ignores the findings
of environmental historians who have begun to emphasise the vast number
of past human civilisations from Easter Island to the altiplano of the Andes
which have been brought to their knees by nature's active involvement. That
we now have a global culture is no reason to suppose that our intellectual
resources are proportionately any greater than those of past civilisations.
The Easter Islanders can hardly have been unaware that the destruction of
their forests and soils would eventually leave them destitute and starving.
Perhaps they too were tied in to powerful economic systems that made it
impossible to do anything about the long term consequences of their actions.
Perhaps they too suffered from a surfeit of so-called 'intellectuals' who could
not see the most obvious signs of their inadequacy to theorise their
predicament I
Second, it forgets that we too are biological components of nature. Thus
there are certain resources which we cannot do without, air, water, food etc.
and which too many of the world's population already have in short supply.
)
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3) Grundman simply seems impervious to the fact that resource switching is
not the same as resource conservation. In the former case one uses up and
destroys, often forever, a part of our environment. For example the great
British forests which were destroyed for shipbuilding, agriculture and
charcoal are gone, taking many of their species with them. That we now
have substitutes for these in the forms of fibre glass or nuclear fuel does not
counter the deep ecologist's point that what is valuable is the forest, those
same forests which can now no longer play any part in forging the kinds of
society and people which would otherwise have been possibilities. Some of
us would prefer a world of 'natural' values and community with nature to one
which is centred upon the immediate pecuniary gratification of selfish
individuals.
Rather than succumbing to a deep depression about the conceptual
inabilities of conservative thinkers on left and right we need to forge new
paradigms. The work of philosophers like Benton shows at least a
willingness on the part of some Marxists to begin the radical shift in
perspective necessary to encompass environmental issues. Other Marxists
too are moving in this direction. I
Chakraverti notes that Marxists have often been concerned to distance
themselves from a naive materialism or objectivism about nature, they tend
to deny Spinoza's thesis that nature exists "'in itself' without human
intervention or mediation"." He rightly asserts that this has led to the
subsequent emphasis on human productive labour as the active component
of the dialectic at the cost of nature becoming simply passive. But Marxism,
33 Satindranath Chakraverti 'Praxis and Nature' p. 92.
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properly understood, should have no quarrel with the positing of a material
nature existing in itself, but only with the view that this nature is knowable in
itself. Alfred Schmidt makes this point as follows.
"The dialectical element of Marxist materialism does not consist in the
denial that matter has its own laws and its own movement (or motion),
but in the understanding that matter's laws can only be recognised
and appropriately applied by men through the agency of mediating
practice." 34
Schmidt can account for technological advances whilst arguing that these in
no way overcome physical reality. Matter exists independently of human
consciousness and though matter can only be known through social
practices it is not ruled by them. Schmidt re-injects the material of "dialectical
materialism" back into theoretical discourse about the dialectic. Human aims
are
"not just limited by history and society but equally by the structure of
matter itself ....men, [sic] whatever historical condition they live in, see
themselves confronted with a world of things which cannot be
transcended and which they must appropriate in order to survive." 35
Schmidt also quotes Marx's letter to Kuglemann
"it is absolutely impossible to transcend the laws of nature. What can
change in historically different circumstances is only the form in which
-- saAHred Schmidt The Concept of Nature in Marx p. 97.
35 ibid., p. 63.
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these laws express themselves." 38
Chakraverti and Schmidt illuminate a major defect in Althusser's
problematic, namely that his concerns are entirely with the human and social
aspects of the dialectic as they are worked out within society. This view
requires a radical distinction between society and the material of nature,
insofar as he simply accepts nature as the unchanging background against
which, and by utilising which, human history is played out. This background,
to be sure, can be comprehended in a variety of ways and under a number of
problematics, but it remains an entirely passive background nonetheless.
However, nature effects changes in our society as well as itself being
understood through changing social relations. The typhoon which destroys
a village is socially experienced. That experience is not primarily one
mediated by human productive labour but by nature's destructive labour
upon the social formation. Whether this is understood through scientific
meteorology or through the explanatory system of a local shaman makes no
difference to the materiality of the destructive effects. Nature does exist in
itself, it simply can't be known in itself. Indeed nature must exist in itself for
any thesis to deserve the title of a materialism. This is no less the case for a
dialectical materialism.
- 36 Marx quoted in Schmidt ibid., p. 98. Schmidt also makes some relevant points about
past misinterpretations of the Marxist epistemological project. "One such misinterpretation
identifies Marx with the 'reflection theory'., Another is the view that the critique of the
philosophical attitude as such". implies that he had no interest in or understanding of
epistemological questions. Finally, there is the view which ignores Marx's essentially
epistemological utterances because they are not couched in the phraseology of traditional
academic philosophy." Ibid., p. 108. Thus Schmidt supports Althusser's contentions about
the importance of epistemology in Marx's project.
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In debates between green thinkers and orthodox Marxists the treatment of
nature as an active participant in the dialectic becomes all important.
Environmentalists' emphasis upon natural processes reaches to the very
heart of the Marxist enterprise, introducing doubts about the production
paradigm and the mediation of the dialectic by human labour." In humanist
Marxism the dialectic is a process of active human consciousness; of
intentional agency engaging with a passive material world. It is human
productive activity which builds our world and our world-views at one and the
same time. In transforming this world for their own social purposes humans
come to understand it in particular ways and talk of it in particular discourses.
It is the transforming agency of human productive social activities which
builds the world we can know. In no sense is the world admitted to shape
our society except through its role as the basic raw material of productive
practices. This particular section seeks to redress the balance between the
human and natural aspects of the dialectic such that nature is allowed to
have an active rather than a passive role.
Althusser's work, whilst stressing the unimportance, or rather the derivative
and secondary nature of human intentions (which are formed through the
individual's interpellation into social formations via the very productive
practices in which they engage), retains the basic outline of this
anthropocentric problematic. Despite his numerous, important and
innovative variations upon a Marxist theme, his anti-humanism, his use of
Spinoza and structuralism, his emphasis upon theory and epistemology etc.,
Althusser remains firmly within the mainstream Marxist tradition in his
- 371 use the term "environmentalists" here in the restricted sense of radical
environmentalists. I am fully aware of the differences of opinions within 'green' circles.
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insistence upon the primary importance of productive practices in structuring
our world. His introduction of theory itself depends upon it being seen as a
practice for the production of knowledge from certain raw materials via the
action of human labour. Nature is still the passive participant in the dialectic,
the material to be acted upon and transformed rather than an active
participant which can itself influence the very nature of human practices
through its own material structure. Like so many issues this focusing upon
one or other aspect of the dialectic may seem to be merely a matter of
emphasis, but once again emphasis is of crucial importance for the
mainstream traditions of Marxism have, by largely ignoring this issue,
warped the dialectic towards a social constructivism seen entirely from the
human perspective. This deformation of the dialectic is symptomatic of an
aporia which goes to the very roots of dialectical materialism. How if we are
to pass over the agency of nature itself in silence and return again and again
to the miraculous transformative powers of humanity in creating its universe
are we to distinguish dialectical materialism from a dialectic idealism? By
making society in general, and labour in particular, the sole originating locus
of all material transformations orthodox Marxism is no longer in any position
to explain our current catastrophic environmental situation without tortuous
theoretical manoeuvring.
In one sense at least what I suggest in this chapter is nothing less than a
radical shift in historical materialism, Le. in the claims "about the kinds of
structures which have primacy in explaining social systems, namely .... the
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forces and relations of production." 38 The motivation for this change is the
present inadequacy of Marxist theory or practice to address the massive
environmental problems which now beset our planet. It is important to see
that this attempt to redress of the balance in nature's favour is a necessary
part of any thoroughgoing anti-humanism. It marks a rejection of the
elements of anthropocentrism still present in Althusser's work where human
social activity still represents the sole creative force capable of transforming
the world.
Philosophy is not the only subject showing signs of reconstruction. In the
rest of this chapter some of the more hopeful developments are surveyed.
Two areas in particular which have focused upon the mutual interactions of
society and nature are mentioned. First, elements of the new history and
second, the development of Human Ecology.
New History; The Annales Historians
The group known as the 'AnnaJes school', which includes such figures as
Lucien Febvre, Marc Bloch, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Fernand
Braudel, have become the central figures of the new French history.
Annales is a shortening of the title of the journal with which all of these
figures have been associated. Starting as the Annales d'histoire
economique et sociale in 1929 the journal has had a further three titles up to
- 38 Alex Callinicos Making History: Agency, Structure and Change in Social Theoryp. 41.
Callinicos defends a much more orthodox economist Marxism but the need for a
reconstruction of historical materialism is widely felt. See for example Jorge Larrain A
Reconstruction of Historical Materialism.
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the present Annales; economies, societes. civilisations.
In his study of the Annales school Burke refers to three distinct phases. The
first begins with the inauguration of the journal and the influential figures are
Bloch and Febvre. The second phase is dominated by the figure of Fernand
Braudel and the third has seen the rise of a wider variety of interests and
new names such as Jacques Le Goff and Georges Dury.39There are
certainly differences in the approach of the major figures of this movement
(indeed some would tend to deny that they represent a movement at ali).
However, one of the themes commonly running through their work is a
concern for structural explanations, in which they include (especially in
Braudel's case) the environment, amongst the causal factors behind
historical events. This emphasis on the role of the environment is as Braudel
puts it in his most famous work The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean
World in the Age of Philip II, to help "rediscover the slow unfolding of
structural realities, to see things in the perspective of the very long term". 40
Braudel's Mediterranean is divided into three sections each representing a
different time-scale of history, from the almost "imperceptible" changes
brought about by the underlying and continual presence of particular
environmental factors, through the medium term histories of social
movements, the conjunctures (which might be translated as 'trends'), to the
micro-history of individual events. First and foremost comes the history of la
longue duree, the passage of time on geographical and environmental
- 99 Georges Dury in particular is concerned with the issue of ideology in a very Althusserian
framework. See Peter Burke The French Historical Revolution pp. 72-73.
'0 Fernand Braudel The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip /I
p.23.
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scales. Here he examines the constraints imposed by the physical
geography of the areas surrounding the Mediterranean, the great deserts to
the south, the mountain ranges to the north and of course the landlocked sea
itself which unifies the histories of those peoples who have lived on its
shores. The sea has provided the element of transport, communication and
trade but also introduces dangers of invasion and piracy. The mountains
have provided refuge from these invasions, shelter for flocks, a home for the
poorest and, due to their inaccessibility, a reservoir for old superstitions and
cults. These geographical 'facts' rather than decisions of the individual
human subjects are the major structuring forces of history.
"For centuries, man has been a prisoner of climate, of vegetation, of
animal population, of a particular agriculture, of a whole slowly
established balance from which he cannot escape without the risk of
everything's being upset." 41
The inclusion of environmental factors also points to two other features of
Braudel's work (and to a lesser degree that of the other Annales historians).
Firstly, his rejection of the human subject in favour of structural explanations
in a manner very reminiscent of (though preceding) Althusser, and secondly
the breaking down of barriers between academic disciplines in an attempt to
give a more holistic account (a histoire totale). The Annales school are not
principally environmentally orientated so much as anti-humanist and holistic
in their approaches. As Stoianovich puts it, they wish ''to plead in favour of a
community of the human sciences, despite the walls that separated them
41 Braudel quoted by Stuart Clark 'The Anna/es Historians' p. 185.
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from one another." 42 Braudel has stated that he is "by temperament a
structuralist" 43 but rather than relying, as Levi-Strauss does, for his
explanatory paradigm on the structures of the human brain, or as Althusser
does on the different productive practices found in all social formations,
Braudel's transcendent (though not unchanging) structures are those of
climate, oceans, mountains and ecosystems. It is these natural structuring
elements which are primarily influential in determining and limiting human
human history.
The acceptance of natural limitations should not be mistaken for a
geographical determinism, which is far indeed from the intentions of any of
the Anna/es school. For example they would reject outright the reductive
suggestions of environmental historians like John D. Post who argues that
the world economic crisis following the defeat of Napoleon in the early 19th
Century could be explained as "the product of agricultural shortages and
these, in turn, of a world-wide climatic disturbance." 44 As Clark notes,
Febvre, who has specialised in the history of rural and semi-rural
environments,
"... in particular set himself 'against any form of geographical
determinism, following instead the 'possibilism' of de la Blache and
stressing the idea that environments are as much vehicles of
42 Traian Stoianovich French Historical Method: The Annales Program p. 12. Another
general feature of the Annales historians is their rejection of positivism and their a general
awareness of the philosophical implications of their works. Thus Braudel can say that ''Todraw
a boundary is to define, analyse, and reconstruct it, in this case [The Mediterranean] select,
indeed adopt, a philosophy of history." Fernand Braudel op. clt., n. 40 above, p. 18.
43 Braudel quoted by Clark in Skinner op. cit; n. 41 above, p. 189.
44 Stoianovich op. cit., n. 42 above, p. 83.
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endowed meanings as brute facts about the external world." 45
Another Annales historian, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, who is less willing
than Braudel to ascribe a primacy to climatic and geographical factors, has at
least considered such information important enough to study the possible
effects of ecology, botany, zoology etc. in relation to the Langeudoc
populations which have formed his major area of study.48
The Annales historians can then, to greater or lesser degrees, be seen as
engaged in a project which aims to treat the environment as something more
than a passive object which can be ignored, treated as simply raw material
for human productive processes, or idealised by arbitrary Significations.
Rather they introduce the world as an active participant in a holistic dialectic
between the people of historical times and their surroundings. The natural
environment introduces structural contingencies narrowing historical
possibilities for its human subjects. Unsurprisingly then all Annales
historians without exception reject positivism and, as Stoianovich notes,
Braudel openly supports a dialectical view of the relations between
environment and humanity," This dialectic cannot however be the limited
version of the Marxist dialectic interested only in those human practices
as Clark in Skinner op. cit., n. 41 above, p. 182.
48 See Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie The Peasants of Languedoc.
47 Braudel refers to his work as having a "basic approach around which the whole is
structured, the dialectic of space and time (geography and history)" Braudel op. cit., n. 40
above, p. 16. but he adapts this somewhat in the later edition of his work to give greater
weight to economic and political influences. It is as though in an Althusserian fashion he
admits that he ''bent the stick too far" in his earlier work to make plain its distinctiveness from
some aspects of the tradition in which it arose.
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which can be described as 'productive' in economic terms."
Anna/es historians have had to learn to regard production as part of
the overall communications system ..... It is based on their long-
standing interest in the interaction between people and environment
and to their image of people as a function of their situation on a
dynamic Earth, at once acting upon them and acted upon. It has its
origins in the "possibilist" geography of Paul Vidal de La Blache, as
reinterpreted by Febvre, Bloch and Braudel." 49
Febvre might be thought to be the exception to this rule for he is generally
skeptical about the extent to which environments determine history, as can
be seen by his debates with Ratzel the German geographer (who
emphasised the impact of the natural environment on society). But Febvre
only argues against a naive determinism not against the importance of the
environment per se. 50 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie too refuses to be
constrained by a narrow framework of economic production and emphasises
48 An economist Marxist response to the introduction of ecological factors in history can be
found in R Brenner 'The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism' pp.16-113. In particular
Brenner is concerned to counter the NeQ-Malthusian aspects of Ladurie and Postan's work.
See M.M. Postan 'Population and Class Relations in Feudal Society, and Emmanuel Le Roy
Ladurie 'A Reply to Professor Brenner'. Ladurie criticises Brenner for what amounts to
economic determinism, for" adopting a simplistic assimilation between power (political) and
surplus value (economic)" ibid., p. 56. He also states "I believe that history must give more and
more room to specifically epidemic and therefore, one could say, biological factors ....Professor
Brenner, on the other hand, greatly underestimates epidemic factors (plagues and the like)
when he purports to explain the crisis of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries essentially in
terms of seigneurial exploitation." Ibid., p. 57 .
•eStoianovich op. cit., n. 42 above, pp. 76-77.
50 As Burke puts it "In this debate between geographical determinism and human liberty
Febvre warmly supported Vidal [de La Blache] and attacked Ratzel, stressing the variety of
possible responses to the challenge of a given environment. For him there were no
necessities, only possibilities." Burke op. cit., n. 39 above, pp.14-15.
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the importance of demographic patterns as affecting the economic and social
sphere rather than the opposite. In his studies technological improvements,
ecology, demography and the social organisation (into, for example, nuclear
families) go hand in hand. Technological innovations like those of the
wheeled plough were of little use in the thin soils and sloping lands of the
Massif Central, and so this area acted as at least a temporary natural barrier
to the dissemination of technology and the social changes which went with it.
This exemplifies the AnnaJes approach and has many potential parallels with
those relational aspects of Althusser's metaphysics which he derived from
Spinoza. Here too the outcome, a given historical situation, can be seen to
be overdetermined by a number of relatively autonomous factors articulating
is a certain unique way. Thus for example, Braudel makes clear this
interaction between the economic and social and the natural spheres when
he refers to the practice of transhumance.
"..all transhumance is the result of a demanding agricultural situation
which is unable either to support the total weight of a pastoral
economy or to forgo the advantages it brings, and which therefore
offloads its burdens according to local possibilities and the seasons, to
either the lowland or the mountain pastures. Any logical study should
therefore start with this local agricultural situation." 51
This dialectic between the natural and the social is a constant feature of the
first section of Braudel's 'Mediterranean', as for example in his discussion of
the safeguarding of the natural Venetian lagoon with artificial canals
necessary to stop its silting Up.52 Of course Braudel's picture of
'-------~~~~~~~
Si Braudel op. cit., n. 40 above, p.95.
52 'b'd 79I I ., p. .
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environmental limitations seems to be somewhat outdated, at least insofar as
he treats these changes as being necessarily slow moving. Burke points out
that this long term view of nature's influences was open to criticism long
before the realisation of the Greenhouse affect or ozone depletion.
"Despite his admiration for Maximilien sorre, a French geographer
who was already concerned in the early 1940's with what he called
'human ecology', Braudel fails to show us what might be called 'the
making of the Mediterranean landscape', most obviously the damage
done to the environment over the long term by cutting down the tree
cover." 53
Pesez and Ladurie have taken just this sort of interaction between society
and ecology into account, stressing the interconnections between human
activity and the surrounding environment without reducing one to merely a
product of the other. Thus in their studies of rural depopulation they gives the
following account.
"..the irrational clearing of forests that went hand in hand with the
economic revival destroyed the soil and did irreparable damage to the
I
higher regions. Beginning with the sixteenth century, the forests of
Provence were robbed of all vitality, mercilessly destroyed by
voracious goats, by timber merchants, by the harvesters of tanning
bark, by chalk ovens and charcoal burners; and where solid masses of
trees had once stood we now find, not good wheat land, but barren,
burnt ground la terre gaste ... By ruining the source of humus, the
deforestation destroyed one capital asset without creating another in
its place. There can be no doubt that in the very long run,
- 53 Burke op. cit., n. 39 above, p. 41.
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deforestation was a factor in the "inter-secular' demographic decline
of the mountainous, rocky region of Provence." 54
Of course the Anna/es school are not the only historians to be interested in
environmental factors. Indeed there is now a growing number of publications
in the field of environmental history, a field which Donald Worster traces back
to the seminal work of Roderick Nash." Gustaf Utterstrom has argued that
the relative political and economic decline of Scandinavia and those
countries, like Iceland and Greenland, bordering the North Atlantic during the
late Middle Ages was at least in part the result of a colder climate in these
regions. During this period, Norway in particular suffered from this loss of
political power, at the same time the population of Scandinavian settlers in
Greenland became extinct and the growing of wheat in Iceland ceased.
Utterstrom is not suggesting that climate by itself is capable of explaining
such changes in social formations (for example he is fully aware of the
impact on Norwegian trade caused by the growth of the Hanseatic
merchants) but he thinks that environmental considerations have been
seriously overlooked by past accounts of these phenomena. He argues that
I
agriculture was of significant import in determining social systems and that
agriculture in mediaeval society was particularly susceptible to climatic
changes and other natural occurrences. Amongst these he mentions, the
eruption of Hekkla in 1300 which "made farming difficult, or even for a time
impossible, over extensive areas" 56 of Iceland; the extension southwards of
- 5a Jean-Marie Pesez and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie 'The Deserted Villages of France: An
Overview' p. 90.
55 See the appendix to Donald Worster ed., The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on
Modern Environmental History.
58 Gustaf Utterstrom 'Climatic Fluctuations and Population Problems in Early Modem
History' in Worster ibid., p.43.
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the glaciers, which might account for the increased conflict with Eskimos
recorded at this time as they followed the seals upon which they depended;
and plagues of insects destroying the grass upon which cattle depended.
To show how these major environmental changes affect society he relies
upon contemporary accounts, for example those recorded in the parish
registries of Orslosa in Sweden giving horrifying accounts of the famine of
1596.57 This famine followed widespread floods which caused similar
situations in other parts of Scandinavia. Utterstrom has compiled information
from a number of such sources which suggest that the years that followed
1596 included a whole series of natural disasters, from freezing
temperatures to exceptionally deep snow falls and even droughts. These
changes serious though they indubitably were to the local economies were
also, he argues, representative of a longer term change which combined
with other factors to alter the balance of power to the Northern Atlantic
countries' dlsaovantaqe."
Climate is not the only environmental factor active in shaping human
societies. Other relevant environmental factors might include, soils, water
I
resources, fauna and flora, and disease. The latter has been a component
cause of many social changes. Few now doubt that the Black Death was
57 ibid., pp. 61-62
58 Interestingly, similar studies have tried to account for the rise of Viking power and the
extent and success of their settlement of the North Atlantic in the preceding centuries. One
account which also brings out the dialectical nature of these human / environmental
encounters is that of Thomas H McGovern, Gerald Bigelow, Thomas Amarosi and Daniel
Russell'Northem Islands, Human Error, and Environmental Degradation: A View of Social and
Ecological Change in the Mediaeval North Atlantic'. They describe how the farming practices
which the Scandinavian settlers bought with them led to degradation of pasture land and the
removal of any remaining tree cover. This change in turn made the communities more
susceptible to the later climatic downturn.
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one of the factors which hastened the end of the feudal social system in
Britain and Europe. This series of plagues swept across Europe between
1347 and 1350 with other lesser, but still considerable outbreaks over the
following decades.
"One third of the country's [England's] population cannot be
eliminated over a period of some two and a half years without a
considerable dislocation to its economy and social structure." 59
Although Philip Ziegler notes that its effects were certainly not uniform, and
somewhat ameliorated due to the relative over-population which preceded it,
the plague resulted in the freeing up of land as people died without
successors and a consequent reduction in the amount of strip cultivation in
favour of larger patches of land. This in turn would make the later enclosure
of lands, so important in the agricultural revolution, that much easier.
Braudel equally claims that "[p]lague would appear as what it was; a
structure of the [sixteenth] century:" In the plague which struck Venice
following 1575 fifty thousand people died, between a quarter and a third of
the population. "When the plague finally left Venice in 1577, quite a different
city with a new set of rulers emerged, There had been a complete
,
changeover." 61 The effects went deeper than the mere replacement of one
elite class by another for, whenever plague threatened the wealthy
evacuated the Mediterranean cities for their country homes leaving the poor
to suffer the brunt of the onslaught. This was a "source of lasting class
hatred"."
50 Philip Ziegler The Black Deathp. 240.
60 Braudel op. cit., n. 40 above, p. 332. [my emphasis]
61 ibid., p. 333.
62 ibid., p. 333.
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The importance of infectious diseases is not of course limited to Europe.
Thus, for example, the Spanish invasion of South America was not a purely
economic and political phenomenon, the role of diseases in these conquests
cannot be underestimated. Over three and a half million Indians died of
smallpox alone in the wake of Cortez's invasion of Mexico. Amongst the
victims was Cuitlaha the successor to Montezuma. Two hundred thousand
Incas died from the same source before Pizzaro's invasion of Peru." The
last few surviving native tribes in the Amazon are still suffering from imported
diseases like measles reducing their population and subsequently their
ability to withstand accompanying cultural and economic invasions of their
territory. This pattern is repeated over the whole of the Pacific, including the
island populations.
"...Pacific islanders were in general, free from smallpox, measles,
typhus, typhoid, hookworm, leprosy, syphilis, and certain other ills
before the white invasion ..." 64
Diseases were not the only novel species which were introduced with
colonisation. Many other larger species like rats jumped ship and played
havoc with the native ecosystems, forcing many species to extinction. This
replacement of indigenous plants and animals with exotic species altered
both the landscape and the way of life of the colonised countries. Some
introduced species became serious pests; well known examples include
rabbits in Australia and the opossum in New Zealand. The introduction of
these species was in many cases intentional but the effects thereafter were
far removed from their original purpose. Prickly Pear cacti Opuntia sp. were
63A. Grenfell Price The Western Invasion of the Pacific and its Continents. A study of
Moving Frontiers and Changing Landscapes .
•• ibid., p.176.
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introduced from America to Australia in 1787 to provide food for beetles.
These were needed in the cochineal industry which produced red dyes for
soldiers uniforms. However by 1925 60,000,000 acres of land were overrun
and made unusable following the cacti's uncontrolled expansion due to the
lack of any suitable phytophagus predators.
It cannot be overemphasised that few people actually suggest that social
change can be accounted for solely in terms of these non-human influences.
(Some have perhaps pushed this line of explanation a little too far. Grenfell
Price gives one example of an academic who held that the success of the
Protestant reformation could be accounted for by the fact that Henry VIII
contracted syphilis thus leaving a sterile daughter who could have no
children by Philip" of Spain!) I only suggest that the social experiences
gained of the environment in these active roles (rather than as a passive
material input into economic processes) has to be given due weight. Our
understanding of the environment comes through a dialectic which is not
wholly intentional and mediated through active human practices. Rather, the
environment plays an active as well as a passive role, imposing its own limits
and possibilities upon social structures and knowledge, upon values and
forms of life. In this sense we can talk of an environmental components of
practice instead of just human labour.
In one sense the Annales use of the 'natural' environment might be thought
to be opportunistic. That is, they make little attempt to specify to what degree
we should think of practices as being constituted by active environmental
involvement rather than simply Promethean human activity. This is because
of the contextual way in which they approach their subject matter. It would be
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wrong to make general claims about the extent of the environment's effects
on history for the very reason that this would oppose a theoretical
contextuality and risk being misread as an environmental foundationa/ism.
What is required is a theoretical space in which the environment can operate
and be introduced in the specificity of its actions in particular circumstances.
This the Anna/es school provide admirably. The Anna/es school are aligned
with a critical anti-humanism insofar as they do not regard human conscious
activity as the basis for historical explanation and they give due regard to the
environmental structuration of events.
Human Ecology
The New History is not the only academic discipline to acknowledge the part
played by the environment in the development of social formations. There
are now several emerging disciplines which make the process of mediation
between society and the environment their central theme. One such area is
that of "human ecology" which draws together relevant aspects of geography,
J
environmental science, theoretical ecology, anthropology etc.
At present human ecology is still a fragmented discipline, regarded by most
as a sub-discipline of other more traditional subjects, rather than a radically
new perspective. As with other developing disciplines, environmental
concerns tend to be subsumed under the aegis of the currently favoured
paradigms of older disciplines. Thus, for example, philosophy tries to simply
apply current theories of ethics, either utilitarianism or deontological to
environmental concerns (see Introduction). Treating environmental issues in
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this way enables the practitioners of traditional subjects to argue their
continued relevance in a changing world and maintains an intellectual
hegemony over developments which threaten to disturb the academic
status quo. But these new environmental problematics which necessitate the
restructuring of traditional subject boundaries are distorted by being
squeezed into intellectual frameworks in which they previously played no
part. As Althusser makes clear, the introduction of new concepts will of
necessity lead to the restructuring of the problematic they enter.
Environmental concerns cannot just be treated as novel examples to shake
the dust off bewhiskered theorems. The challenge they pose goes much
deeper than this, indeed so deep as not just to threaten a cherished theory
here and there but to challenge the very boundaries of subjects like
philosophy.
Human ecology exemplifies the mutually interactive and co-constitutive form
of the dialectic between 'nature' and human society. In a review article of
extraordinary breadth Gerald L. Young has attempted to pull together those
aspects of traditional disciplines which converge in the mediation of nature
}
and culture. He considers sociology, geography, politics, philosophy,
anthropology, engineering, architecture, planning and scientific ecology. He
stresses that "the most obvious need is for a unified body of theory, one
acceptable to each and transcending all." 65 This he believes can only come
about through "interdisciplinary effort".
There are many examples that could be quoted of environmental awareness
amongst anthropological writings (to pick just one of Young's areas). This
65 Gerald L. Young 'Human Ecology as an Interdisciplinary Concept: A Critical Inquiry' p. 85.
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awareness is especially noticeable in those studies of cultures which as
Young notes are "least buffered from the environment by technological and
material artifacts." 88 This explains why the term "cultural ecology" was
coined by Stewart in 1955 to emphasise the importance of including
environmental factors in anthropological explanation. Young gives a short
summary of the development of this field, but notes that in many cases the
environment is still seen as simply a passive feature in social arrangements;
as the material requirement of production rather than a component of
production. Marshal Sahlins and perhaps the majority of cultural ecologists
tended to be engaged in an "ecological version of cultural materialism"
which seeks to "identify the material condition of socio-cultural life in terms of
the articulation between productive processes and habitat." 87
In many respects this particular Marxist derived approach to cultural ecology
stressing economic aspects still falls within the economist paradigm. Human
societies are seen as simply appropriating those natural objects which
happen to be around. However, some attempts have been made to give
nature an active role in social determination and hence provide a more
I
holistic approach. These holistic forms of Human ecology emphasise a
mutually interactive dialectical approach to the nature / society interface.
This differs from the more traditional concerns of anthropology which have
tended to focus upon social institutions and relations in their own right whilst
nature provides an important but largely passive backdrop for social
phenomena. Human ecologists attempt to recognise and express the
relationships between societies, practices and the environments in which
ibid., p. 19.
67 Marshal Sahlins quoted in You ng ibid., p. 21.
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they find themselves." Thus for example Katherine Milton correlates the
ecological factors important for determining the different foraging strategies
amongst groups of the Mbuti pygmies.6s In the Northern part of the Ituri forest
where flora and fauna as diverse and plentiful they retain their traditional
hunter-gatherer lifestyle. However, in the more variable and less biologically
diverse southern sections of the forest they rely upon trade in meat with
neighbouring Bantu tribesmen for sustenance.
One of the best known attempts to study the mutual interactions of the
'natural' environment and human society is the cultural anthropology of Roy
A. Rappaport.7o Rappaport worked amongst the Maring tribal highlanders of
the New Guinea highlands. He focuses upon the functional roles rituals play
within these societies in maintaining sustainable relations with the
environment and surrounding tribes. He criticises past attempts to reduce
ritual to a psychological functionalism which merely accounts for them as
palliatives, i.e. giving an aura of control over aspects of the environment
which are in fact outside practical influences. e.g. the weather. Rappaport
88 These environments are not necessarily "natural" in the commonly accepted sense.
Young is careful to point out that one should not now confuse the term "nature" with
something that is untouched by human hands: "man [sic] lives with the realities of smog as
much as sky, in cement not stone, in contemplation of a windowbox more than a biome."
Young ibid., p. 88.
se Katherine Milton 'Ecological Foundations for Subsistence Strategies among the Mbuti
Pygmies'.
70 There are, of course, many other works in this area. Two deserving mention are Robert
McC. Netting Cultural Ecology. and Tim Ingold The Appropriation of Nature: Essays on
Human Ecology and Social Relations. Ingold, following Gibson, refers to the environment as
offering a set of possibilities, or 'affordencies'to the individuals they surround. An interesting
selection of essays from a specifically materialist perspective and containing varying degrees
of ecological emphasis can be found in Eric B. Ross ed.,Beyond the Myths of Culture:
Essays in Cultural Materialism.
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claims that in "some instances ritual actions do produce a practical effects on
the external world.'?' The rituals of the Tsembaga and other Maring tribes
centre around a cycle of variable length, usually between twelve to fifteen
years long. The end of each cycle which "is largely regulated by the
demographic fortunes of the pig populatlon'" is marked by the slaughter of
pigs on a grand scale, termed a kaiko. The pigs are a major resource and
benefit for the Tsembaga in terms of protein and because of their
consumption of otherwise disease spreading faeces and rubbish. However,
they can be very destructive, damaging the Tsembaga's gardens and, when
their numbers increase, become very time consuming to care for.
Additionally, they are also a potential cause of friction between neighbouring
tribes. The time taken for pigs to reach a "sufficient" number Le. for the
losses to outweigh the benefits, depends upon many ecological variables
including the quality of the land.
The practical effects of rituals are mediated in very complex ways through the
rituals, not just in terms of their obvious direct effects for example the
environmental impact of growing extra food for a feast. The Tsembaga ritual
cycle can be regarded as a complex homeostatic mechanism dictating
"when attacks may be launched, land annexed, affiliations of personnel
changed, and truce or peace established ..." 73 The kaiko is also associated
with a variety of territorial disputations and with the lifting and imposition of a
variety of other taboos, for example the eating of marsupials. Rappaport
maintains that the rituals function to provide a kind of negative feedback
between society and environment helping to keep a form of balance
71 Roy A. Rappaport Pigs For The Ancestorsp. 3.
72 ibid., p. 153.
73 ibid., p. 221.
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between them.
''Tsembaga ritual, particularly in the context of a ritual cycle, operates
as a regulating mechanism in a system or set of interlocking systems,
in which such variables as the area of available land, necessary
lengths of fallow periods, size and composition of both human and pig
populations, trophic requirements of pigs and people, energy
expended in various activities and the frequency of misfortunes are
included." 74
Of course the Tsembaga themselves do not view their ritual in this fashion
and as such Rappaport is imposing a Western conceptual scheme on their
practices in an attempt to 'explain' them." The Tsembaga see their rituals as
concerned with interactions with (mainly) ancestral spirits.
Rappaport's study, although bordering in places upon an environmental
functionalism in its account of ritual, exemplifies in its other respects the
value of an integrated approach to the society / nature horizon. He is not
alone in this. The work of environmental historians and human ecologists
amongst others have begun the work of reconstructing academic disciplines
74 ibid., p. 4.
751tmight be argued that such explanations involve a fundamental misunderstanding of
the nature of ritual practices as experienced from within the Tsembaga form of life itself. See for
example Wittgenstein's comments upon Sir James Frazer's anthropology. 'Remarks upon
Frazer's Golden Bough' in G. Luckhardt ed., Wittgenstein; Sources and Perspectives.
Johnson holds that Wittgenstein believes that this form of interpretation misunderstands
social activities because some human actions are simply not amenable to the forms of
explanation prevalent in the natural sciences. This is not however Wittgenstein's polnt. which
is rather that abstract scientific explanation is not an objectively better explanation or a true
causal explanation of the motivation and feelings and beliefs of those involved in rituals but
simply different, reliant upon making connections with a modern scientifically orientated form
of life rather than trusting to the phenomenological expressions of the participants. (See
chapter 9.)
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around the nature / human interface frequently operating with what can
justifiably be termed a dialectical approach. The consequences of this shift
are potentially wide-ranging. It both reflects and amplifies a progressive
tendency towards a re-evaluation of Western humanity's orientation towards
the non-human environment. It represents a (partial) break with and critique
of past ideological assumptions which have influenced the way we have
regarded and valued nature and a movement away from economist and
humanist suppositions.
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CHAPTER 7: THE HUMAN SUBJECT
Reprise
The last chapter argued the case for a wider conception of 'production' than
that accepted by economically reductive models. This more expansive
conception of production included all 'objectifying' activities which either
reproduce current social structures or introduce novel components into the
social formation. These activities, it was claimed, need not, as the humanist
holds, necessarily be the result of purposive actions on the part of human
individuals. It was also argued that 'nature' is to be seen not as separate
from the social formation, but as an active component in a genuinely
dialectical relationship with society. This dialectic takes place at all levels of
the social formation. Hence, nature is not (as it is in traditional Marxism)
simply passive raw material waiting to be transformed via economic
processes - those processes which, according to traditional Marxism, then
determine the form taken by super-structural elements. This hierarchical
model was replaced by one derived from the Althusserian conception of
,
levels within the social formation, political, ideological etc., each with a
relative autonomy from the other and each dialectically engaged with each
other and the surrounding environment.
This attempt to build a holistic model of society, whilst retaining something of
the standpoint of traditional Marxism and the language of its analysis, does
not impose a single rigid, universal, and teleological theory of societal
development. Instead it recognises the complexity of real situations and
deconstructs many of the anthropocentric preconceptions which lie at
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traditional Marxism's heart. Dogmatic Marxists may well reject such a
historical compromise, for it can only be reached at the cost of recognising
and rejecting humanist and economist aspects of their own traditions.
However, this recognition does not compromise the radicalness of Marxist
social theory, for it is precisely these aspects which Marxism shares with the
"liberal" and capitalist philosophies which it long regarded as its ideological
enemies.
If the ethical concerns of Western and non-Western environmentalists are to
be addressed by Marxists this must occur at a deep theoretical level. One
cannot simply tack green issues onto an agenda based on a very different
analysis of history and society.' In this sense the environment may be that
issue which finally forces many Marxists to come to terms with the historical
and geographical specificity of their own ideological presumptions, forcing
them to abandon their restrictive and linear view of history and their
universalising cultural assumptions. Insofar as the critical adaptation of
Althusser's model presented here is successful, it may help create a
theoretical space where constructive discourse between 'left' and 'green'
agendas can take place.
Of course, this suggests that some of the economic specificity of the Marxist
analysis of society will be lost. Economic production will no longer provide
the key to a comprehensive understanding of social formations or the guide
for revolutionary action. Many Western Marxists have in any case long since
abandoned such economic reductionism and the preceding analysis has
1 To ignore this point is to risk repeating the divisive arguments which occurred when
Marxists attempted to subsume radical feminism into a "productivist" framework (in the narrow
economic sense).
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questioned whether Marxism ever did, or could, provide a 'scientific' theory
of society which would lay bare its essential structures. Science, it was
argued, is in any case neither transcendental nor objective. Whatever
understanding such theories provide is always intimately tied to specific
ideological backgrounds, which are in turn embedded in and part of
particular cultural and historical forms of life.2 This being so, there must
come a point where particular forms of life become, as time passes, so
different from those present at the inception of a theory that the theory needs
to be either changed or overthrown. This argument is, I believe, entirely
consistent with Marxist social theory, but there is little real point in arguing
over whether or not such theoretical developments are actually Marxist or
not.
Marxism must learn to apply the historicist aspects of its theory of ideology to
itself, and recognise the need to evolve to suit new circumstances.'
Scientistic conceptions of Marxist philosophy born in Nineteenth Century
Western Europe need to be replaced by a theoretical standpoint which
understands itself as providing a possible geography of the terrain of late
,
twentieth century life. Perhaps philosophy, so understood, can provide as
Wittgenstein suggests a way of finding one's way around a world imbued
with meanings and values, a way of relating these different places to each
- 2 Chapters 3 and 4 showed how Althusser's own attempt to radically divorce science from
ideology and make them epistemologically autonomous fails.
3 This does not mean abandoning its principled stance on human emancipation in the face
of the expansion of consumer capitalism, but rather realigning itself with other radical
movements who now face a common enemy. Foremost amongst these are the greens and
environmentalists.
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other,' This geography is not a representational map of the ideological
terrain, it does not mirror timeless or universal truths (indeed it does not
mirror anything at ali), but is itself an intimate part of that terrain and the
dynamic processes which help form it. Theory provides a communicable
account of our perceptions of the current relations between 'things', Le.
'things' as they are constituted in what is always and already a dialectical
process, a process which is organically part of our forms of Iife.1i
Our theoretical "maps" of the world chart the assumed manner and form of
our relations within the world; language is not simply a supervenient
property of 'forms of life' but actively participates in the creation and evolution
of those forms of life. Just as a map of the Venezuelan rain-forest might
enable it to be exploited by oil companies or to be set aside as tribal lands,"
the knowledge which a theoretical map encapsulates will almost certainly be
instrumental in altering the very relations it attempts to portray. Producing a
philosophical or theoretical map opens and closes certain avenues, and
constrains and facilitates the formation of particular relations between those
reading the map and the 'objects' on that map. Often the results of such
4 As Wittgenstein states "A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way
about" Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations §123. There remains an important
difference between post-Althusserian theory and Wittgensteinian philosophy. Wittgenstein
apparently retains an almost positivistic belief in the need for philosophy to leave everything as
it is i.e. that ideally it can describe the world and its language without itself intruding upon or
altering them. Although Althusser shares in this separation of (Marxist) philosophy from
ordinary language, the point of his theorising is to alter the world.
S See chapter 5.
6 The 'map' that a tribal culture would produce would be significantly different once again.
Like the songlines of the Australian aborigines it may be so different that it is difficult to
conceive of in terms of a theoretical map at all. For example, it might not recognise a division
between the landscape and the people who live in it in anything approaching the way in which
we understand it.
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cartographical exercises are unforeseen. What was developed with one
purpose in mind may have very different practical results. We have already
seen how theory, in its articulation of similarities and differences, creates
taxonomies which are never neutral but always value laden. Theoretical
assumptions are not always transparent to the theoretician, but function
ideologically - creating spaces in relation to which human individuals and
groups come to align themselves, e.g. as rich or poor, black or white etc.'
Certain aspects of the humanist theoretical map have not been without
benefits for those who can afford them, e.g. due to medical science many
diseases are no longer life threatening. However, if, as many
environmentalists now agree, humanism "got it wrong" in placing humanity
(and in particular a very narrow concept of humanity based upon Western
patriarchal society) at the centre of its universe then there comes a need to
re-draw our theoretical contours, to use a different projection which will alter
our perceptions of the size and importance of the European continent, the
rational male subject and all of the other ideological baggage which comes
with a humanist world-view. This does not involve throwing out all that has
been achieved by the last centuries of European culture, or, as some post-
,
modern philosophers seem to suggest, doing without a map altogether, but
does require putting things into a different perspective. Most importantly it
involves the realisation that we are situated on the map, not above it - and
that our theoretical horizons are limited by the ideological terrain which
surrounds and in part produces us.
Human and environmental influences have continued to change the world
- 7 For a full description of this presumed relation between ideology and theory see chapter
4.
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and our relations to it, but the geography of traditional Marxism has, up until
now, explained change entirely in terms of the Promethean processes of
human economics divorced from environmental constraints. It has ignored
the physical processes which are constantly and actively at work altering the
forms of life we are able to live. Marxism has been one of the powerful forces
at work upon our theoretical and practical heritage, creating, in part, the
landscape in which we now live. Despite this, it now faces the fate of all
maps which, once set down, become ossified and anachronistic and entirely
inadequate for expressing novel relations between features of the
landscape.
However, anti-humanist Marxism does, I claim, contain certain intellectual
resources which can help us produce a dynamic 'geographical' critique
amenable to our present conditions. Earlier chapters of this thesis attempted
to re-draw the humanist representational account of 'cartography', to provide
a theory of how theoretical language relates to the non-theoretical world.
They utilised a concept of "social practice" found (in differing forms) in both
Wittgenstein's and Althusser's philosophies. Taking this with the more
holistic and less reductive account of "production" presented in the last
chapter, we are now in a position to reconstruct that other central tenet of
humanism - the autonomous individual "subject".
To this end we will need to examine the character of the subject / object
divide and the relations between the individual and society. Chapter 2
illustrated the pervasive use of the subject / object dichotomy in ethical
theories. From the perspective of social theory (within which category we
can include Wittgenstein's later philosophy following his "anthropological
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turn"), the debate within the objective / subjective framework typical of post-
Cartesian philosophy changes and becomes focused on the relative import
and primacy of individual praxis or social practices and human agency or
social structures ? This debate hinges upon whether one takes human
subjects to be autonomous from, and foundational to, society: Le. do human
subjects, as subjects existentially prior to social formations, consciously
determine the forms that social practices take; or are those subjects' practical
actions and very forms of existence constrained (and faCilitated) by forces
and relations released through social and environmental interactions but
largely outside of those individuals' control,"
In the former (humanist) camp, which exclusively emphasises human
agency, are included the various sociological traditions such as
Methodological Individualism, Ethnomethodology, and Phenomenological
Sociology. In the opposing, and in these terms at least anti-humanist, camp
lie functionalist approaches derived from the work of Durkheim and
structuralist explanations such as that of Althusser. It is necessary to keep in
mind that this "structure / agency" debate is not simply that between an
,
individualism which sees society as reducible to the collective actions of the
individuals who compose it, and opposing views which hold that societies
have emergent properties of their own. Both sides of this older sociological
8 Anthony Giddens Central Problems in Social Theory. A debate which I have claimed
must be widened to include environmental structures. I use Praxis here in a narrow sense to
identify those positions, like Sartre's, which treat consciously directed human individual activity
as of primary importance, but who also hold a non- representational and dialectical
epistemology.
eDespite his anti-positivist epistemology, the scientistic leanings of his account of theory
means that Louis Althusser comes perilously close to replacing such a simple economic
reductionism with an equally deterministic and objectivist (though multi-level) structural
determinism. See chapter 3.
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debate share a common agenda insofar as they see human subjects as
objective 'givens' - they just differ on whether society ranks as an objective
entity in its own right. The structuralist, on the other hand, denies this
foundational premise, rejecting any concept of an eternal and universal
human subject. 10 The structure / agency debate, as formulated by Althusser,
goes beyond the humanist categories of the subjective and objective. It
would therefore be a mistake to view structures as objective entities which
cause the subject to act in particular ways. In economist and reductionist
accounts these structural relations are seen as objective qualities of society
and exert their influence through a strict social determinism. These positions
can be discounted for the purposes of the present argument as they simply
recapitulate humanist objectivism in a new guise.
In terms of morality, the structure / agency debate hinges on the type of
account which can be given of ethical values. Should we consider the
human individual to be the locus and origin of ethical values - the basic unit
to which all analysis of moral thought must return? Certainly it seems over-
ambitious for Althusser to deny this individual any explanatory role
whatsoever in a theory of cultural values. Simply defining the "subject" as a
product of bourgeois philosophy and constructing an alternative 'scientific'
discourse will not make her disappear. In its favour, an extreme anti-
humanist theory provides a welcome critique of the anthropocentric
metaphysics of humanism and subjective rationality. The subject is no
longer the autonomous producer of all "meaning", ''truth'' and "value", but
- lOThe anti-humanist metaphysic of Althusser's problematic challenges the very possibility
of positing ''foundations''. In this sense Althusser takes the structure /agency debate beyond
the naive objectivism of Levi-Strauss who envisages structures as the underlying grammar or
logic of society. See also the comments in chapter 9 on Pierre Bourdieu.
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becomes historicised - a figure created by the interpellation of the concrete
biological individual into the contingencies of modern Western society.
(Meaning, truth and values also become relational.) On the negative side,
this seems to relegate the individual human to a functional role within
society, leaving no scope for individual productivity; it also seems to fail to
provide an adequate account of the phenomenology of consciousness.
However, Althusser's anti-essentialist and anti-reductionist structuralism can
provide a solution to these apparent difficulties. The humanist account of
moral agency has two alternative explanations for values. They are either
subjective choices made by the agent and equivalent to personal
preferences, or alternatively they are objective and grounded in the ontology
of the world." The anti-humanist structuralist can avoid this problematic with
its interminable questions about the subjectivity or objectivity of values. I
shall argue that values should be seen as dispositions created in the on-
going process of the co-constitution of the subject and the world. The
concrete subject comes to assume her individuality and the values which
form a part of this individuality only through her practical relations with
society and the surrounding environment. Values are thus irreducibly
relational in their origins and intent. Once the humanist problematic is
overcome, the question of the subjectivity or objectivity of values becomes so
much metaphysical baggage to be discarded.
This chapter will address the question of how far the humanist subject retains
a metaphysical 'presence' in current theories of value formation and how far,
11 Obviously this does not entail that all systems of morality which are termed "relativisms"
are anti-foundational. Some forms of anthropological relativism which ground values in
"society" come to reify this aspect of the world as the ultimate analytic foundation of all values.
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if at all, this role can be justified in the light of the anti-humanist critique. The
question will be posed by first considering the concept of the subject as he
[sic] typically features in humanist philosophies, and then developing an anti-
humanist conception of the production of ethical values. Contrary to
humanist conceptions of ethical values we can, I claim, account for the
subject's values in terms of her place and engagement in particular
practices. This obviates the necessity to appeal either to "human nature", or
to natural objective qualities, and reduces the tendency to reduce values to
questions of "rational" choice and individual "free-will".
I shall give accounts of two different attempts to overcome humanist moral
theory. The first, that of the Existential ethics of Jean Paul Sartre. Sartre
develops a phenomenological conception of the subject which avoids a
naive humanist dichotomy between subject and object. However, his early
philosophy retains many of the features of a humanist problematic insofar as
it operates with a Promethean conception of the individual as creator of
herself and the world. I show how, to some extent at least, he overcomes this
drawback in his later philosophy which almost comes to take on the air of an
,
anti-humanism. I then turn to Charles Taylor's communitarian ethics which
argues that ethical values are necessarily inter-subjective in their appeal to
social norms. However, I claim that Taylor is too wedded to a humanist
perspective. First, in restricting his account to the agent's utilisation of moral
concepts rather than the deeper operations of ideology which remain
unrecognised by but are nonetheless constitutive of the conscious subject.
Second, in arguing for a distinction between ethics and personal
preferences, he actually maintains in the latter a sphere where the subject
remains completely autonomous and unconstrained.
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Humanism and Moral Autonomy
"The highest point attained by perceptual materialism, that is
materialism that does not comprehend sensuousness as practical
activity, is the view of separate individuals and civic society." 12
This conception which Marx criticises is one which portrays society as
composed of atomistic individuals each consciously acting in their own
independent interests. Such individualism has been one of the central
features of the humanist philosophical paradigm, and today exerts its
foremost influence through its unquestioned acceptance in the field of
neoclassical economics. However (as chapter 2 has illustrated), its
influence is not confined to economics, but pervades every aspect of
Western society from our concepts of rationality to our ethical intuitions. In
the sociological terminology of Ferdinand Tonnies, this individualistic
society (Gesel/schaft) is an artificial conglomeration of egoists linked only by
an instrumental rationality. This is contrasted with community
(Gemeinschaft) whose members are linked organically by a shared moral
,
framework which has a cohesive function."
The humanist perceives the morally autonomous subject as the analytical
bedrock of society, ultimately responsible for both producing and choosing
her own values. Analytic philosophers have spilt a great deal of ink upon
the topics of "consciousness" and "identity", but this has tended to focus upon
delineating conceptual conditions necessary for their realisation rather than
12 Karl Marx 'Thesis on Feuerbach §g'
13Ferdinand Tonnies Community and Society. The demise of shared moral frameworks in
modern society is the central concern of the work of Alasdair Macintyre. See After Virtue.
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questioning the relation of these concepts to historical, environmental and
social conditions. Thus, so far as Peter Strawson is concerned, the concept
of a person as an autonomous and unified consciousness and body is part of
that
"...massive central core of human thinking which has no history - or
none recorded in the history of thought; there are categories and
concepts which, in their most fundamental character change not at
all." 14
Not all analytic philosophers would agree with Strawson that it is the concept
of a "person" is "logically prlrnitlve"." One has to guard against a tendency
to oversimplify and conflate accounts which even within mainstream
humanism have differed markedly in their emphases. But even more
detailed analyses frequently seem to suffer from a synchronistic and a-
contextual one-dimensionality. For example, Steven Lukes has recognised
no less than eleven "basic ideas of individualism", each emphasising
different aspects of person-hood. They comprise, ''the dignity of man" [sic],
"autonomy", "privacy", "self-development", the "abstract individual", and
"political", "economic", "religious", "ethical", "epistemological", and
,
"methodological individualism". According to Lukes there is no unitary
concept which can be labelled individualism - but rather a series of "distinct
unit-ideas (and intellectual traditions) which the use of the word has come to
conflate." 16 These "unit-ideas" all have their own sets of general conceptual
conditions associated with them.
14 Peter Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics p. 10. This is the
antithesis of a project like Foucault's who seeks to provide just such an history of changing
conceptions of the subject. See for example his three volume work on the history of sexuality.
15 Peter Strawson 'Persons' p. 402.
16 Steven Lukes Individualismp. x
314
Whilst Lukes' distinctions are informative, his approach has serious
drawbacks. Despite their differences, the conceptions of individuality he
recognises have all emerged in the context of European culture over the last
few hundred years. Their 'conflation' may not be a case of the analytical
oversights of past philosophers who have failed in their writings to
distinguish "unit-ideas" one from the other. Rather, it is more likely that these
conceptions are genuinely intertwined and even to a degree historically
indissociable because of their common genetic heritage and their mutual
interactions over centuries. Contrary to Lukes' assertions it may be that they
can only be understood by an examination of their relations to each other
and to the social formations of which they form a part. Whilst it is true that
individuality is not a single concept, the same might equally be said of Lukes'
own "unit-ideas". These categories do not, as Lukes seems to believe,
provide fundamental grounds for an understanding of all uses of the term
"individualism". For example, Luther's conception of the unit idea of
autonomy is not the same as that of Eric Fromm, nor Marx's the same as
Kant's. Each concept achieves its meaning through its relations to other
terms in a theoretical problematic which is, in turn, only at home in particular
I
historical and social conditions. Their similarities to each other arise from the
communality of their evolutionary environment, Le. the forms of life which
developed in modern Europe, and from the constant inter-breeding and
mixing of theoretical bloodlines, Le. the constant restructuring of one
problematic into another drawing upon the material available in related
traditions.
Lukes' one-dimensional approach is also evident in his treatment of the 'unit-
ideas' of individualism in philosophical isolation from how each concept of
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the self is supposed to articulate with the wider community. Insofar as he
does this one can only agree with him that his own analysis is a "map that is
radically incomplete." 17 If Althusser is even partially correct in his contention
that the autonomous human subject is inherently ideological, a conception
which only arises in particular historical conditions, then it cannot possibly be
understood in isolation from social and environmental factors.
Lukes is certainly not alone in wanting to distinguish types of autonomy.
Gerald Dworkin has pointed out great differences between analytic theorists
about exactly what constitutes autonomy. Indeed Dworkin stresses that
"About the only features held constant from one author to another are that
autonomy is a feature of persons and that it is a desirable quality to have." 18
These features may be identified as the core of the humanist position and
this chapter will throw doubt upon even such common-sense assumptions to
the extent that these are supposed to be universally true.
Central to the question of autonomy are the degrees and types of influences
upon the formation and expression of our moral values. How far are such
I
values the products of 'individual choice' and how far are they dependent
upon and determined by variables beyond the individual's control? Maria
Ossowska has compiled an impressive list of ways in which moral
phenomena have been counted as dependent variables." Although her
primary interest is in the influence of socia/determinants of moral values she
points out that there are a wide range of features which have been thought to
play at least a part in value formation. These factors include: the role of the
17 ibid., p. 158.
18Gerald Dworkin The Theory and Practice of Autonomyp. 6.
19Maria Ossowska Social Determinants of Moral Ideas chapter 2.
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physical environment, demographic factors like the the sex ratio of the
society, the state of population growth or decline, age ratios, the community's
spatial mobility etc., the state of industrialisation, whether the society is urban
or rural based, the type of government, the family structure, the society's
traditions and history, the division of labour, the role of that person within
society e.g. as bureaucrat or blue collar worker, religion, art, law, state of
knowledge, education etc. etc. All of these she claims have been held to
determine ethical values in at least some circumstances. Ossowska also
points out that any empirical or comparative study of these factors is
extremely difficult due to the way in which they interact with each other.
Perhaps the only safe thing to say is that it is impossible to make cross-
cultural universal generalisations about the degree of influence of such
factors.
However, according to the typical humanist account, the self comprises that
essential core which, despite all these possible 'external' influences,
remains untouched. These core features are, it is claimed, common to all
humans and have come to provide the largely unquestioned foundations of
,
humanist epistemology, sociology, ethics etc. These essential features are
also the very same ones used to delineate the human from the non-human,
acting as the necessary criteria that qualify one to enter the privileged
category of the human." Thus, for example, Daniel C. Dennett considers six
features, each of which he claims to be a necessarycondition of person-
hood. Unsurprisingly amongst these we find the oft repeated qualities of
rationality, of consciousness and of verbal communication." In the
20 See the discussion of this relation in the introduction.
21 Daniel C. Dennett Brainstormspp. 269-270.
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development of European humanist traditions these themes have become
inextricably linked with definitions (such as John Locke's) of humans as
"free, equal and independent". This gives us three interlocking themes
which occur throughout humanist accounts of the "subject".
1) Autonomy - the self as autonomous; a unitary bounded being usually
possessing "free will" and a commensurate degree of responsibility for her
actions."
2) Rationality - the self as rational; capable of making independent logical
decisions using a rational faculty.
3) Transparency - the self as a conscious being where reasoning is seen as
a process which is directed by and transparent to the reasoner.
Given the privileged position this autonomous subject is accorded, it is
perhaps unsurprising that, so far as ethics is concerned, some humanists
come to believe that the subject's only possible motivation for action must be
221 shall avoid, insofar as is possible, straying into the free-will / determinism debate in
philosophy. Obviously philosophical determinists might deny the existence of free-will i.e. the
possibility of the subject making decisions that are not preordained by what has gone before.
However, by and large determinists still maintain a distinction between internaland external
causation, thus maintaining the boundaries of the subject even if the subject is now seen only
as the most proximate cause of any action. This is also true of those philosophers like Hume
(perhaps the majority) who promote a form of compatibilism. The structure / agency debate is
fought over a different theoretical territory - namely whether the key to sociological
understanding e.g. of moral values, lies in a theory of social organisation and social practices or
in an exhumation of the qualities inherent in individuals.
Perhaps a thoroughgoing determinism might be counted as anti-humanist insofar as it
does try to remove one of the humanist barriers between humanity and nature - that which
decrees the natural world a sphere of determinate action and the human indeterminate.
However, one should note that a thoroughgoing indeterminacy has exactly the same effect.
A second closely related field of philosophical debate revolves around the concept of
Akrasia - or weakness of the will. Again I shall not touch directly upon this debate, but see
Justin Gosling Weakness of Will for an overview.
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the furtherance of her own goals. Certain humanist ethical theories
encapsulate the three themes above and add only the unsavoury Hobbesian
proviso that people only use their rational faculties in what they see as their
own self-interest. Thus, for example, modern "game theory", taking its lead
from utilitarian and classical economics, sees 'rational self-interest' as the
undisputable and central feature of human nature. The individual calculates
the costs and benefits of her every action so as to maximise benefit to
herself." That the general qualities of person-hood which analytic
philosophy has 'uncovered' should be identical to those posited by
neoclassical economists comes as no surprise to those who see both of
these approaches as the inevitable end result of the progressive working out
of that "subjective rationality" which Horkheimer and Adorno so vividly
describe." Ironically, this individualistic philosophy both depends upon and
promotes a view of human subjects as essentially identical to each other. As
Max Horkheimer put it
"The Monad, a seventeenth-century symbol of the atomistic economic
individual of bourgeois society, became a social type. All the monads,
isolated though they were by moats of self-interest, nevertheless
,
tended to become more and more alike through the pursuit if this very
self-interest." 25
Horkheimer rejects this reductionist and impoverished conception, arguing
that we are imbued with values which are not expressions of an underlying
human nature but are socially constituted. This is true even of those values
231nthis context, the presence of the absolutely autonomous and self-interested subject
undermines "altruism" which has been thought by many to be central to ethics.
24 See chapter 2.
25 Max Horkheimer Eclipse of Reason p. 139.
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normally associated with the concept of individuality itself.
"The absolutely isolated individual has always been an illusion. The
most esteemed personal qualities, such as independence, will to
freedom, sympathy and the sense of justice, are social as well as
individual virtues." 26
That Horkheimer's critique of subjective rationality and his analysis of moral
valuation are pertinent can, I believe, be illustrated by the way that even
philosophers in the humanist traditions have found the need to give social
features due weight in constituting individuals' values. In a very real sense
this anthropological and linguistic turn in philosophy has been motivated by
analytic philosophy's need to defend the territory of ethics as its own subject
matter. Since the conception of "economic man" is identical with that of post-
enlightenment humanist philosophy, and since economic theory provides a
simple calculus ideally suited to present bureaucratic structures, there seems
no a priori case for maintaining ethics as an independent area of
philosophical study. Moral decisions could be left for economists and game
theoreticians to decide. Thus, those within analytic philosophy who are
unhappy with this narrow conception of the human subject and the
,
consequent loss of philosophical prestige can find themselves, to a degree
at least, making common cause with proponents of an Althusserian
conception of ideology in rejecting the absolutely autonomous subject. This
necessitates a movement away from describing autonomy in terms of
general qualities common to all individual subjects and towards
explanations of values in terms of the individual's place in relation to already
given structures of language, meaning and forms of life. I now turn to an
examination of the development of this anti-humanist shift as it relates to
26ibid., p.13S.
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moral autonomy, and its consequences for a theory of value production.
shall first examine the early humanist philosophy of Sartre and then return to
his later almost anti-humanist position via Taylor's communitarian critique of
his work.
Sartre and the promethean Conception of Moral Autonomy
Chapter six discussed and criticised what was termed the Promethean
conception of human society. This social Prometheanism also finds its
expression at the level of the individual "subject". The early work of Jean-
Paul Sartre provides the most obvious target for such criticism. Sartre
explicitly defines himself as a humanist, yet I shall argue that this by no
means associates him with all of the characteristics listed in chapter 2.27 For
example, Sartre certainly does not hold a Cartesian picture of the subject /
object distinction. Nonetheless he does operate in his early work with a
parallel dichotomy which, although based in a phenomenological
epistemology, still retains an anthropocentric and individualistic bias. Sartre
deconstructs the abstract humanist subject but retains a concept of the
individual as the active centre and creator of values and the world. In his
early philosophy at least Sartre invokes an individual Prometheanism which
parallells the traditional Marxist and productivist Prometheanism. I shall,
however, argue that to some extent the later philosophy of his Critique of
Dialectical Reason overcomes this anthropocentrism.
27 Which in turn exemplifies the importance of not running together all the aspects of
humanism as if they formed part of a unified and essentially identical platform.
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Sartre's humanist and existentialist philosophy is exemplified in the following
quotation from his Existentialism and Humanism.
"Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the
first principle of existentialism. And this is what people call its
"subjectivity," using the word as a reproach against us. But what do
we mean to say by this, but that man primarily exists - that man is,
before all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is
aware that it is doing so. Man is indeed, a project which possesses a
subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a
cauliflower. Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even
in the heaven of intelligence; ...." 28
This statement emphasises the notion of the autonomous self-reflective
individual, that 'subjective life' which Sartre regards as so radically distinct
from the other 'objects' of living nature, from fungi or mosses; a subject who
through her phenomenological experience may construct an ontology of the
world but who always retains an ability to distance herself from current
phenomenal experience, to reflexively bring her own subjectivity to bear on
that world and determine her own future.
Following Husserl, Sartre's subject is a phenomenological consciousness -
a consciousness which is always intentional Le. consciousness of
something. Phenomena are the foundations of Sartre's epistemology, they
are the irreducible basis of thought comprising a dialectical unity of object
and subject, a composite achieved through an active involvement in the
28 Jean-Paul Satre Existentialism and Humanism p. 28. It's French title is even more explicit
in revealing Sartre's allegiances - "Existentialism is a Humanism".
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world, Le. individual praxis. This consciousness is transparent to itself, Le.
capable of self-reflection, just as the Cartesian thinker is able to establish her
presence by reflecting upon her own thoughts. Sartre, however, wishes to
avoid the subjective idealism of Descartes and claims that there is no special
immaterial ingredient, or soul, which can be identified with the subject; no
lingering presence behind the individual's phenomenological experiences.
Whilst utilising Husserl's phenomenological epistemology which sees the
world and the self as co-constituted through practical activity, Sartre rejects
entirely Husserl's concept of the pure self as a phenomenological equivalent
of Descartes homunculus-like subject."
Nevertheless Sartre's wish to defend an absolute freedom for the human
individual necessitates that he posit a special role for the subject - a
particular form of being not found in the rest of the natural world. He
develops a distinction between "Being-for-Itself" and "Being-in-Itself". The
former is the kind of conscious awareness attainable by humans, the latter is
the unconscious and deterministic existence of non-human nature. Thus
despite his critique of the Cartesian problematic he retains one of the primary
humanist distinctions, that of an absolute gulf between humanity and nature.
He simply redefines this distinction at a different level, that of consciousness
rather than substance." In this sense at least Sartre is guilty of recapitulating
20 See Jean-Paul Sartre The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of
Consciousness.
30 David E. Cooper holds that 'The Existentialist' dissolves [humanist] dichotomies
between subject and object. He argues that Sartre's own distinctions are not dualistic as
"...the term dualism is generally, and reasonably restricted to distinctions between kinds of
entities that are alleged to exist in logical independence from each other." Ex;stential;smp.
79. Even if we grant, on these terms, that Sartre's distinction between the pour-so; and the
en-so! is not strictly speaking a substance dualism it nonetheless represents an absolute and
a-historical dichotomy which in the terms outlined in chapter 2 is also indubitably humanist.
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this fundamental humanist dichotomy.
"For Sartre and Weber the world is constituted by two dimensions of
being: matter and consciousness, or things and human values. The
world of things is externally determined by causal laws. The world of
consciousness, on the other hand, resists such determination." 31
In Sartre's early philosophy this conscious subject maintains an absolute
freedom of choice entirely unconstrained by external circumstance. The
ability to choose freely is rooted in the ability of consciousness to experience
absence - to desire what is not present. This ability to generate its own
alternatives is necessary if it is to consider future goals, actions or values
which are at all different from those determined by the current situation. The
special feature of consciousness is its inherent quality of producing its own
desires, in its ability to exist for-itself (pour-sol). According to Sartre the non-
human world has no such ability - it exists entirely in-itself (en-sol).
"One must be conscious in order to choose, and one must choose in
order to be conscious. Choice and consciousness are one and the
same thing." 32
Sartre thinks that those who deny this essential human attribute - who
pretend that their actions are predetermined by circumstances outside of
31 Gila J. Hayim The Existential Philosophy of Jean-Paul Satre p. 23.
32 Jean-Paul Sartre Being and Nothingness p. 462. However Sartre's concept of
consciousness includes what might be termed preconscious decisions, ones which are not
brought before the tribunal of the reflective mind but which are conscious in a more tenuous
sense of belonging to us, Le. it is we and no one else who acts in a particular case. This
emphasis on consciousness is thus different from distinctions made by philosophers in the
analytic tradition, like Harry Frankfurt, who discuss human autonomy in terms of first and
second order desires. (See below) See Richard Bernstein's discussion of Being-for-Itself in
Praxis and Acfion pp. 134-148 especially p. 141.
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their own control - are guilty of "bad faith" in trying to exist as 'hings" rather
than humans." We cannot escape the necessity to choose. Although the
options open to us are in some sense limited by nature or historical and
social circumstance, which are a part of the 'facticity' of our situation, our
choice itselfis undetermined by externalities, it is always our own." Not only
is our ability to choose unaffected by external nature, but Sartre also
categorically denies the existence of any fixed human nature, the individual's
existence always precedes her essence. There is thus no sense in which
the individual's autonomy is compromised by either an external or an
internal nature.
"...man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world -
and defines himself afterwards ...he will be what he makes of
33 Sartre is also critical of what he refers to as the "spirit of seriousness". One aspect of this
is that those concerned refuse to take responsibility for their values - a pertinent example of
this might be those philosophers who see values as absolute properties of certain types of
objects e.g. the kind of essentialist humanist arguments for intrinsic values in nature criticised
in chapter 2. Another example is the positivist attitude still so current in the natural sciences
which regards its theories as value-free.
34 Although I cannot hope to do justice here to the complexities of existentialist thought in
general or give a detailed exposition of Sartre's philosophy, I support the widely held view that
there is a radical change of emphasis betWeen the earlier Being and Nothingness and the
later Critique of Dialectical Reason. The later work is much more influenced by Marxism and
takes greater account of the material circumstances in which the individual finds herself. (See
below.) Hayim has expressed this difference as follows. "In Being and Nothingnessfreedom
is a radical condition resting on the ontological status of man qua man. In the Critique, the
concept of freedom appears as an historical condition, qualified by the constrictions of human
affiliation, social obligation, material scarcity and so forth. But, common to both usages is the
human prerogative for transcendence, that is, for the surpassing of the given." Hayim op. cit.,
n.31 above, p. 16. I would argue that the difference is even more pronounced than Hayim
suggests and that, in some respects at least, Sartre's later philosophy actually comes close to
renouncing this claim to transcendence.
Leo Fretz argues that there is also a change within Sartre's early works between the
impersonal cog ito of the Transcendence of the Ego and the personal consciousness of
Being and Nothingness. See "Individuality in Sartre's Philosophy".
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himself.'?"
For Sartre, the human individual is, in all cases, free either to transcend or to
passively accept the constraints imposed upon her by the ideology of her
own culture and history; that ideology formed as a result of past decisions by
other individuals. Her ''form of life" is necessarily relative to that culture, but
whatever she might do she cannot escape the fact that it was her and her
alone who made those decisions which circumscribe her relations to that
culture. The force of circumstances does not absolve one of the need to
choose, for one can always transcend those circumstances. All action, even
that of conforming to societal norms, is viewed as the result of a choice. For
this reason, conformity itself cannot be decried on moral grounds, only the
pretence to have no choice but conformity. The grounds for claiming
humanity's difference from a cauliflower do not lie, as the Enlightenment
philosophers would have it, in a universal human nature or a transcendent
rationality, but only in the very fact that the human has an inborn ability to
make self-reflective choices, an ability that is part and parcel of what it is to
exist humanly. Of course, put like this it seems that Sartre is actually
engaged in an intellectual sleight of hand for, in reality, he claims that in all
places and at all times human subjects can be defined by this very ability to
choose. If this is the case then, despite his protestations to the contrary,
Sartre simply introduces a new and different conception of human nature
rather than rejecting all such claims. To be sure, this new conception is of
little use in providing that set of normative and objective moral values which
many Enlightenment philosophers had hoped to find. Indeed it gives no
35 Sartre op. cn., n. 28 above, p. 28. This work is widely regarded as a rather oversimplified
account of Sartre's early position and so despite its explicitly humanist thesis is used here only
in conjunction with other material.
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specific moral guidance at all except insofar as it proclaims the ultimate
inescapability of individual choice. But this moral subjectivism is precisely
where its humanism lies, for in Sartre's early philosophy the structures of
language are held to make no difference to the subject's ability to choose.
One cannot make a rational choice or a good choice: the only virtue lies in
exercising one's ability to choose and here we have no freedom at all - since
to decide not to choose is itself a form of choice.
There are obviously several aspects of Sartre's arguments which are of
direct relevance to the debate over humanism and anti-humanism. First, as
we have seen, Sartre's theoretical position is emphatic about the existence
of an essential dividing line between humanity and nature, despite the fact
that he explicitly criticises the view that there is an essential human nature
and the subject / object divide of classical humanism. The second aspect is
Sartre's conception of the autonomous subject, his Promethean view of
human praxis. Sartre continually refers to the human individual as the
"author" of his situation, who "defines himself" and "propels himself"
forwards.
The Sartrean subject is a series of intentional phenomena which synthesise
a unified but mythical identity through directing her intentions inwards, Le.
through developing a second order intentionality. But it is surely wrong to
move from this conception to the claim that this bundle of phenomena, united
by acts of reflexivity, can simply create itself and the phenomenal world.
Self-reflexivity is not the same as self-creation, and it is precisely this self-
creation that Sartre's radical autonomy requires. Even if we agree that
reflexivity is an active process through which we can change our
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understanding of ourselves and the world, a process which would include
changing our values, this does not mean that it is the only source of such
change.
We might agree that the practical activity which the human individual
engages in influences her experience of the world and modifies her own
relations to that world. But Sartre, having made the epistemologiealdecision
to bracket the existence of the world and subject and concentrate upon their
phenomenology, seems to make the mistake of making phenomena in
general and human consciousness in particular the only ontological source
of meaningful activity. That is, he is guilty of eliding the view that we can
know nothing of the self and the world in isolation from each other into the
claim that this co-constituted knowledge is a (the) self-contained source of
dialectical activity. This is both anthropocentric and mistaken, in precisely
the same way that Promethean Marxism was mlstaken." Sartre's
anthropocentric humanism means that the "For-itself" is seen as the
mysterious origin of everything that appears significant to consciousness.
!
From the point of view of the humanism / anti-humanism debate (which in
this case is also the structure / agency debate) the most important question is
how far the existential subject can make choices that are undetermined by its
environment and past history. In Sartre's terms this revolves around the
'facticity' of the person: "..the For-itself's necessary connection with the In-
38 The similarity between the Promethean Marxism identified in the last chapter and
Existentialist claims is exemplified in the following quotation from Jose Ortega y Gasset.
'What we call nature ...or the world is essentially nothing buta conjunction of favourable
and adverse conditions encountered by man ...[it] has no being ... independent of us ; it
consists exclusive/yin presenting facilities and difficulties ... in respect of our aspirations."
Quoted in Cooper op. cit., n. 32 above, p. 66.
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Itself, hence with the world and its own past." 37 How far is the person able to
produce her own desires, rather than simply consuming and then
reproducing those of her surrounding social environment?
Sartre holds that people are necessarily completely autonomous. This
seems to suggest that each individual starts the human project anew,
choosing from unlimited options. Given the many factors which might seem
to affect our potential actions, the biological, the social, and our own past
decisions, this seems a very incautious statement indeed. But one should
always hold in mind that this does not refer to an ability to do as we wish but
rather to an ability to make choices. So, for example, we are not free to
change past events in our lives, but we are never (until death) simply the in-
itself of this past - we can decide to give this past whatever meanings we
wish and to completely change our direction in life. According to Sartre our
situation never compromises our inherent freedom to choose.
However, when Sartre makes claims such as that the French people "...were
never more free than under the Nazi occupation" 38 one begins to doubt the
applicability of his theories to real life. As Soper points out "..Sartre's theory
of the absoluteness of human freedom obliterates ordinary distinctions
between "voluntary" and "involuntary" action and therefore belittles the status
of those limited but concrete freedoms which we aspire to protect and
enlarge." 39
Sartre is also ultimately unsuccessful in his attempt to move the debate
37 Sartre op. cit., n. 32 above, p. 631.
38 Quoted in Rene Lafarge Jean-Paul Satre: His Philosophyp. 79.
3e Kate Soper Humanism and Anti-humanismp. 67.
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about human consciousness to a different plane from that of Descartes; that
is, he retains a humanist conception of a Promethean consciousness
occupying a privileged position outside of material constraints. Obviously,
Sartre does not accept Descartes radical divide between subject and object;
he holds that "[a]1Iconsciousness is consciousness of something and at the
same time self-consciousness." 40 However, insofar as he wants to allow self-
consciousness the freedom to create whatever meaning it wishes from the
phenomenology of consciousness (which to avoid idealism has to be a
dialectical relation between the human and non-human aspects of the world,
not simply the For-itself imposing taxonomies and values willy-nilly) self-
conscious choice exists in a radical void. That is insofar as he is successful
in arguing for radical free choice, the Sartrean self is no longer a unity but
becomes divided into one aspect which reflects upon its own
phenomenology and possibilities - the For-itself - and one which is an
indivisible amalgam of the material world as apprehended through material
individual praxis, The only uniting factor to these aspects of consciousness
is the act of reflection itself and this relies upon the transparency of thought
and feeling to the reflecting subject. In other words Sartre can only be
,
successful in retaining the subject's moral autonomy to the degree that he
rejects the implications of his phenomenological epistemology and leaves
his self-conscious self, the process of free choice, floating, unconnected to
the world, in much the same manner as the Cartesian soul.
Charles Taylor points to a further, but related, problem which he believes
Sartre faces: that "....moral dilemmas become inconceivable on the theory of
40 Hazel E. Barnes 'sartre's Ontology' p. 19.
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radical choice." 41
"Either we take seriously the kinds of consideration that weigh in our
decisions, and then we are forced to recognise that these are for the
most part evaluations which do not issue from radical choice; or else
we try at all costs to keep our radical choice independent of any such
considerations ....but then it becomes a simple expression of
preference, and if we go further and try to make it independent even of
our de facto preferences, then we fall into a criteria-less trap which
cannot properly be described as a choice at all." 42
Insofar as Taylor sees ethical values as tied to linguistic concepts which are
always communally inspired, he rejects those accounts which see values as
the products of an entirely personal quest. The individual is orientated
within a framework of conceptual dichotomies which exist prior to, facilitate
and place constraints upon her evaluations. She cannot simply create her·
ethical values. Taylor thus places himself in opposition to those Existential
conceptions of ethics which emphasise the radical freedom of individual
choice. Taylor holds that we must, as humans, engage in strong evaluations
I
and that these form the background against which we posit our own
identities. As human individuals we orientate our conception of our selves
by appealing to a preexisting communally formulated language of
evaluation. A morally autonomous being, such as Sartre posits, would be a
contradiction in terms since to have a moral identity is necessary to conceive
of oneself as already in the moral environment of a particular society. In this
respect Taylor's criticism can be seen as a more limited version of the
41 Charles Taylor 'What is Human Agency' p. 30.
42 ibid., p. 33.
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critique of individual Prometheanism - a version limited to the content of a
moral vocabulary rather than one which includes other aspects of ideological
influences. It is to Taylor and his fellow communitarian thinkers that we now
turn.
The Communitarian CritiQue of the Impoyerished Self
The current debate between communitarian and liberal conceptions of
morality centres around the autonomy of the human subject." I shall first
outline the differences between liberal and communitarian perspectives with
regard to their different conception of the subject and ethical values.
Communitarian critics of ethical liberalism and its attendant conception of
moral autonomy include such figures as Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel,
Alasdair Macintyre and Charles Taylor. There are distinct differences
between the approaches of these thinkers, but I shall not enter into these
differences here.44 I shall focus for current purposes upon the work of
Charles Taylor, who has made the possibility of autonomy central to his
thesis, and make only passing reference to others. Using Taylor as an
example, I attempt to show how his communitarian thought frequently relies
upon the very same subject / object and fact / value distinctions found in
humanist liberalism. That is, I claim that Taylor is actually tied very closely to
a humanist problematic which in many respects he successfully rejects. In
the subsequent section I return to Sartre's later attempts to avoid his earlier
43 The themes of rationality and the transparency of thought identified above as central to
the humanist conception of the subject also have important roles to play, but see below.
UBut see Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift Liberals and Communitarians. See also Michael
Sandel Liberalism and the Limits of Justice and Macintyre op. cit., n.13 above.
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Promethean humanism."
The main target of all of these communitarian thinkers has been the liberal
(and humanist) conception of the self relied upon by John Rawls in his
influential A Theory of Justice" In Seyla Benhabib's words,
"The Communitarians criticise the epistemic standpoint of the
Enlightenment on the grounds that this standpoint and liberal political
philosophies which proceed from it presuppose an incoherent and
impoverished conception of the human self." 47
Based upon the features which Mulhall and Swift identify in Sandel's critique
of the liberal individual we can extract three aspects of the communitarian
critique; 'liberalism's' impoverished conception of the self, its atomism and its
reduction of moral values to personal preferences."
First, Sandel argues that Rawls' account of the individual excludes many of
the features which we view as constitutive of individuality and is thus both
impoverished and unrealistic. Most importantly, it does not recognise the
constitutive role values playas inherent characteristics of a person's
individuality. In providing an account of the just society Rawls imagines a
scenario where humans meet behind a "veil of ignorance" to decide the form
as That Sartre's rejection of Cartesian dualism in favour of a phenomenological
epistemology is not, by itself, enough to overcome his humanist tendencies emphasises the
importance of not having a naive and essentialist definition of "humanism" as a set of features
which are always present together .
• 6 John Rawls A Theory of Justice .
• 7 Seyla Benhabib Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in
Contemporary Ethics p. 71 .
• 8 Mulhall & Swift op. cit. , n. 44 above, p. 4.
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of a future society of which they will be part. The parties concerned know
almost nothing about themselves, their future stations in that society or their
abilities, thus they can have no personal bias about what form the society
should take. The individuals concerned are all presumed to be self-
interested and rational. "In choosing between principles each tries as best
he can to advance his interests." 411 But the very fact that all factors which
might introduce bias have been removed in effect makes them all identical.
Given this identity it is hardly surprising that they are able to come to an
agreement about the just society. As Rawls states "...it is clear that since the
differences amongst parties are unknown to them, and everyone is equally
rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments." 50
In other words what started as a theory for expressing intuitions about social
justice between individuals, ends by appealing to a subjective rationality
which can only operate insofar as it suppresses the very factors which make
people different subjects.
The Rawlsean individual in its impersonal absoluteness has been stripped of
the very features which allow us to recognise humans as individuals, for
example, their disparate conceptions of "the good". Rawls assumes that any
system of morals in a pluralistic society must be organised so that it remains
neutral towards such competing conceptions. In contrast communitarians
argue that to assume that people can simply put to one side these
differences is to ignore the subject matter of morality.
The debate between communitarians and deontological liberals like Rawls is
40 Rawls op. cit., n. 45 above, p. 142.
50 ibid., p. 139.
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frequently characterised as one about the priority of "the right" or "the good".
Rawls' claim that a system of justice needs to abstain from sanctioning any
particular conception of the good leads him to ground his system of justice in
terms of the rights which would be allocated by and to people independently
of such conceptions. This supposedly neutral stance thus depends upon a
very thin concept of the human self, one which is precisely that of humanism,
i.e. an autonomous, rational, self-interested subject. Communitarians thus
claim that, far from being neutral, such a conception denies the constitutive
role of society in producing a "subject" which we would actually recognise as
a human being. Amongst the vital ingredients missing is the community's
role in the production of ethical values. These socially derived values are,
the communitarian claims, necessary for the person to engage in any form of
debate about justice. Hence the good is seen as prior to the right. So far as
is possible I shall avoid couching the debate in terms of the right and the
good because, as Benhabib points out, there is no necessary link between
holding a deontological position and one's conception of the self. For
example Jurgen Habermas could be classified as a deontologist, but he
certainly does not share the liberal's concept of moral autonomy" I shall
therefore restrict my analysis to the implications of the debate for the
production and reproduction of values in the wider terms of humanism and
anti-humanism.
This leads us to the second communitarian claim, namely, as the above
account might suggest, that Rawls is tied to an "asocial individualism", i.e.
the subject is treated as a fundamental given logically prior to her immersion
in society rather than a product of that immersion. Third, and closely tied to
S1 Seyla Benhabib op. cit., n. 47 above, pp. 72 -73.
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these two previous points, communitarians like Taylor claim that liberal
individualism provides no adequate grounds for distinguishing between
moral values and personal preferences. That is, the liberal comes to see all
values as subjective in the sense that they are regarded as the expression of
subjective desires.
These three features are obviously very closely aligned with what critical
theorists have termed subjective or instrumental rationality. (See chapter 1.)
There are strong similarities between the critical theorists' account of modern
society and communitarians' critique of liberalism in morals. Both reject the
liberal humanist subject and her absolute moral autonomy and both see
society and the individual as co-constitutive.
"Communitarianism and contemporary critical social theory share
some fundamental epistemological principles and political views. The
rejection of a-historical and atomistic conceptions of self and society is
common to both, as is the critique of the loss of public spiritedness and
participatory politics in contemporary society." 52
There are also links between communitarians and certain environmentalist
theses. Alasdair Macintyre, in particular, shares a nostalgia for the
valuational certainties of pre-modern societies, based in relatively stable and
52 ibid., p. 70. As we saw in chapter 1 the concept of the autonomous subject was seen by
Weber and the Frankfurt School as one product of the impact of the process of
"rationalisation", the development in modern times of a "subjective rationality" which
separated fact from value and consequently resulted in the disenchantment of the 'objective'
world. The communitarian critique of this humanist notion of the morally autonomous
individual goes some way towards deconsttucting the subject I object dichotomy. Benhabib
states, '1i]n their critique of modernity and liberalism communitarians and postmodernists
unwittingly echo many of the themes of the first generation of Frankfurt School thinkers and
especially the works of Adorno and Horkheimer ..." ibid., p. 69.
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unchanging forms of life, with those environmentalists like Jim Cheney who
see the much vaunted concept of "progress" as illusory. These parallells will
be made explicit in the next chapter, but for the present one should note that
both claim that the fragmentation which marks modern society has destroyed
our sense of community and shared values." Insofar as communitarians,
critical theorists and deep ecologists criticise the humanist conception of the
autonomous self and the reduction of all values to subjective values, they are
all aligned with a theoretical anti-humanism.
Taylor and Macintyre conceive of communities as unified by a shared ethical
ethos or by a shared telos. This conception is, as I argue in the next chapter,
too restrictive and potentially destructive of many of our currently held values.
It belittles the many positive features of modern societies including their
relatively tolerant attitudes toward those with different moral values." We
should recognise that communities need not be monolithic and need not
require that their members share essential features or hold identical values,
but need to recognise differences as well as similarities. A multiplicity of
communities might co-exist nested one within another, each sharing a variety
of aspects of their respective forms of life however these are constituted.
Communities are not only found but might be built. They need not be
restricted to the human but could include the non-human."
S3 See chapter 7.
54 Of course this tolerance is otten only rhetorical rather than practical. However it is
nonetheless important to recognise that different conceptions of the good do need to
coexist.
ss See chapter 9.
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Taylor. Ethics and Personal Preferences
In emphasising the importance of social and environmental structures in
determining the subject and her values the anti-humanist should not be read
as denying human effectivity or underestimating the importance of
individuals' reflective choices upon their values. Rather, a sophisticated
anti-humanism attempts to show the contingent nature of the debate
between individualism and communitarianism. (The implications of this
contingency are further explored in chapter s.) The debate is not to be
understood in terms of the triumph or defeat of individualism at the hands of
anti-humanism. Rather, anti-humanism, properly understood, actively
implies that such solutions are not possible in any absolute terms. I argue
that the social (and environmental) formation must be understood as
including the ability of humans to engage in critical thought, and to not simply
reproduce prevalent ideology.
Thus one cannot simply ignore the existence of conscious self-reflection, of
each individual's potentially unique role as a locus and proximate origin of
discourse and action. But, this recognition must not lead either to the
reification of these factors as essential features of human nature or to
Promethean theories which come to see consciousness as a self-contained
and autonomous process, a process which occurs entirely within a world of
transparent thought.
Charles Taylor's import lies in his attempt to theoretically accommodate
human agency within the wider structure of communally shared language
and to determine the import of this structure for morality. However, as will
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become obvious, I believe that he utilises philosophical distinctions which
reinstate in a different way the categories of the autonomous subject and of
objective values. These categories, despite their anthropological bent, retain
the structure of the humanist problematic. Indeed, as we shall see, Taylor
comes to delineate the moral sphere entirely in relation to these categories.
In Taylor's case the moral sphere comes to attain 'objectivity' in its grounding
in social taxonomies of value made explicit in shared linguistic concepts
whilst the subject retains absolute autonomy in her personal preferences;
those largely unconscious and unspoken dispositions which appeal to
criteria no broader than her own feelings.
The following critique of Taylor's attempt to make an a-historical distinction
between personal preferences and ethical values should be taken in the
light of my broad agreement with the anti-humanist ethos of the
communitarian project. My objection to such a distinction is two-fold. First,
that it is arbitrary to the extent that the features which he recognises as
characteristics of ethical valuation are frequently associated with personal
preferences and vice-versa. There are, I claim, no features which will allow
one to make such an absolute distinction. Second, that Taylor seems to be
working with two distinct conceptions of the human subject. To the extent
that he allows the individual a complete autonomy where personal
preferences are concerned he pictures the subject in terms of a humanist
liberal individualism." To the extent that, where ethics are concerned, the
individual must be engaged with the language and values of a wider
community he seems to hold a dialectical and anti-essentialist conception of
58WiII Kymlica 'Communitive Critics of Liberalism' has argued in a similar vein that, despite
their claims, communitarians frequently do assume that the subject exists prior to her ends.
She is not just constituted by her position in respect of the wider community.
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the subject.
In a seminal paper Harry Frankfurt claimed that the distinguishing feature of
human subjects was their possession of second order desires Le. desires
whose objects are themselves desires.
"In my view that one essential difference between persons and other
creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will ... It seems to
be particularly characteristic of humans, that they are able to form
what I shall call "second order desires" .;." 57
Frankfurt envisages humans as beings capable of self-reflection, possessing
an inherent ability to evaluate their own desires. But can Frankfurt's concept
of the moral subject as a self-reflexive autonomous agent support a
distinction between humanity and nature which it is intended to foster? What
exactly is supposed to be so special about second order desires?
According to Frankfurt, desires of the first order are "...simply desires to do or
not to do one thing or another." 58 Having a second order desire is not
equivalent to making decisions between competing desires. Frankfurt.
admits that animals other than humans frequently choose which of two
competing desires to act upon, for example when deciding between different
sources of nutrition. According to Frankfurt, when an animal chooses to do
something it does so only as a result of an unreflective ordinal ranking of first
order desires. The animal does not have the capability "...to want to have (or
not to have) certain desires." 59 This ability to evaluate our desires is
supposedly part of the structure of the human mind and is what makes us
57 Harry Frankfurt 'Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person' p. 6.
58 ibid., p. 7.
5i ibid., p. 6.
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free and other animals detsrmlnlstlc." This general humanist position is
integral to the work of a number of analytic philosophers such as Gerald
Dworkin and including Charles Taylor, all of whom share the belief that only
humans can be properly regarded as agents capable of moral evaluation."
A question arise as to how could one fill out the concept of "second order
desires" without assuming the very distinction between humans and animals
that it is supposed to prove. This seems possible only if we count a choice
as "second order" if, and only if, the subject makes a conscious end
reflective decision. That is, the subject is expected, in the 'transparency' of
her own thought, to bring to mind various alternative actions and desires,
and reflect upon their relative merits and demerits before taking any
particular course. Only when she does this is she acting as an autonomous
human being. But then why is it that we believe that animals are incapable
of this reflective autonomy? Frankfurt does not consider this question directly
but it seems that he would provide an explanation in terms of animals lack of
conceptus/ability. Animals cannot conceptualise their desires ss desires
and hence cannot choose between them on 'rational' grounds. This in turn
shows how Frankfurt's position can be linked to other features commonly
held to discriminate the human from the natural - namely the distinction
between reason and feelings and the supposedly unique ability of humans
to use language.
According to Donald Davidson "propositional attitudes", amongst which one
would include even first order desires, necessarily utilise language.
10 "It is only because a person has volitions of the second order that he is capable of both
enjoying and of lacking freedom of the will." ibid., p. 14.
81 Gerald Dworkin 'The Concept of Autonomy'.
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Davidson concludes that only creatures with language can be genuinely
said to possess thouqhts." There is an implicit humanist communality
between Davidson's and Frankfurt's positions. Even if they differ about
where to draw the line between human and animal (Le. whether genuine first
order desires require language) they both agree that some form of
conceptualisation is a distinguishing feature of human thought and, if
Davidson is right, this requires a language. We shall return to the
importance of the linguistic medium later, but for now we should note that,
like Frankfurt, Taylor believes that the "...capacity to evaluate desires is
bound up with our power of self-evaluation, which in turn is an essential
feature of the mode of agency we recognise as human." 83 The possession
of second-order desires is a necessary criterion of being human. However
Taylor wishes to make a further distinction amongst second order desires,
namely between those which are simply personal preferences and those
which involve decisions on the grounds of the comparative worth of first
order desires.
Taylor believes that the the ability to evaluate ''the worth of different desires"
is the important distinguishing feature of moral choice" and that this
evaluation proceeds by relating desires to contrastive distinctions like "good"
and "evil". Taylor points out that these contrastive dichotomies can only be
utilised with reference to each other. One cannot have a concept of good
without the corresponding concept of evil.6s He refers to thoughts which
82Donald Davidson Truth and Interpretation chapter 11.
13 Charles Taylor 'What is Human Agency' p. 16. [My emphasis]
84 ibid .• p. 16.
85 The addition of new terms into a moral vocabulary effects on the meanings of the other
terms with which it articulates. in Althusserian terms it alters the moral "problematic" as a whole.
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involve these distinctions as "strong evaluations". These are contrasted with
"weak evaluations", or personal preferences. I decide between first order
desires on the grounds of personal preference when my decision depends
simply on what I feel like doing. To use Taylor's examples, I feel like taking a
holiday either in the North or the South or choosing one kind of pastry over
another. Thus although personal preferences can be second order desires
they do not appeal to qualitative distinctions about the 'worth' of my
motivations.
So, Taylor's position requires that moral judgments refer to 'concepts' which
are inevitably constructed through their membership of a common linguistic
community. Moral judgments necessarily require an appeal to a supra-
individual moral framework which brings with it its own presupposltlons."
The use of such frameworks might serve to provide options for, and
constraints on, the individual via an accepted and unquestioned ethical
taxonomy. Taylor insists that "... doing without frameworks is utterly
impossible for us; otherwise put, that the horizons within which we live our
lives and which make sense of them have to include strong qualitative
discriminations. Moreover, this is not just a contingently true psychological
fact about human beings ... Rather the claim is that living within such strongly
qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency ..." 67 This claim is, so far
as morality is concerned, the linguistic parauel at the level of consciousness
of Althusser's views on the inescapable nature of ideology in constituting
human subjects and hence is, in this sense at least, anti-humanist in its
6& This concept of working within a moral framework has been developed separately within
the field of environmental ethics by Andrew Brennan Thinking About Nature who uses it to
defend a sophisticated form of moral pluralism.
67 Charles Taylor Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity p. 27.
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orientation. (But see below.)
The motivation behind Taylor's paper is a desire to exclude Utilitarianism
from the realm of genuine ethical theories. Taylor, quite rightly points out that
Utilitarianism hinges upon a thin conception of the autonomous individual
(and is therefore associated with a form of subjective rationality, although
Taylor does not use this term). However, if moral decisions cannot be made
by completely autonomous beings, but of necessity appeal to communally
derived criteria like "good" and "evil", then it would follow that Utilitarianism
can have no role to play in evaluating moral decisions. Decisions about right
or wrong would have to refer to communal norms.
Taylor's paper performs a vital function in exposing the inconsistencies of
utilitarianism and the inadequacy of its conception of the human individual.
One cannot, as the utilitarian claims, simply own one's own preferences and
moral opinions. Utilitarianism exemplifies the extension of 'subjective'
rationality into the moral sphere. It makes no appeal to inter-subjective
criteria in its moral evaluations, it simply sums the entirely subjective
preferences of those involved. As far as the utilitarian theorist is concerned
people's desires are all their own, Le. people are completely morally
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autonomous." But, as Taylor remarks "The complete utilitarian would be an
impossibly shallow character ...." 611 Their desires are completely lacking in
what Taylor refers to as "depth"."
The irony is that the "depth" which a person seems to have would on Taylor's
view be directly proportional to the influence of extra-individual, communal
factors which enter into her moral decisions. In other words the wider the
person's social influences the greater the depth that their moral evaluations
will have. This seems counter-intuitive at least insofar as it privileges authors
of moral decisions, not in terms of their greater autonomy, but in terms of the
width of their moral vocabulary and the experiences which have gone to
1BHowever Taylor's argument does seem weakened by the fact that even Utilitarians must
appeal to at least one inter-subjective distinction, namely that between happiness and
unhappiness. That is, in arguing for Utilitarianism as a theory one must appeal to a communal
conception of the intrinsic ''worth'' of happiness. Taylor claims that utilitarians only use the
distinction between happiness and unhappiness in an entirely subjective sense. But, any
attempt by a person to make a decision on utilitarian grounds necessarily involves making
generalisations about the happiness / unhappiness created for others by that action. The
measurement of utility thus seems to require at least some sort of an inter-subjective
standpoint from which to make comparisons between subjects. This might reinforce Taylor's
position on the necessity of inter-subjective criteria in making strong evaluations but does
seem to suggest that on his grounds utilitarianism might have to be counted a moral theory
precisely insofar as it fails to establish itself as a pure form of subjective rationality, i.e. it does
recognise intrinsic goods.
The extension of Taylor's critique might also have radical implications, some of which the
utilitarian may envisage as anti-democratic. Anti-democratic in the sense that the individual is
no longer to be regarded as an isolated individual with separate preferences which S/he owns.
It is however necessary to remember that utilitarianism defines its own conception of
democracy which, far from reflecting the will of the people, rather comes to simply reflect the
dominant ideology of the Western capitalist social formation in its exclusion of all grounds
other than personal preference from the scope of political debate.
BGCharles Taylor 'What is Human Agency' p. 26.
7°The use of the term "depth" by both Taylor and "deep ecologist" critics of utilitarianism
hardly seems accidental despite there radically different approaches.
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construct that vocabulary. The ideal moral agent is no longer the same as
the ideal free-agent, for in a very real sense one precludes the other,"
This raises a crucial point. Debates about moral autonomy are usually
carried on in terms of free will and determinism. (Indeed philosophers tend
to read the whole structure I agency debate in social theory as just another
form of the same tired old argument.) However, the position of social theory
allows a wider perspective to emerge on the nature of this debate. We can
now see that those who believe in complete moral autonomy do so at the
cost of sacrificing all depth in the individual. This applies just as much to the
moral absolutism of many rights-based theory's as to Utilitarianism. In both
cases their arguments are justified on the basis of a conception of human
nature which leaves the 'autonomous' individual with absolutely no features
which we can even recognise as human. As Kupperman states
"Despite the opposition between Kantians and consequentialists, it is
easy ...to get the picture of an essentially faceless ethical agent who is
equipped by theory to make moral choices that lack psychological
connection with either the agent's past or future." 72
,
The anti-humanist is ironically able to argue against utilitarianism and other
forms of subjective rationality on the grounds that it is theirconception of
human nature which does not fit with our moral phenomenology. However,
71 This necessary tension in Taylor's work means that he has difficulty in accommodating
both those moralities which advocate the authenticity of the individual as a locus of moral value
and those which attempt to change current moral taxonomies. His latest book The Ethics of
Authenticity can be seen as an (unsuccessful but stimulating) attempt to bridge this gulf.
This is not to say that Taylor is unaware of the historical influences which have gone into
the construction of modern identity, and in hisbook Sources of the Selfprovides one of the
clearest accounts of its genesis. But insofar as he holds that certain personal preferences are
autonomous his work exemplifies the standard humanist account of this identity.
72 J. Kupperman 'Character and Ethical Theory'.
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Taylor's radical rebuttal of utilitarianism is compromised precisely to the
extent that he shares many of utilitarianism's assumptions about human
autonomy in the realm of personal preferences, i.e. the humanist conception
of the person as the owner / occupier of a mind filled with private thoughts
and values absolutely divorced from the wider community. Taylor retains the
myth of subjective rationality where personal preferences are concerned.
There thus remains a lacuna in his argument, insofar as he seems to think
that personal preferences are simply existential 'givens' based upon strength
of feeling, and remain contingent upon the whim of the individual.
If Taylor means what he says when he claims that the ultimate criterion for
deciding upon a certain course of action in weak evaluations is simply what
one 'feels like'then two problems anse."
First, Taylor would argue that the contrastive dichotomies used in deciding
upon holiday destinations or one's choice of cake are not categories of
"worth"; one simply feels like one sort of cake over another. However, we
actually do use all sorts of conceptual schemes as a part of making decisions
which we count as personal preferences, some of which make explicit
reference to qualitative distinctions of "worth". For example, we might speak
of the differing qualities of Swiss versus British cake manufacturers, the
nutritional value of cakes etc. One might then come to hold and express
such 'personal' preferences in terms of inter-subjective and consciously
recognised concepts. Even if one accepts that these might not always be
questions of moral worth this still leaves Taylor begging the question. It
seems tautological to appeal to a distinction between criteria of moral worth
and non-moral criteria to support an argument which is supposed to justify
73Taylor op. cit., n. 69 above, p. 7.
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such a distinction. If personal preferences too can be explained and justified
in inter-subjective conceptual terms then, in the final analysis, Taylor simply
seems to be saying that moral decisions are moral only because they appeal
to moral rather than non-moral criteria. Whilst this may be true to some
extent, it is trivially so, as it gives no account of the relation between moral
and non-moral categories, nor does it justify any claim that categories of
moral worth are somehow deeper and more constitutive of human communal
existence than appeals to non-moral categories. Why should one only count
criteria of worth as adding depth to the subject. Surely one could say the
same for any communal criteria which come to be a constitutive feature of the
subjects being, including those that influence her personal preferences.
That is, Taylor has not provided us with criteria which can make categorical
distinctions between personal preferences and moral choice.
Second, because of his reliance on the moral subject's conscious
appropriation and utilisation of linguistically formulated concepts Taylor
remains confined within a humanist problematic of transparent
consciousness. Taylor reintroduces a distinction between moral reasons
,.
and personal feelings. But, if preferences can be understood as sometimes
appealing to conceptual schemes and taxonomies then it is also true that
Taylor equally disregards the unconscious acquisition and utilisation of
moral feelings. He disregards the ideological aspects of morality's
functioning. Moral values are not just transparently carried by conceptual
categories but frequently operate beneath the surface of language. They are
incorporated at the heart of the concrete individual through her interpellation
in society. This interpellation is not simply a function of her conscious
(theoretical) appraisal of her position, of her ability to understand concepts,
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but as Althusser makes clear, incorporates her dialectical experience, her
practical involvement in a number of levels of society ego economic and
political. (See chapter 3.)
It is open for someone to claim that the ultimate criterion for any moral action
may simply be that it feels right in the same way that it feels right to go North
this summer, Le. as an example of a "gut feeling". For example, I might just
feel that I should go on a march to save whales rather than fix my bicycle,
without being able to give any reasons for it; or again, I just jump in to save
the drowning man without prior consideration. If pressed about my concern
for whales there will come a point where I shall simply have to say that
"justification comes to an end", that I simply feel that a particular course of
action is appropriate. These non-verbalised grounds, these gut feelings,
should not be taken as an indication of the persona/origins of a particular
action or decision. If Althusser is right they, no less than explicit appeals to
communal conceptions of worth, are the result of the co-constitution of that
individual in an ideology which is fostered in and produced by particular
social practices.
For example, suppose a group of hill-walkers comes upon a game-keeper
about to shoot at an eagle. One of them runs forward in the immediacy of the
event to stop the killing. She does not stop to consider the rights or wrongs
of the situation in any conceptual framework. Her decision is not reflective,
but her action was none the less moral and a unique feature of her presence.
It seems that Taylor must deny this kind of non-reflective action any moral
validity on these counts and explain it simply as the expression of a first
order desire.
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Therefore, I would claim, it is not possible to make the absolute distinction
Taylor wishes between morality and personal preference: for both can
appeal to external criteria involving conceptual frameworks, and both can be
irreducibly constitutive of a persons being and non-verbalisable. Despite the
attractions of Taylor's posltion, it is doubtful that the act of appealing to
conceptual frameworks can be reified as an essential and necessary
condition of moral agency. Indeed, as the above example illustrates, it is not
at all clear that moral agency must always entail the use of concepts. Many,
if not most, of our moral decisions appear to be spontaneous and taken
without reflection. If Taylor means that we must bring concepts to bear in
making moral decisions then it seems he must deny that these spontaneous
actions are the acts of morally autonomous agents. He must limit his
account to being a description of what is entailed in reflecting on and
theoretically articulating certain moral acts. That Taylor's framework
operates only at the conceptual surface severely limits the explanatory
power of his thesis.
Taylor betrays his humanist leanings with his concern to explain autonomy in
terms of reasons and concepts as items to be called upon by the already
existing subject. The emphasis on conscious thought underestimates the
complexity of how values are produced and actually come into play in moral
actions. In Taylor's account of morality, concepts await the summons of the
reflexive subject, and once called upon are brought to bear in the
transparency of a linguistically framed consciousness. He thus places
limitations on the moral agent such that she only truly exists in the process of
reflection itself. This misconstrues the role conceptual frameworks play in
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the internalisation of norms and the constitution of the subject. Here then is a
major difference between Taylor's conceptual frameworks and Althusserian
ideology: for the later operates at a level beneath the reflective surface of the
conscious process, it is constitutive of the very heart of the subject and her
recognition of herself as that subject."
What Althusser has in mind is a more radical anti-humanism where there is
no necessity to appeal to conceptual distinctions at every turn. He holds that
part of what it is to be human is to have internalised the ideological content of
these concepts to such an extent that the taxonomies and values they
express become a constitutive part of our being. We act in certain ways that
are informed by prevailing moral distinctions because these categories now
form a part of being who we are. Taylor cannot follow this argument through
because he wishes to retain an absolute distinction between moral decisions
and personal preferences. It seems spurious to keep a space where no such
'internalisation' has taken place, a realm of purely personal preferences in
which we remain a pure and unadulterated "self". Taylor produces a
humanist compromise which, whilst allowing that conceptual frameworks can
I
constitute our identity, strictly limits the horizons of this constitution to the
ethical/aesthetic sphere, preserving a space for the subject as an
autonomous consciousness in the field of personal choice. Whilst Taylor
argues that language enables us to have a reflective consciousness (and
make second order decisions), and understands that this use of language
ties us inextricably to the community at large, he fails to see the subtler
ideological operation of language and the non-linguistic structures which
74 Although Taylor perceives himself as engaged in a philosophical anthropology, he still
retains crucial humanist distinctions, for example between the human and the natural
sciences.
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also go towards constituting our values. He fails to see that concepts
operate at other levels than their face-value, that language is not a
transparent medium but an integral part of our forms of life. He operates with
a version of the reason I feeling dichotomy, which sees feelings as the realm
of the pure subject. 75
Taylor's concept of strong evaluation highlights the need for a background
within which moral (and indeed non-moral) discourse takes place. Without
these frameworks, which have a superficial affinity with the Althusserian
conceptions of ideology, the individual reverts to the shallow and inhuman
caricature necessitated by subjective rationality. These frameworks both
place limitations upon and facilitate the individual's decisions and actions.
However, Taylor's argument is stronger than he seems to realise. The
critique of the autonomous moral agent of subjective rationality can be
extended far wider than the moral sphere. Indeed, once we have rejected
this model of the moral subject we can see that social influences might
extend to all aspects of the constitution of the individual. Taylor cannot
maintain an absolute distinction between weak and strong evaluators
,
because, in many cases, one no more owns one's own desires in the former
case than in the latter. They are all, to a degree, socially constituted.
How then are we to see the relationship between personal preferences and
75 This is not to say that one cannot gain a critical distance from the language of one's
society, nor that one's values simply reproduce those of society. Any critical theory requires
that there be some ability for the individual to stretch the boundaries of their language and
culture, to step beyond, reflect back upon and question the views of society at large.
However, there is a great difference between allowing that we have such an ability, which is
always based in communal forms of life and our unique relations to them, and holding that
there are certain areas, namely personal preference, in which we are completely autonomous.
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ethical valuations? If these are not differently constituted realms of activity,
have we not opened the door for the economist or utilitarian to reduce ethics
to the calculus of subjective rationality? On the contrary, I would argue that
ethical values and many personal preferences are constitutive of human
individuals precisely in such a manner that they are not thought of as
tradable. They constitute that person's relations to society at a deep level.
They are ingrained in both the character and personality of the individual
and inscribed in that person's conception of the social and environmental
formation. The attempt to make all values tradable is exposed for what it is:
not the application of a neutral system of rationality but the imposition of an
impoverished conception of the self - a political act which is itself value laden
and must be exposed as such. The degree to which we extend the private
sphere of personal choice into the domain of the community is a matter to be
decided by public debate, not by the application of the very "market forces"
and "subjective rationalities" which need to be brought into ouesnon."
We can now return to examine some of the claims made about radical choice
in the existential philosophy of Satre utilising and extending Taylor's own
I
critique of moral autonomy.
76 For example Mark Sagoff's distinction between my role as a consumer and my role as a
citizen does not have to be defended as an a-historical and a-contextual truth. Rather it can be
seen both as a description of the current placement of the dividing line between the public
and the private spheres and as a defence of an ideal positioning of that divide.
This distinction does have widespread ramifications for the interpretation of other theories
of environmental ethics. For example Bryan Norton specifically ties his defence of ''Weak
anthropocentrism" to an ability to distinguish between personal preferences and ethical
ideals. He states: "Nor need weak anthropocentrism collapse into strong anthropocentrism. It
would do so if the dichotomy between preferences and ideals were indefensible. If all values
can, ultimately, be interpreted as satisfactions of preferences. then ideals are simply human
preferences." 'Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism' pp.131-148. Norton's
defence of weak anthropocentrism is thus justified but not on any absolute criteria.
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Anti-humanism and Moral Values
Sartre's theory of radical choice is not incoherent as Taylor claims simply
because ....it wants to maintain both strong evaluation and radical choice." 77
Rather, it is inadequate because it retains a metaphysical conception of the
subject as something possessing only a superficial connection with the wider
environment. I want to argue that the subject can only obtain its form and
identity as a subject through relations with society and the wider environment
which are genuinely co-constituting.
Thus we can, by utilising an Althusserian picture of ideology, extend Taylor's
critique of Sartrean radical choice to all aspects of the individual,
deconstructing that banal picture of the autonomous human subject created
in subjective rationality. Whilst it is true that I cannot choose my evaluative
moral criteria because they are, in a very real sense, a part of what it is to be
me (though ironically they are also often beyond my control). this is also true
of many weak evaluations. My personal preferences often turn out to be
infected by advertising and the mass media. There is thus also a need for a
I
critical attitude towards the concept of radical autonomy inherent in the
concept of "personal preferences".
From the perspective of the structure / agency debate in social theory, the
anti-humanism espoused here maintains that there is no such thing as
absolute autonomy, that one can only gain a relative autonomy, an autonomy
that can only be articulated relatively to the dominant social ideology, the
manner in which other subjects are interpellated into the social structure.
77Taylor op. cit., n. 69 above, p. 32.
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This is why the question of moral autonomy is, from a structural social and
environmental perspective, identical to the question of 'productive autonomy'
( the question of the effectiveness and functioning of the ideological
apparatus of the social formation, of the limits and prescriptions laid down by
the structure and history of a given society). How far, given the universal
presence of ideology and the depths of its operation, its inescapable
participation even in the production of the individual herself, can one make
any sense of a concept of individual action, thought, or choice? Can one still
choose to defy convention, to overcome those values and taxonomies which
predominate, to counter the moral hegemony of a whole social formation
from the perspective of a single individual? To what extent are the values
expressed by an individual in a community her own? Do we produce our
own values or are we simply conduits necessary for the reproduction of
values already current in the social formation? Do we speak our own values
or does the social formation speak through us? What seems clear is that we
do not simply reiterate the moral precepts and rules of our social formation.
We live them with at least the illusion that we have a degree of autonomy.
We think of ourselves as individuals maki[lg free choices. The question
I
remains as to whether this apparent freedom is, as Althusser claims, an
ideological illusion inculcated by the concrete individual's interpellation into
a bourgeois social formation.
To dismiss Althusser's insights is to operate with a much diminished (and
humanist) concept of ideology which is liable to lead to an underestimation
of the complexity of the social situated ness of the individual. To be simply
influenced by (for example) a particular political problematic with certain
concepts is not the same as being ideologically constituted. Nor is the rote
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learning of phrases and moral opinions enough to explain the transmission
of moral values from person to person or generation to generation. To
operate effectively these values have to be 'internalised', not as concepts
stored away in part of the brain and brought out for special occasions, but as
co-constituents of the subject herself. Only in this way can we also come to
begin to understand how moral taxonomies can be reformulated to suit a
variety of novel moral situations. (This point is central to the social theory of
Pierre Bourdieu. See chapter 9.)
As we have seen, Althusser's structural Marxism does not have to imply that
the person is nothing more than her role in society. To this degree at least
humanism has a place in emphasising the importance of individual praxis
within the socia-environmental formation. It is precisely here that the
philosophy of the later Althusser converges with that of the later Sartre. The
"anti-humanism" of the later Althusser is not so very different from the so
called "humanism" of the later Sartre. In the Critique of Dialectical Reason
Sartre's humanist pour-soi is supplemented by the concept of the homme
historique, a being embedded in and deeply influenced by her social
I
formation. The forms of Sartre's explanation also change.
"Personal characteristics that Sartre would previously have
represented as part of a freely chosen project are now interpreted as
ineradicable structures of the infant's facticity ..." 78
Sartre rightly rejects the absolute determinism and reductionism of the
individual implied in an extreme structuralism: his subjects could never just
7'Christina Howells 'Conclusion: Sartre and the Deconstruction of the Subject' p.339. [My
emphasis]
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be the Trager of society - they always have a degree of effectivity even in his
later work. The common ground between the later Althusser and the later
Sartre goes beyond, but is no doubt influenced by, their common Marxist
inheritance. Whilst both reject the label of "structuralist", Althusser's debts in
this direction are obvious, but Peter Caws may not be far wrong in
suggesting that one might, in some respects, interpret the later Sartre as a
structuratlst." Sartre's later project also has similarities with aspects of
communitarian thought. For example, Sartre comes to recognise the import
of language, which is prior to our personal existence, in structuring our
thoughts.
"Sartre recognises in Lacan's view of language elements that are
compatible with his own, in particular the idea that we speak the
language of others, that our speech is "stolen" from us, that it is
second-hand, that we are born into a language that precedes us,
alienates us, and determines us in ways of which we are often
unaware." 80
With the exception of the point about alienation, which somehow suggests
that there might be a state of human being without recourse to language, this
,
could be Taylor's (and Althusser's) point precisely.
Sartre himself recognises this change.
"So, in Being and Nothingness, what you might call "subjectivity" is not
what it would be for me today: the little gap in an operation by which
what has been internalized [sic] is reexternalized as an act. Today, in
any case, the notions of "subjectivity" and "objectivity" seem to me
f9Peter Caws 'Sartrean Structuralism?'.
80 Howells op. cit., n. 78 above, pp. 337-338.
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entirely useless .... The individual internalizes his social determinants:
He internalises the relations of production, the family of his childhood,
the historical past, contemporary institutions, then he reexternalizes all
that in acts and choices that necessarily refer us to everything that has
been internalized." 81
My point in emphasising this convergence between humanism and anti-
humanism in what were originally distinct and antithetical theses is twofold.
First, it avoids naive interpretations of the humanism / anti-humanism debate
which see no common ground between them. A return to Althusserian
structuralism need not entail the re-running of old debates about structure
and agency. Second, this new found communality in Sartre and Althusser
provides a possible anti-essentialist and anti-reductionist point of departure
from which one can criticise subjective rationalltles."
Althusser's concept of ideology, as an unconscious system of reproduction of
the social formation and as the crucial factor in the production of individuals
and individuality, has the potential to playa crucial role. For values to be
J
passed from one place within a social formation to another they need to be
compatible in some way with their new environment. They must find
themselves in a habitat which is congenial for their growth. Moral values
must therefore connect with the form of life of those who are the recipients,
and this form of life is not determined by social convention only but also
SI Jean-Paul Sartre 'Situations IX' quoted in Howells ibid., p. 340.
82 One might also include here the work of Anthony Giddens who sees acts as situated
practices. "[I]n social theory. the notions of action and structure presuppose one another, but
... recognition of this dependence, which is a dialectical relation, necessitates a reworking of
both .... " Giddens op. cit., n. 8 above, p.53.
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depends on the practical relation of society to the natural environment.
Here we can see the real affinities between structural Marxism and Deep
Ecology. Both are critical of atomistic humanist conceptions of the individual.
They both agree that no understanding of the self is possible in isolation, that
any analysis which omitted an account of the structural relations which both
constrain and facilitate the individual's development would be incomplete.
For traditional Marxism these structural relations are those imposed by
society, and particularly by economy, for deep ecologists they are those
imposed by the natural environment. Both explanations deny the possibility
of a completely autonomous individual and criticise Promethean
anthropocentrism.
"Human beings - anyone of us; and our species as a whole are not all
important, not the centre of the world. That is the one essential piece
of information, the one great secret, offered by any encounter with the
woods or the mountains or the ocean or any chunk of nature or patch
of sky." 83
,
The individual is not a 'given' - she cannot be understood as an object which
remains fundamentally and essentially unchanged in her encounters with
the surrounding environment. Her individuality must be seen as an evolving
process through time and space rather than a static characteristic always
present or reached at a certain stage of maturity. That surrounding
environment is, at least in part, constitutive of her individuality, but she
remains a unique locus; a 'geographical' place in a unique set of relations
with that environment. It also follows from this that there can be no universal
83 Bill McKibbon quoted in the Guardian.
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and timeless criteria of what individuality consists in. Not only is the
individual inevitably and intimately connected to her surrounding
environment, whether ideological or physical, but any description of that
individual will also be historically particular - dependent upon the ideological
/ theoretical background assumptions which are specific to the analyst's
society. In this sense too, both Marxists and environmentalists point to the
historical genesis of our current conception of the individual - the former
placing it in the rise of industrial capitalism, the latter in industrialism and
modernism in general. Both theoretical problematics see links between the
form of life engaged in by Western society and the conceptual maps that they
reproduce."
The value of adapting Althusser's anti-humanist approach to social theory
lies in its critique of this autonomous conception of the subject. In particular,
his theory of ideology provides an alternative problematic capable of
accounting for the values held by individuals entirely in terms of their social
situation rather than any properties of the individuals themselves. These two
positions, the humanist emphasis upon the subject's complete autonomy
I
and the anti-humanist denial of any constitutive role for the individual, form
the extreme poles of the agency / structure debate.
aaIn reemphasising the "structural constitution"of the individual, both deep ecologists and
structuralist Marxists believe that they are engaged in subverting current ideological
assumptions. But it should be remembered that they are not alone in their rejection of
individualism, for many of the conservative thinkers opposed to the enlightenment such as
Edmund Burke also condemned a subjectivism which they saw as undermining traditional
ethical values and ways of life. There is a danger, as many of Althusser's critics have pointed
out, of the structuralist falling into a reactionary conservativism in which individual humans
count for nothing in themselves.
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Althusser fully understands the historical and social particularity of the
humanist conception of the individual and the central role it has come to play
in the philosophy, politics, economics and ethics of the modern world.
Western humanist philosophy sets itself unnecessary problems because it
inevitably tries to explain the world and our values wholly in terms of a
subjective rationality and an essential human nature.
"...to rediscover the world of history on the basis of principles (the
homo oeeonomieusand his po/itiea/and philosophiea/avatars) which,
far from being principles of scientific explanation, were, on the
contrary, merely a projection of its own image of the world, its own
aspirations, its own ideal programme ( a world which would be
reducible to its essence: the conscious will of individuals, their actions
and their private undertakings ...)" 85
It is the ubiquitous presence of humanist ide%gythat makes it almost
impossible to break from it, as according to Althusser the later Marx did.
"The earlier idealist (bourgeois') philosophy depended in all its
domains and arguments (its 'theory of knowledge', its conception of
history, its political economy, its ethics, its aesthetics, etc.) on a
,
problematic of human nature (or the essence of man). For centuries,
this problematic had been transparency itself, and no one had thought
of questioning it even in its internal modifications." 88
According to Althusser these two aspects of humanist explanation, its
essentialism and its category of the subject, are two sides of the same
humanist coin. These indissociable postulates serve only to show the unity
85Louis Althusser For Marxp. 126.
86 ibid., p. 227.
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of such apparently diverse traditions of thought as idealism and empiricism.
(See Chapter 2)
"These two postulates are complementary and indissociable. But,
their existence and their unity presupposes a whole empiricist-idealist
world outlook. If the essence of man is to be a universal attribute, it is
essential that concrete subjects exist as absolute givens; this implies
an empiricism of the subject. If these empirical individuals are to be
men, it is essential that each carries in himself the whole human
essence, if not in fact, at least in principle; this implies an idealism of
the essence. So empiricism of the subject implies idealism of the
essence and vice versa. This relation can be inverted into its
'opposite' - empiricism of the concept / idealism of the subject. But the
inversion respects the basic structure of the problematic, which
remains fixed." 87
For Althusser the debate between empiricism and idealism has (to borrow a
phrase of Jonathan Porrit's) all the import of that conducted between
Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Both are aspects of the same humanist
problematic which is part and parcel of the last few hundred years of Western
European social development. Once the particularity of this problematic is
recognised, and the individual is seen not as an absolute given but as a
social (and environmental) construction who is also in part self-constructing,
then that 'subject' can no longer provide an objective or indubitable
foundation for those political, ethical and economic theories which are at the
heart of the despoilation of our planet.
87 ibid.• p. 228.
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Of course, it is necessary to go somewhat further than this, because we
cannot simply replace one taxonomic dualism with another, Le. the object
/subject dichotomy with the structure/agency dichotomy. We cannot as the
early Althusser seems to suggest simply throw out all those ideas and values
which are so intimately associated with the concept of the autonomous
individual, the subject of humanist philosophy and the moral agent, in favour
of a structural explanation which reduces the person to a mere functional
role. This question of structure and agency takes the form in Marxist circles
of a debate about who makes history, the human individual or impersonal
economic and social forces. This debate stretches back to the works of Marx
himself who stated that:
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by
themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and
transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations
weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living." 88
,
Criticism of Althusser has frequently taken the form of comparing and
contrasting various interpretations of Marx with often crude accounts of
Althusser's own position. Not surprisingly this debate has remained internal
to Marxist intellectual circles and proved entirely sterile. In focusing upon the
textual exegesis of difficult passages in an attempt to establish orthodox
interpretations, it failed to address the profound insights and possibilities
opened by Althusser's structuralist and anti-humanist leaning. Althusser's
extreme reductionism of the agent to Trager of society also runs the risk of
88 Karl Marx 'The Eighteenth Braumaire of Louis Bonaparte' p. 398.
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falling into the very form of essentialist explanation he previously associated
with humanism. For Althusser the debate between structure and agency is
simply the difference between a scientific explanation and an ideological
one. It is therefore not surprising that he makes little attempt to incorporate
the phenomenological experience of "individuality" within his structural
problematic. It might therefore seem that there is little possibility of
reconciling the poles of the structure / agency debate. If all that human
individuals are is a particular kind of interchangeable support for the
relations and forces of production, then they would seem to be definable in
terms of this essential functional role. To be human would not be to be
rational, but to be that kind of creature whose being required her to be
interpellated into certain economic and social rather than environmental
niches. Placing the stress upon complete individual autonomy leads to the
undermining of all ethical values other than those systems of utilitarianism
associated with subjective rationality - a devaluation of the social in favour of
consummating the temporary whims of the individuals concerned. In
contrast, the early Althusser's stress upon structure leads to a situation
whereby the individual becomes nothing other that her functional role in
,
society, a person who can contribute nothing new to ethical debate but only
reproduce current values. There are problems in taking too reductive a
structuralist line. Althusser's account of the role of ideology in reproducing
social formations is too static. On Althusser's account we simply reproduce
the ideology that surrounds us and yet history and societies do not stand still.
One might easily argue that of all the social formations known to us the one
which changes its form most rapidly, the least stable of all, is that of Western
industrialised capitalism. Even over the course of a single generation the
very structure of our society has changed almost beyond recognition and our
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moral values have changed too though at differing rates.
A philosophy of consciousness (like Taylor's and to a lesser extent Sartre's)
simply leaves us back in the humanist problematic in which we started. What
seems to be required is a form of "compatibilism"; a structural explanation
which does not ignore our personal moral phenomenologies - one which,
whilst admitting the full extent to which material realities and factors external
to the individual's consciousness in the sense that it does not entirely deny
that individual a role in the formulation of their own values. This new
formulation must also account for the way in which theory and individual
thought, though comprised of communal language, can produce novel
values rather than simply reproducing those of the past. The anti-
foundational aspects of Althusser and the later Wittgenstein's problematics
can, I believe, help to formulate a theoretical perspective conducive to a
reworked and environmentally sensitive anti-humanism. This is precisely the
position which Bourdieu has attempted to occupy and forms the basis of
chapter 9. First I shall examine some of the implications of this reformulated
anti-humanism for theories of environmental ethics. In particular I shall
!
examine the work of Jim Cheney, who, I shall claim, exemplifies a rather
naive anti-humanism and mistakenly rejects much of the intellectual
background which might inform his position on the spurious grounds that
modernism as a whole is indelibly tainted with humanism.
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CHAPTER 8: JIM CHENEY: ENVIRONMENTAL
POSTMODERNISM AND ANTI-HUMANISM,l
preliminary remarks on 'Postmodernism'
This thesis began by sketching a number of inter-related "humanist"
dichotomies which, it was argued, might be seen as products of, and
influences upon, the development of modern Western society. The concept
of "subjective rationality", derived from the Frankfurt school via Weber, linked
the creation of modern man [sic] - the abstract, autonomous, Promethean,
self-interested subject of much humanist discourse - with an equally abstract
concept of a supposedly 'neutral' reason.
Modernity may be understood as that social state which provides the context
for our current experience and recent history. As practices proliferate and
rates of social change increase communities are fragmented, their members'
forms of life become increasingly disparate and common values more difficult
to find. To plug this gap humanism produces a number of unifying myths,
most especially those of the universal human subject and of a 'neutral'
rationality, an instrument which these subjects may utilise without prejudice
to organise society. For example, as we saw in the last chapter, humanism,
faced with disparate conceptions of the good, utilises an apparently value-
free notion of instrumental or subjective rationality which eschews any
particular conception of the good in favour of a discourse founded in an
1 Much of the material included in this chapter will appear as 'Cheney and the Myth of
Post modernism' .
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abstract and impoverished conception of human nature. Social
fragmentation dictates that these humanist myths have to remain at a very
general level to fulfil their unifying function yet their very abstraction means
that they fail to recognise those important components of human life which
are inextricably contextual.
In the previous chapter a communitarian critique of the liberal humanist
subject informed by an amended version of Althusser's concept of ideology
was used to theoretically undermine these humanist myths. Such features
should not be seen a-historically: they are not the neutral foundations they
claim to be, but the expressions of a particular humanist ideology produced
in modern society. Of course, we are all enmeshed in humanist
presuppositions. Even Althusser's anti-humanist theory could not make the
complete break from past ideologies required of it. Indeed the attempt to
epistemologically privilege one form of discourse (theory) as a 'true'
interpretation of the social formation, a discourse uncontaminated by social
ideology, could be interpreted as a form of scientistic humanism. This
conception of science and epistemology was criticised in chapter 4 using the
work of Michel Foucault, work which is regarded many as an exemplar of
"postmodern" or "poststructuralist" critique.
The claim that modernity is coming to an end is now commonplace. Modern
"theory" is to be replaced by "postmodern discourses". I have not the space
here to provide a detailed exposition of the widely varying philosophies
which are labelled "postmodern" (a label which I shall use for the sake of
convenience, but which is actually rejected by many of those philosophers to
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whom it is applied). I shall simply point out that postmodern practitioners are
frequently aligned with theoretical anti-humanism in their criticisms of those
features of humanism presented in chapter 1.2 In particular, postmodernists
proclaim the dissolution of the humanist subject, they reject the 'neutral'
conception of rationality and representational and foundationalist
epistemologies. This in turn implies that no one discursive field such as that
of science can be epistemologically privileged. Thus, for example, the
foundational role of the humanist subject is challenged by Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guattari, who produce a psychology / philosophy in which the
autonomous ego is dissolved and replaced by "desire" as an object of
study," Foucault too refuses to recognise the existence of an a-historical and
essential subject, stating that
"My objective ... has been to create a history of the different modes by
which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects." 4
This interest in producing localised accounts of the production of those
subjects (which are presumed by humanism to be identical in all important
respects) points to a further feature frequently associated with
postmodernism, namely its repudiation of "tota/ising" theories.
Postmodernists frequently advocate local and contingent discourses as
opposed to general and universal theories. The degree to which it is actually
possible to avoid reference to some form of all encompassing Grand Theory
2 See Kate Soper Humanism and Anti-Humanism passim. The existence of common
humanist enemies in no way implies that postmodernism offers a uniform philosophical
framework with which to replace them.
3 Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus.
4 Michel Foucault 'The Subject and Power' p. 208. See also Richard Rorty 'Moral Identity
and Private Autonomy: The Case of Foucault'.
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is a moot point. Certainly many avowed postmodernists seem on occasion to
lapse into claims that are just as deterministic and general as their modern
predecessors.' For example, Jean Baudrillard, the self styled doyen of
postmodernism, comes close to espousing a wholesale technological
determinism in his later work by placing so much emphasis upon the
machinery of communication. The importance of postmodernism lies in its
attempt to avoid the imposition of over-arching theoretical constraints upon
thought. Thus Foucault, exhibiting an awareness of the ideological
functioning of theory, avoids making a-historical generalisations or
foundationalist and essentialist claims. I shall argue that whilst it is
necessary to retain a healthy reflexivity about the limits imposed by particular
theoretical frameworks one also needs to recognise theory's role in
facilitating as well as constraining discourses. In this sense totalising
discourses are not necessarily to be avoided at all costs, for so long as one is
aware of their limitations they may nevertheless provide valuable insights
into particular events. In any case as Frederick Jameson points out
"...everything significant about the disappearance of master narratives
has itself to be couched in narrative form. Whether, as with Godel's
proof, one can demonstrate the logical impossibility of any internally
self-coherent theory of the postmodern - an anti-foundationalism that
really eschews all foundations altogether, a nonessentialism without
the last shred of an essence in it - is a speculative question; its
empirical answer is that none have so far appeared, all replicating
within themselves a mimesis of their own title in the way in which they
51ndeed Quentin Skinner claims that Foucault, Oerrida et a/ can, ironically, all be seen in
the light of The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences.
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are parisitory on another system (most often on modernism itself) ..." 8
That Postmodernism itself cannot always avoid dependence upon totalising
theory does not diminish the importance of the reflexive awareness which the
critique of humanism preaches.' However, Jameson's point about the
'parasitic' reliance of postmodernism upon the modern is important because
postmodernism is frequently vaunted as a radical break with what has gone
before. I shall argue that this is a serious mistake for, in distancing
themselves from modernism, postmodernists risk repeating the errors of their
predecessors: they impose a monolithic framework which misconstrues the
relations between modern theoretical problematics by overlooking their
important differences. Insofar as postmodernists arrogantly dismiss all that is
deemed modern, they risk falling into a theoretical vacuum," Anti-humanism
is not the sole preserve of postmodernism.
This chapter focuses on Jim Cheney's recent attempt to provide a
'postmodern' account of the production of environmental values. I shall
8 Frederick Jameson Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism p. XII.
7 What it does show is that one should retain a healthy scepticism about claims to hold a
postmodern high ground and claims to have made a complete break with the past.
• Postmodernists are frequently very selective about the origins of their ideas. Thus, for
example, postmodernism's rejection of the neutral conception of reason is frequently traced
back to Neitzsche's criticisms of Western Philosophy and Heidegger's attacks upon
metaphysics. "For Heidegger, the triumph of humanism and the project of a rational
domination of nature and human beings is the culmination of a process of the "forgetting-of-
Being" that began with Socrates and Plato." Steven Best & Douglas Kellner postmodern
Theory: Critical Interrogations p. 22. Yet, as we have seen, the attack on instrumental reason
and the domination of nature also plays a central role in the analysis of the Frankfurt School and
Weber.
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argue that his account ultimately fails because, in his wish to argue for a
specifically postmodern ethics, he neither recognises nor learns from the (in
his terms) 'modern' precedents for his own thesis. In particular, he fails to
recognise the common faults shared by his attempt to provide a naturally
founded anti-humanism and the early structuralist's attempts to produce a
socially founded antl-humanisrn."
Despite the importance of the postmodern claim to radically break with
modernism the nature of this break is often obscure. Thus, Best and Kellner
criticise Jean Baudrillard because,
"..he never adequately describes or theorises the assumed absolute
break between the modern and the postmodern eras and thus never
develops a theory of postmodernity which adequately periodizes,
characterises, or justifies claims concerning an alleged break or
rupture within history .... Baudrillard's theory tends to be abstract, one-
sided, and blind to the large number of continuities between modernity
and postmodernity ..." 10
I shall argue, along with Frederic Jameson and Anthony Giddens, that there
is a more of a continuum between modernism and postmodernism than is
frequently recognised. Indeed it might always be the case that,
"[r]ather than entering a period of postmodernity, we are moving into
one in which the consequences of modernity are becoming more
radicalised and universalised than before." l'
o Nevertheless I am generally sympathetic to much of Cheney's anti-humanism.
10 Best & Kellner op. cit., n. 8 above, p. 22.
11Anthony Giddens The Consequences of Modernity p.3.
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I shall now turn to the work of Jim Cheney to further examine some of these
points.
Jjm Cheney and the Myth of Postmodernjsm
That postmodernism should enter the world of environmental ethics was
inevitable. The most explicit attempt to produce a postmodern environmental
ethics to date is Jim Cheney's intricate, and sometimes obscure paper
"Postmodern Environmental Ethics: Ethics as Bioregional Narrative". This
paper raises important considerations, not least in its emphasis on context, or
place in determining ethical values." Unfortunately, as I shall argue,
Cheney's paper is marred in certain respects which hamper his avowed aim
of recontextualising ethical discourse.
I shall draw critical parallels between Cheney's work and various aspects of
modernism which he has ignored or misrepresented. The three main areas
of criticism are, first, that Cheney's history of ideas is appallingly crude. He
amalgamates all past western philosophical traditions irrespective of their
disparate backgrounds and complex interrelationships under the single
heading, 'modern". Following this, he posits a radical epistemological break
between a deluded modernism defined, in terms reminiscent of my
12 Jim Cheney 'Postmodern Environmental Ethics: Ethics as Bioregional Narrative'. I
concentrate almost entirely on this paper as an expression of Cheney's philosophy rather than
his later 'The Neo-Stoicism of Radical Environmentalism', which is a more specific critique of
certain Deep Ecological approaches.
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characterisation of humanism," as foundationalist, essentialist, colonising,
and totalising, and a contextual postmodernism. Cheney seems unaware
both of the complex genealogy of postmodernism and of those aspects of
modern traditions which prefigure his own thesis. Second, Cheney's
account of primitive peoples is both ethnocentric (though positively so) and
inaccurate. Third, Cheney reduces context or place in the last instance to a
concept of bioregionality. The individual becomes little more than a conduit
for the promotion of values produced and grounded in the structural relations
of nature. Thus he reinstates a privileged but anti-humanist foundationalism
which should by his own definition make his philosophy modernist. This
chapter develops these criticisms to suggest a less restricted contextual
approach to environmental values.
Cheney's paper centres on an explicit thesis which divides human history
into three epochs:
PRIMITIVE / MODERN / POSTMODERN
According to Cheney the change from the "primitive" to the "modern" period
began "some nine or so millennia" ago with the appearance of agriculture,
that from modern to "postmodern" only very recently. The dominant world-
view of the whole of Western society and consequently all Western
philosophy until now has been modern." These historical epochs are
associated with radical changes in social ethos. Postmodernism represents
hSee chapter 2
14 Cheney 'Postmodern Environmental Ethics: Ethics as Bioregional Narrative' p. 122.
Although Cheney names 7000 B.C. as the starting point of modernism his evidence is hardly
supportive of this, for example, one author cited declares that a unified concept of the self
developed between the composition of the Iliad and the Odyssey, i.e. some 6000 years laterl
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a long awaited return to a primitive understanding of our place in the world.
Although historically and sociologically disparate, being separated by an age
of modernist domination, these world-views are linked by a number of
supposedly "shared affinities":
"With the advent of postmodernism, contextualised discourse seems to
emerge as our mother tongue; totalising, essentialising language
emerges as the voice of the constructed subjective self, the voice of
disassociated gnostic alienation." 15
If such a structural axis is represented as;
PRIMITIVE & POSTMODERN / MODERN
the homologous associations implicit in the above passage can be
represented as following;
CONTEXTUAL DISCOURSE / TOTALISING DISCOURSE
FEMALE / MALE
NATURE / CULTURE
AT HOME / ALIENATED.
In all cases Cheney wishes to re-privilege the left hand side of the dichotomy.
These qualitative divisions remain constant throughout Cheney's paper, and
reinforce one another. Thus, the .boundary between primitive and modern
corresponds to a change from contextual discourse to a totalising discourse,
from female influence in society to male control. It also marks the
appearance of the individual subject as a fundamental given ( Le. the
"intuitive "obviousness" of the Cartesian privatised self" • ) as well as the
15 ibid.,p. 122.
16 ibid., p. 120. I use Cheney's conception of myth throughout this chapter rather than
introduce any of the many technical meanings the term has in anthropological literature or
structuralist writings like Roland Barthes' Mythologies.
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point at which language lost its rootedness in natural place.s Conversely
postmodernism supposedly heralds a return to primitive homologies,
especially contextual discourse.
According to Cheney, the primitive paradigms of contextual discourse are
tribal mythologies. For this reason a mythological approach can "significantly
inform postmodern thought on olscourse"." Myths are both fabulous stories
with moral connotations and forms of "knowledge shaped by transformative
intent.':" They are "historically sociologically and geographically shaped
system[s] of reference that allow ... us to order and thus comprehend
perception and knowledge." 20 Mythic narratives are the 'primitive'
alternative to theory, they reflect upon, and are tied to, specific contexts. By
contrast totalising discourses are forms of theory abstracted from place and
context. Once divorced from the specific settings and practices which
originally gave it meaning "language closes in on itself, becoming inbred." 21
Totalising discourses tend to be universalising, acontextual and possess an
internal autonomous logic or grammar which often claims to represent the
world's underlying structure. ' As far as Cheney is concerned the blame for
environmental destruction lies firmly on the shoulders of totalising discourses
and the societies which have developed them.
17 ibid., p. 122. Barbara Bender 'Prehistoric Developments in the American Midcontinent
and in Brittany, France' challenges the anthropological evidence for such a division into so-
called hotand coldsocieties, those with history and those without, those that change and
those that supposedly do not.
la ibid., p. 122.
Ig ibid., p. 121.
20 Paula Gunn Allen in Cheney ibid., p. 121.
21 ibid., p. 126.
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Cheney's paper is, at heart, a defence of mythical narrative and its
concomitant associations against totalising discourse. He presents a myth of
a past Golden Age with a tribal humanity at one with itself and nature, a
present alienated society uprooted from the natural world and a future
postmodern rnluennlum." Each stage is epitomised by the form of language
it uses. In an attempt to bolster this position Cheney cites Heidegger's
parallel distinction between primordia/and fallen languages. Fallen
obviously carries with it all the moral overtones he requires to disparage the
discourse of modernism.
The World and Language
Cheney deconstructs subjectivity and replaces it with a concept akin to
Heidegger's "being-in-the-world". This deconstruction takes the form of
rejecting the traditionally accepted division between the world and language.
A frequently cited aspect of postmodernism is its refusal to accept any
taxonomic divisions as absolute givens i.e., there are no facts of the matter
upon which we can safely ground argument. Cheney takes this line in his
discussion of the relationship between ontology and language.23 He
accurately portrays the general postmodern consensus that it is best to
"practice ontological abstinence", to treat language without epistemological
presuppositions about just how it relates to the world. The usually cited
22 Cheney's reference to male domination and intratribal violence in contemporary tribal
societies as a "deterioration" exemplifies this Arcadian myth. In saying this, he implies that
these tribes enjoyed a past in which these vices were absent.
23 ibid., pp.118-120.
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postmodern alternatives are to treat language as "either a set of tools" or the
"free creation of conscious persons and communities". 24 Cheney is
dissatisfied with these options and favours instead a "more useful ... feminist
standpoint epistemology" as an alternative. Here
"[o]bjectivity is defined negatively in relation to those views which
oppositional consciousness deconstructs. A voice is privileged to the
extent that it is constructed from a position that enables it to spot
distortions, mystifications, and colonising and totalising tendencies
within other discourses." 25
This conception of objectivity, or rather privilege, is not a "claim to having
access to the way things are" but a positional concept describing the world
as it seems from a particular place. Cheney's form of standpoint
epistemology recognises that there is no wholly objective position from which
we can determine how the world really is. At the same time it alters the role
of the human subject. The voice we hear is not that of an atomistic individual
separated from the surrounding environment. Rather the particular contexts
within which a person has developed are supposed to speak through her.26
At least, Cheney argues, this is what happens in primitive conditions where
the surrounding environment is natural. Primordial language is the original
contextualised language within which the "world speaks through us", It
results from a "meditative openness to the world"." In primordial language
20 ibid., p. 118. These are not the only "postmodern" options but it should be recognised
that to treat language in these ways hardly eschews ontology or makes a radical break with
modernism. Instead, these options resurrect elements of modern philosophical traditions. The
former alternative is an example of pragmatism, the latter a type of anthropocentric idealism.
25 ibid., p. 118.
28 ibid., p. 119.
27 ibid., p. 119.
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we are not trapped but 'free'. Primitive societies' residence in natural
contexts ensures the contextuality of their discourse; ''the world discloses
itself by our being rootedin the world." [my emphasis]
In contrast, fallen (modernist) language, as the opposite structural pole,
"uproots itself." Because it is abstract it becomes a vehicle for repressive
power which can be exported from one context to another. Modern societies
utilise their discourses in the colonisation of other areas and cultures. This
causes environmental problems because the colonising language will
almost certainly have developed in surroundings very different to its new
circumstances. The practices it enjoins therefore disrupt the delicate
balance which Cheney thinks was reached between primitive humanity and
its natural environment.
The unhealthy tendency for discourses to become bases for oppressive
power needs to be overcome. Cheney believes that simply deconstructing
the current dominant paradigm is not enough, for as soon as one totalising
discourse is overthrown, another takes on its oppressive role. How then can
we avoid this need for constant recontextualisation?
"Is there any setting, any landscape, in which contextualising
discourse is not constantly in danger of falling prey to the distortions of
essentialising, totalising discourse? Perhaps not. A partial way out
might be envisioned, however, if we expand the notion of a
contextualising narrative of place so as to include nature - nature as
one more player in the construction of community." 28
28'b'd 128I I "p, ,
378
In other words Cheney tries to ground the notion of place in particular natural
regions:
"[o]ur position, our location, is understood in the elaboration of
relations in a non-essentialising narrative achieved through a
grounding in the geography of our lives." 29
and again, "Bioregions provide a way of grounding narrative ...1130
Klaus Eder identifies three alternatives to modernism - namely,
postmodernism, traditionalism and primitivism. All of these alternatives "give
up the idea of a society disembedded from its cultural tradition and from
nature." 31 Communitarians who, like Alasdair Macintyre, bewail the loss of
past communities with unified conceptions of "the good", obviously fall into
Eder's category of ''traditionalism''. "Primitivism" goes one stage further and
claims that the direction of Western society has been radically and inherently
wrong from the start. It also appeals to romantic conceptions of 'primitive'
humanity's rootedness in nature, a rootedness which assured a sustainable
balance. In optimistic strands of postmodernism the Arcadian myth of a
29 'otd 126I I ., p. .
30 ibid., p. 128. The concept of bioregional foundationalism has a distinctly modernist
ancestry. "The earth was one whole. But geographers also recognised the existence of
regionality. Phenomena peculiar to a particular region were the causes of other equally
regional phenomena - for example, climatic and environmental conditions influenced human
society so that, as Kant wrote, "in the mountains, men are actively and continuously bold lovers
of freedom and their homeland". Malcolm Nicholson, 'Alexander von Humboldt and the
Geography of Vegetation' p. 170. Certainly Cheney would abjure Kant's simplistic causality of
place determining personality and replace it with place "speaking through" people. But is this
really any less naive? Both see place primarily as a bioregional concept. (This is not to
disparage bioregionality per se, merely certain formulations of it.)
31 Klaus Eder "The Rise of Counter-culture Movements Against Modernity: Nature as a
New Field of Class Struggle" p. 27.
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natural past is frequently replaced with the Utopian vision of a future society
unconstrained by modernist dichotomies and a-historical conceptions of the
subject and society. Pessimistic postmodernism provides a rather bleak
prospect of a continual struggle to avoid the imposition of totalising
discourses and ideologies.
Cheney obviously combines Eder's category of primitivism with an optimistic
view of postmodernism. However, this raises a serious question which
Cheney should, but does not, address on the compatibility of these two
alternatives. If Frederick Jameson is right, when he claims that
postmodernism arises from the expansion of the sphere of culture, then it
would seem antithetical to the spirit of environmental conservation or
primitivism.
"Postmodernism is what you have when the modernisation process is
complete and nature is gone for good. It is a more fully human world
than the older one, but one in which "culture" has become a veritable
"second natura"."
With these points in mind we can now turn a critical eye upon Cheney's
"myth" of the postmodern and the primitive outlined above. There are a
number of problems associated with the dissolution of the world / language
barrier and its replacement with Cheney's dichotomy between narrative and
totalising theory, perhaps the most obvious being the status of Cheney's own
proposals. Cheney's taxonomy of discourses seems to conflate a number of
concepts with very different meanings:




COLONISING / IN PLACE
FOUNDATIONAL / NON-FOUNDATIONAL
The terms on the left hand side are all used almost synonymously for any
form of modernist discourse and those on the right for what is postmodern
and primitive. It is possible to argue that on all the above classifications
Cheney's own discourse is not mythological but is itself a modern, abstract,
theory. It is foundationalist insofar as it makes bioregions the necessary
grounds for all properly contextual discourse. It is colonisingto the extent
that it appears in an international journal written in English, the most
widespread colonial language. It is essentialising in its conception of all
modernism as inherently divorced from place." The reader is left
wondering how Cheney can defend his monolithic treatment of modernism
and his view of primitive peoples as uniformly environmentally friendly.
It would be difficult to enter a debate upon the nature of discourse in
prehistoric societies. Evidence of whether such societies were contextual, as
Cheney claims, or totalising is simply unavailable. By definition, prehistoric
societies leave no discourse for posterity. Cheney does however consider
there is some evidence for his claims; namely, that the discourse of
contemporary "primitive" i.e. tribal peoples is contextual. I would argue that
such a claim involves a parochialism reminiscent of Victorian anthropology.
33 It is also inconsistent, for how can Cheney repudiate totalising attempts to give one true
picture of the world at the same time as endorsing Ridington's' remark that "the true history of
these people [Beaver Indians] will have to be written in mythiC language" [my emphasis] Robin
Ridington "Fox and Chickadee" in Cheney op. cit., n. 14 above, p. 121.
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Other cultures are taken as anachronisms, survivals from the evolutionary
past of our own society, rather than as separate peoples with their own
cultural development. In effect, by privileging tribal world-views the Victorian
assumption of modern superiority over the primitive is simply reversed. More
importantly, by generalising about primary peoples and their language,
Cheney is in danger of engaging in a kind of essentialist discourse himself.
Instead of noting the vast cultural differences between tribal peoples, he
simply buries these under the weight of a supposed essential similarity,
namely their possession of contextual discoursel
What is the nature of contextual discourse? Cheney seems to confuse the
context which produces a particular statement, its epistemological
standpoint, with the content of that statement (in particular, whether or not it
makes universal claims). He certainly cannot hold that primitive peoples do
not make universal generalisations. Indeed the example Cheney offers of a
contextual discourse, that of the Ainu, an indigenous people of Japan,
actually claims that "everything is a Kamui [spirit] for the Ainu." This is an
abstract statement which is just as universal as any claim a contemporary
scientist might make. The Ainu may be contextual in the sense that they
come from a particular locale and have a language specific to that context,
but they are certainly not contextual in the sense that they do not use
totalising generalisations i.e. that they do not have a framework whether
'theoretical' or 'mythical' which they can apply universally.
For Cheney, the totalising discourse of modernism is indelibly associated
with the artificial, the unnatural and the colonising (that which is abstracted
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and applied outside its own remit - a remit that in natural circumstances is
bounded within a bio-geographical region). He states that "[t]he possibility of
totalising, colonising discourse arises from the fact that concepts and
theories can be abstracted from their paradigm settings and applied
elsewhere." 34 In contrast, it is simply not possible for contextual discourses
to be applied out of place. "[T]hey are not thought of as exportable." 35 In
one way this makes perfect sense. The carrying of a language from that part
of the world in which it developed to another might well cause serious
problems. Just as a tropical plant may not be at home in a temperate climate
and either does not flourish there or destroys indigenous flora, taxonomies
designed for one place may be disruptive in other places.
However, there is no reason to suppose that, in general, a language of
place (bio-geographically) need be environmentally friendly. Places are not
static, environments change, and the development of language and place
hand in hand may have been one which saw the destruction of many
features of the original prehuman landscape. It maybe that 'stable'
ecological relationships tendto evolve when language, people and place
have been associated for long periods. But to hold a priori that this is
universally the case for all tribal cultures is surely unwarranted.
For Cheney totalisation is a consequence of language closing in on itself as
it gets further from the natural world." But, to operate at all language has to
be closed in on itself to some degree. Language is a means of
34 'b'd 126I I ., p. .
35 ibid., p. 120.
36 ibid., see p. 120.
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communication between different places (people, social groups etc.) in the
world and so must be abstracted as a condition of its existence. It has to be a
relatively autonomous aspect of the world. Cheney provides no
anthropological evidence to show that tribal languages are less abstract than
others. Rather, his argument merely shows that mythic narrative frequently
incorporates metaphors of natural place. All languages are abstracted from
place insofar as they can be carried by human vectors. Thus any kind of
distinction that can be made between mythic narrative and modern theory on
the grounds of abstraction seems likely to be one of degree rather than kind.
(See chapter 9.) Cheney has to recognise that any language is potentially
exportable and couldbecome colonising.
Primitive taxonomies are not necessarily less rigid than modernist ones.
Further, not all primitive peoples live statically in one geographical locale.
Most have moved at some period and when they move they take their
language with them. A language which is less general, and more tied to
bioregional place, seems to have just as much potential to be disruptive as a
more generalised language. lane reason for this is that general languages
might of necessity tend to be more flexible in their construction of boundaries
than those that are tied to specific locales. The best sort of language to
export, if any, will be one that is not essentialist, one that recognises the need
to be flexible and fit language into place wherever it might end up. This anti-
essentialist form of contextuality is not inevitably tied to residence in
particular bioregionallocales. In short it is not totalising discourses per se
that are at fault but their a-contextual application.
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Next, consider whether, as Cheney suggests, close contact with specific
natural environments leads, via a meditative openness, to a mythical account
of the relations between people and the world. It is at the level of this
mythical narrative that moral norms are supposedly expressed and justified.
The suspicion that abstract theory somehow creates a barrier between the
world and our speaking of it is not only charaderistic of some postmodernists
but was common to many romantics. In general the romantic answer was to
re-privilege the feeling side of a perceived dichotomy between reason and
feeling. Attentiveness to primitive feelings was seen as an antidote to
rationally imposed structures. So for example;
"like the other Romantics, Herder idolised early language and
literature, from a time when these had still been direct expressions of
inner feeling, not yet spoiled by the sophistication of reason and
retlection.?"
Others saw the answer not in terms of inner feelings but in a meditative
openness to nature which seems very close indeed to Cheney's and
Heidegger's prescription. There can be few better examples to show the
complexity of the modern traditions lumped together by Cheney than Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. Here is a figure central to Enlightenment thought who
was also a profound Romantic. His philosophy, like Cheney's, was inspired
by an Arcadian myth of a prehistoric society rooted in nature. Meditative
openness to nature also plays an important role in Rousseau's work. In
Reveries of a Solitary Walker Rousseau provides a paradigm for letting the
world speak through him:
'The more sensitive the soul of the observer, the greater the ecstasy
37 Nicholas A. Rupke 'Caves, Fossils and the History of the Earth' p. 253.
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aroused in him by this [natural] harmony. At such times his senses are
possessed by a deep and delightful reverie, and in a state of blissful
self-abandonment he loses himself in the immensity of this beautiful
order, with which he feels himself at one. All individual objects escape
him; he sees and feels nothing but the unity of all things. His ideas
have to be restricted and his imagination limited by som~ particular
circumstances for him to observe the separate parts of this universe
which he was striving to embrace in its entirety." 38
This passage is particularly striking with its talk of self-abandonment,
sensitivity and reverie. This could be read as a romantic version of the
deconstruction of the self, the rejection of taxonomic boundaries and an
openness to the world that allows it to speak through US.39
The links between Cheney and Rousseau go deeper still. Both have very
S. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Reveries of a SOlitary Walker p. 108.
38 ibid., pp. 110-111. It is a great shame that this wor1<which was Rousseau's last seems to
have been overlooked in the literature on environmental ethics. Amongst other things it
contains beautifully expressed and witty passages on the distinction between the instrumental
and intrinsic valuation of nature. ''There is one further thing that helps to deter people of taste
from taking an interest in the vegetable kingdom. This is the habit of considering plants only as
a source of drugs and medicines ... No one imagines that the structure of plants could deserve
any attention in its own right ... Linger in some meadow studying one by one all the flowers that
adorn it, and people will take you for a herbalist and ask you for something to cure the itch in
children, scab in men, or glanders in horses ... These medicinal associations ... tarnish the
colour of the meadows and the brilliance of the flowers, they drain the woods of all freshness
and make the green leaves and shade seem dull and disagreeable... It is no use seeking
garlands for shepherdesses among the ingredients of an enema." Rousseau was also aware
of the dangers of such instrumental evaluation. "This attitude which always brings everything
back to our material interest, causing us to seek in all things either profits or remedies, and
which if we were always in good health would leave us indifferent to all the works of nature ..."
ibid., pp. 109-110.
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partial views on the advantages of primitive societies. Both over-estimate the
quality of life and degree of freedom obtainable in such societies. The well-
known depiction of the "noble savage" was itself influenced by the findings of
contemporary explorers. For example, when Bougainville brought reports of
Tahiti and its populace back to France it seemed as if a primitive Arcadia had
been found. But Bougainville himself only had the most superficial
acquaintance with the ceustomsof the islanders. That Tahitian society had
strong class and gender divisions and was adept at human sacrifice only
emerged as contacts with the culture became more prolonged. Nor were
Tahitians' relations with the natural world all that the romantics might have
envisaged. At the time of Tahiti's 'discovery' by Europeans it had a massive
population of approximately 200,000:
"A single bread-fruit tree was often owned by two or more families,
who disputed each others' rights of property over the branches.
Infanticide was habitual." 40
Closeness to nature and the absence of theoretical orthodoxy is no
guarantee of human freedom. Indeed the absence of theory may actually
I
exclude the possibility of voicing heterodoxy, of questioning the ideological
assumptions incorporated in that society's world-views, ethical values ate."
(See chapter 9.)
40 Henry Adam Tahiti p. 6. Bougainville touched only the Eastern side of Tahiti at Hitiau in
April 1768. Douglas C. Oliver Ancient Tahitian Society reports that violence was endemic and
mass rape of those females on the losing side in battle a common occurrence. "Sometimes
when a warrior felled his opponent he would beat the body to a flat pulp, cut a slit through it
large enough for his own head to pass through, and then wear it, poncho fashion as a
triumphant taunt."
41 For a detailed anthropological discussion of this question see Pierre Bourdieu Outline
of a Theory of Practice pp. 159-171.
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If there is anything to the analogy just drawn it might suggest that Cheney's
distinction between postmodernism and modernism is certainly one that is
difficult to justify on grounds of philosophical concerns. 42 Modern traditions
influence him more deeply than he admits, but the point is not to claim
Cheney for modernism. Rather what I am suggesting is that the dichotomy
between modernism and postmodernism is unconvincing.
Modernism and its context
Modernism needs to be seen in the context of its specific historical and
cultural origination. Modernisms have their own myths, no doubt in part
influenced by particular biogeographies. There is then no a priori reason
why modernism does not deserve attention as an example of the world
speaking through people, a world of artifice, no doubt, but nonetheless a part
of nature in the wider sense in which humanity is natural too. Cheney is
willing to extend this contextual privilege to some instances of modernist
discourse where the predominant influence is supposedly natural. One
42 Cheney also characterises all modernist philosophy as accepting a subject / object
divide. He endorses Paula Gunn Allen's description of the modernist position where ''there is
such a thing as determinable fact, natural - that is right explanations, - and reality that can be
determined outside the human agency of discovery and fact finding "Cheney op. cit., n. 14
above, p. 121. See also Cheney's own remarks on p. 120. Cheney's paper drastically
underrates the complexity of modern Western world-views. He rightly notes the connections
frequently found between a representational epistemology (which sees theory as a wholly
autonomous realm mirroring the world) and conceptions of a rational autonomous human
subject. But, in equating this humanism with modernity, he completely overlooks the many
alternative problematics. There are many philosophies, including that of Althusser, which deny
just these humanist presuppositions but which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
termed postmodern.
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example is Aldo Leopold's land ethic which states "A thing is right when it
tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It
is wrong when it tends otherwise." 43 Cheney sees this ethic as in part
formed by a rootedness in the Sand Counties of Wisconsin, but there is no
doubt that it is meant to apply beyond Wisconsin's boundaries. It is therefore
a "colonising discourse", in the sense Cheney gives to this phrase and, as a
principle abstracted from the practice in which it originated and theoretically
prescribing our relations to the world, it must also be considered totalising.
Can other modernist claims be seen as analogously rooted? Why can
modernism's totalising discourses not be regarded as instances of particular
places operating, in Cheney's words, "all the way up"? The answers to these
questions lie in Cheney's acceptance of the particular set of hard and fast
homologies outlined earlier. He has not yet begun the work of social
negotiation for his own culture because his overt acceptance of the
naturelculture and modern/postmodern dichotomies will not allow thls." To
escape the necessity for a constant recontextualising of social discourse he
43 Aldo Leopold A Sand County Almanac pp. 224-225.
44 In a different context Cheney has asked a similar question. "Mightwe listen with the
same ear to the residents of Harlem (or to the corporate executives engaged in the destruction
of the old-growth forests) with which we listen to the voices of a tall-grass prairie in southern
Wisconsin? What would such a listening be like?" He seems to think that we might and must
achieve this listening. "Even the strategies of the colonisers must be understood ecologically.
They are not to be understood or condemned using timeless and ahistorically "true" criteria."
Unfortunately he does not seem to have realised the implications of this answer for his own
methodology. He criticises Deep Ecology-for "its [modernist] dualistic opposition of
anthropocentric and ecological consciousness" and its acontextuality whilst working with just
such rigid dualisms himseH. Jim Cheney 'The Neo-Stoicism of Radical Environmentalism' pp.
317- 318.
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depends upon an idealised picture of a timeless natural environment and
opposes this the historicised artificial environment of our cities. But this
division is merely a continuation of a myth that is undoubtedly modernist in
origin, even in his own terms. For, if modernism is that which broke the
connections between the human, qua abstract subject, and the world, then
the nature / culture division upon which Cheney relies is very much a
modernist creation."
Cheney's Arcadian myth of a primitive people rooted in nature is allied to a
utopian vision of a return to contextuality with the advent of postmodernism.
But what does this mean for the majority of people who live in urban and
agricultural environments? Is it impossible for place to speak through
mediating subjects in modern cultures? To be sure, the city environment is
not one populated with salmon, unless they lie cold on the supermarket slab,
but it is populated with its own ecology of cars preying upon pedestrians, the
rich upon the poor. In Britain we live in an environment with no wilderness
left. All the geography and landscapes are human influenced, yet the land,
its history and its occupants.furman and otherwise can still speak through us.
Like Cheney I can speak out against the horrors of the city and against much
of the history that made me. We are free to produce our own myths or
alternatively we are all tied to producing the myths of our personal place.
Each of us is a product of our particular place in the world, a product whose
place can be described in terms of geography, history, family, biology and so
.5 The intuitive obviousness of this culture/nature dichotomy is being broken down in many
respects. Bill Mckibben suggests that with the advent of the greenhouse effect and ozone
depletion we see The End of Nature. Human influence is now so widespread as to preclude
the existence of untouched wilderness.
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forth, a product that is also to a degree self-constructed, internally motivated
etc. The world does not just speak through us, we also form an active part of
To the extent that we are a product of a particular society at a certain
historical period (a social formation), both the theoreticaVmythic pictures we
draw and our everyday actions are ideologically infused. There is no reason
why theories, like myths, cannot be seen as an expression (rather than a
representation) of a particular modern place. Correspondingly theory also
forms an important part of the modern environment which can be
ideologically incorporated at the very heart of the individual. Our dispositions
and ethical values are constructed in, influenced by, and in turn influence
place (including our theoretical place). Insofar as such values and
perspectives are theoretically articulated they attain a relative paradigmatic
autonomy but remain open to transformative criticism inspired by alternative
theoretical expressions and by practical experiences of the non-human and
the non-theorised.
The importance of place is not an invention of postmodernism, rather the
opposite. But "place" in this sense has to be something much wider than
Cheney's bioregionalism. He excludes important aspects of Martin and
Mohanty's multi-faceted conception of the contextual background of
discourse which they term home. Their original concept included
46 Cheney's reduction of individuals to vectors of a mythological language originating in
natural structures can be seen as a naturally grounded version of the social anti-humanism
promoted by structural-Marxists such as Althusser. It similarly underestimates the degree of
individual human autonomy.
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"geography, demography and architecture, as well as the configuration of ...
relationships to particular people" 47 that is, elements of both 'nature' and
'culture'. But Cheney's conception of bioregionality puts exclusive emphasis
on the importance of 'natural' contexts. It might therefore be appropriate to
question his bioregional foundationalism by re-privileging one of Martin and
Mohanty's "cultural" elements, namely architecture. Let us do this through an
examination of the following remarks of Le Corbusier, unquestionably a
doyen of modernism:
"Every modern man has the mechanical sense. The feeling for
mechanics exists and is justified by our daily activities. This feeling in
regard to machinery is one of respect, gratitude and esteem.
Machinery includes economy as an essential factor leading to minute
selection. There is a moral sentiment in the feeling for mechanics.
The man who is intelligent, cold and calm has grown wings to
himself." 48
Here are all the hallmarks of modern (humanist) discourse, the emphasis
upon the abstract human subject and "his" calculating rationality, the
reference to essentialfactors inherent within machinery etc. However, from
another perspective it can be read as a piece of contextual writing upon the
condition of a group of people placedwithin a modern environment. It states
that the world "speaking through" these particularly placed people is such
that they come to regard some of the mechanical constituents of that world in
a moral light, come to entertain a certain epistemology, engage in particular
practices and so on. In this world even machinery can be spoken of in
47Cheney op. cit., n. 14 above, p. 126.
48Le Corbusier Towards a New Architecture pp. 115-119.
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ethical terms. Our ethical values have come to incorporate our practical
relations to the modern world and Le Corbusier can, in this sense, be seen
as a mythographer of modernity. As Walter Gropius states - modern
architecture in all its abstraction can also be spoken of in terms of its
expression of the relations inherent in the social formation.
"...although the outward forms of the New Architecture differ
fundamentally in an organic sense from those of the old, they are not
the personal whims of a handful of architects avid for innovation at all
cost, but simply the inevitable logical product of the intellectual, social
and technical conditions of our age." 49
The problem for Cheney is this: if al/ geographical (or wider) environments,
are admitted to be influential, to speak through people, then how can he
privilege the natural and its concomitant contextual (geographically
speaking) discourse above artificial (and sometimes totalising) discourse?
His only recourse is one which sees any discourse espousing opposition to
"modernism" as being privileged just because it is oppositional. Although
this allows almost any position whatsoever to be positionally privileged
(given a certain characterisation of modernism) it provides no grounds at all
for taking these views as objectively right. It is merely to admit that all
discourse comes from place. But this is precisely what he seems to deny in
lOWalter Gropius The New Architecture of the Bauhaus p. 18. In this respect perhaps one
could also note Marx's remark that "Within the division of labour [social] relationships are bound
to acquire independent existence in relation to individuals. All relations can be expressed in
language only in the form of concepts. That these general ideas and concepts are looked
upon as mysterious forces is the necessary result of the fact that the real relations, of which
they are the expression, have acquired independent existence." Kart Marx The German
Ideology p. 406.
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the case of modernism.
Cheney is caught in a bind because, despite his standpoint epistemology, he
is loath to admit that there is no way of being objectively right. To make such
an admission in no way lessens the importance nature might have for us nor
does it entail that we should worship machines. Nor need this admission
weaken criticism of those forms of foundationalism which aim to prove that
nature is not morally considerable. The paradox of Cheney's paper lies in its
attempt to privilege an oppositional mythical narrative (i.e. his own theory).
This opposes the general tendency of his thought towards a much more
radical positionality: a relational view of taxonomy and discourse which
would see "nature" as "one more player [amongst many] in the construction
of community". The reason for the aporia is Cheney's desire to see an
environmentally-friendly stance, one that maintains close connections with
nature, as being objectively correct. The "correct" stance towards the
environment would be a myth able to transcend boundaries and cultures.
Insofar as his position depends crucially upon the opposition of 'contextual'
myth to totalising and foundational discourse he must be judged inconsistent.
By contrast a wider and less constrained positionality than Cheney's has
great potential. Such an account would not be identical with a cultural
relativism of the kind which holds that one ethic cannot be judged better than
another. Such anthropological relativism takes cultures as isolated and
essentially incommensurable. A modest positionality, on the other hand,
would suggest that there may be similarities and differences at all levels.
Moral values in different communities might converge due to similarities in
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geography, biology, cultural practices, problematics, histories or any
combination of these or other aspects of "place".
In terms of the modest account it would be possible to develop a conception
of place with similarities to Wittgenstein's idea of forms of life. Form of life
would not just be a narrowly defined concept grounded in either human
culture or the natural world but would include instead a wider conception of
community including all relevant aspects of past and present environment.
Humans tend to have similarities with each other on many levels in their
practical as well as discursive encounters with the world and these
similarities make communication possible. Without similarities at some level
discourse becomes impossible but communication also entails a meeting of
places, an expression of different perspectives.
Human social practices, including discursive practices, do not just exist in
place but themselves form a part of place. As Hans Peter Duerr states
"the questions that have meaning within a particular form of life are not
determined by that way of life, but constitute themselves elements of
life of that world view." 50
We can expand Wittgenstein's concept to provide a vague perspectival
standpoint where forms of life are to be seen as the background in which and
against which humans function as nodes of positionallty" A broadly similar
interpretation to that offered by Lynne Rudder Baker who, to reiterate, writes:
&0 Hans Pater Duerr, Dreamtime. Concerning the Boundary between Wilderness and
Civilisation p. 96.
5, Cheney alludes to this view of the positional subject in the work of Linda Alcott. op. cit.,
n. 44 above, p. 318.
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"[t]he idea of a form of life emerges as the result of a kind of
transcendental argument: We have language that we use to
communicate; ....... meaning requires a community. 'Form of life' is
Wittgenstein's way of designating what it is about a community that
makes possible meaning. Given this role of the idea of a form of life, it
is hardly surprising that little meaningfully can be said about it." 52
In this sense we can treat Wittgenstein's statement that "[w]hat has to be
accepted, the given, is - so one could say - Forms of life"53 in a much less
anthropocentric and sociological way than is usual. Such an admittedly
vague form of totalising but anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist myth
seems a more promising ground for understanding the complexities of
morality than any narrow concept like bioregionalism. We can see that
bioregionalism is only one amongst many aspects of community which we
can use to recontextualise social discourse. Finally, this positional holism
does not reduce the human subject to a completely functional role as the
voice of nature. To quote Duerr once more:
"[i]t seems a mistake on which extreme relativists and dogmatists of
the 'transcendental' bent agree to be convinced that the form of
life is the framework in the strict sense of the word within which all
questions have to find their meaning.
Dogmatists tend to hold .... that we do not think the myths but the myths
think themselves in us." 54
52 Lynne Rudder Baker 'On the Very Idea of a Form of Life' and see chapter 5 of this
thesis
53 Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophicallnvestigationsp. 226e.
54 Duerr op. clt., n. 50 above, p. 97.
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It is ironic, important and probably not accidental that there is a current re-
emphasis of context in philosophy. This has occurred at a moment in history
when global uniformity is proclaimed from the offices of governments and
powerful multinationals. When all place comes to mean to anyone is how
close one is to the nearest MacDonald's the totalising discourse of mass-
communication, of television and radio, will have triumphed. We will not be
free even to create our own modernist myths but will have them created for
us by the commercial exploiters of our planet encouraging us to join them in
the death of the "natural" world.
The most devastating myth we are fed is that of economic humanism, the
reduction of all value to economic value, determined by a "free" market of
isolated selfish individuals. This myth has already become a part of the
ideological place of many people. But perhaps we can resist it if our position
is such that we are able to see the over-simplified essentialist nature of its
discourse. To this extent I agree with Cheney, not in the privilege accorded to
this opposition but in its necessity for those who have and wish to promulgate
different world-views. In this sense those of us who value nature for itself
cannot but oppose this particular modernist myth. However, whilst insisting
upon the value of nature, we must forgo any claim to step outside of ideology,
to obtain a transcendental perspective via privileged access to nature and
the natural. Instead, the strength of the environmentalists' argument must be
seen in its coming from many places to similar conclusions, in the
overdetermination of natural value and the overdetermination of
environmental policies and decisions.
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CHAPTER 9: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND COMMUNITy
This concluding chapter will attempt to weave together some of the threads
which have run through previous sections, namely, the epistemological
critique of "representationalism", the subject / object dichotomy,notions of
"subjective rationality" and "objective science", the concept of "ideology",
ideas of "social practice" and "production" and the deconstruction of the
'humanist subject'. It is no accident that these concerns come together in the
social theory and anthropology of Pierre Bourdieu, who is heavily influenced
by both Marxism and the later Wittgenstein. His work can be seen as a
contemporary response to the extreme structuralism of Levi-Strauss and the
early Althusser. Bourdieu's primary aim is to transcend the structure / agency
debate without rejecting the insights that structuralism provides.
"I wanted, so to speak, to reintroduce agents that Levi-Strauss and the
structuralists, among others Althusser, tended to abolish, making them
into simple epiphenomena of structure. And I mean agents, not
subjects." ,
Bourdieu's work attempts to overcome this structure / agency dichotomy in.
two ways. First he attacks the epistemological perspectives he associates
with each of these conceptions. He claims that phenomenologists and
structuralists conceive of their own theoretical activity as giving subjective
and objective accounts of society respectively. Insofar as they do this
Bourdieu claims that they have fundamentally misunderstood their
theoretical relationship to their 'objects' of study. Second, he posits a theory
'Pierre Bourdieu In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology p. 9. In this
sense at least Bourdieu is engaged in that same project as the work of the later AHhusser and
Sartre. See chapter 7. For a useful introductory account of Bourdieu see Derek Robbins
The Work of Pierre Bourdieu : Recognising Society and Richard Jenkins Pierre Bourdieu ..
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of social production and reproduction which neither privileges the individual
social actor nor reduces her to merely a support of the social structure. His
aim is
"... to construct the theory of practice, or more precisely, the theory of
the mode of generation of practices, which is the precondition for
establishing an experimental science of the dialectic of the
internalisation of externality and the externalisation of internality, or,
more simply, of incorporation and objectification." 2
That is, Bourdieu reconceptualises social theory so as to make the
production and reproduction of values central to both theoretical and
empirical investigation. He rejects the objective and subjective categories
which have moulded past debates in favour of a problematic which is
reflexively aware of its own origins. This problematic refuses to think in terms
of humanist categories, it is both a critique of them and an alternative to
them. It is not, as the following section attempts to illustrate, a version of a
naive structuralism but is as opposed to reductive concepts of structure as it
is to the autonomous agency of liberal humanism.
The Epistemological Critique
The translator of Bourdieu's Outline of a Theory of Practice, Richard Nice,
claims that Bourdieu's work is best understood as a response to and
rejection of structuralism. He warns readers to avoid thinking of Bourdieu as
a structuralist; for "...nothing guarantees that, for some readers, the work,
written against the currents at present dominant in France, "structuralism" or
2 Pierre Bourdieu Outline of a Theory of Practice p. 72.
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"structural-Marxism" will not be merged with the very tendencies it combats."
3 Yet, despite Nice's warning, there does remain a genetic and theoretical
linkage with structuralism in more than one sense. Bourdieu leans heavily
upon the insights that structuralist anthropology has provided and his work
emerges out of the same philosophical and anthropological problematics
and the same epistemology of science which so influenced Althusser. In
particular, like Althusser, Bourdieu is indebted to Gaston Bachelard.
Bachelard's concept of the epistemological break, so vital to Althusser,
survives in Bourdieu, as a break not between science and ideology but
between different conceptions of epistemology, different understandings of
the status of scientific and theoretical knowledqs.'
First Bourdieu criticises those phenomenological accounts of social theory
where the only justifiable explanation of a social activity is that which the
participants in that society might provide. To accept these explanations at
face value is to believe that the social world is entirely transparent to those
occupying it, and to hold that people can give a 'true' account of the
motivations behind their every action. (Insofar as phenomenological
I
sociology does this it resurrects elements of the Cartesian and humanist
subject.)
Second, Bourdieu criticises those accounts which see anthropology,
sociology etc. as providing objective and true accounts from the supposedly
privileged point of view of a scientific observer. Bourdieu associates these
objectivist pretensions with scientific structuralism (e.g. the work of Levi-
:IRichard Nice in Bourdieu ibid., p. viii.
4 See chapters 3 and 4 for an account of the epistemological break.
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. Strauss, who claims to uncover the underlying structures of social
organisation) and views such structuralism as fundamentally flawed.5 The
problem with structuralism as practised by Levi-Strauss does not lie in its
rejection of phenomenology and the philosophy of the humanist subject, but
in its selective amnesia about its own origins. One cannot simply conceive of
theory as a process of uncovering the truth, an opus operatum, but must
rather see that science (qua theoretical practice) is itself a particular form of
life - a modus operandi. Despite rejecting 'scientism' Bourdieu claims that
such an 'objectivist' epistemological perspective forms an inevitable stage in
the break from phenomenology - a break which is necessary before one can
start to understand events in their social and historical context. A naive
structuralism retains a positivistic and representationalist belief in the
objective position of the scientific observer. The greatest mistake of
objectivism is to constitute "...practical activity as an object of observation
and analysis, a representation." 6 Instead we should understand theory as a
particular form of practical activity relative to our own social framework.
Theory does not represent objects but is an expression of the practical
interaction of the theoretician with their surrounding environment. Bourdieu
I
thus believes that a second epistemological break is required to create a
social theory with an epistemology based in social practice. One must break
with the objectivist pretensions of structuralism as well as the subjectivist
g Claude Levi-Strauss Structural Anthropology.
6 Bourdieu op. clt., n. 2 above, p. 2.
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assumptions of phenomenology.'
One can imagine these alternative accounts of human dispositions as
follows. An anthropologist wishes to investigate the value systems of a
particular culture. She can understand the epistemological status of her own
research in a number of ways and these different understandings are
reflected in the methodology she chooses to use. The phenomenological, or
ethnomethodological, approach would claim that those engaged in activities
have a privileged understanding of those practices through their
phenomenological experience of them. This being so it might be thought
that the correct methodology is to record the explanations given by members
of the culture being studied for their values, dispositions etc., this would
reflect the belief that they, and only they know what they are doing. By
contrast the naive structuralist or objectivist account claims that the
anthropologist is, by her position as dispassionate observer, able to uncover
the real underlying reasons why members of that culture behave in particular
ways, whether these reasons are psychological, environmental, historical
etc. From this perspective the explanations given by those observed are
7 Bourdieu is mistaken in interpreting aI/structuralist theories as exhibiting a naive
representationalism. As chapter three endeavoured to show, Althusser's epistemological
position is much more complex than this generalisation would allow. Indeed, this objectivist
epistemology, which Althusser associates with positivism, is one of the grounds on which he
denies that he is a "structuralist". There is a genuine, but largely unnoticed, communality of
thought between Althusser and Bourdieu in their wish to break with epistemologies of
objectivism and subjectivism - to break with naive humanism. However there is also no doubt
that Bourdieu rejects Althusser's attempts to reconstitute and re-privilege science as a
completely autonomous practice. Instead he emphasises the historical particularity ot current
scientific practices and the ideological background which this privileged view ot science
assumes. In this respect Bourdieu's analysis of science could be said to be very close to the
criticisms already made of Althusser. (See p. )Bourdieu's conception tits well with a view of
sciences as relatively autonomous forms ot social practice.
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only superficial rationalisations of their particular cultural milieu. They lack
the ability to see their practices in a wider context. This form of objectivist
account is provided both by structuralists and of course by earlier
anthropologists working within a positivist framework. It is, for example, the
position taken by J. G. Frazer in the Golden Bough who claims to have
deduced the historical origin and underlying events responsible for the
creation of the myths he investigates.8
The Wittgenstienian critique of objectivism, which has heavily influenced
Bourdieu, would claim that such an account ignores the position of the
anthropologist as a 'prisoner' of her own cultural milieu i.e., that of Western
society in general and more particularly of a particular scientific 'culture'
within that society." It is impossible for the anthropologist to escape her own
presuppositions, to take a position from nowhere. Thus the scientific
explanation is always the construction of the anthropologist's practical
activity, of her own and her culture's relations to any other culture. This
explains why other members of the anthropologist's own culture find her
explanations convincing.
So, although Bourdieu praises structuralism for its break with
phenomenology, for making space for ''theory'' as a form of understanding
beyond that given by direct experience, this break does not, by itself, provide
a warrant for its epistemological assertions. What is required is a second
epistemological break where a science like anthropology (and indeed any
theoretical field) comes to see itself as a historically and culturally specific
8 James George Frazer The Go/den Bough.
S See chapter 4.
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practice in a dialectical relationship with its subject matter. Any account of
social theory needs to take into account the theoretician's own practical
interactions with the material of her study and the propositions upon which
that practice is based. This second epistemological break entails the
reflexive recognition that theories produced to explain actions, values etc.
incorporate the social structures of the observer's society as well as those to
be observed. The presuppositions inherent in Western anthropology form
an integral part of the theoretical picture which emerges from its study of any
other society no matter how disparate from our own. Anthropology is a
cultural practice which actively produces a knowledge tied to its particular
practical interactions with alternative cultures (or sub-cultures). Of course
this point about anthropology can be extended to theoretical discourses in
general, including philosophy.
Bourdieu's analysis points to a further problem for any social philosophy.
Starting from the complexity of the social situation and the dialectical relation
of the observer to the observed he argues that mechanistically construed
ideas of underlying structures or rules governing behaviour are impossibly
simplistic. The structuralist project of uncovering the real objective
processes and associations underlying social behaviour is bound to fail: it is
reductive, rigid, and entails a synchronic perspective which ignores the
dynamic context of actual social actions. Whereas phenomenology
"...excludes the question of its own posstbllity"," structuralism freezes
practical activity in a timeless and a-contextual discourse. It ignores the
dynamism of social processes by producing a fixed map which is supposed
to represent reality. In doing so it reifies knowledge produced in a dialectic
10 Bourdieu op. cit., n. 2 above, p. 3.
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which says as much about the culture of the theoretician as about that of the
society it studies. In some senses this latter form of synchronisation is
inevitable "...[b]ecause science is possible only in a relation to time which is
opposed to that of practice it tends to ignore time and, in doing so, reify
practices."" Bourdieu claims that this very science and its frozen
synchronistic presentation of its theoretical content is a product of a modern
society which is itself held together by synchronic and explicit rules. This
analysis of modernity has obvious affinities with those of Weber and the
Frankfurt School. (See chapter 1 and below.)
Bourdieu's Concept of Habitus
In keeping with his reflexive epistemology of social theory, Bourdieu rejects
the usual explanations of the regularities produced and reproduced in social
formations. Such regularities are frequently explained in terms of 'rules'.
Here, as elsewhere, there is a tendency to fall back into a discourse of
subjectivity and objectivity: to see 'rules' either as consciously formulated by
individuals and transparent to them, or as underlying structures recognised
and expressed by the anthropologist. Bourdieu spurns both these
alternatives and, developing a conception of rules similar to that found in the
later Wittgenstein, he introduces a looser conception whereby such rules are
no longer to be envisaged as consciously formulated limits on social action
but rather ideologically incorporated and open ended strategies. Bourdieu's
strategies are the embodiment of Wittgenstein's 'rules' qua flexible
II ibid., p. 9.
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dlsposltlons." Strategies, unlike explicit rules, are not concrete artifacts
applied to situations by rote. The members of any given society usually have
no need of such rules, instead they have a feel for the social field in which
they exist; an 'unconscious' ability to act within the expected bounds of that
field. Just as. for example, a football player may exhibit a mastery of the
game by knowing when to pass or when to shoot at goal without ever
following explicit laws on such matters.
This feel for the game is incorporated into the individual through her
immersion in society. Our behaviour is not to be understood as driven by
hard and fast laws but as the product of dispositions "inculcated in the
earliest years of life and constantly reinforced by calls to order from the
group, that is to say, from the aggregate of the individuals endowed with the
same dispositions, to whom each is linked by his dispositions and
interests.'?' The anthropological or sociological observer may express the
perceived patterns of these dispositions in terms of rules, but no such rules
actually exist - one must not make the mistake of reifying the results of
scientific practice as existing entities. Where explicit rules do exist in other
societies, they exist only as a second line of defence "intended to make
good the occasional misfiring of the collective enterprise of inculcation" 14
We must try not to impose the pattern of our own, rule governed society, upon
those which are strategy driven. (For Bourdieu the reification of the
conception of human behaviour entailed in the view of humans as
expressions of Homo economicus represents just such an imposition.)
12 Thus when I refer to rules in this chapter I mean explicit formulations not the
Wittgenstienian conception.
13 Bourdieu op. cit., n. 2. above, p. 15.
14 ibid., p. 17.
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This system of dispositions transmitted from generation to generation is
referred to as the 'habitus'. This generative habitus is, Bourdieu explains, a
"series of dispositions acquired through experience, thus variable from place
to place and time to tlms"," a form of practical sense which operates without
the necessary mediacy of conscious thought but which is nonetheless not a
simple application of a set of a-contextual abstract rules. This difference
might be expressed in terms of the difference between the spontaneous
improvisation of an actor and the explanatory framework which the audience
constructs to explain her activities. Where the actor's activities and language
flow unconsciously by dint of her feelings for the situation of her character
etc., the audience tends to impose a rigid and inflexible storyline onto the
acting by dint of their relation qua audience to what unfolds before them."
They posit specific reasons as the cause of her actions. By contrast, the term
"habitus" stresses the importance of a practical capacity. Each society and
field within that society has a habitus which individuals incorporate and
reproduce.
"The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of regulated
improvisation, produces practices which tend to reproduce the
regularity immanent in the objective conditions of their generative
principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective
potentialities in the situation ..." 17
In other words, the habitus is a dynamic immanent structure which
15 Bourdieu op. cit., n.1 above, p. 9.
16 Of course this improvisation does not spring from nowhere but is a product of inculcated
dispositions.
17 Bourdieu op. cit., n. 1. above, p. 78.
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imperfectly reproduces the social relations of its past in the strategies of
members of future generations.18 It does not induce knee-jerk or mechanical
reactions to events but rather instils creative dispositions, bounded by limits
imposed by social conditioning but at the same time mediating a whole
variety of reactions to what must always in some respects be the unique
circumstances in which individuals find themselves.
"Action is not the mere carrying out of a rule, or obedience to a rule.
Social agents, in archaic societies as well as in ours, are not automata
regulated like clocks, in accordance with laws which they do not
understand. In the most complex games, matrimonial exchange for
instance, or ritual practices, they put into action the incorporated
principles of a generative habitus: ...." 19
The habitus is a feature not only of entire cultures, but of fields of social
activity within those cultures. (These "fields" of activity playa very similar role
in Bourdieu's problematic to forms of life in Wittgenstein's later theory. See
chapter S.) Bourdieu's conception of social practice brings together aspects
of both Marxist-Structuralism and Wittgenstein. Society is composed of a
j
number of fields, which can be seen as relatively autonomous social
practices, each one with an internal practical logic, its own approaches and
concerns, habits and expectations, and usually its own linguistic terminology
and discursive patterns. The concept of a ''field'' thus plays a similar, but
more restricted role than that of "form of life", but retains a non-essentialist
notion of interconnectedness on a number of levels which together produce
distinguishable practices. Each field has its own habitus and this habitus
18 For an account of the concept of an immanent structure see chapter 3.
19 Bourdieu op. cit., n. 1 above, p. 9.
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guarantees the mutual intelligibility of each member's actions and speech.
"One of the fundamental effects of the construction of the habitus is
the production of a common-sense world endowed with the
objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning (sens) of practices
and the world .... The homogeneity of the habitus ... causes practices
and words to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence
taken for granted." 20
Thus we can also see Bourdieu's "habitus" as the mode of operation of
ideology - as those aspects of the social structure which are incorporated
into the very being of individuals within a particular social formation or field
within that formation. With the concept of habitus Bourdieu has developed a
radical critique of the humanist subject. Individual subjects are no longer the
transcendental autonomous foundations of human societies but exist within
a specific social context which impregnates their every action in daily life. At
the same time Bourdieu's problematic provides a mechanism or site for the
functioning of ideology. The habitus expresses "....the necessity, the
constraint of social conditions and conditionings, right in the very heart of the
'subject' ...." 21 Bourdieu's theory also has the advantage of reintroducing the
temporal axis lost in the synchronic structuralism of Levi-Strauss (and to a
lesser extent Althusser), re-emphasising both the dynamic and dialectical
nature of the theory and the interpenetration of the individual in her social
context. Bourdieu has produced by his own account a "genetic structuralism"
where "agents participate in accordance with their position in the social
space and with the mental structures through which they apprehend this
2°Bourdieu op. cit., n. 2 above, p. 80.
21 Bourdieu op. cit., n. 1 above, p. 15.
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space." 22
Like "ideology" in Althusser's problematic, the habitus plays a role as an
explanatory term which links the reproduction of the social structure with the
production of new individuals who incorporate that structure within
themselves. Thus the habitus is not only the generative principle of the
individual's dispositions, but also the 'social cement' which binds those
individuals together in the matrix of social relations. The habitus becomes a
second nature incorporated into the very being of the people composing that
field.23 Thus by placing the concept of the habitus at centre stage Bourdieu
hopes to overcome the unnecessary extremes of humanism and structuralist
antl-humanism."
"One of the points I would stress ... is the need to move beyond
couples of oppositions ... For example, on the one hand, you have
humanism, which at least has the merit of of inciting one to move
closer to people. But they are not real people. On the other hand, you
have theoreticians who are a million miles away from reality and
people as they are. The Althusserians were typical of that attitude."
As Bourdieu states, the "use of the notion of habitus .... can be understood as
a way of escaping from the choice between a structuralism without subject
22ibid., p.14.
23This term "second nature" is often used as a synonym for ideology - for the
unquestioned and unquestionable presuppositions which form the framwork for practical
activities. For example this ideological conception of 'second nature' plays a central role in the
environmental philosophy of Murray Bookchin and the ecofeminism of Janet Biehl. Murray
Bookchin The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays in Dialectical Naturalism, and Janet Biehl
Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics.
2. Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Chambordon & Jean-Claud Passeron The Craft of
Sociology: Epistemological Preliminariespp. 251-252.
II )
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and the philosophy of the subject." 25
The Habitus. Codification and Ideology.
Bourdieu develops a sophisticated form of cultural relativism whereby the
ideological presuppositions of one society determine, at least in part, the
interpretation and understanding that can be achieved of other societies.
Bourdieu produces an epistemological critique of anthropological and
sociological understanding focusing upon its inadequate conception of its
own relations to the 'objects' of its study. He then proceeds to formulate an
alternative way of understanding the apparent regularity of social relations,
as ordered by strategies rather than as the result of following explicit rules.
This underlies the way in which the epistemological presuppositions of a
problematic are an integral part of the accounts given of the world by that
problematic. It emphasises the dialectical construction of knowledge. The
rules that anthropologists claim to find can be interpreted as the result of our
imposing the mode of juridical social regulation and formal rationality of our
own modern society onto others - i.e. a result of unreflexive anthropological
practices which take no account of their own social origins. We naturally and
unthinkingly take such rules as a model for the regulation of all other
societies. But, once we have become aware of this tendency the possibility
of our escaping this cultural imposition arises (although, ine_vitably we cannot
be aware of and avoid all such impositions). Thus Bourdieu might be seen
as advocating a kind of critical hermeneutics. If one's epistemology rejects
25 Bourdieu op. cit., n. 1 above, p. 10.
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any possibility of exhuming rules, as Bourdieu's does, then we need other
hypotheses to account for the maintenance and reproduction of social order
found in other societies. This is the role of the "habitus" in Bourdieu's
proble matico26
This whole approach hinges upon a particular analysis of modernity and a
corresponding analysis of ancient societies which, in one way at least, sees
them as quite different. Bourdieu claims that in ancient societies there are
very few explicit rules, that society is regulated by the reproduction of the
habitus within a shared but largely unspoken world-view," Ancient
societies can operate in this way because they are more culturally
homogeneous. In Tonnies' terminology we are dealing with community
(Gemeinschaft) rather than a society or association (Gesellschaft). Bourdieu
refers to the experience of this unspoken world-view as a doxa. Traditional
societies have a communal doxa.
"...in the extreme case, that is to say, when there is a quasi-perfect
correspondence between the objective order and the subjective
principles of organisation (as in ancient societies) the natural and
I
social world appears as self-evident. This experience we shall call
doxa, so as to distinguish it from orthodox and heterodox belief
26 This is not to claim that the habitus is itself an objective representation of ancient
societies, it is of course the product of Bourdieu's own ideological assumptions, of the break
with the positivistic conception of rules. The break with empiricism (in Althusser's very wide
use of the term) does not mean that one must abjure from theoretical speculation, but it does
diminish the persuasive power of certain humanist kinds of theoretical account.
27 Bourdieu admits that there are some explicit norms, e.g. proverbs in ancient societies,
but claims that these norms are rarely obeyed. One might of course make just such a point
about most of the explicit norms in our own society e.g. speed limits on roads. It is important to
notice the links here with Weber and the Frankfurt School's theses about the peculiar formal
rationality of modern society
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implying awareness and recognition of the possibilities of different or
antagonistic beliefs." 28
In traditional societies power distribution and social values are relatively
uncontested; they are untheorised and so largely unquestionable, forming
the second nature of all who live in that community. As Eagleton puts it,
paraphrasing Bourdieu, "What matters in such societies is what 'goes
without saying' which is determined by tradition; and tradition is always
'silent', not least about itself." 29 Of course, this concept of a communal doxa
also expresses a very similar view of pre-modern cultures to the neo-
Aristotelian conception of communities of shared virtues and ethical values
propounded by Macintyre and Taylor. The incorporation of the habitus to
reproduce communities structured by a common doxa is then one mode of
operation of ideology - it reproduces a form of life and its associated
dispositions and values in a manner such that they remain unquestioned
and unquestionable, - stable over many generations and relatively
unchanging. Non-conformity would be rare in such a society since all are
inculcated by the same habitus and incorporate the same world-view. The
,
relatively static nature of such societies means that the relations between
various practices within the society are fixed in respect of each other, thus the
tensions between different experiences of social life are kept to a minimum.
Where tensions do exist, as they frequently do due to the different practices
associated with certain roles, e.g. in the disparate roles played by men and
women, they are experienced by both parties as part of an unchangeable
natural ordering of the world. These social inequalities are built into the
28 Bourdieu op. cit., n. 2 above, p. 164.
2iTerry Eagleton Ideology: An Introductionp. 157.
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system at its very roots. Ethical values are stable and shared by all members
of society in respect of their given roles in that society. There is little need for,
or possibility of, ethical and meta-ethical speculation. (This is important, for
naive primitivisms like Cheney's promise to oppose the destructive activities
of modern society only at the cost of re-imposing these fundamental
constraints on individual expressions of difference.) Indeed, Bourdieu
claims, there is little need for theory at all in traditional societies. The
transmission of the habitus occurs through the experience of practices
themselves rather than through the medium of theoretical discourse. Bodily
communication performs a much more important function - "bodily nexis: is
incorporated directly into the individual's dispositions.
"80 long as the work of education is not clearly institutionalised as a
specific practice ... the essential part of the modus operandiwhich
defines practical mastery is transmitted in practices, in its practical
state, without attaining the level of discourse." 30
Our deportment, body language, and forms of life are incorporated and
reproduced without being theoretically articulated as we are brought up and
interpellated into certain communally recognised niches.
I
All of this changes radically in modern society. The homogeneous
community is fragmented by continuous and rapid change and by the
proliferation of disparate practices. The increasing complexity of society and
the increasing specialisation seen within it diminishes the degree to which
everyday practical life can be shared by all members of that society. Each
has to find some method of communicating her values and dispositions if the
society is to continue to function, for the values and dispositions which
30 Bourdieu op. cit., n. 2. above, p. 87.
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develop within these relatively autonomous fields of society may be radically
different. As they can no longer be inculcated through direct experience of
those practices the spoken and written word together with other methods of
mass communication come to mediate between increasingly isolated
individuals, each enveloped within, and formed by, her own unique place in
a set of social fields. Inculcation can no longer occur simply by practical
participation in society without the mediacy of theoretical discourse and
formal education systems. Discourse in general and theoretical discourse in
particular becomes the primary mode of operation of ideology. (Although
Bourdieu would not necessarily express the difference in terms of
ideology.)31 But as theory become the locus of ideological transmission,
discourse has to codify practices that were previously experienced through
other levels of society. Explicit rules become more and more necessary to
maintain social coherence as the doxa is challenged and dispersed."
The doxa is challenged in times of social crisis - when a gap opens between
practical experience and the doxa - when common-sense presuppositions
no longer seem to hold true. Theory then steps into the place of doxa and
I
forms a second line of defence of tradition, a holding action until a new doxa
can develop.
"It is when the social world loses its character as a natural
phenomenon that the question of the natural or conventional
3' Bourdieu's repudiates the term "ideology" because he claims that it both lacks specificity
and is otten treated as synonomous with false consciousness.
32 Bourdieu's contrast here seems to rely upon a rather loose use of the term "discourse"
which might be thought to conflate meanings such as a) language of any kind, b) the
formulation of explicit rules and c) the formulations of theory qua a product of theoretical
practice. See here my comments below.
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character ... of social facts can be posed." 33
In societies like our own which are in a constant state of flux, that move from
crisis to crisis, then theory has to take an increasingly active role. It does this
by codifying practical experience, reducing it to clear, simple, basic formulae
which because of their simplicity and generality are communicable between
members of that society. It thus ensures a minimal degree of communality.
To codify is to come to regulate social practices by formal rules - to objectify
the previously unspoken doxa in a juridical discourse. "Codification is an
operation of symbolic ordering, or of the maintenance of the symbolic
order ..". 34 As more and more of the society's activities become objectified in
this way, the doxa becomes less influential and theory becomes a site of
conflict, where experiences of practices clash with, or agree with, the
expression given to or denied to them in theoretical practice. The implicit
doxa is replaced by an explicit orthodoxy which because it no longer has the
unquestioning consent associated with the doxa, can be challenged by
explicit heterodoxies.
A process of increasing codification has engulfed society such that it now
exerts an influence throughout the modern social formation. It is expressed
in an understanding of theory as a representation of the 'external world'. As
theory becomes more abstract and autonomous it begins to picture itself as a
world apart from practice, a world of pure thought mirroring that which is
external to the mind." At the same time the dissolution of the doxa and the
33 Bourdieu op. cit; n. 2 above, p. 169.
34 ibid., p. 80.
35 For a more detailed account of this process see Richard Rorty Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature
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increasing isolation of the individual leads to the conception of a subjective
realm of thought. Thus the poles of objective / subjective reason are born.
The ability to communicate and describe the world is put down to a
universally shared rationality, an ability to think and calculate directly and
consciously about all of our actions and values. The reification of this
concept as neutral 'reason' could only have happened in a framework where
codification has assumed such power and control. The autonomous subject
(discussed in chapter 7) is the end result of this process.
This picture Bourdieu paints of modern society is one where an explicit logic
rules both society as a whole and the individuals who compose it. These
individuals follow juridical regulations and consciously calculate the
outcome of their activities. They are imbued with a subjective rationality and
are no longer guided by a simple feel for the game. Without wishing to
engage in armchair anthropology, this picture does seem over-simplistic in
its apparent denial of a modern doxa. Indeed it seems that in trying to
account for the development of a humanist conception of society Bourdieu
has fallen into the trap of actually believing that such a society exists here
/-
and now - that humanist subjects do guide their own actions by rational
calculations concerning utility and by prior conscious thought, that subjective
rationality has triumphed and fully replaced the habitus as the mode of
reproduction of society.
The differences between ancient and modern societies correspond with the
perceived differences between levels of discourse, between practical and
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codified discourse." It is because of this difference that the mechanism of
society's reproduction and the inculcation and formation of the individuals is
different. But, even given that modern society is less homogeneous and no
longer tightly unified by a singular doxa there do seem to be commonly held,
indeed almost universal assumptions about individual autonomy etc.,
assumptions questioned only in very specialised practices such as
philosophy and social theory. These assumptions, which are those of
humanism, are currently becoming more rather than less widespread as
capitalism spreads its influence across the globe. I would suggest that the
habitus has not disappeared in modern society - to be replaced by a
transparent level of theoretical discourse - but that discourse now marks the
place of its ideological operation. The consenusal values and dispositions
which unify society are, I claim, now largely transmitted by the unspoken
assumptions and values carried by discourse. Society reproduces itself
through linguistic systems rather than bodily hexis. Nevertheless the
incorporation of the values and dispositions that will encourage society's
reproduction carries on apace and these result in successive doxic stages.
Bourdieu's problematic can be seen as adding a Wittgensteinian subtlety to
the Frankfurt School's analysis of codified discourse in modern society.
Bourdieu places necessary emphasis upon theory's ideological operations
in a manner akin to Althusser. He reminds us that theory operates
unconsciously in defining relations to social taxonomies and values. He
dismisses the idea of a neutral rationality which he sees as a form of rhetoric.
36 Bourdieu is not simply making a distillction between theory and practice and claiming
that the former exists only in modern society. Rather he claims that modern society is both
reproduced and dominated by a particular type of theory, one which has forgotten its practical
origins and instead wishes represent and control the world in a quasi-juridical discourse.
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All discourse is imbued with a certain "symbolic capital", it expresses certain
power relations within society. (In this sense his analysis also has affinities
with the later Foucault.) The formalisation of theory seems to be an
inevitable consequence of its increasingly important ideological role in
interpellating individuals and reproducing the social structure. However, he
seems to overplay the distinction between practical and codified language;
he introduces a simplistic dualism which overplays the distinction between
codified, formalised language and the practical language associated with the
habitus. At one point he even suggests that the process of codification - the
synchronising action of theory which abstracts and classifies, providing
determinate, precise and explicit boundaries - entails a change of
ontological status between practical and totalising logics.37 He seems to
envisage two levels of language. One is the home of everyday practices; it is
dominant in traditional societies, as an adjunct to the habitus and never more
than a part of its internalised creation. The second is a level of fixed and
determinate meanings backed with public authority and explicitly defined.
This is the language he takes to be predominantly associated with modern
societies. This latter "formal logic" finds the vagaries of everyday practical
logic anathema, and imposes its own quasi-juridical definition of reality. It
tries to apply its own criteria to habitual behaviour by claiming to excavate a
logic or grammar which underpins everyday life, a logic which is not really
there but is a fiction of its own theoretical/practical relationship to the
dispositions it observes.
The hard and fast distinction that Bourdieu has generated between
uncodified and codified discourse is itself an example of the drawbacks
37 Pierre Bourdieu op. clt., n. 1 above.
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inherent in codification which attempts to petrify precise and transcendental
distinctions. It also crucially weakens the role of the habitus, threatening to
reduce it to a feature of the "body" rather than the "mind" Le. to revert to
humanist distinctions. I do not believe that this gap in codification is nearly
as serious as Bourdieu sometimes suggests. The production of explicit
taxonomies seems to me to be an integral part of even the simplest practices
and, for that matter, bodily hexis is important in our society.
It may well be that the habitus has a more narrowly defined role in ancient
societies, but there seems little reason to think that it loses its importance in
modern society, or that its ideological mode of operation is so radically
different. Of course once the doxa has become an explicit orthodoxy, there is
more room for heterodoxy to operate. We also have the ability to consciously
consider the wider set of rules that modernity generates and decide whether
to follow them or not, always remembering that these decisions will
themselves largely depend upon the degree to which we have incorporated
the norms of society or of fields within that society into our very being.
Codification does not just work at the level of conscious rules. Such rules,
which may originally be explicit, soon cease to operate explicitly and
become a part of the ideological background incorporated into the person's
world-view, dispositions and values. Theoretical language has an
ideological moment, it inculcates a feel for the game and becomes, in
subjects like philosophy, the territory on which the game is largely played.
This is to say that no language is ever fully explicit and that theory is only
ever relatively autonomous. Indeed it is difficult to see how it could operate
in any other way. One seldom needs to bring rules before one's mind to
follow them, and rarely 'calculates' in explicit terms the benefits and losses to
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accrue should one follow or break such rules. These rules are influential in
producing the second nature of the member of modern society but tend also
to express themselves in the dispositions of people, as strategies rather than
by strict adherence to their letter. There are certainly differences between
modern societies and ancient ones, but these differences have more to do
with the method by which ideologies are transmitted and social cohesion
maintained than with qualitative differences in the ontology of individual's
thought processes, or the presence or absence of ideology. That is, in
modern society theoretical practice comes to playa more autonomous and
important role. Indeed Bourdieu himself seems to suggest as much when he
states that certain moderns might need to become virtuosi in having a feel for
when to apply or not to apply rules, Le. there might need to be a habitus
concerning rules themselves, a feel for when to break them, for how far they
can be bent, when to apply them stc."
The dispersal of the doxa does not mean that all communication must cease,
but rather that the grounds for this communication and the form it takes must
change. Values and other dispositions come to be inculcated largely
through the medium of discourse rather than through direct practical
experience or bodily hexis. We do not and can not live and understand the
relationships between the multifarious and changing forms of life without
some form of theoretical taxonomy. We come to live social relations
vicariously through theory. Ideology begins to function to a much greater
degree through the medium of language. But this necessarily means that a
gap emerges between theory and practices, at least between those theories
38 Bourdieu's exact position on this seems a little hazy for he also wants to claim that the
members of primary cultures where codification is less common actually have a more acute feel
for the social game than members of modern society. ibid., chapter 4.
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and discourses which attempt to mediate relatively autonomous fields within
society and people's experience in those flalds." Such theoretical accounts
face a dilemma for, as Wittgenstein shows, a discourse's ability to function
communicatively depends upon those that engage in it sharing in aspects of
certain forms of life. In most cases these forms of life might be predominantly
practical activities. But in a society where each person has a much more
divergent practical perspective, where the forms of life experienced by
people have less and less in common and are in a rapid and continuous
state of change (e.g. modern society), the grounds upon which theory can
carry communicative meaning become increasingly narrowed. Theory
separates from practice and begins to become internalised, becomes itself a
form of life in which people share, but a form of life which by this very action
threatens to divorce itself from people's real experiences and values. Theory
retains power in modern society because it plays such an important role in
holding it together, allowing one part of society to communicate with another.
But this very role is its undoing, since insofar as it does this it ceases to
speak of people's places but replaces this diversity with its own internal and
monolithic logic, its own internal grammar. Insofar as it ceases to express the
practical experiences of the residents of certain fields it open up the
possibility of heterodoxy or dissent, culminating in the eventual overthrow of
38 The existence of this gap, between the language of a specialised practice like
theoretical physics and that of ordinary life, is frequently noticed in attempts to translate and
mediate between the two.
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that theory and ways of life associated with it."
To replace theory as such becomes impossible in modern societies as they
are currently constltutsd. Theory is the current site of ideology's action in
reproducing society, a society characterised by its very diversity. This
inevitably seems to lead to the reification of theoretical categories and the
sidelining of many people's lived experience. The grounds that theory can
propose for unifying society are slim, and so it often chooses shallow
categories, e.g. individualism, as unifying concepts. (See chapter 7.) Thus
subjective and objective rationalities proceed hand in hand. The simplicity
required of theory, a function of its need to communicate between disparate
places, means that it has to operate at the level of the lowest common
denominator of social experience, which it presently constitutes as that of the
individual human, i.e. it is currently de rigeur to promote a theoretical
framework of individualism (which in humanist terms means subjectivism).
However, it is certainly possible to overcome certain of these humanist
aspects of theory, those epistemological universalisms which go hand in
hand with the political imposition of modern Western society. This requires
,
that we deconstruct all aspects of theory as it is presently understood,
40 This change will itself only come about through its structural overdetermination. (See
chapter 3.) That is, our current environmental problems might combine with an assault upon
the presuppositions of humanist thought so as to undermine the authority of the current social
paradigm. The increasing impact of environmental constraints upon society may well change
this as people once again find a common ground of practical experience, as they did in their
experience as classes in the process of the industrial revolution. This communality could
inculcate values and dispositions at a different level from those induced by current theory and
thus give grounds in a common form of life for a new revolutionary class, a new heterodoxy.
This heterodoxy will of course also need to express itself theoretically, and one of the ways it
will inevitably do this is through a re-theoretisation of our current predicament. Indeed this is
part of the role the current work hopes to begin.
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especially its claims to possess epistemological privilege.
Re-contextualising Ethics; the Feminist CritiQue of Humanism
Without doubt the most important recent attempt to specifically question the
role of theory in current moral paradigms is that undertaken by feminists like
Annette Baier. They believe that theory, seen as a "systematic account of a
fairly large area of morality, with a keystone supporting all the rest" 41simply
fails to express the concerns and experiences of women. The production of
systematic, foundational and totalising theories favoured by humanist
philosophers obscures the particular experiences of women who are
subsumed under abstract and synchronistic discursive generalities. These
generalities, it is argued, reflect predominately masculine paradigms. The
production of abstract moral logics is undertaken by, and incorporates, a
largely (though not exclusively) male world-view.42 The feminist alternative to
this humanist moral practice is commonly referred to as the "ethics of care"."
This particular debate over the relations between contextual and theoretical
ethics originally came to prominence through Carol Gilligan's questioning of
., Annette Baier "What do Women Want in Moral Theory" p. 55 .
•2CarolGilligan In A Different Voice. Gilligan associates this claim with a thesis about the
role of women as mothers and child carers which has distinctively conservative implications .
• 3 There is a danger of being accused of tokenism in bringing feminist ethics in at this late
stage of a thesis. However, I hope that it is plain that I see certain forms of the feminist project
(generally speaking those which are not closely tied to liberal or socialist humanist
problematics) as an important component of the critique of humanism. See for example, the
importance placed upon the work of Seyla Benhabib in chapter 7 and the remarks on
ecofeminism in chapter 3.
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Lawrence Kohlberg's psychological studies which claimed to show six
stages in the moral development of all human subjects." Women typically
reach only stage three of the developmental sequence of this supposedly
universal ontogenetic pattern. In stage 3, the subject comes to employ
techniques of empathy with others' problems and particular circumstances,
thus contextual interactions are regarded as characteristic of this stage of
morality. Few women, it is claimed, utilise either the abstract rules which
characterise stage 4 or the universal generalisations of stages 5 and 6, the
generalisations which typify utilitarian and deontological systems e.g., Rawls'
Theory of Justice.
Gilligan claims that this does not indicate a congenital immaturity on the part
of women; the contextual ethics which typify female thinking are not faulty or
inferior in any way to those stages supposedly succeeding it. Quite the
contrary. Gilligan claims that it is Kohlberg's developmental teleology which
is sexist and Eurocentric. Although, as a matter of empirical fact, women
tend to speak in a different contextual voice, this is actually a sign of their
moral superiority, insofar as women are better equipped to understand real
day to day problems where we need to take practical moral action at a
personal level.
Whether or not the contextual voice is more closely aligned with women's
valuations than men's (and I certainly don't want to deny that this is currently
the case), and whatever the underlying causes of this alignment might be, it
is certainly true that the dominant form of moral evaluation is an a-contextual
moral logic which operates at a very abstract theoretical level. For example,
44 Lawrence Kohlberg The Philosophy of Moral Development.
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the contextual voice gets little chance to speak in utilitarianism or rights-
based theories. Values which do not fit precisely within the appointed
theoretical framework are simply excluded as irrational or self-contradictory.
(See the comments made by Beckerman in chapter 2.) Cheshire Calhoun
claims that,
"...concentrating almost exclusively on rights of non-interference,
impartiality, rationality, autonomy, and principles creates an ideology
of the moral domain which has undesirable political implications for
women." 46
To summarise, this feminist rejection of abstract theory involves at least three
aspects.
First, the reconstruction of conceptions of the self to include factors which are
frequently constitutive of women's experiences of the world. This project is
allied in many respects to the communitarian critique of the abstract
humanist liberal subject and, like communitarianism, favours its replacement
with a richer and more contextual conception of the subject. That is, the
feminist critique claims that we should recognise the diversity present in
,
concrete subjects and oppose attempts to define a norm which is so abstract
as to be universalisable across genders, times, places etc.
Second, this rejection of a universal concept of human nature leads
inevitably to the dismissal of universal moral theories which rely upon such
foundations and to the re-emphasis of context in ethical evaluation,
highlighting the importance of practical activity fitted to particular
circumstance. The claim here is that, insofar as current moral theory
45 Cheshire Calhoun "Justice, Care Gender Bias" p. 453.
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excludes attention to contextual detail in favour of the formal and abstract
rules, it overlooks components of vital importance in determining values.
(See here the critique of axiological theories in chapter 2 and the critique of
subjective rationality in chapter 7 of this thesis.) The ethics of care
emphasises attention to detail - to the particular idiosyncrasies of each case
rather than providing general rules which are claimed to express and
represent current ethical insights.
"This view does not imagine our moral understandings congealed into
a compact theoretical instrument of impersonal decision for each
person, but as deployed in shared processes of discourse,
expression, interpretation and adjustment between persons." 46
Third, the ethics of care emphasises communication and inter-relationships
rather than the lonely and impersonal calculus of autonomous and
disinterested individuals. It abjures an allegedly neutral reason and
recognises the importance of conversations which are always and already
value-laden.
In all of these three senses the feminist programme outlined here leans
towards an anti-humanism. However, in discussing ethical relations Gilligan
has placed too much stress upon the importance of face to face contact and
communication between those concerned. Whilst there is no doubt that care,
to be effective, requires some knowledge of the particular circumstances, a
less restrictive ethic of care might recognise the need to incorporate those
members of the community who cannot speak for themselves and with whom
46Margaret Urban Walker 'Moral Undestandings: Alternative "Epistemology" for a Feminist
Ethics' p. 166.
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we might have no direct personal contact, including whales, trees,
mountains, rivers etc.
There are also close parallels between the feminist critique of 'heory",
typified by Baier and Gilligan, and that of postmodern philosophers like Jim
Cheney. (See last chapter.) Both identify theory as synchronistic,
essentialist and representational and argue against these tendencies
towards abstraction and codification. However, whilst, to an extent, all theory
has to be codified, and hence synchronistic and abstract, not all theory has to
regard itself as representational or essentialist. Some anti-humanist theories
are reflexive, in the sense that they recognise and attempt to explain the
aporias which their own codification of the world entails. Cheney's
postmodernism and Gilligan's feminist ethics do not adequately distinguish
between theory in general and humanist conceptions of theory in particular,
they mistakenly tar all theory with the same brush." I would claim that given
the importance of theory in the modern world it is important that we retain a
space for a critical theory, in particular, theories which are able to oppose
humanist tendencies at their own level. We cannot simply abandon all
attempts to engage in theorettcat discourse. The rejection of theory en
masse would severely limit our understanding of modernity and our current
predicament. We need to articulate our understandings of the roles of
codification in society, we need theories of theoretical practices, which can
allow, in Derrida's terminology, for dlfterancs at the theoretical level.
The rejection of "theory" which the ethics of care and the postmodern ethics
47 Wittgenstein thought of having a line from Shakespeare's King Lear "I will teach you
differences" as a motto for the Philosophical Investigations.
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of Jim Cheney advocate is mistaken because it seems necessary in any
discussion to engage in some form of codification. The mythical language
which Cheney supports is no less synchronistic than abstract theory, indeed
it is timeless only because of the atemporal and conservative nature of the
tribal societies in which it develops. Gilligan's conversations too will involve
the use of abstract concepts. Rather than rejecting theory outright, we need
to develop a post-humanist mythology which recognises itself as tied to
particular sociological and environmental "places" or traditions, an anti-
foundationalist myth to counter that of foundationalist humanism."
This anti-humanist understanding might be summarised as follows. Theory
engages in a necessary act of codification. That is, it posits a formal
grammar or logic to explain the practical relations observed. However, not
only is this logic a function of the dialectical relation between observer and
observed, rather than a direct representation of the observed and her
practices, but it is always synchronistic, it does not and cannot follow the
vagaries of the practical activity of everyday life which is ruled by the habitus.
This grammar runs the risk of becoming a single totalising framework which,
;
when applied rigorously, swamps practical experience in a totalitarian wave
of regulation. But to blame the theoretical world itself for our current
r
predicament is to misunderstand the complexity of the situation and the
historical and social processes which brought this situation about.
In the current backlash against Enlightenment thought, ''totalising theory" has
itself been regarded as the enemy of a postmodern theoretical pluralism.
48 Horkheimer and Adorno put it thus "Myth is already enlightenment; and enlightenment
reverts to mythology" The Dialectic of Enlightenment p. xvi
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The irony is that in attempting to escape from the control of monolithic
theoretical logics some have started to look back with nostalgia to pre-
modern societies with their shared values. They forget that this atheoretical
doxa excludes the possibility of questioning that community's form of life at
all. There is nothing liberal and pluralistic about such societies, and they
have little in common with the theoretical anarchism expounded by
postmoderns from their comfortable positions within late capitalist societies.
The absolute rejection of theory on the grounds of its totalising nature forgets
that this totalisation is not an essential feature of theory itself but is
associated with a humanistic conception of theory as something that is
outside of practice. If we accept that theory can also be a discursive
expression of place then we can reject a vision of theory as a teleological
march towards truth, towards an accurate and transcendental
representation of the world. Rather, theory is seen as a historically and
socially relative form of practice, which evolves to cope with its present
environment, as an evolutionary fitting in place rather than a teleological
progression. Like biological evolution theory has only certain material
bequeathed to it by hlstory'to work on. The past plays a continuous role in
the expression of the present. This conception of theory as critical
hermeneutics opposes the humanistic faith in formal rationality, it
undermines the epistemological claims of such rationality and exposes its
wider relations to politics, economics and ideology. For example subjective
rationality's bogus claims to be a "neutral system" are seen as relying upon
and supporting the current hegemony of humanism.
Formal logic liberates the bureaucrat from the need to inquire into the
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particular case; it does away with the intuition and practical reasoning which
come from acquaintance with, and involvement in, actual concrete moral
circumstances. It replaces practical reasoning with an abstract and explicit
rationality of rules, laws and calculus which only account for 'general'
characteristics. But, as Bourdieu shows, these general and abstract
characterisations are not neutral facts of the matter. They are recognised
and imposed by particular societies and classes within societies and the
process of abstraction and reductionism makes all things commensurable,
inter-changeable and tradable. The 'clarification' produced by formal
rationality entails a necessary oversimplification which edges society
towards one-dimensionality, a monoculture which plays off the short-term
gains made by a few humans against the survival of the planet. Formal
rationality presents itself as neutral but embodies at its very heart a particular
world-view. Rationalisation imposes an official line - it canonises particular
conceptions of human nature, modes of life, etc., which replaces a modus
vivendi with a cult of efficiency for its own sake.
Perhaps then, rather than dismissing ethical theory altogether, we can
distinguish between humanist and anti-humanist ethical theories. The
former consciously see themselves as uncovering and making explicit the
underlying rational principles behind moral actions. The latter see ethical
theory as a communicative discourse which is an expression of particular
forms of life, rather than of fundamental principles. Thus those with differing
forms of life, or with utopian expectations which fall outwith the current
consensus, can not simply be included in a moral calculus which is itself a
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feature of that ideological consensus." As we have seen (in chapter 2) the
intention behind humanist ethics is to provide a rubric which can be applied
to a variety of situations to determine what is right and what wrong. Ethics is
given a role as arbiter - as a tool for passing judgments or evaluating actions.
Whilst supposedly neutral this very conception of ethics implies a particular
understanding of the relations between theory and practice - a relation that
claims to encapsulate and represent the essentialfeatures of moral activities
and then re-apply them in different circumstances.
"Society is understood as an arena of rival and competing interests
and what morality supplies are rules which from a neutral and
impartial point of view set constraints upon how these interests may
be pursued. The rules are neutral and impartial in that they are such
that any rational person who has detached his or herself from the
distorting causal influence of his or her interests would assent to
them." 50
This humanist perspective attempts to reduce the irreducibly multi-level
dynamism of communal relations to the one-dimensionality of a synchronistic
and abstract system of rules.51 We cannot formulate rules in abstraction; they
can only be formulated from particular contexts, which necessarily implies
that there are boundaries and limits to their 'applications' and that their form
and content embodies particular social and environmental perspectives.
There is thus a tension between the contextual background within which
codification ensues and the a-contextual synchronicity which codification
.~Thus we return to the relationship between ideology and utopia which formed the basis
for Mannheim's problematic and of Ricoeur's lectures - Ideology and Utopia. See chapter 4.
50 Alasdair Macintyre 'Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake'.
51 Here lies the import of Althusser's Spinozistic metaphysics: his refusal to reduce
society's complexity to a single formula.
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entails. Humanism takes this a-contextuality as a sign of neutrality (when it
embodies its own particular world-view) rather than a sign of imposition.
The Habitus and Ethical theory: Towards an 'Epistemology' of Morals.
Bourdieu's synthesis of Althusserian, Bachelardian and Wittgenstienian
perspectives can help us develop a anti- (or post-) humanist perspective.
This requires that we make an epistemological break on a number of planes,
which must change the taxonomy of discourse away from the categories
presupposed and reified in humanism. First, this coupure must occur at the
level of the concepts employed by an anti-humanist problematic: e.g., those
of ideology, production, reproduction and practice. This change necessitates.
a change in our understanding of the concepts previously central to the
humanist problematic e.g., consciousness, subject, human nature, (neutral)
ratlcnallty," Second, it must also be able to theoretically account for its own
origins and those of the discourse of humanism which preceded it. (Just as it
behoved relativity to explain Newtonian physics.) Third, this break also has
,
to provide an understanding of ''theory'' itself, in terms of its epistemological
relations to its contents and the wider social and natural environment.
Bourdieu's theory of practice, which combines the subtlety of Wittgenstein's
treatment of language with the non-reductive and relational metaphysics of
Althusser, goes some way towards fulfilling this role. This anti-humanist
framework focuses on the ideological role of theory in terms of the production
and reproduction of modern society. It gives a broader theoretical framework
within which to speak of the Frankfurt School's worries about formal
52 See chapter 3.
433
rationality and, at the same time, conjoins this with a view of ideology which
is very similar to Althusser's.
Bourdieu stresses that the habitus is "that regulated disposition to generate
regulated and regular behaviour outside any reference to rules; and in
societies where the work of codification is not very advanced, the habitus is
reproduced through and a feature of the modes of production." 63 Whilst
Bourdieu may overemphasise the degree to which societies without codified
rules exist (the difference between primary and modern civilisations), it is
none the less true that in modern Western society such codifications abound.
Yet, Bourdieu seems to suggest that the habitus somehow becomes less
important in modern society. Whilst it may be true that codified language
comes to have a more autonomous role in modern society one can still
question the nature of its operation. If, as Althusser suggests, language
operates ideologically beneath its surface meanings, i.e. in ways which are
largely hidden to consciousness, then one might still be inclined to posit a
habitus for modern societies. Instead of seeing modernity as characterised
by the disappearance of a common doxa one could argue that it is the form
»
taken by the doxa which has changed. In other words, the "feel for the game"
characteristic of the habitus actually comes to be induced, to a large degree,
by the incorporation of theory itself into the individuals dispositional and
value systems rather than through bodily hexis. In modern society, theory
becomes, as Althusser suggests, a relatively autonomous field of
structuration. Rules which are more often juridical, set down in writing and
given absolute status, form part and parcel of the environment in which the
modern person develops. Indeed the individual's ability to incorporate these
53 Pierre Bourdieu op. cit., n.1 above, p.65.
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quasi-juridical theories becomes a necessary part of the feel for modern
forms of life, whether one is an academic, a computer programmer, a
philosopher etc. However, this incorporation is not, as humanists suggest,
just a conscious grasping of and subsequent application of concepts. The
reason why theory is such a capable second line of defence when the doxa
fails is not just because it replaces the implicit with the explicit, the strategy
with the rule, opacity with transparency - but because it too acts ideologically:
it is incorporated into the very being of the subject. It becomes her
unconscious second nature.
The development of a separate level of theory has a fatal impact. At the
same time as it opens up new fields of potential difference it also starts to
inculcate its own dispositions in people. It can operate both critically and
ideologically. The categories and taxonomies it operates with become
reified in the structures of thought and action. Left to its own devices the
generation of a theoretical habitus, in our case the ideology of individualism
and the myth of humanism, might, in time, create a shared form of life - that of
Marcuse's "one-dimensional man". Given time, as the theoretically induced
habitus reinforces itself; reproduces itself throughout all fields of the social
formation, it creates a new conformity, a new shared form of life in which
people's values genuinely are shared and reproduced. If this process goes
unchallenged in our society then perhaps future generations will come to be
more and more like economic man. It was this vision, and its seeming
inevitability, that engendered such a pessimistiC appraisal of our current
predicament by Weber and the Frankfurt school. World events seem, so far,
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to have fully borne out such pessimism." Theoretical practice emerged
through its role as a second line of defence, a social cement for a
continuously changing modernity. If, as humanism presupposes, types of
synchronistic formal rationality gain ascendance, i.e. the ideological
functioning of theory dominates its utopian potential, then we run the risk of
becoming locked into that increasingly all pervasive bureaucratic and
economic system which makes the Earth's destruction inevitable.
In a 'static' society (e.g. tribal or pre-modern) the possibility for thinking
changes are few, the doxa is transmitted from generation to generation
without much alteration. Given no external inputs a modus vivendi is
reached and theoretical innovation is minimised. Indeed theory plays a
relatively unimportant role. In our society, theory has become an important
and relatively autonomous axis of structuration in its own respect. (In
Althusserian terminology, a "theoretical practice".) Theory forms a part of the
social structure, the (theoretical) environment which may become
incorporated in the ongoing processes of social production and
reproduction. Theory does not bypass the habitus but, in modern society, is
!
itself a site of its operation. It is not separate from ideology, but a different
mode of its transmission. Codified language carries its codes unbeknown to
those who think it. Just as the economic and political spheres emerge from,
and then encourage, certain forms of life, theory too plays a role in the
determination of social structures. Sometimes theory is in concert with other
structuring practices and they operate to overdetermine the resultant society,
sometimes it is in opposition to, it contradicts other social components
54 For reasons which will become apparent I do not believe that this conception of
economic man is sufficiently robust to maintain a cohesive social structure. The challenges
that our current environmental predicament poses may well be its undoing.
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expressing a heterodoxy.
Humanism, as a theoretical paradigm, has grown up inscribed with and
expressing certain social and environmental relations. It imposes this
ideological complex upon those who have little choice but to think it.
Opposition to the economic and political aspects of humanism, which have
wreaked such havoc on the non-human world, will only be successful if this
opposition too is overdetermined. That is, those of us who value the non-
human environment need to think oppositionally, in different and unorthodox
ways which allow us to express the values which emerge in our forms of life.
The post-humanist paradigm outlined here operates with concepts of
production and reproduction, social practice and ideology etc., rather than a
taxonomy of fact / value, subject / object. It rejects those theses which posit
essential, qualitative differences between the human and non-human realms
- differences like conscious (transparent) / unconscious (opaque) and free
(subject) / determined (objects). Consciousness, I have argued, is never
transparent; freedom is only ever relative. We do not escape from the world
via the magic of the concept. As Wittgenstein and Marx both show, the idea
that language can step outside of the world, to reach a position over and
above it is a fallacy. It is the philosophers' stone of humanism. Thus we
should not see theory as throwing light upon past mistakes in the sense of
revealing our true nature. Rather anti-humanism preaches a "hermeneutic of
suspicion" and in anti-humanism's deconstruction and reconstruction of
current problematics philosophy loses its last claims to reveal ultimate truths.
Instead it becomes merely one practice amongst many - in today's society
neither the least nor the most important.
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I now wish to turn to the implications of this anti-foundational and critical
theory for ethics. One purpose of this thesis has been to argue that those of
us with radical environmental, political or feminist views need not attack
theory qua theory but do need alternative theoretical paradigms to think our
different practical experiences. These paradigms need not be created de
novo but can be synthesised from our humanist and anti-humanist traditions,
whether they be Romanticism, post-structuralism, Marxism etc., to create a
post-humanism. This synthesis is no more and no less 'arbitrary' than
humanism, but it does provide an alternative field of thought and action
which can be opposed to the hegemony of humanist rationality.
The acceptance of this view of theory completely transforms moral
philosophy, in terms of both its scope and contents. It necessitates a different
conception of the relations between moral theory and moral practice.
Theories no longer provide rubrics for the calculation of right or wrong; we
cannot have the same concept of applied ethlcs." Instead theories have.
themselves to be seen as expressions of particular places in the world,
,
expressions which are always alreadyvalue laden. Theory is not
transparent to the user. It cannot provide a neutral tool to be applied without
prejudice. It is intrinsically prejudiced and those theories which claim to
provide absolute criteria, whether utilitarian, deontological etc., are
themselves attempts to impose a form of moral absolutism upon people and
nature.
Whatever one may think of Gilligan's claims about the different voices of men
55 See Maclntytre op. cit., n. 50 above.
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and women, there is surely something right in her emphasis upon the
importance of re-contextualising ethics. I would argue that this re-
contextualising must also emphasise, as Gilligan points out, the
communicative dimension. The formal and abstract solution is to work
"impersonally through systems of logic and law", the contextual and narrative
account works through a "process of communication" which involves the
forming of a relationship between those concerned." She is right to reject
the formalisation of humanist conceptions insofar as they embody a poltttcat
discourse which excludes and marginalises certain values and modes of
experience which are constitutive of being, in favour of an allegedly neutral
(but actually partial) rationality," Gilligan is right to bring ethical theory down
from its pedestal and place it at the heart of communities. She shares this
wish with some of those ethicists referred to as discourse theorists.
Discourse and the Community of Ethics
As we have seen, post-enlightenment communitarians recognise the
I
constitutive role played by the community in producing concrete individual
subjects with heartfelt values. Discourse ethics provides one possible
solution to the problem of accounting for the different valuational
constitutions of concrete individuals and societies. Rather than applying
(imposing) general axiologies to particular situations, discourse ethics aims
to engender communicative discussion between interested parties.
Discourse ethics rejects the claims of philosophy to provide expet1opinions
56 Gilligan op. cit., n. 42 above, p. 29.
57 Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy also argues for less abstract and
more contextual conceptions of moral reasoning.
439
or neutral methodologies for determining the moral rights and wrongs of a
particular situation. Instead it represents a radical extension of democracy.
One of the foremost proponents of discourse ethics, Jurgen Habermas,
envisages a procedural universalism which, recognising the complex and
already value-laden life of concrete individuals, aims to reach consensual
conclusions about ethical issues. He envisages a moral community
engaged in a discourse which all involved in consider fair, i.e. an ideal
speech situation.
"Discourse ethics replaces the Kantian categorical imperative by a
procedure of moral argumentation. Its principle postulates [that]
Only those norms may claim to be valid that could meet with the
consent of all affected in their role as participants in a practical
discourse." 58
Such debate has to be unimpeded by formal constraints other than those
which aI/those participating in the debate would recognise and agree to.
Personally held values become objectified communally just as they were, in
a different way, originally constituted communally. In many respects this
I
procedural universalisation can be seen as a more sophisticated version of
Rawls' Theory of Justice, with the sole difference that no universal
assumptions are made about the nature of the individuals concerned.
Habermas' individuals are not those impoverished atomistic creatures of
humanist discourse and calculus. However, Habermas is still engaged in
setting up universal and formalised criteria of justice when he posits an
"ideal speech situation". To this extent it is pertinent to ask why (and if) aI/
people need consent to the norms of discourse ethics for it to be valid.
58 Jurgen Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Actionp. 197.
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Seyla Benhabib argues that there is no need for discourse ethics to make
such grand universal claims. One could retain the insights of discourse
ethics, its recognition of concrete individuals and its fundamentally inter-
subjective nature, whilst seeing ethical discourse itself in terms of a
"...continuation of ordinary moral conversations in which we seek to come to
terms with and appreciate the concrete others' point of view." 69
"In such a conversation of moral justification as envisaged by
communicative ethics, individuals do not have to view themselves as
"unencumbered" selves. It is not necessary for them to define
themselves independently either of the ends they cherish or of the
constitutive attachments which make them what they are. In entering
practical discourses individuals are not entering an "original position."
They are not being asked to define themselves in ways which are
radically counter-factual to their everyday identities. This model of
moral argumentation does not predefine the set of issues which can
be legitimately raised in the conversation and neither does it proceed
from an unencumbered concept of the self." 60
Instead of reaching a consensus we may only be able to reach an
understanding at the level of discourse. But at least an understanding of this
sort has advantages over formal systems of applied ethics in that it is aware
of the particularity of cases and recognises that the community is the proper
sphere of ethical deliberation. The community is both the sphere where such
values originated and the nearest we can come to a sphere where their




implications can be understood. However, ethical values are also produced
through our non-linguistic practical experiences, our dialectical relations to
our surrounding natural and social environments. (See chapter 6.) In
situations where a sub-set of the totality of practices imposes particular forms
of rationality then it may become literally impossible, for those constituted
through different channels, to speak their values at all. In present systems of
formal rationality their values are simply regarded as subjective expressions
of (unreasonable) feelings.
Thus those of us who are in part constituted by our experiences of nature as
something other than a resource, for example as something mysterious,
beautiful, spiritual, different, and / or worthy of respect, are excluded from the
economic and utilitarian calculus current in modern society. Our voice is not
heard because the language we have open to us is either seen as 'arcane'
or 'emotional', as something not fitting the current circumstances of the
modern world. Thus simply sitting over a table to discuss values is not
enough in itself, for the very language we use is tainted. The post-humanist
problematic must try to give voice to these different experiences.
When considering the environment, it is obvious that even discourse ethics
will not allow those members of our community which do not speak with our
voice direct entrance to the community of values. The wilderness is still
excluded from the communal fireside. It is up to those of us who feel its
presence to cross the dividing line between the two and to bring something
of the fear and wonder of the non-human back into our increasingly narrow
horizons, whether by poetry, such as the work of Gary Snyder, or by
philosophy in a broad sense. We also have to live this alternative set of
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values practically. Alternative values can only be incorporated and felt by
opposition to the hegemony of current consumerist lifestyles. We can retain
little of our sense of 'nature' and its value if we live a life dominated by the
car, dish washer, and tumble dryer. These icons of modernity place limits on
our values as we internalise their import. They are a mark of our
subservience to the most destructive regime the world has ever known.
It is vital that we overcome the anthropocentric tendencies which have led
even these authors who object to the current consensus in moral theory to
exclude the non-human from the construction of our communities and
therefore our personal identities. What is required is a form of communion
with nature as well as with our fellow human beings. We need to build a
community which is considerate, in the broadest sense of the word, to all of
its members, recognising them as having certain roles and relations in
respect of the community as a whole and particular individuals. This does
not mean that we have to posit these relations in a timeless and absolute
manner or award some statutory notion of equality to all members of a
community. We cannot, I argue, envisage any procedural norms which will
)
satisfy all members of the community. We have to recognise and cherish
differences in communities as well as similarities.
This thesis advocates a paradigm transformation; one that cannot work in
isolation at the level of theory alone, but necessitates the production of
different forms of life. Primarily it advocates the decentralisation of society
and the resurrection of communities which are imbued with ecological
awareness. It is a utopian theory in the sense that it posits an alternative to
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the current world." It is not common sense or realistic in the sense that it
does not comply with, but actively opposes, current ideology. It is an
alternative which reconstitutes the categories of humanism and makes a
theoretical space for a variety of post-humanist common-senses to operate.
This radical shift in paradigm is aligned with that espoused by radical greens
and deep ecologists.
Thus, if one reads Arne Naess' work from an anti-humanist perspective, one
can see that his whole conception of the human self (see chapter 2)
recognises the constitution of concrete individuals in terms which are wider
even than those proposed by communitarian philosophers (chapter 7).
Naess sees that the concrete individual is not a shallow abstraction, but is
constituted by her place in a wider community. This community is not only in
based in a shared ethical language (which is where Taylor, for example,
places his emphasis) or even by the whole community of social relations
(Althusser) but also includes the 'natural' communities of which we are a
part: mixed communities of different species and 'objects' (e.g. ecosystems)
which come to be recognised in the dialectical of practices between human
and non-human influences.
Naess argues (and I agree with him) that in relatively stable communities (as
opposed to modern societies) a sort of modus vivendi is reached between
these different members of the community. Naess provides an example of
the problems associated with codification as it applies to a "mixed
community" of bears wolves and humans. In Norway bears occasionally kill
61 There is a long tradition ot 'green' utopias which have a constitutive relation to radical
ecological politics and philosophy, See, tor example, Robert Nisbet 'The Ecological
Community',
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sheep. This is expected to happen and regarded as perfectly normal.
Farmers are paid compensation for their losses and bears are not hunted
unless they become persistent offenders. Bears and humans develop
particular relations to each other as members of a community. These
relations (which include ethical relations) form the strands which weave the
community together on all levels and are incorporated into the concrete
individuals in those communities. The relations between bears, sheep,
wolves and people are complex and are certainly not reducible to formal
claims e.g. about all members of the community being 'equally' valuable.62
Different species come to have different relations and are valued
accordingly. Naess says that these values are rooted in cultural traditions
but we might use Wittgenstein's terms and say forms of life. And, since anti-
humanism needs to break down the barriers between fact / value, we might
further adapt Wittgenstein and say that the value of an 'object' depends upon
its place in the form of life which recognises it. This conception of value
maintains an ethical anti-essentialism.
Modern Western society cannot reach such a modus vivendi because
!
continual change is its guiding star, whether through economic growth or
'progress' of some other kind. Modern society also requires to power this
change the continual discovery and utilisation of 'resources'. Thus anything
which sets certain resources out of bounds will be anathema. The utopian
dimension of theory, its ability to be a catalyst for change, is stifled insofar as
it is tied to a narrow humanism which plays the ideological role of replacing
one form of 'social cement' i.e., the "habitus", with another Le., "formal
62 Although Naess himself often makes his 'biocentric' claims in terms of "equality"
between species and individuals of different species.
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rationality".
For these reasons environmentalists must not pander to formal rationality-
must not get embroiled in a form of rationality which gets its prestige from its
role in supporting, and conforming to, the very form of humanist society
which necessarily destroys 'nature' in order to survive. The growth of
practical solutions depends upon a radical agenda which breaks from
modern Western society in a number of fundamental ways to produce new
forms of ecologically aware communities. Those who spend their time
developing methodologies which suit the bureaucrat are helping, not
hindering, the long-term destruction of the planet.
The radical post-humanism I have outlined here, which one might call an
Ecosophy (after Naess, see chapter 2), aligns itself with aspects of deep
ecology, eco-feminism, and radical green politics which see 'progress' in
terms of a steady state economy, decentralisation, local (bioregional) modes
of living and living in a rough balance with nature (a modus vivendi). Ethical
discourse could become an arena of conversation which recognises and
communicates the particularity of events, traditions etc. rather than a formal
logic imposed from above.
The choice between conformity and opposition is one of degree, but this
makes it no less important. We cannot move from where we are now to
where we want to be, from ideology to Utopia, either by rejecting our heritage
outright and returning to Cheney's primitivism, or by proposing a postmodern
'childhood'. We need to do more than "play amongst the ruins" of modernity.
We need to match theory with political and economic strategies. These
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strategies have to recognise the constitutive role of ideology in producing our
values and take proper account of the depths at which ideology functions.
Theory allows us to criticise current forms of life, to a degree, but this
theoretical expression of our oppositional place is always a hermeneutic
criticism, a criticism which is necessarily tied in some way to where we are
now. We are embedded within particular social and environmental relations
which produce our values. This embeddedness can however be the source
of our opposition to certain aspects of that society. Because of our positions
as concrete individuals standing in co-constitutive relations to a 'natural'
environment which is being destroyed and a society engaged in that
destruction we can come to feel and voice that opposition. Herbert Marcuse
spoke in his last lecture (delivered in 1979) of "Ecology and the Critique of
Modern Society". 63 As Kellner states,
"[a] radical ecology ... which relentlessly criticised environmental
destruction, as well as human beings, and that struggled for a society
without violence, destruction, and pollution was part of Marcuse's
vision of liberation." 64
Marcuse emphasised the "introjection'" of society within individuals and the
,
dialectical relations between the individual, society and nature. Humanity is
embedded in 'nature' and 'culture' and, paradoxically, this embeddedness
both constrains our thoughts and facilitates criticism. It is in this dialectic
between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, between ideology and utopia, that any
hopes for the future must lie.
83 Herbert Marcuse 'Ecology and the Critique of Modern Society'.
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